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As a member of the 17th legislature of the Italian Parliament, I was Speaker 
for the Chamber of Deputies for the establishment of Law 24/2017 on care 
safety and professional responsibility in health matters. It is a great pleasure 
for me to present this publication because it is the result of the valuable work 
of many colleagues all over the world. Together, we have animated the cul-
tural debate and fostered a consolidated and professional network of “clinical 
risk managers” aimed at improving the quality of care in health services.
With this goal in mind, I founded the “Fondazione Italia in Salute” in 
2018, at a time when the sustainability of our Healthcare System seemed to 
be at risk for various factors, in the face of new health needs. The Foundation 
chose to promote this book because it is consistent with its mission: to sup-
port and strengthen the protection of the right to health and the culture of 
error prevention through public initiatives, medical-scientific and technical-
legal research, national and international networking activities with the aim 
of establishing a system of recognition and validation of Clinical Practice 
Guidelines in Italy.
In this book, you will find interesting observations and professional expe-
rience provided not only by senior experts but also by medical post-graduates 
from 30 foreign countries who participated in the First International Meeting 
“Patient Safety for New Medical Generation” held in Florence on September 
3, 2018. The dialogue between senior experts and post-graduates in medicine 
and nursing sciences is always useful; the surprising participation in this 
meeting allowed the WHO to present the point of view of the younger genera-
tions of doctors on the safety of care. It is no coincidence that “teamwork 
training” is the cross-cutting theme of all chapters of this book: it is important 
to overcome the often still too individualistic view of hospital work.
This publication therefore becomes an important educational tool, particu-
larly for young colleagues, to broaden their knowledge of clinical risk and the 
importance of the human factor in healthcare. In fact, “clinical risk manage-
ment” has only recently been included as a subject of study in medical degree 
courses; some years ago, the WHO published some important documents to 
guide training in care safety.
I believe that having a culture of patient safety is fundamental, and that the 
change in the professional behaviours becomes effective when knowledge is 
shared and risk awareness is instilled in all healthcare professionals. To this 
end, we need to start training new generations of professionals, certainly 
more open to change, and to promote a culture of care safety.
Foreword
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I would like to thank all the authors of this book because I believe that 
their excellent work will be very important for the future of international 
health. Special thanks to Liam Donaldson, Walter Ricciardi, Susan Sheridan 
and Riccardo Tartaglia for their willingness to produce this book. They repre-
sent all the stakeholders in the health security system: Liam, our institutions, 









Despite the extensive attention and public commitments towards patient 
safety over the last two decades, levels of avoidable harm in healthcare around 
the world remain unacceptably high.
By creating a book with broad scope and clear descriptions of the key 
concepts and thinking in patient safety, we have aimed to connect with a 
much wider readership than those with a professional or academic interest in 
the subject.
We have not limited ourselves to theoretical models or risk management 
methodologies. We have aimed to address safety in various medical special-
ties. For example there is a discussion of the causation and solutions in condi-
tions such as infantile cerebral palsy; today in many health systems this has a 
high human and economic cost, some of which are preventable.
We have also dealt with how the structure, culture and leadership of 
healthcare organizations can determine how many patients suffer avoidable 
harm and how safe they and their families should feel when putting their trust 
in  local services. Safety problems relating to non-technical skills are also 
discussed; this is a topic of great importance but under-represented in medical 
and nursing educational and training curricula.
Any assessment of the prospects for creating much safer healthcare sys-
tems and health facilities everywhere will be bound to conclude that it will be 
a long journey. A clear consequence of this is that it cannot be entirely 
achieved by the current group of senior patient safety leaders. Their succes-
sors need to be grown, mentored and inspired to take up the mantle of future 
leadership as well as guiding those in day-to-day clinical practice where harm 
is generated but where it can also be prevented.
That is why this new book has embraced the next generation of health 
professionals with such warmth and enthusiasm. The idea to write it came as 
a result of an international meeting on patient safety for young doctors held 
in Florence, Italy, in 2018. Such doctors came from over 40 countries. 
Representatives from that meeting have been involved in the chapters in Part 
III of the book.
The book was conceived and commissioned in a pre-pandemic time, but 
by the time it was coming near completion COVID-19 was the dominant 
feature of health and healthcare across the world. This has only served to 
heighten awareness of patient safety as the pandemic has swept across conti-
nents and led to seriously ill patients threatening to overwhelm acute care 
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facilities and care homes in many countries. We have added a chapter that 
summarizes the safety recommendations developed by the International 
Society for Quality in Health Care in collaboration with the Italian Network 
for Safety in Healthcare.
It is encouraging also to see that World Patient Safety Day 2020 had as its 
theme health worker safety, which, of course, is closely intertwined with 
patient safety.
We are grateful for the support of the Fondazione Italia in Salute (Healthy 
Italy Foundation) to allow this text to be open access in order to be available 
to the greatest number of interested people. We hope to see it in the hands of 
young health professionals everywhere, thus giving it a global reach into the 
next generation of patient safety clinical leaders and practitioners.
We express our deep gratitude to the authors for their work. We also thank 
those many friends and colleagues who have made themselves available to 
review the chapters from a technical and linguistic point of view.
We dedicate our work on this book to the memories of all those patients 
and families who have suffered or died through avoidable harm in their care. 
It is on the foundation of a safer future for all patients, everywhere in the 










The volume editors wish to thank the following colleagues and friends for the 
chapters review and for their collaboration to the book preparation:
 – Sebastiano Bagnara, Psychologist, Florence, Italy
 – Luigi Bertinato, Istituto Superiore di Sanità, Rome, Italy
 – Gianni Biancofiore, Intensive care, University of Pisa, Italy
 – Stefano Canitano, Radiology, San Camillo de Lellis Rieti, Italy
 – Claudio Cricelli, Primary care, Italian Society General Medicine, Italy
 – Alessandro Dell’Erba, Forensic Medicine University of Bari, Italy
 – Davide Ferorelli, Forensic Medicine University of Bari, Italy
 – Alessandra De Palma, Forensic Medicine, IRCS AOU, Bologna
 – Enrico Desideri, Public Health, Fondazione Innovazione e Sicurezza delle 
Cure, Rome, Italy
 – Vittorio Fineschi, Forensic Medicine, University La Sapienza, Rome, Italy
 – Paola Frati, Forensic Medicine, University La Sapienza, Rome, Italy
 – Georgia Libera Finstad,  Psychological sciences and techniques, Rome, 
Italy
 – Maurizio Hazan, Lawyer, Milan, Italy
 – Roberto Nardi, Internal Medicine, Bologna, Italy
 – Patrizia Olmi, Radiotherapist, Florence, Italy
 – Maria Pia Ruggeri, Emergency Medicine,  Azienda Ospedaliera San 
Giovanni-Addolorata-Britannico, Rome, Italy
 – Anna Maria Marconi, Gynaecologist, University of Milan, Italy
 – Chiara Seghieri, Statistic, School of Advanced Study Pisa, Italy
 – Andrea Silenzi, General Directorate for Health Prevention, Ministry of 
Health, Rome
The volume editors also wish to express their thanks for the linguistic revi-
sion to:
 – Roland Bauman
 – Liisa Dollinger
 – Lucrezia Romano
Acknowledgements
xi
Part I  Introduction
 1  Guidelines and Safety Practices for Improving  
Patient Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
Walter Ricciardi and Fidelia Cascini
 2  Brief Story of a Clinical Risk Manager . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
Riccardo Tartaglia
 3  Human Error and Patient Safety  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
Helen Higham and Charles Vincent
 4  Looking to the Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  45
Peter Lachman
 5  Safer Care: Shaping the Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  53
Liam Donaldson
 6  Patients for Patient Safety  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  67
Susan Sheridan, Heather Sherman, Allison Kooijman, 
Evangelina Vazquez, Katrine Kirk, Nagwa Metwally,  
and Flavia Cardinali
 7  Human Factors and Ergonomics in Health Care  
and Patient Safety from the Perspective  
of Medical Residents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  81
Pascale Carayon, Peter Kleinschmidt, Bat- Zion Hose,  
and Megan Salwei
Part II  Background
 8  Patient Safety in the World  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  93
Neelam Dhingra-Kumar, Silvio Brusaferro, and Luca Arnoldo
 9  Infection Prevention and Control  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  99
Anna L. Costa, Gaetano Pierpaolo Privitera, Giorgio Tulli, 
and Giulio Toccafondi
 10  The Patient Journey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
Elena Beleffi, Paola Mosconi, and Susan Sheridan
Contents
xii
 11  Adverse Event Investigation and Risk Assessment  . . . . . . . . . . . 129
Tommaso Bellandi, Adriana Romani-Vidal, Paulo Sousa,  
and Michela Tanzini
 12  From Theory to Real-World Integration:  
Implementation Science and Beyond  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
Giulia Dagliana, Sara Albolino, Zewdie Mulissa,  
Jonathan Davy, and Andrew Todd
Part III  Patient Safety in the Main Clinical Specialties
 13  Intensive Care and Anesthesiology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
S. Damiani, M. Bendinelli, and Stefano Romagnoli
 14  Safe Surgery Saves Lives  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
Francesco Venneri, Lawrence B. Brown, Francesca Cammelli, 
and Elliott R. Haut
 15  Emergency Department Clinical Risk  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
Riccardo Pini, Maria Luisa Ralli,  
and Saravanakumar Shanmugam
 16  Obstetric Safety Patient . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
Antonio Ragusa, Shin Ushiro, Alessandro Svelato,  
Noemi Strambi, and Mariarosaria Di Tommaso
 17  Patient Safety in Internal Medicine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
Micaela La Regina, Alessandra Vecchié, Aldo Bonaventura, 
and Domenico Prisco
 18  Risks in Oncology and Radiation Therapy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
Adriano Marcolongo, Glauco Cristofaro, Aldo Mariotto, 
Maurizio Mascarin, and Fabio Puglisi
 19  Patient Safety in Orthopedics and Traumatology . . . . . . . . . . . . 275
Guido Barneschi, Francesco Raspanti, and Rodolfo Capanna
 20  Patient Safety and Risk Management in Mental Health . . . . . . . 287
Alessandro Cuomo, Despoina Koukouna,  
Lorenzo Macchiarini, and Andrea Fagiolini
 21  Patient Safety in Pediatrics  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299
Sara Albolino, Marco De Luca, and Antonino Morabito
 22  Patient Safety in Radiology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309
Mahdieh Montazeran, Davide Caramella, and Mansoor Fatehi
 23  Organ Donor Risk Stratification in Italy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319
Adriano Peris, Jessica Bronzoni, Sonia Meli, Juri Ducci, 
Erjon Rreka, Davide Ghinolfi, Emanuele Balzano,  
Fabio Melandro, and Paolo De Simone
 24  Patient Safety in Laboratory Medicine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325
Mario Plebani, Ada Aita, and Laura Sciacovelli
Contents
xiii
 25  Patient Safety in Ophthalmology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339
Myrta Lippera, Jacques Bijon, Chiara Eandi,  
and Gianni Virgili
Part IV  Healthcare Organization
 26  Community and Primary Care  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 365
Elisabetta Alti and Alessandro Mereu
 27  Complexity Science as a Frame for Understanding the 
Management and Delivery of High Quality and Safer Care . . . . 375
Jeffrey Braithwaite, Louise A. Ellis, Kate Churruca,  
Janet C. Long, Peter Hibbert, and Robyn Clay-Williams
 28  Measuring Clinical Workflow to Improve  
Quality and Safety. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 393
Michela Tanzini, Johanna I. Westbrook, Stefano Guidi,  
Neroli Sunderland, and Mirela Prgomet
 29  Shiftwork Organization  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 403
Giovanni Costa, Eleonora Tommasi, Leonardo Giovannini, 
and Nicola Mucci
 30  Non-technical Skills in Healthcare  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 413
Stavros Prineas, Kathleen Mosier, Claus Mirko,  
and Stefano Guicciardi
 31  Medication Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 435
Hooi Cheng Soon, Pierangelo Geppetti, Chiara Lupi,  
and Boon Phiaw Kho
 32  Digital Technology and Usability and Ergonomics  
of Medical Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 455
Francesco Ranzani and Oronzo Parlangeli
 33  Lessons Learned from the Japan Obstetric Compensation  
System for Cerebral Palsy: A Novel System of Data  
Aggregation, Investigation, Amelioration, and No-Fault 
Compensation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 465
Shin Ushiro, Antonio Ragusa, and Riccardo Tartaglia
 34  Coping with the COVID-19 Pandemic: Roles  
and Responsibilities for Preparedness  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 485
Michela Tanzini, Elisa Romano, Aldo Bonaventura, 




3© The Author(s) 2021 
L. Donaldson et al. (eds.), Textbook of Patient Safety and Clinical Risk Management, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59403-9_1




Actions to improve patient safety have  shown 
widely varying degrees of effectiveness. 
Usually hospitals are focused on the occurrence 
of adverse events and the level of adversity to the 
patient in the contexts of insurance premiums and 
the costs of malpractice. Furthermore, even risk 
management units within hospitals focus on these 
factors, when comparing the performance of 
departments or wards. However, for the improve-
ment of patient safety in clinical practice, a dif-
ferent approach is required, in which the 
prevention of patient harm and effectiveness of 
clinical actions is standardized and assessed on 
the basis of scientific evidence.
Recommendations that have been translated 
into guidelines are the best possible evidence- 
based solutions to clinical practice issues. 
However, it appears that there are very few clini-
cal guidelines focused on patient safety, particu-
larly in the risk management sector. Furthermore, 
when using clinical guidelines for quality and 
safety improvement, practices often seem to 
diverge. Higher quality and safer clinical practice 
are consequently difficult to achieve, share, and 
promote.
Existing knowledge of patient safety essen-
tially covers the nosography of threats and causes 
of patient harm, as opposed to possible evidence- 
based solutions that can (a) prevent risks, (b) 
address healthcare incidents, and (c) which can 
be compared. This means that etiology, patho-
genesis, and observations of safety issues in clin-
ical departments, and, more broadly in healthcare 
organizations, are often investigated while proven 
solutions to patient safety issues are rarely dis-
cussed. To give an appropriate analogy, it is like 
saying that there are many papers that have exam-
ined perioperative complications, type of surger-
ies, and patient characteristics. However, no 
research is available on how the occurrence of 
these complications have been managed in differ-
ent settings according to organizational and 
human factors.
It is essential that healthcare professionals 
acquire proficiency in producing evidence that 
can be used for making improvements to patient’s 
safety and managing the risks of adverse events. 
To successfully achieve this goal, the first step is 
for them to have a clear idea of what guidelines 
and practices are. Definitions of these terms will 
be the content of the first section of this chapter. 
Once these concepts have been introduced, the 
second section will show the current picture 
regarding patient safety and why a greater num-
ber of valuable clinical guidelines are needed. 
The third section will then consider possible 
solutions, lessons to apply in practice, and will 
W. Ricciardi · F. Cascini (*) 
Section of Hygiene and Public Health, Università 
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explain how to prepare and update a guideline. 
The challenges we are facing along with the lim-
its of the current guidelines will be considered at 
the end, which will assist in managing patient 
safety in future.
1.2  The Need to Understand 
Guidelines Before Improving 
Safety
The World Health Organization (WHO) regards 
guidelines as tools to help people to make deci-
sions and particularly  emphasize the concept of 
choosing from a range of interventions or mea-
sures. A WHO guideline is any document devel-
oped by the World Health Organization containing 
recommendations for clinical practice or public 
health policy. A recommendation tells the intended 
end-user of the guideline what he or she can or 
should do in specific situations to achieve the best 
health outcomes possible, individually or collec-
tively. It offers a choice of different interventions 
or measures that are intended to have a positive 
impact on health and explains their implications 
for the use of resources. Recommendations help 
the user of the guideline make informed decisions 
on whether to undertake specific interventions or 
clinical tests, or  if they should implement wider 
public health measures, as well as where and when 
to do so. Recommendations also help the user to 
select and prioritize across a range of potential 
interventions [1].
With a greater emphasis on clinical practice, 
the U.S.  Institute of Medicine (IOM) defines 
guidelines as “statements that include recom-
mendations, intended to optimize patient care, 
that are informed by a systematic review of evi-
dence and an assessment of the benefits and 
harms of alternative care options” [2]. This defi-
nition emphasizes that the foundation of a guide-
line is a systematic review of the scientific 
evidence bearing on a clinical issue. The strength 
of the evidence leads the clinical decision- making 
process through a set of recommendations. These 
concern the benefits and harms of alternative care 
options and address how patients should be man-
aged, everything else being equal.
The U.S.  National Guideline Clearinghouse 
(NGC) of the Agency for Healthcare Research 
and Quality (AHRQ) also uses the definition of 
clinical practice guidelines developed by the 
IOM, stating that “clinical practice guidelines are 
statements that include recommendations 
intended to optimize patient care that are 
informed by a systematic review of evidence and 
an assessment of the benefits and harms of alter-
native care options” [3].
The British National Institute for Health and 
Care Excellence (NICE) stresses scientific evi-
dence as the basis of guidelines. It states: “NICE 
guidelines make evidence-based recommenda-
tions on a wide range of topics, from preventing 
and managing specific conditions, improving 
health, and managing medicines in different set-
tings, to providing social care and support to 
adults and children, safe staffing, and planning 
broader services and interventions to improve the 
health of communities” [4].
The Italian National Center for Clinical 
Excellence (CNEC) that is responsible for the 
National Guidelines System (SNLG) uses essen-
tially the same definition as NICE, stressing the 
importance of evidence-based medicine as the 
foundation of recommendations in guidelines.
The recent report on healthcare quality 
improvement published by the European 
Observatory on Health Systems and Policies [5] 
reiterates that clinical guidelines focus on how to 
approach patients with defined healthcare prob-
lems, either throughout the entire care process or 
in specific clinical situations. As such, they can 
be considered as a tool to inform healthcare 
delivery, with a specific focus on the clinical 
components, in the context of medical practice as 
an applied science. Clinical guidelines have the 
potential to reduce unwarranted practice varia-
tion and enhance translation of research into 
practice; a well-developed guideline which is 
also well implemented will help improve patient 
outcomes by optimizing the process of care [6, 
7].
From the perspective of international accredi-
tation societies such as Joint Commission 
International (JCI), guidelines that help health-
care organizations to improve performance and 
W. Ricciardi and F. Cascini
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outcomes are part of the foundation of processes 
aimed at reaching the goal of safe and high- 
quality care [8]. JCI maintains that clinical prac-
tice guidelines are truly major and effective tools 
in the practice of delivering evidence-based med-
icine to achieve more effective patient outcomes 
and safer care. These guidelines, which must be 
used in all JCI accreditation programs, can 
achieve their maximum potential when they are 
both well developed and effectively introduced 
into clinical practice.
All of  the definitions mentioned are consis-
tent. Guidelines are not presented as a substitute 
for the advice of a physician or other knowledge-
able healthcare professionals or providers. They 
are tools describing recommended courses of 
intervention whose key elements are the best 
available scientific evidence and actions accord-
ing to this evidence. The goal is the promotion of 
health and consequently, the quality and safety of 
care. However, it is also desirable for profession-
als to share within the scientific community the 
results from using clinical practice guidelines in 
the context of valuable, real-world experience to 
inform safety interventions. Professionals are 
expected to share their current practice to help 
them apply guidelines to real-life situations and 
also to improve guidelines in the light of that 
experience.
Ensuring the quality of healthcare services 
and making improvements to patient safety 
require that evidence-based recommendations 
from guidelines, and their application in the form 
of practical interventions (best practices), always 
function as synergetic tools. Nevertheless, there 
is no consensus on what constitutes practice- 
based evidence (which is what emerges from rou-
tine hospital activities) and what metrics can be 
used to ensure the quality of this evidence. 
Healthcare interventions that have been shown to 
produce desirable outcomes and that are suitable 
for adaptation to other settings can be called 
“best practices.” A best practice is “an interven-
tion that has shown evidence of effectiveness in a 
particular setting and is likely to be replicable to 
other situations” [9]. Moreover, a best practice is 
not a synonym of a good practice or, simply, of a 
practice: it is an already existing and selected 
intervention whose effectiveness has already 
been established. This concept is widely appli-
cable in health care, from patient safety to public 
health, including the quality of care. In fact, a 
best practice is based on evidence from up-to- 
date research and it has the added value of incor-
porating experience acquired in real-life 
settings.
A best practice provides tangible solutions as 
the most effective process or method to achieve a 
specific objective, with results that are shareable. 
As a consequence, the practice can then become 
a model. Some organizations are working on cre-
ating best practice models, in particular, on 
selecting techniques or methodologies that have 
been proven to be reliable in achieving desired 
results through consolidated and updated experi-
ence and research. The British Medical Journal 
(BMJ), for example, funds a service (available at 
https://bestpractice.bmj.com/info/) that collects 
the latest evidence-based information to support 
professional decisions and brings together regu-
larly updated research evidence and the knowl-
edge of international experts. According to the 
BMJ, its best practice tool is “a clinical decision 
support tool that offers a step-by-step approach to 
help manage patient diagnosis, prognosis, treat-
ment and prevention.”
1.3  The Current Patient Safety 
Picture and the Demand 
for Guidelines
In most healthcare settings worldwide, patient 
safety data is data on the absence of patient 
safety. On the last patient safety day (September 
17, 2019), WHO announced, “Patient safety is a 
serious global public health concern. It is esti-
mated that there is a 1 in 3 million risk of dying 
while travelling by airplane. In comparison, the 
risk of patient death occurring due to a prevent-
able medical accident, while receiving health 
care, is estimated to be 1  in 300” [10]. WHO’s 
message is based on facts found in studies and 
statistics. These inform us that one in every 10 
patients is harmed while receiving hospital care 
(amounting to nearly 50% of adverse events 
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considered preventable) [11]. Further, the occur-
rence of adverse events due to unsafe care is one 
of the 10 leading causes of death and disability 
across the world [12]. The report of the WHO 
continues with the following findings [13]:
• Four out of every 10 patients are harmed in 
primary and outpatient (ambulatory) health 
care, with up to 80% of the harm considered to 
have been preventable.
• Patient harm may account for more than 6% of 
hospital bed days and more than 7 million 
admissions.
• The most detrimental errors are related to 
diagnosis, prescription, and the use of 
medicines.
Moreover, there are other serious conse-
quences. The WHO report also included the fol-
lowing criticisms concerning the “health status” 
of patient safety worldwide: the costs from unsafe 
medication practices or medication errors [14, 
15] and from delayed diagnosis [16, 17], the 
costs of treating the effects of patient harm, the 
complications from surgery that cause more than 
1 million patient deaths every year [18], and the 
inappropriate or unskilled use of medical radia-
tion leading to health hazards to both patients and 
staff [19].
Approaches to improve patient safety have 
already been suggested. Evidence-based care 
positively affects healthcare practice and patient 
outcomes. For example, the United States Agency 
for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) 
[20] stated that the chances of a patient receiving 
safer care when entering a hospital have 
increased; an estimated 87,000 fewer patients 
died from hospital-acquired conditions between 
2010 and 2014 in the USA. This not only repre-
sents a major improvement in patient safety, but 
also resulted in estimated savings of $19.8 bil-
lion. The US Agency reminded noted  that hard 
work to reduce undesired outcomes had been per-
formed by everyone from front-line staff to 
nurses, physicians, and hospital administrators. 
Further, theoretical financial savings from safety 
improvement and patient involvement were iden-
tified by WHO [13, 21].
Additional measures to implement safety in 
practices should be mandatory, such as tools that 
are mainly evidence-based as well as the education 
of and outreach to providers and patients, and the 
widespread use of hospital-based electronic health 
records. Nevertheless, the practical implementa-
tion of evidence-based research to treat unsafe situ-
ations remains uncertain. One paradigm case is that 
of the healthcare-related infections where, although 
a standardized evidence- based approach to patient 
safety seems accessible and extremely useful in 
this field (e.g., hand hygiene guidelines) [22], 
WHO recently reported [10] that the numbers of 
healthcare- associated infections remain high, 
affecting up to 10 out of every 100 hospitalized 
patients, and that a large proportion were prevent-
able [23–25]. A recent systematic review [26] also 
observed that 35–55% of healthcare-associated 
infections were preventable. This suggests that 
there remains much to be desired in terms of imple-
mentation of evidence-based best practices. 
Further, the levels of reductions in such infections 
attributable to the implementation of multifaceted, 
evidence-based interventions are in line with previ-
ous estimates [27, 28].
Even in high-income countries where a high 
level of adherence to current recommendations is 
expected, and despite the existence of evidence- 
based strategies, a further reduction in the occur-
rence of these infections of 30–50% is achievable 
[26]. In reality, a large discrepancy is emerging 
between the intention to effect change by employ-
ing standard operating procedures and the accu-
rate implementation of such practices in daily 
practice [29]. Great potential exists to further 
decrease hospital-acquired infection rates in a 
variety of settings. Relevant factors in the success 
of such programs include the study design, base-
line infection rates and type of infection [30]. 
Other factors such as global aging trends and 
comorbidity are likely to require additional 
efforts to reduce the risk of infections while med-
ical innovations may also reduce this risk due to 
the emergence of less invasive techniques (e.g., 
minimally invasive surgery or noninvasive 
ventilation).
Suggestions for how to address safety 
improvement in health care can be derived from a 
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literature review of evaluations of interventions. 
The negative impact of failing to improve quality 
and safety in health care is a public health issue 
[9]. Instead of simply moving onto the next new 
paradigm, it is worth considering what deficien-
cies exist in the literature and how these might be 
rectified [31].
1.4  Implementing the Research 
on Patient Safety to Improve 
Clinical Practice
Evidence-based medicine is the use of the best 
available evidence to inform decisions about the 
care of individual patients [32]. This means that 
clinical care choices undergo rigorous evaluation 
instead of having their effectiveness presumed on 
the basis of subjective experience or arguments 
relating to the etiopathogenesis of diseases. 
Despite this, it has been noticed [31] that imple-
mentation efforts typically proceed on the basis 
of intuition, anecdotal stories of success, or stud-
ies that exhibit little of the methodological 
sophistication seen in the research that estab-
lished the intervention’s benefit, even after mul-
tiple rigorously designed and well-conducted 
clinical trials have established the benefit of a 
particular care process.
Systematic reviews of the evidence and clini-
cal practice guidelines that synthesize studies 
addressing important clinical decisions have been 
underestimated in clinical practice. A variety of 
factors have prevented clinicians from acquiring 
evidence in a reliable and timely fashion. Such 
evidence would include factors that have been the 
object of only limited study so far. Other ele-
ments of implementing evidence-based medicine 
that have been glossed over include the follow-
ing: disagreement with the content of guidelines, 
which could quickly become out of date or have 
wide variations in methodological quality; the 
personal characteristics of providers, for exam-
ple, their resistance to perceived infringements 
on physician autonomy; and logistical or finan-
cial barriers [33].
It has also been noted [31] that research into 
quality improvement (including patient safety) 
and the related literature differ from the other 
biomedical research in two major respects. First, 
evaluations of specific interventions often fail to 
meet basic standards for the conduct and report-
ing of research. Second, and more fundamentally, 
the choices of particular interventions lack com-
pelling theories that can predict their success or 
be applied to specific features during their devel-
opment. Methodological shortcomings in the 
quality improvement research literature include 
basic problems with the design and analysis of 
the interventions as well as poor reporting of the 
results.
In light  of this, a recent review [34] high-
lighted that delivering improvements in the qual-
ity and safety of health care remains an 
international challenge. In recent years, quality 
improvement methods such as plan-do-study-act 
(PDSA) cycles have been used in an attempt to 
drive such improvements. This method is widely 
used in healthcare improvement however there 
are  little overarching evaluations of how it is 
applied. PDSA cycles can be used to structure the 
process of change iteratively, either as a stand-
alone method or as part of a range of quality 
improvement approaches, such as the Model for 
Improvement (MFI), Total Quality Management, 
Continuous QI, Lean, Six Sigma or Quality 
Improvement Collaboratives [35–37].
Despite the increased use of quality improve-
ment methods, the evidence base for their effec-
tiveness is poor and unsubstantiated [31, 38, 39]. 
PDSA cycles are often a central component of 
quality improvement initiatives; however, few 
formal objective evaluations of their effective-
ness or application have been carried out [40]. 
Some PDSA approaches have been demonstrated 
to result in significant improvements in care and 
patient outcomes [41] while others have demon-
strated no improvements at all [42–44]. Thus, 
evidence of effective quality improvement inter-
ventions remains mixed, with literature conclud-
ing that quality improvement interventions are 
only effective in specific settings and are used as 
“single-bullet” interventions that cannot deliver 
consistent improvements. Conversely, effective 
interventions need to be complex and multifac-
eted [45–47] and developed iteratively to adapt to 
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the local context and respond to unforeseen 
obstacles and unintended effects [48, 49].
Finding effective quality improvement meth-
ods to support iterative development to test and 
evaluate interventions in clinical care is essential 
for the delivery of high-quality and high-value 
care in a financially constrained environment. 
However, in the field of quality and safety 
improvement, strategies for implementing 
evidence- based medicine require an evidence 
base of their own, unlike in other medical disci-
plines [50]. Progress in researching quality 
improvement requires an understanding of the 
factors driving provider and organizational 
change. Moreover, possible elements affecting 
the results of research when implemented in 
practice, such as organizational factors and 
human features related to both professionals and 
patients, have to be considered. Additionally, 
research into patient safety improvement and its 
implementation requires looking at the health-
care system as a whole, including professionals, 
patients, and features of facilities.
Once an intervention to improve safety has 
been developed, the next step should be a pilot 
study to confirm that it works or, in other words, 
a Phase I of clinical studies [51]. The pilot study 
should start from a study design that includes the 
formulation of the hypothesis, the method of 
sampling the population involved in the study, 
the choice of and correlations between dependent 
and independent variables, and the analysis and 
reporting of results. It is important to ensure that 
the interpretations and explanations of the effi-
cacy and value of interventions adopted to man-
age specific patient safety issues are shareable.
Researchers and clinicians working on 
patient safety improvement should take into 
consideration the following: how to carry out 
this particular type of research; if it is correct to 
consider just a sample or the whole population 
of patients; what techniques to use in data col-
lection and observation processes; and how to 
describe the data. All of these elements are 
essential to support the hypothesis of the study, 
and to give credibility to both the research meth-
odology adopted and the conclusions of the 
trial. This kind of research is needed to produce 
informative, reliable, and evidence-based con-
clusions that ultimately lead to, from a wider 
point of view, a change of perspective. To be 
precise, the aim is to switch the focus from the 
statistics on patient injuries, damages, and 
claims, to data derived from clinical trials. 
Ultimately, the purpose of collecting this data is 
to propose actions and solutions to deal with the 
lack of safety in healthcare organizations, and 
medical treatments.
Empirically-derived models are needed to 
inform decisions to select specific implementa-
tion strategies, based on clinical features of the 
quality target, organizational or social context, 
and relevant attitudes and beliefs of providers and 
patients. These models thereby contribute to 
improvements to quality and the value of the ser-
vices delivered, and so help to reduce dramatic 
statistics that can overshadow the vision of a 
safer healthcare system. It must be noted that 
although the iterative development of change 
(PDSA cycle) is the most validated model to 
improve quality and safety, no single quality 
improvement tool can absolutely be considered 
the best. Preferences depend on the skills of pro-
fessionals and the type of setting which 
means choosing one method over another for an 
organization can be difficult.
The choice of the model is an important deci-
sion as it can involve serious risks and costly con-
sequences for healthcare organizations. The 
integration and adaptation of different models to 
healthcare settings is generally preferable to 
choosing only one model. However, the problem 
is that no formal criteria for evaluating the appli-
cation or reporting of PDSA cycles currently 
exist. It is only in recent years, through SQUIRE 
guidelines, that frameworks for publication that 
explicitly describe PDSA applications have been 
developed [52, 53]. Such frameworks are neces-
sary to support and assess the effective applica-
tion of PDSA cycles and to increase their 
legitimacy as a scientific method for 
improvement.
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1.5  Working Towards Producing 
Guidelines That Improve 
Safety Practices
As documents that synthesize current evidence 
on how to most effectively organize and deliver 
health services for a given condition [54], guide-
lines inform healthcare decision-making and can 
serve as a basis for policy, planning, evaluation, 
and quality improvement. “Working towards pro-
ducing guidelines that improve safety practices” 
means developing structured processes to write, 
update, and apply guidelines. The most important 
element to take into account is the methodology. 
Consequently, it is fundamental to have a plan 
that is divided into different steps and that can be 
summarized as a checklist. In fact, a checklist for 
developing guidelines should contain a compre-
hensive list of topics and items outlining the prac-
tical steps to consider. The checklist is intended 
for use by guideline developers to plan and track 
the process of guideline development and to help 
ensure that no key steps are missed. Following 
the steps outlined in the checklist ensures that 
key items are covered and increases the likeli-
hood of the guideline achieving higher scores 
when evaluated with credibility assessment tools. 
Checklists for developing guidelines can be com-
bined with guideline credibility assessment tools 
like AGREE1 (Appraisal of Guidelines for 
Research and Evaluation) [55] and other tools 
that may reflect standards established by the 
Guidelines International Network2 (GIN) [56] or 
Institute of Medicine (IOM).
One easy-to-use and reliable checklist is the 
GIN-McMaster Guideline Development 
1 The AGREE (Appraisal of Guidelines for Research and 
Evaluation) Collaboration developed the most commonly 
used instrument to assess the quality of a guideline. The 
instrument comprises 23 criteria grouped in six domains 
(addressed by the AGREE II): scope and purpose; stake-
holder involvement; rigor of development; clarity and pre-
sentation; applicability; and editorial independence.
2 The work of the Guidelines International Network (http://
www.g-i-n.net/) promotes the dissemination of guideline-
related content and provides an exchange platform for 
guideline developers and users. Further, the GIN provides 
reporting guidance for guideline-based performance mea-
surement tools.
Checklist, which is available on the internet 
(https://cebgrade.mcmaster.ca/guidecheck.html). 
It is divided into 18 steps as follows [57].
 1. Organization, budget, planning, and train-
ing. These involve outlining a detailed plan 
describing what is feasible, how it will be 
achieved, and what resources will be required 
to produce and use the guideline. The plan 
should define a specific completion date and 
be expressed in formal, measurable terms.
 2. Priority setting. This refers to the identifica-
tion, balancing, and ranking of priorities by 
stakeholders. Priority setting ensures that 
resources and attention are devoted to those 
general areas where healthcare recommenda-
tions will provide the greatest benefit to the 
population, jurisdiction, or country, e.g., 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, dia-
betes, cardiovascular disease, cancer, and 
prevention. A priority-setting approach needs 
to contribute to future plans while respond-
ing to existing, potentially difficult 
circumstances.
 3. Guideline group membership. This defines 
who is involved and  in what capacity, how 
the members are selected, and in which steps 
of the development of the guidelines each of 
them will participate.
 4. Establishing guideline group processes. This 
defines the steps to be followed, how those 
involved will interact, and how decisions will 
be made.
 5. Identifying target audience and topic selec-
tion. This involves defining the potential 
users or beneficiaries of the guidelines and 
defining the topics to be covered in the guide-
line (e.g., the diagnosis of chronic obstruc-
tive pulmonary disease).
 6. Beneficiary and other stakeholder involve-
ment. This describes how relevant people or 
groups who are not necessarily members of 
the panel (e.g., as the beneficiaries or users) 
will be affected by the guidelines and 
involved in their development.
 7. Conflict of interest considerations. This 
focuses on defining and managing the poten-
tial divergence between an individual’s 
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interests and his or her professional obliga-
tions. These considerations lead to questions 
about whether actions or decisions are moti-
vated by gain, such as financial, academic 
advancement, clinical revenue streams, or 
community standing. Financial, intellectual, 
or other relationships that may affect an 
individual’s or organization’s ability to 
approach a scientific question with an open 
mind are included.
 8. Question generation. This focuses on defin-
ing key questions the recommendations 
should address using the PICO (patient/
problem, intervention, comparison, out-
come) framework, including the detailed 
population, intervention (including diagnos-
tic tests and strategies), and outcomes that 
will be relevant in decision-making (e.g., in 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, 
should test A or treatments B, C, D, or E be 
used?).
 9. Considering the importance of outcomes and 
interventions, values, preferences, and 
advantages. This includes integrating how 
those affected by recommendations should 
assess the possible consequences into the 
process of developing guidelines. These con-
siderations can include: (a) patient, caregiver, 
and healthcare provider knowledge, atti-
tudes, expectations, moral and ethical values, 
and beliefs; (b) patient goals for life and 
health; (c) prior experience with the inter-
vention and the condition; (d) symptoms 
experienced, e.g., breathlessness, pain, dys-
pnea, weight loss; (e) preferences relating to 
and importance of desirable and undesirable 
outcomes; (f) perceived impact of the condi-
tion or interventions on quality of life, well- 
being, or satisfaction; (g) interactions 
between the work of implementing the inter-
vention, the intervention itself, and patient 
experiences; (h) preferences for alternative 
courses of action; and finally, (i) preferences 
relating to communication content and 
styles, information and involvement in 
decision- making and care.
 10. Deciding what evidence to include and 
searching for evidence. This focuses on out-
lining inclusion and exclusion criteria based 
on types of evidence (e.g., rigorous research 
or anecdotes), study designs, characteristics 
of the population, interventions, and com-
parators. It also covers deciding how the evi-
dence will be identified and obtained, which 
should not be limited to evidence about val-
ues and preferences, local data and resources.
 11. Summarizing evidence and considering 
additional information. This focuses on pre-
senting evidence in a synthetic format (e.g., 
tables or brief narratives) to facilitate the 
development and understanding of recom-
mendations. It also involves identifying and 
considering additional information relevant 
to the question under consideration.
 12. Judging quality, strength, or certainty of a 
body of evidence. This consists of assessing 
the confidence one can place in the evidence 
obtained by transparently evaluating the 
research (individual- and group studies) and 
other evidence applying structured 
approaches. This may include, but is not lim-
ited to, evidence about baseline risk or bur-
den of disease, the importance of outcomes 
and interventions, values, preferences, bene-
fits and drawbacks, use of resources (e.g., 
finance), estimates of effects, and accuracy 
of diagnostic tests.
 13. Developing recommendations and determin-
ing their strength. Developing recommenda-
tions involves the use of a structured 
analytical framework and a transparent and 
systematic process to integrate the factors 
that influence a recommendation. 
Determining the strength of the recommen-
dations refers to judgments about how confi-
dent a guideline panel is that the 
implementation of a recommendation will 
exert a greater number of desirable conse-
quences than undesirable ones.
 14. Wording of recommendations and of consid-
erations about implementation, feasibility, 
and equity. This refers to choosing syntax 
and formulations that facilitate the under-
standing and implementation of the recom-
mendations, accounting for the views of the 
guideline panel.
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 15. Reporting and peer review. Reporting refers 
to how a guideline will be made public (e.g., 
print, online). Peer review refers to how the 
guideline document will be reviewed before 
its publication and how it can be assessed 
(e.g., for errors), both internally and exter-
nally, by stakeholders who were not mem-
bers of the guideline development group.
 16. Dissemination and implementation. This 
focuses on strategies to make relevant groups 
aware of the guidelines and to enhance their 
uptake (e.g., publications and tools such as 
mobile applications).
 17. Evaluation and use. This refers to formal and 
informal strategies that allow the evaluation 
of (a) the guidelines as a process and prod-
uct; (b) their use or uptake, or both; and (c) 
their impact and whether or not they will 
lead to improvements in patient or popula-
tion health or other consequences.
 18. Updating. This refers to how and when a 
guideline will require revision because of 
changes in the evidence or other factors that 
influence the recommendations.
All the above-mentioned steps are believed to 
optimize the development and implementation of 
guidelines. However, two tough questions on 
guidelines persist, namely [8]:
 (a) Is there enough evidence to make 
recommendations?
 (b) How should we apply recommendations to 
individual patients?
With respect to the evidence to make recom-
mendations, guideline development tools have, 
since their inception in 2003, increas-
ingly  included the GRADE approach [58–60]. 
The Grading of Recommendations Assessment, 
Development and Evaluation (GRADE) approach 
was created by the eponymous working group 
(www.gradeworkinggroup.org), which is a col-
laborative project, consisting mainly of method-
ologists and clinicians. It provides a framework 
for assessing the quality (or “certainty”) of the 
evidence supporting, inter alia, guideline recom-
mendations and therefore their resulting strength 
[61]. Essentially, GRADE classifies recommen-
dations as “strong” when a specific, recom-
mended intervention or management strategy 
would be chosen, on reasonable grounds, by a 
majority of patients, clinicians, or policymak-
ers in all care scenarios. In contrast, such recom-
mendations would be classified as “weak” when 
there is a reasonable range of choices, reflecting 
the following possible factors: limited evidence 
quality, uncertain benefit-harm ratios, uncertainty 
regarding treatment effects, questionable cost- 
effectiveness, or variability in values and prefer-
ences [62]. Further, the GRADE 
evidence- to- decision framework helps guideline 
developers to structure their process and evalua-
tion of available evidence [59]. Nonetheless, a 
trade-off between methodological rigor and prag-
matism is required [63, 64].
Concerning the issue of applying recommen-
dations to individual patients, it has been observed 
that practices from guidelines vary considerably 
and translating guidelines into practice can fail to 
close gaps that have been identified, both in the 
scope and the follow-up of interventions [65]. 
Education for professionals and/or patients is a 
good strategy to ensure the implementation of 
guidelines. Nonetheless, another substantial 
influence on the ability to implement guidelines 
is how their implementation has already been 
built into the guideline development process. The 
planning of implementation provides a set of 
concrete, actionable steps to take during the 
implementation phase [66, 67]. The central ele-
ments of successful implementation approaches 
appear in: their target-oriented dissemination, 
education and training, social interaction, deci-
sion support systems and routine procedures, 
thereby  tailoring implementation strategies to 
settings and target groups [68]. To assist guide-
line developers regarding implementation, a tool 
with context-specific implementability features 
for the whole guideline process has been devel-
oped [69].
Further, clinicians must balance the risks and 
benefits of any guideline recommendation for an 
individual patient and consider that patient’s 
preferences. If the patient does not adhere to care 
recommendations, health benefits will not be 
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maximized or perhaps even realized. Clinical 
decisions should be based on guideline recom-
mendations, but all decisions must be individual-
ized according to a patient’s risk-benefit ratio 
and  incorporate patient preferences through 
shared decision-making. Clinician leadership in 
quality improvement efforts and administrative 
support are key drivers of quality and safety 
improvement through  care-integrated tools and 
aligned incentives aimed at achieving meaningful 
guideline implementation.
One of the most prominent developments in 
the area of guideline implementation in recent 
years has been the increased utilization of infor-
mation technologies to facilitate: (a) push mecha-
nisms for guideline adherence, such as decision 
support components integrated into clinical man-
agement software, for example, alerts, reminders, 
or routine procedures [70]; (b) the use of guide-
lines at the bedside, available on, for example, 
mobile guideline apps; (c) the faster and poten-
tially real-time updating of individual guideline 
recommendations as new evidence emerges, for 
example, by adding “living guidelines” [71, 72]. 
Observational data is necessary to describe cur-
rent health provision and its quality, pinpoint 
potential patient groups that are adequately cov-
ered by guideline recommendations, and identify 
gaps and issues to be resolved by clinical 
research. This data is also vital for identifying 
late onset treatment harms and drug safety issues.
1.6  The Challenges of Improving 
Safety and the Current 
Limits of Guidelines
Guidelines are expected to be focused on broad 
and complex topics, on developing standards to 
guide healthcare organizations, on providing best 
practice recommendations for patient care, and 
on informing the clinical decision-making of 
health professionals. Successfully incorporating 
all of these factors into features of guidelines is 
particularly difficult in today’s age of complexity 
and multimorbidity. This is an age which is also 
characterized by the desire for personalized med-
icine and the ambition to push the frontiers of 
modernization, for example, by introducing arti-
ficial intelligence into health care. Thus, beyond 
the methodological quality of the guideline itself, 
there are many relevant aspects which represent 
challenges or limits to take into account regard-
ing guidelines and their applicability.
The first challenge is to improve the effective-
ness of a guideline—especially regarding how it 
improves the safety of care—while also focusing 
on patient-centeredness; this principle consists of 
(a) properly taking into account the needs and 
preferences of patients and of their caregivers and 
(b) supporting professionals in improving their 
practice. These dimensions are fundamental to the 
delivery of care and to patient outcomes as well 
[73–75]. Patient-centeredness constitutes a more 
recent focus of the discussion around the develop-
ment and use of guidelines [76]. Guidelines can 
facilitate patient education, engagement, and 
shared decision-making, thus assuring that indi-
vidual patient values are balanced against the 
desired outcomes, which are embedded in the tri-
als that form the basis of guideline recommenda-
tions. Different modalities of patient involvement 
exist in different contexts. The two most studied 
ones are (a) patient group representatives, who are 
sometimes involved in the guideline development 
process and (b) guideline documents, which are 
increasingly produced in different formats for 
practitioners and patients [77–81].
Another challenge is related to the speed with 
which medical knowledge progresses and the 
pace of knowledge production at the  primary 
research level. Guideline recommendations are 
expected to be kept up to date  but a relatively 
recent, comprehensive review of this issue [82], 
concluded that 1 in 5 recommendations is out of 
date 3 years after being launched and that longer 
updating intervals are potentially too long. 
Additionally, the development and updating of 
clinical guidelines represents a challenge because 
of the speed and resources required for producing 
and especially updating them. Approaches that 
can result in efficient and potentially real-time 
updating of guideline recommendations as new 
evidence emerges have been discussed, particu-
larly in the form of living systematic reviews and 
living guidelines [71, 83–85].
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With regard to limitations, there are different 
aspects to consider. Maybe the most restrictive 
limitation regards the evaluation of the costs of 
the guideline development process, compared 
with the effectiveness of guidelines, once they 
are implemented. This limitation particu-
larly  relates to the use (or under-use) of cost- 
effectiveness analyses as a part of the development 
process of clinical guidelines and their related 
challenges or opportunities [86]. A comprehen-
sive cost-effectiveness analysis should cover the 
costs of the development and of the guideline dis-
semination/implementation processes, and the 
change in the effectiveness of health service by 
putting the guideline into practice. However, data 
on the costs of guideline development is scarce 
and, given the vast variability of settings and 
practices, likely not generalizable [87]. As has 
been already pointed out [88], only 27% of 200 
studies on guideline implementation strategies 
(of which only 11 were from Europe) had some 
data on cost and only 4 (2%) provided data on 
development and implementation. Most of the 
relevant studies only partially accounted for the 
costs incurred in the process of guideline produc-
tion. In some contexts, active implementation 
seemed to require a substantial upfront invest-
ment compared to general dissemination prac-
tices. Furthermore, the results regarding 
optimized processes of care and improved patient 
outcomes were not sufficient to render them cost- 
effective [89, 90].
Another relevant limitation is that the concept 
of a guideline-based quality indicator framework 
has so far been inadequately elaborated, despite 
the fact that performance measurement sustains 
the relationship between clinical guidelines and 
healthcare data. More and more guideline groups 
have developed quality indicators along with sets 
of recommendations [91]. Usually,  these indica-
tors are primarily intended as general perfor-
mance measures. However, a closer look at 
measurement results can provide insights into the 
extent to which practice reflects guideline recom-
mendations. In other words, the indicators inform 
us on the extent of guideline adherence, and con-
sequently feed into how they are shaped. 
Moreover, an overview of country-specific prac-
tices [5] clearly demonstrates how divergent 
guideline practices can be, especially when 
viewed as strategies for the improvement of 
healthcare quality. The context-specific nature of 
guidelines persists, despite their adaptability to 
the practices of different countries. In the past, the 
quality of clinical guidelines was narrowly defined 
according to how closely recommendations were 
linked to scientific and clinical evidence [92]; 
however more recently, researchers have explic-
itly addressed the question of whether guidelines 
should be systematically pilot-tested in care deliv-
ery settings before being finalized [93].
Switching the focus to how guidelines are 
implemented, newer studies have shown mixed 
results regarding the effect of guidelines on out-
comes but established a clear link between imple-
mentation modalities and patient outcomes 
[94–97]. Barriers to the adoption of or adherence 
to guidelines by clinicians have been discussed in 
the literature. Substantial gaps were found in the 
evidence on the effectiveness of implementation 
interventions, especially regarding clinical out-
comes, cost-effectiveness, and contributory con-
textual issues [98]. Barriers included time 
constraints, limited staffing resources, clinician 
skepticism, clinician knowledge of guidelines, 
and the age of the clinician. The characteristics of 
guidelines, such as format, resources, and end- 
user involvement, were identified as facilitating 
factors, along with stakeholder involvement, 
leadership support, and organizational culture 
(including multidisciplinary teams and electronic 
guidelines systems).
Beyond challenges and limits, there is the 
issue of editorial independence in clinical guide-
line development. Implementing guideline rec-
ommendations that have been created in irregular 
conditions is not only ethically questionable but 
may also endanger quality of care, as the content 
may not actually reflect best available evidence. 
To give an example of irregular conditions, an 
international survey of 29 institutions involved in 
clinical guideline development found variability 
in the content and accessibility of conflict of 
interest policies; some institutions did not have 
publicly available policies and, of the policies 
available, several did not clearly report critical 
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steps in obtaining, managing, and communicat-
ing disclosure of relationships of interest [99]. 
While financial conflicts of interest seem to have 
been adequately disclosed in the most rigorously 
developed guidelines, active management of 
existing conflicts of interest has lagged behind 
[100–103]. Beyond measures to address direct 
financial conflicts of interest, the management of 
indirect conflicts of interest is also important in 
guideline development. Such indirect conflicts 
can include issues related to academic advance-
ment, clinical revenue streams, community 
standing, and engagement in academic activities 
that foster an attachment to a specific point of 
view [104]. Ensuring that guidelines are devel-
oped on the basis of robust consensus processes 
by a multidisciplinary panel can contribute to 
mitigating the effects of such conflicts [105].
Systematically developed, evidence-based 
clinical guidelines are in widespread use as a 
strategy to improve the quality of healthcare ser-
vices and consequently the safety of care. 
However, the rigor of their development, their 
mode of implementation, and the evaluation of 
their impacts should be improved in many set-
tings to enable their goal of achieving safer 
healthcare practices. One of the most important 
knowledge gaps in this respect is the extent to 
which guidelines affect patient outcomes and 
how this effect can be enhanced to ensure better 
care. For that purpose, both quantitatively mea-
sured parameters and patient experience should 
be taken into account. Today, technology and 
clinical decision support solutions are readily 
available to help transform research into practice 
and recommendations. These solutions take clini-
cally approved best practice guidelines and match 
them with each patient to provide a recommended 
and customized care pathway for optimal out-
comes. They can also be configured to meet the 
needs of each organization, taking into consider-
ation local needs and practices [8].
1.7  Recommendations
 1. The improvement of patient safety should be 
based on evidence-based recommendations 
included in well-developed guidelines, which 
should in turn be rigorously implemented in 
clinical practice as the best safety practice.
 2. More scientific research into healthcare qual-
ity and safety improvement is needed, the 
results and effectiveness of which should be 
shared across the scientific community 
worldwide.
 3. To face the challenges of a changing health-
care sector in today’s age of multi- morbidities, 
tutors, researchers, caregivers, and patients 
should work together to address the current 
limits of clinical guidelines.
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This chapter briefly recounts the story of some-
one who worked as a clinical risk manager of a 
regional health service for 16 years since his 
appointment as director of a regional center for 
clinical risk management and patient safety.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a tes-
timony of one of the first international experi-
ences of safety management in a public health 
service. It does not claim to speak to a particular 
type of profession but aims to relate an experi-
ence in which some will recognize themselves, 
others will be able to find advice, and others will 
be able to understand the differences with the 
health reality in which they operate. It may also 
be useful in order to define the “clinical risk man-
ager,” a new professional figure that has now 
entered the scene in our hospitals.
This story takes place in Italy, a country that, 
according to international indicators [1] and the 
World Health Organization (WHO) [2], has a 
fairly good health service but with very strong 
variability between the northern and southern 
regions.
Unfortunately, the economic crisis has wors-
ened the situation and, in terms of quality of care, 
Italian services no longer occupy the top posi-
tions [3].
In the current Italian context, Tuscany is one 
of the regions with the best indicators of quality 
of care, along with some northern regions.
Let us briefly describe the context in which 
the story takes place. Tuscany is located in the 
center of Italy and covers an area of approxi-
mately 23,000 km2, 67% of which is hilly. It is 
home to about 3.7 million inhabitants and a 
health service with 33 acute care hospitals of 
which three are university hospitals in Florence, 
Pisa, and Siena. Every year about 550,000 people 
are admitted to public hospitals in Tuscany. Of 
them, 1500 patients annually claim compensa-
tion for alleged harm resulting from treatment 
received, but only 40% of these citizens will be 
awarded compensation, amounting to a total of 
about 40–50 million euros a year.
Healthcare is mainly public and adopts the 
tax-financed Beveridge model. The cost of public 
health service is around 7.4 billion euros a year, 
with a per capita quota of 1981 euros, compared 
to a national average of 1888 euros per capita [4].
2.2  The Start
In 1989, Scally and Donaldson [5] promoted 
clinical risk management in the field of clinical 
governance and, in 1999, the “To err is human” 
report was published [6]. At the same time, James 
R. Tartaglia (*) 





Reason travelled the world making his “Swiss 
Cheese model” known globally [7], while Charles 
Vincent published “Clinical risk management: 
enhancing patient safety” in 2001 [8].
It was precisely in 2001 when the medical 
director of my hospital brought me the book by 
Charles Vincent and asked me to take charge of 
health safety. The reason he proposed this role to 
me stemmed from my position as manager of a 
structure that dealt with ergonomics and the 
human factor in the field of occupational safety, a 
relevant issue for clinical risk management.
I started working on this topic with some 
young people from my unit and we grew passion-
ate about it. I was the only doctor, a specialist in 
occupational health and public health, surrounded 
by an industrial designer and experts in commu-
nication sciences and sociology. The medical 
director was highly interested in patient safety. 
We no longer dealt with the latter, except for 
aspects related to occupational stress and 
burnout.
We started presenting the Swiss Cheese Model 
to fellow doctors and nurses, inviting them to 
promote incident reporting. We stressed the 
importance of a “no blame” culture to the direc-
tors of units, doctors, and nurses, with the sup-
port of health management, but our moment of 
fame came in 2002 when we invited James 
Reason to Florence. In an auditorium full of doc-
tors and nurses, people began to talk about medi-
cal errors, a subject that up until then was 
untouchable, almost unthinkable. Since forensic 
medicine was dominant at that time, we wanted 
to make it clear that our aim was not the pursuit 
of professional responsibility (i.e., negligence, 
inexperience, and imprudence), but to learn from 
error.
Reason concluded his presentation by stating 
that “we cannot change the human being which 
by nature is fallible, but we can change working 
conditions in an attempt to prevent and intercept 
errors before they cause an adverse event.” He 
also told us that we would still have accidents and 
that we should learn to manage them, even from 
the point of view of communication.
A journalist from the most important national 
television network heard about our Florentine 
experience and made a report for an important 
television program in which she showed how 
doctors discussed their mistakes. In the broad-
cast, you are presented with a slightly darkened 
hospital room in which a group of doctors, almost 
like some secret sect, was discussing adverse 
events. I believe it was the first significant event 
audit or confessional meeting filmed for televi-
sion in Italy.
At that time, the alderman of the Regional 
Health Service, who participated in the James 
Reason conference, understood the importance 
of the subject and launched the establishment of 
a regional center that would coordinate all the 
activities for the management of clinical risk and 
patient safety in Tuscan hospitals. The aim of this 
center would have been the promotion of a cul-
ture of safety, the reporting of adverse events, and 
learning from adverse events—in a word, our 
mission. It was announced publicly that one mil-
lion euros had been raised for the establishment 
of a regional patient safety center.
2.3  The Evolution of the Patient 
Safety System
After the James Reason conference, the Tuscany 
region decided to invest one million euros to 
organize a center for clinical risk management in 
an Italian region of 3.7 million inhabitants and 33 
acute care hospitals.
I was then in charge of running this center 
with a budget of only around 600,000 euros for 
personnel management (the announced invest-
ment was therefore somewhat reduced). I of 
course turned to the operators I already had in my 
old ergonomic group, 8 young and brilliant tech-
nicians chosen on the basis of multidisciplinary 
skills, and overcame numerous bureaucratic 
problems that represented the greatest initial 
operational difficulty—bureaucracy is the great-
est enemy of safety.
It is difficult for many to understand the 
importance of other professional figures in 
healthcare than traditional doctors, nurses, obste-
tricians, etc. In Italian healthcare, according to an 
ancient and outdated conception of professional 
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skills, there is a health area (i.e., traditional health 
professions) and a technical-administrative area 
(i.e., statisticians, computer scientists, sociolo-
gists, communicators, jurists, engineers). These 
areas rarely interact and are often separated both 
physically (e.g., across different buildings) and 
intellectually. Teamwork is exclusively linked to 
common interest in a few topics and to the net-
working skills of individual operators.
In my opinion, the acquisition of knowledge is 
difficult when people do not work together. This 
also applies to primary care and hospital profes-
sionals. Opportunities and moments for exchange 
are needed at least weekly.
I must say that in recent years clinical risk 
management has brought many professionals 
closer to each other, due to its multidisciplinary 
approach. For example, IT professionals are now 
involved in the ergonomics and usability of com-
puterized medical records, which are frequently 
sources of error, while psychologists and com-
munication experts are involved in the analysis of 
adverse events. Each of my collaborators had 
solid training in ergonomics and the human fac-
tor, acquired through master degree programs 
and academic courses, and therefore skills in 
accident analysis, communication, highly reli-
able organization, and resilience. If I had imme-
diately opted for a team of doctors and nurses, the 
budget would probably not have been enough and 
we would have spent much more time recruiting 
new staff. Furthermore, for a healthcare organi-
zation, a doctor contractually costs more than a 
sociologist or industrial designer.
As a matter of fact, over time the skills avail-
able to the team proved both useful and valid for 
our work. A center that deals with clinical risk 
and the complexity of the causes of accidents 
must include professionals that come from vari-
ous disciplinary areas besides health [9]. With 
regard to communication problems (which often 
cause accidents), organizational problems, and 
problems associated with the interactions with 
biomedical, ergonomic, and legal equipment, the 
professionals in our team were much better pre-
pared than other professionals in their own disci-
pline, precisely thanks to the specific training in 
human factor and risk management.
A scientific committee consisting of the best 
medical specialists and nurses in the health ser-
vice had the function of supporting the center in 
all the more strictly clinical assistance-related 
aspects which we would encounter during sig-
nificant events audit, mortality and morbidity 
meetings, and the promotion of safety practices.
Working in this multidisciplinary context has 
been culturally enriching for clinicians and 
nurses as well as other professional figures, 
resulting in a continual exchange of knowledge 
that has favored professional growth.
The headquarters were planned to reside in a 
building of the most important Tuscan hospital.
2.4  The Network of Clinical Risk 
Manager
After implementing staff training, a network of 
professionals (one in each hospital) was needed 
in order to organize the activity, develop a report-
ing and learning system, and create a risk man-
agement system.
We asked the general managers of each hospi-
tal to designate a point person for clinical risk 
and patient safety. In the beginning, we did not 
expect specifically trained professional figures 
but professionals from biomedical, psychosocial, 
and technical fields with good reputation, credi-
bility, and standing among other clinicians and 
health professionals. Some choices proved to be 
right and others not, which is normal.
Over time, I noticed a certain vulnerability 
of this new professional figure. Although safety 
is the duty of every healthcare worker and can-
not be delegated to a single professional, the 
risk manager often becomes a scapegoat for 
many problems. For this reason, they are some-
times replaced not on the basis of professional 
ability and merit but of loyalty to the general 
manager.
The selected professionals followed a manda-
tory university course involving over one hun-
dred hours of training and a 1-week internship in 
a hospital risk management service. Subsequently, 
in almost all hospitals, the professionals obtained 
a risk management unit with collaborators.
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For each hospital unit, other doctors or nurses, 
usually one or two, were then identified as 
facilitators.
The facilitators were expected to be profes-
sionals, usually doctors and nurses, who, in addi-
tion to performing their daily work, should have 
had hours dedicated to promoting clinical audits 
and mortality and morbidity meetings following 
adverse events, unsafe actions, and missed 
accidents.
2.5  Training and Instruction
The training of our gladiators, numbering about 
30, took place in collaboration with one of the 
most prestigious Italian universities, the 
Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies in Pisa. 
The course was very hands-on, including lectures 
by experts on the subject and many exercises on 
clinical cases of adverse events and the imple-
mentation of safety practices. However, the most 
beautiful experience of this course was the 
1-week internship at various international 
hospitals.
We took our gladiators to numerous hospitals 
to show them what actions could be taken to 
improve patient safety. We visited the hospitals of 
many cities (such as Berlin, London, Boston, 
Chicago, Copenhagen, Paris, Valencia, and 
Amsterdam), comparing the different risk man-
agement models adopted. This experience was 
very useful for the planning of our work [10].
What stood out was that, in most of the hospi-
tals we visited, clinical risk management was 
entrusted to nurses. The doctors were mainly 
involved in mortality and morbidity meetings and 
in research projects almost always conducted in 
multidisciplinary teams.
In our country, risk management is entrusted 
to medical personnel with the support of senior 
nurses, albeit with some rare exceptions. I believe 
that with regard to competences, it is always nec-
essary to evaluate the context of reference and the 
functions of units, research, or clinical health. 
The training topics have gradually changed over 
time, adapting to emerging needs and to the 
transformation of the role of the professional.
After the risk managers’ first year of work, we 
realized that the professionals coming from the 
clinical side performed better than those who had 
worked in health departments. The reason was 
essentially that the clinical professionals had a 
closer relationship with the structures we sought 
to improve.
Furthermore, the managers of quality and 
accreditation structures and the managers of clin-
ical risk continued to exist as separate entities. 
The two roles coincided only in rare cases. For 
this reason, we identified in each hospital a clini-
cal risk manager (CRM) and a patient safety 
manager (PSM), thus differentiating the func-
tions [11].
In Italy as well as internationally, care safety 
and quality management and accreditation have 
had different stories. While clinical risk manage-
ment was born in more recent times and has 
attracted the immediate interest of professionals, 
quality management and accreditation have never 
fascinated clinicians because of the excessive 
bureaucracy and the occasional distance of the 
procedures proposed by clinical practice from 
real problems.
Regarding our two professional roles, the 
CRM is a professional who works on the clinical 
side and is entrusted with risk management in a 
department, while the PSM is a doctor, nurse, or 
non-healthcare professional who operates among 
the health management staff. Figure 2.1 summa-
rizes the differences between these two lines of 
operation and the professional figures involved.
Today, following specific training and experi-















for this role (clinical risk manager/patient safety 
manager) in order to enhance their skills and 
offer more guarantees to insurance system.
The training has substantially contributed to 
the definition of a risk management model that 
we have theorized and put into practice over 
about 15 years.
2.6  Adverse Events
Some of the studies we have conducted in our 
regional health service [12, 13] did not show 
higher rates of adverse events compared to other 
research carried out with similar methodology. 
Similarly, the claims rate is average compared 
with other Italian regions.
Our reporting and learning system has clearly 
lowered the levels of confidentiality thus expos-
ing our health service to the media. Where there 
is no transparency, it is difficult for serious acci-
dents to emerge as everything is managed confi-
dentially. If significant event audits or mortality 
and morbidity meetings are organized, news 
leaks out more easily. Nevertheless, the number 
of adverse events reported by our operators 
through our reporting system is always much 
lower than expected. The expected amount, 
which is at least 4–5 times higher, was deter-
mined from the comparisons we have made with 
colleagues from other countries where reporting 
systems have been operating for a longer time.
Under-reporting had been attributable to the 
fear of judicial consequences until the first of 
April, 2017, when the law on patient safety and 
professional liability was instituted. However, in 
our experience the main cause of under-reporting 
was the absence of a safety culture (i.e., “I’m not 
used to reporting, it’s just not the way things are 
done”) [14].
The law introduced in 2017 has protected 
reporting and learning systems from legal action 
since documents produced within these systems 
cannot be used for judicial purposes [15]. The 
development of a clinical risk management system 
did not completely shelter us from serious acci-
dents but it helped to deepen our understanding of 
clinical cases with an unexpected outcome.
On February 20, 2007, about 2 years after we 
started implementing our risk management sys-
tem, the first important event happened. We had a 
serious sentinel event that had great media cover-
age at the national and international levels. It 
happened in the field of transplant surgery, an 
area that we mistakenly thought to be fairly safe 
because it was under the control of national 
supervisory bodies. Furthermore, it involved an 
analytical laboratory in which the attention to the 
procedures of the accreditation and quality sys-
tem is very high. The case involved the transplan-
tation of two kidneys and a liver from an 
HIV-positive donor to three patients awaiting 
transplantation [16].
The event had great resonance but the center, 
at least in the initial phase, was absolutely not 
involved in the analysis of what happened. The 
case was managed by political leaders only and 
exclusively at a communicative level. It was 
announced that the cause was human error of an 
operator who had erroneously transcribed the 
machine data for serological examinations in the 
report.
Instead of a culture of learning based on the 
discussion of organizational problems that can 
determine the occurrence of significant events, a 
culture of guilt had prevailed. A culprit was 
immediately found; the rotten apple was removed 
from the bunch.
Subsequent analyses conducted by various 
national and regional committees have shown 
that in those working conditions any human 
being could have made mistakes. In this case, that 
human being was a good and honest biologist, 
the only one to bear the blame for what had hap-
pened. In organizing the task, the human factor 
had not been taken into account. A “traditional” 
way of working continued to prevail in which a 
human being rather than a machine had to per-
form a monotonous and repetitive job, reporting 
serological examination results.
It was therefore decided that each of these 
patients would be rewarded with a very high 
compensation. It was a decision that served to 
stop the controversy around the event: the 
news disappeared from the media in a few 
days.
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As head of clinical risk management, I was 
determined to resign. After this serious event, I 
felt it was my duty, even if we had not yet inter-
vened in the transplant system precisely because 
it was a sector with its own autonomy. I was 
asked to investigate what had happened. The 
results of the investigation we conducted brought 
about many changes, highlighting several critical 
issues in the transplant system. Donations had 
increased too quickly compared to the system’s 
ability to meet operational needs.
It was one of the many cases in which I real-
ized that legal truth is not always consistent with 
“true truth.”
With regard to sentinel events, the biggest 
problem was overcoming the strong desire of 
politicians and general managers to look for a 
culprit (culture of guilt) in order to focus their 
attention on preventing the recurrence of such an 
event (no-blame culture).
When a serious accident occurs, the citizens 
want a culprit even if the time taken by justice is 
much longer than that of the clinical risk man-
ager, whose first goal is to secure the hospital and 
provide psychological support for the victims of 
event, both the first victim, the patient, and the 
second victim, the professional.
2.7  The First Results
We had our first results when we started dissemi-
nating all the good safety practices that research 
had developed in the meantime: introduction of 
hand hygiene gels, checklists for operating the-
aters, prevention of postpartum hemorrhage, pre-
vention of thromboembolic complications, 
bundles for the prevention of CVC infections, 
etc. Since, more than 30 safety practices have 
been developed in collaboration with clinicians. 
The greatest difficulty was the differences in 
implementation capacity, which depend little on 
the clinical risk manager. Much depends on the 
environmental context and on how much impor-
tance the general manager gives to safety and 
quality of care. The best results concerned those 
hospitals in which management executives gave 
great importance to the patient safety.
Unfortunately, some general managers were 
very far removed from the basic principles of 
clinical risk management. They were only inter-
ested in the economic costs and the volume of 
activity, not value of care.
Obviously, politics has considerable weight 
and responsibility in imprinting certain behaviors 
in general managers. Although training has been 
introduced in management courses, it has never 
been enough to change the externally ingrained 
behaviors nor the behaviors guided by the nature 
of the employees themselves.
Overall, we can affirm that some important 
successes have been achieved. At an organiza-
tional level, we have been equipped for years 
with a reporting and learning system that is a 
credit to our organization. There has been a 
reduction in the number of accidents and falls in 
the hospital, the latter being the most frequent 
cause of damage reports. According to third- 
party data, we are the Italian region with the low-
est rate of maternal mortality and mortality in 
intensive care. Attention to infections has 
increased even if their rate continues to be high. 
Much more could and should be done.
2.8  The Relationship 
with Politics and Managers
Politicians, obviously with some exceptions, 
have rarely shown interest in the many national 
and international events we have organized. I 
realized over time that the topic of patient safety 
does not excite politicians. The reason is simple: 
talking about mistakes, the criticalities of a health 
system, and litigation has no electoral value. It is 
much more politically profitable to talk about 
robotic surgery, transplants, technological inno-
vation, and opening up new health services. Even 
if it is clear from the data that in the last 15 years 
we have saved money and above all human lives 
thanks to clinical risk management, politics has 
always preferred other topics. On the other hand, 
it is true that patient safety is an electoral cam-
paign theme that can be used to denigrate the 
political opponent. In fact, whenever elections 
approached, newspaper headlines about “mal-
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practice” poured in to instrumentally demon-
strate the inefficiency of the health service.
One of the critical issues that has arisen in 
recent years is the lack of autonomy of the center 
with respect to political apparatus and hospital 
managers. The regional bodies of clinical govern-
ment that deal with the safety of care, such as the 
Tuscan GRC center, must have their own opera-
tional and budgetary autonomy. These are 
technical- scientific bodies that cannot depend 
directly on the political and administrative gov-
ernment. The model of government agencies 
should be adopted, guaranteeing these bodies a 
third-party nature and independence, precisely 
because of the importance of their role.
Despite the unanimous approval of a specific 
request by the regional council [17], the regional 
executive committee has never given autonomy 
to the center.
As operators, we have always remained 
administratively dependent on the hospital from 
which we came. This hospital was one of the 
structures subjected to evaluation by the regional 
apparatus and therefore by our center. This obvi-
ously led to a clear conflict of interests and con-
sequent management difficulties due to the desire 
of some managers to influence the activities of 
the center.
Currently, the Italian law for safety of care 
foresees in every Italian region the presence of 
centers for the management of healthcare- 
associated risk and patient safety. However, the 
law does not provide precise indications on their 
administrative location and level of independence. 
None of these structures has total autonomy, 
being administrated by regional apparatuses or 
managed by personnel employed by hospitals.
Patient safety has never been a topic of pride 
for politicians even when the results were good. 
Politicians prefer to maintain an attitude of 
“understatement” on this issue. There is the 
awareness that at any time a serious accident can 
occur and this could be exploited by the opposi-
tion against the current administration. It is there-
fore preferable to promote the “positive” aspects 
of the health service such as the opening of a new 
structure, the purchase of new equipment, and the 
hiring of doctors. Although patient safety is one 
of the eight domains of healthcare risk manage-
ment [18], its real importance has not yet been 
understood (Fig. 2.2).
Another crucial aspect involving the risk man-
ager relates to the culture of guilt facilitated by 
hindsight bias. Those who do not subscribe to a 
culture of safety and sometimes even great clini-
cians often fall into this trap of judging the past 
based on new knowledge of the facts. In our 
country, in the event of a serious accident, people 
immediately want a culprit even when events 
may have complex causes. In some of the serious 
accidents in the health service that I investigated, 
the identification of a culprit and the communica-
tion to the public that the cause was due to human 
error generally reduced the clamor produced by 
the media. Stating that the problem is the respon-
sibility of a single person and not a structural or 
organizational problem calms public opinion and 
is therefore a functional strategy for the system. 
Even before knowing the facts, we start to attri-












Fig. 2.2 Areas of risk 
in healthcare 
management
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to the individual, rarely to management, and 
hardly ever to politics.
I have noticed this attitude in numerous cases 
where even the most evident responsibilities of 
the political-administrative system were not 
brought under scrutiny (e.g., lack of personnel, 
technological criticalities, training criticalities).
Another important aspect is the general man-
agers’ understanding of the need to maintain the 
two lines of action separate in the management of 
sentinel events. We have repeatedly theorized 
that the first goal of a risk manager when an acci-
dent occurs is to analyze what has happened and 
quickly introduce prevention measures to secure 
the system. It is therefore necessary to initiate 
clinical audits, mortality and morbidity meetings, 
and root cause analysis.
The search for responsibility is generally the 
duty of the investigating judiciary or other admin-
istrative bodies whose purpose is to identify the 
judicial and administrative responsibilities.
It is therefore advisable that the risk manager 
is not involved in investigations aimed at identi-
fying responsibilities. It is also advisable not to 
make the documentation produced within the 
reporting and learning systems available to law-
yers or judges in order to identify the responsi-
bilities. Exceptions are obviously cases involving 
malice, that is, intention to cause damage on the 
part of the professional.
In my experience, I have been in interesting 
situations in which we, as clinical risk operators, 
have investigated the same event together with 
the police. Table 2.1 shows some differences that 
emerged from a careful analysis of the facts [19].
As I once heard from John Ovretveit in his 
beautiful lecture in Florence, the successful 
improvement of patient safety depends only 10% 
on the clinical risk manager and slightly more 
(20%) on “safety practices” which must be based 
in strong scientific evidence. 40% of the success 
is derived from the cultural landscape in which 
the practices are disseminated but, above all, 
60% is grounded in the climate created by the 
corporate establishment that favors the achieve-
ment of greater safety of care, rewarding and cel-
ebrating quality.
2.9  The Italian Law on the Safety 
of Care
Fourteen years after the birth of the center that I 
directed, the Italian law on the safety of care was 
promulgated. Some important international mag-
azines have covered the contents [15, 20].
The law is due to two Italian medical parlia-
mentarians, Federico Gelli and Amedeo Bianco 
and it is titled “Provisions for care safety and pro-
fessional responsibility.” It has introduced impor-
Table 2.1 Differences between human factors and forensic investigations
Type of investigation Forensic Human factors/ergonomics
Ownership Judicial Authority Clinical Governance Institution
Aim Ascertain illegal actsFinding criminals Redesign system interactions to improving safety
Approach Focus on individual performance 
(contractual relationship)
Focus on system awareness (organizational 
context)
Investigation team Police detectives, coroner, clinicians 
(team leader with expertise in forensics)
Experts in HF/E: clinicians, psychologists (team 
leader with expertise in HF/E)
Investigation 
methods and tools
Police interrogations, recorded 
interviews, surveillance
Meetings with healthcare professionals based on 
the systemic analysis
Outcomes Preliminary investigation report with 
evidence of individual culpability
Confidential report of contributory factors and 
recommendation for improving patient safety
Time scale In keeping with forensic procedures, 
investigation, debate, and court judgment 
(years)
In keeping with healthcare organization activities 
and needs (days/months)
Resulting actions Judgment in a court of law and 
sentencing (individual-oriented)
Implementation of improvement actions and 




tant changes which have provided strength to all 
those working in the field of clinical risk 
management.
It has created specific clinical risk manage-
ment centers in each Italian region with the aim 
of collecting data on adverse events and promot-
ing best safety practices. It has also protected 
reporting and learning systems by preventing the 
use of the internally produced documents for 
judicial purposes. This law also provides specific 
training for those who decide to become clinical 
risk managers in hospitals. The professional cer-
tification system implemented in our country is 
giving further value to this professional role. 
Finally, it has provided regulation for scientific 
societies around the generation of guidelines and 
recommendations for safety of care. It is not yet 
clear whether hospitals can become “highly reli-
able organizations” [21] but this law could con-
tribute thanks to the changes it produces.
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Human Error and Patient Safety
Helen Higham and Charles Vincent
3.1  Introduction
Making a serious error is one of the most stress-
ful professional experiences for a doctor or for 
anyone in clinical practice. In other professions, 
such as architecture or the law, serious mistakes 
can generally be remedied with an apology and 
compensation for losses sustained. But in medi-
cine, mistakes can have serious and lifelong con-
sequences for patients and families.
Medical schools rightly encourage the highest 
standards of professional practice. Doctors are 
expected to work hard and do their best for their 
patients and, ideally, not make errors. It is tempt-
ing to think that only ‘bad’ or ‘lazy’ people make 
mistakes and that making a serious error implies 
a flaw in character not worthy of a serious profes-
sional. The reality however is that all doctors, 
indeed all clinicians, will make errors during 
their career and that some of them will have seri-
ous consequences.
We cannot completely avoid errors but we can 
do much to reduce them, to spot them more 
quickly and to protect patients from the worst of 
the consequences. However, in order to do this, 
we need to understand the nature of error and, in 
particular, how working conditions strongly 
influence our behaviour and the likelihood of 
error. We also need to understand that while we 
can make personal efforts to avoid errors, the 
greatest protection will come from working in a 
team of people who are willing to recognise 
errors, speak up, support each other, and protect 
both patients and colleagues from the conse-
quences of errors.
3.2  What Is an Error?
In everyday life, recognising error seems quite 
straightforward though admitting it may be 
harder. Immediate slips, such as making tea when 
you meant to make coffee, are quickly recog-
nised. Other errors may only be recognised long 
after they occur. You may only realise you pre-
scribed a drug incorrectly when the patient 
returns to follow-up clinic a few weeks later with 
problematic side effects from an overdose. Some 
errors, such as missing a lung tumour on an X-ray 
taken to investigate a potential shoulder injury, 
may only become apparent years later.
An important common theme running through 
all these examples is that an action is only recog-
nised as an error after the event. Human error is a 
judgement made in hindsight [1]. There is no spe-
cial class of things we do or don’t do that we can 
designate as errors; it is just that some of the 
things we do turn out to have undesirable or 
unwanted consequences. This does not mean that 
we cannot study error or examine how our 
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 otherwise efficient brains lead us astray in some 
circumstances, but it does suggest that there will 
not be specific cognitive mechanisms to explain 
error that are different from those that explain 
other human thinking and behaviour.
Eric Hollnagel [2] points out that the term 
error has historically been used in three different 
senses: as a cause of something (wrong site sur-
gery due to human error), as the action or event 
itself (removing the incorrect kidney) or as the 
outcome of an action (the death of a patient from 
renal failure). The distinctions are not absolute in 
that many uses of the term involve both cause and 
consequence to different degrees, but they do 
have a very different emphasis.
The most precise definition of error, and most 
in accord with everyday usage, is one that ties it 
to observable behaviours and actions. As a work-
ing definition, John Senders [3] proposed that an 
error means that something has been done which:
• Was not desired by a set of rules or an external 
observer
• Led the task or system outside acceptable 
limits
• Was not intended by the actor
This definition of error, and other similar ones 
[2], imply a set of criteria for defining an error:
• First, there must be a set of rules or standards, 
either explicitly defined or at least implied and 
accepted in that environment
• Second, there must be some kind of failure or 
‘performance shortfall’
• Third, the person involved did not intend this 
and must, at least potentially, have been able 
to act in a different way
All three of these criteria can be challenged, or 
at least prove difficult to pin down in practice. 
Much clinical medicine is inherently uncertain 
and there are frequently no easily applicable pro-
tocols to guide treatment. In addition, the failure 
is not necessarily easy to identify; it is certainly 
not always clear, at least at the time, when a diag-
nosis is wrong or at what point blood levels of a 
drug become dangerously high. Finally, the 
notion of intention, and in theory at least being 
able to act differently, is challenged by the fact 
that people’s behaviour is often influenced by 
factors, such as fatigue or peer pressure, which 
they may not be aware of and have little control 
over. So, while the working definition is reason-
able, we should be aware of the difficulties of 
applying it in practice.
3.3  Understanding Error
In his analysis of different types of error, James 
Reason [4] divides them into two broad types of 
error: slips and lapses, which are errors of action, 
and mistakes which are, broadly speaking, errors 
of knowledge or planning. Reason also discusses 
violations which, as distinct from error, are inten-
tional acts which, for one reason or another, devi-
ate from the usual or expected course of action. 
These psychological analyses are mainly con-
cerned, with failures at a particular time and 
probe the underlying mechanisms of error. There 
is therefore not necessarily a simple correspon-
dence with medical errors which, as discussed 
above, may refer to events happening over a 
period of time. However, we will see that this 
conceptual scheme is very helpful in understand-
ing errors in clinical practice and how they some-
times combine to cause harm to patients.
3.3.1  Slips and Lapses
Slips and lapses occur when a person knows what 
they want to do, but the action does not turn out 
as they intended. Slips relate to observable 
actions and are associated with attentional fail-
ures, whereas lapses are internal events and asso-
ciated with failures of memory. Slips and lapses 
occur during the largely automatic performance 
of some routine task, usually in familiar sur-
roundings. They are almost invariably associated 
with some form of distraction, either from the 
person’s surrounding or their own preoccupation 
with something in mind.
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A trainee doctor working on a surgical ward is pre-
scribing an antibiotic for a patient after a ward 
round. Just as she opens the patient’s drug chart 
on the computer a nurse interrupts because he is 
concerned about a patient with very low blood 
pressure. The doctor goes with the nurse forgetting 
to complete the prescription. Other tasks follow 
and there is a substantial delay in delivery of the 
antibiotic and the patient becomes profoundly 
septic.
3.3.2  Mistakes
Slips and lapses are errors of action; you intend 
to do something, but it does not go according to 
plan. With mistakes, the actions may go entirely 
as planned but the plan itself deviates from some 
adequate path towards its intended goal. Here the 
failure lies at a higher level: with the mental pro-
cesses involved in planning, formulating inten-
tions, judging, and problem solving [4]. If a 
doctor treats someone with chest pain as if they 
have a myocardial infarction, when in fact they 
have a perforated gastric ulcer, then this is a mis-
take. The intention is clear, the action corre-
sponds with the intention, but the plan was 
wrong.
Rule-based mistakes occur when the person 
already knows some rule or procedure, acquired 
as the result of training or experience. Rule-based 
mistakes may occur through applying the wrong 
rule, such as treating someone for influenza when 
you should follow the guidelines for meningo-
coccal sepsis. Alternatively, the mistake may 
occur because the procedure itself is faulty (defi-
cient clinical guidelines for instance).
A swab is inadvertently left in a wound after sur-
gery because the standard operating procedure for 
counting swabs is not followed properly. 
(Misapplication of a good rule)
A patient is transferred from one site to another 
with inadequate medical assistance and monitor-
ing. (Application of a bad rule: the standard oper-
ating procedure for the safe transfer of patients is 
poorly designed and difficult to understand, the 
patient is inappropriately deemed fit for low 
dependency transport)
Knowledge-based mistakes occur in novel 
situations where the solution to a problem has to 
be worked out on the spot. For instance, a doctor 
may simply be unfamiliar with the clinical pre-
sentation of a particular disease, or there may be 
multiple diagnostic possibilities and no clear way 
of choosing between them; a surgeon may have 
to guess at the source of the bleeding and make 
an understandable mistake in their assessment in 
the face of considerable stress and uncertainty. In 
none of these cases, does the clinician have a 
good ‘mental model’ of what is happening to 
base their decisions on, still less a specific rule or 
procedure to follow?
In knowledge-based mistakes, the changes 
encountered are not recognisable or planned for 
and rely on the cognitively effortful and error 
prone processes of reasoning:
A patient deteriorates rapidly after extubation on 
intensive care and the endotracheal tube cannot be 
repositioned in the usual way (via the mouth or 
nose). The team involved has not faced such a chal-
lenging situation before and the opportunity to site 
a surgical airway (tracheostomy) at an early stage 
is missed. The challenges of making decisions 
about the choice of airway are compounded by the 
high levels of stress in this situation.
3.3.3  Violations
Errors are, by definition, unintended in the sense 
that we do not want to make errors. Violations, in 
contrast, are deliberate deviations from safe oper-
ating practices, procedures, standards, or rules. 
This is not to say that people intend that there 
should be a bad outcome, as when someone 
deliberately sabotages a piece of equipment; usu-
ally, people hope that the violation of procedures 
won’t matter on this occasion or will actually 
help get the job done. Violations differ from 
errors in several important ways. Whereas errors 
are primarily due to our human limitations in 
thinking and remembering, violations are more 
closely linked with attitudes, motivation, and the 
work environment. The social context of viola-
tions is very important and understanding them, 
and if necessary curbing them, requires attention 
to the culture of the wider organisation as well as 
the attitudes of the people concerned.
Reason distinguishes three types of 
violations.
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• A routine violation is basically cutting corners 
for one reason or another, perhaps to save time 
or simply to get on to another more urgent 
task.
• A necessary violation occurs when a person 
flouts a rule because it seems the only way to 
get the job done. For example, a nurse may 
give a drug which should be double checked 
by another nurse, but there is no one else avail-
able. The nurse will probably give the drug, 
knowingly violating procedure, but hoping 
that this is in the patient’s interest.
• Optimising violations which are for personal 
gain, sometimes just to get off work early or, 
more sinister, to alleviate boredom, ‘for 
kicks’. Think of a trainee surgeon carrying out 
a difficult operation in the middle of the night, 
without supervision, when the case could eas-
ily wait until morning. The motivation is 
partly to gain experience, to test oneself out, 
but there may be a strong element of the 
excitement of sailing close to the wind in defi-
ance of the senior surgeon’s instructions.
In practice, the distinction between slips, mis-
takes, and violations is not always clear, either to 
an observer or the person concerned. The rela-
tionship between the observed behaviour, which 
can be easily described, and the psychological 
mechanism often hard to discern. Giving the 
wrong drug might be a slip (attention wandered 
and the doctor picked up the wrong syringe), a 
mistake (misunderstanding about the drug to be 
given), or even a violation (deliberate over seda-
tion of a difficult patient). The concepts are not 
easy to put into practice, except in circumstances 
where the action, context, and personal charac-
teristics of those involved can be quite carefully 
explored.
3.4  Understanding the Influence 
of the Wider System
Human beings have the opportunity to contribute 
to accidents and clinical incidents at many differ-
ent points in the process of production and opera-
tion. Problems and failures may occur in the 
design, testing, implementation of a new system, 
its maintenance and operation. The most obvious 
errors and failures are usually those that are the 
immediate causes of an accident, such as a train 
driver going through a red light or a doctor pick-
ing up the wrong syringe and injecting a fatal 
drug.
The immediate causes described above are the 
result of actions, or omissions, by people at the 
scene. However, other factors further back in the 
causal chain can also play a part in the genesis of 
an accident or a serious clinical incident. These 
‘latent conditions’ lay the foundations for acci-
dents in the sense that they create the conditions 
in which errors and failures can occur [5]. This 
places the operators at the sharp end in an invidi-
ous position as James Reason eloquently 
explains:
Rather than being the instigators of an accident, 
operators tend to be the inheritors of system 
defects …their part is usually that of adding the 
final garnish to a lethal brew whose ingredients 
have already been long in the cooking [4]
The organisational accident model applies this 
perspective to the study and analysis of accidents 
in many complex industries [5]. The accident 
sequence begins (from the left) with the negative 
consequences of organisational processes, such 
as planning, scheduling, forecasting, design, 
maintenance, strategy, and policy. The latent con-
ditions so created are transmitted along various 
organisational and departmental pathways to the 
workplace (the operating theatre, the ward, etc.), 
where they create the local conditions that pro-
mote the commission of errors and violations 
(e.g. high workload or poor human–equipment 
interfaces). Many unsafe acts are likely to be 
committed, but very few of them will penetrate 
the defences to produce damaging outcomes. The 
fact that engineered safety features, such as 
alarms or standard procedures, can be deficient 
due to latent conditions as well as active failures 
is shown in Fig.  3.1 by the arrow connecting 
organisational processes directly to defences.
The model presents the people at the sharp 
end as the inheritors rather than as the instigators 
of an accident sequence. Reason points out that 
this may simply seem as if the ‘blame’ for 
 accidents has been shifted from the sharp end to 
the system managers. However, managers too are 
































Fig. 3.1 Organisational accident model from Vincent [6]
operating in a complex environment and the 
effects of their actions are not always apparent; 
they are no more, and no less, to blame than those 
at the sharp end of the clinical environment [7]. 
Reason also describes the human as the hero in 
complex work environments where errors are 
noticed, corrected, and accidents prevented, far 
more frequently than they are missed [8].
We should emphasise that not every slip, 
lapse, or mistake needs to be understood in terms 
of the full organisational framework; some errors 
are confined to the local context and can be 
largely explained by individual factors and the 
characteristics of the particular task at hand. 
However, major incidents almost always evolve 
over time, involve a number of people and a con-
siderable number of contributory factors; in these 
circumstances the organisational model proves 
very illuminating.
3.5  Contributory Factors: Seven 
Levels of Safety
Reason’s model has been extended and adapted 
for use in a healthcare setting, classifying the 
error producing conditions and organisational 
factors in a single broad framework of factors 
affecting clinical practice (see Table 3.1).
At the top of the framework are patient fac-
tors. In any clinical situation, the patient’s condi-
tion will have the most direct influence on 
practice and outcome. Other patient factors such 
as personality, language, and psychological prob-
lems may also be important as they can influence 
communication with staff. The design of the task, 
the availability and clarity of protocols and 
guidelines may influence the care process and 
affect the quality of care. Individual factors 
include the knowledge, skills, and experience of 
each member of staff, which will obviously affect 
their clinical practice. Each staff member is part 
of a team within the inpatient or community unit, 
and part of the wider organisation of the hospital, 
primary care, or mental health service. The way 
an individual practises, and their impact on the 
patient, is constrained and influenced by other 
members of the team and the way they communi-
cate, support and supervise each other. The team 
is influenced in turn by management actions and 
by decisions made at a higher level in the organ-
isation. These include policies for the use of 
locum or agency staff, continuing education, 
training, and supervision and the availability of 
equipment and supplies. The organisation itself is 
affected by the institutional context, including 
financial constraints, external regulation, and the 
broader economic and political climate.
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3.6  Putting It All Together: 
Illustration of Two Cases 
from an Acute Care Setting
Cases and clinical stories have always been used in 
medical schools and clinical practice as a means of 
education and reflection on the nature of disease. 
The presentation of a case of diabetes, for instance, 
will illuminate understanding of the evolution of 
the disease, potential complications, and impact 
on the patient and their family. Cases can also be 
used to illustrate the process of clinical decision-
making, the weighing of treatment options and 
sometimes, particularly when errors are discussed, 
the personal impact of incidents and mishaps. 
Incident analysis, for the purposes of improving 
the safety of healthcare, may encompass all of 
these perspectives but critically also includes 
reflection on the broader healthcare system.
We now take the concepts described above 
and apply them to clinical practice to show how 
chains of errors can combine to cause harm to 
patients. We also examine the role of the wider 
organisation by considering the various factors 
that contribute to the likelihood of an error and 
harm to a patient. We consider two illustrative 
cases of common presentations in acute hospital 
settings. The first evolved over several days and 
the second over a much shorter time frame 
(hours). In each case, we see a chain of errors and 
other problems in the process of care which com-
bine to cause harm to the patient. We also, impor-
tantly, see how working conditions and wider 
organisational issues impact on clinical work and 
how vulnerabilities in the healthcare system pose 
major risks to patients.
3.6.1  Case 1: An Avoidable 
Patient Fall
Box 3.1 provides an overview of the events lead-
ing up to an avoidable fall on a medical ward. 
This 88-year-old man had multiple health 
 problems and was admitted in a confused and 
distressed state. He fell while in hospital with 
Box 3.1: An Avoidable Patient Fall
Day 1
An 88-year-old man was brought to the 
emergency department (ED) in the early 
afternoon by his wife and daughter. He had 
been becoming increasingly confused at 
home and was not taking care of himself as 
he normally would. His past medical his-
tory included chronic obstructive pulmo-
nary disease, aortic valve replacement for 
stenosis, a laminectomy for sciatic nerve 
decompression, and benign prostatic 
hypertrophy. His presenting complaint was 
worsening confusion and hallucinations, 
disturbed sleep, poor appetite, and 
increased shortness of breath.
He was clerked in by a trainee doctor at 
16:20 and seen by a consultant physician at 
Table 3.1 Framework of contributory factors influenc-
ing clinical practice (from Vincent et al. [9])
Factor types Contributory influencing factor
Patient factors Condition (complexity and 
seriousness)
Language and communication




Task design and clarity of structure
Availability and use of protocols







Physical and mental health
Team factors Verbal communication
Written communication





Staffing levels and skills mix
Workload and shift patterns
Design, availability, and 
maintenance of equipment







Financial resources and constraints
Organisational structure
Policy, standards, and goals
Safety culture and priorities
Institutional 
context factors
Economic and regulatory context
National health service executive
Links with external organisations
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17:15 when a provisional diagnosis of sep-
sis of unknown origin was made. A bed 
was found on a medical ward (MW) and 
was transferred from ED at 21:00.
A falls risk assessment was undertaken 
in ED and he was found to be at high risk, 
unfortunately no falls action plan was made 
and the level of risk was not adequately 
handed over to the staff on MW. The family 
spoke to members of staff in ED and on 
MW about their concerns that the patient 
may fall and injure himself particularly as 
the bed on MW was in a bay at the end of 
the ward where the patient would not be 
easy to observe.
The ward was busy and it was staffed to 
agreed levels but the dependency of the 
patients was high. The nurse looking after 
this patient decided that he was settled and 
did not need 1:1 care but asked the care 
support worker (CSW) to review him regu-
larly. The patient was being cared for on a 
bed with side rails (not recommended in 
high risk patients as they can become 
entangled in the rails if they are confused) 
and not on a low level bed with “crash mat-
tresses” either side as recommended for 
patients at risk of falling.
At approximately 21:45 the patient was 
found on the floor by the bed having fallen. 
He was confused and complaining of pain 
in the right hip and thigh. He was reviewed 
by the trainee doctor on call whose note 
read (sic)
Asked to see patient as unwitnessed fall, 
found by nursing staff alert but very con-
fused, admitted with confusion and urinary 
tract infection. Plan for ECG, review of 
right hip in the morning for development of 
swelling/bruising, close observation to pre-
vent further falls, day team to consider if 
further imaging is required.
The patient was moved to a bay where 
he could be closely observed, the ECG was 
reviewed (nothing acute was seen) and the 
nursing notes recorded an otherwise 
uneventful night with no obvious pain.
Day 2
The morning ward round was conducted 
by a different trainee doctor and the speech 
and language therapists came to review the 
patient and decided that he was too drowsy 
and confused to take fluid safely by mouth 
and so the intravenous infusion should con-
tinue. The trainee doctor decided that an 
X-Ray of the right hip should be done but 
requested it as a routine investigation and it 
was not, therefore, prioritised. The hando-
ver to the trainee doctor on call that night 
mentioned that the X-Ray had not been 
done and that it needed ‘chasing’.
Day 3
A different trainee doctor undertook the 
ward round and notes concerns were raised 
in the nursing notes about bruising around 
the right knee but the patient also had a low 
blood pressure requiring closer monitoring 
and a fluid challenge. By 13:15, the X-ray 
had still not been done and the trainee doctor 
called the radiology department. At 16:00, 
the trainee doctor was called by the radiolo-
gist to report a hip fracture and suggest an 
urgent referral to the trauma surgeons.
While this patient was successfully 
treated for his hip fracture and returned 
home, the fall he sustained led to unneces-
sary pain, a protracted recovery and added 
to the concern felt by his family.
long-term consequences for his mobility and 
quality of life. We could easily see his fall as sim-
ply being the consequence of his frail condition 
and not the fault of healthcare staff. However, 
whether or not we regard anyone as being at fault, 
this story exposes some vulnerabilities in the 
healthcare system.
Following the event outline above, we can 
identify a series of problems in the care provided 
and a number of wider contributory factors. 
Figure 3.2 provides a summary of the key error 
points during this patient’s admission to hospital 
and includes error types and contributory factors. 
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The contributory factors in the evolution of this 
incident were a mixture of problems with sys-
tems, organizational, work, and team factors—
the kind of issues seen in most healthcare adverse 
events (these are categorised according to the 
London Protocol in Table 3.1).
An elderly patient with sepsis is difficult to 
assess because of their multiple comorbidities and 
the difficulties of communicating with someone 
who is confused. The emergency department and 
ward were also very busy reducing the time avail-
able. Nevertheless, we can identify the following 
problems or ‘error points’ in the sequence of care:
• Every adult over 65  years admitted to an 
acute hospital in the NHS should receive a 
falls risk assessment but it was not done 
properly. This patient was assessed for falls 
risk and was categorised (appropriately) as 
‘high risk’ but no plan to reduce the risk was 
put in place and the information was not 
clearly handed over by the ED nurse to the 
nurse on MW.
• Although at high risk of a falls the patient was 
placed in a bay which was difficult to observe 
and not kept under close observation. The 
Care Support Worker allocated to the bay was 
busy with someone else while this patient 
attempted to get of bed and fell.
• The trainee doctor on call on the night of the 
fall did an appropriate assessment of the 
patient but did not handover his concerns 
about the risk of fracture adequately.
• On Day 3 the patient had an additional prob-
lem (low blood pressure) another different 
trainee doctor (without senior assistance) 
reviewed the patient but was distracted by the 
low blood pressure and did not prioritise the 
investigation of the hip.
These are the principle error points (active 
failures in Reason’s terms) in the care of this man 
that played a part in both the fall and to the 
delayed diagnosis of fracture. We can also 
(Table 3.2) look at the wide range of factors that 
contributed to these problems occurring. These 
included: the frailty and confusion of the patient 
made assessment difficult, the inconsistent meth-
ods for monitoring and recording falls, the inex-
perience of the junior doctor, the lack of 
systematic handover, and the fact that at night the 
hospital has a lower nurse to patient ratio and that 
other elderly patients required a high level of sup-
port from the nurses on duty.
DAY 3 Different team on ward round, no senior review, patient has
low BP, trainee doctor delays chasing hip X-Ray whilst treating BP -
fracture diagnosed 2 days after fall
DAY 1 Patient admitted to ED with confusion and possible sepsis and
multiple comorbidities - inadequate use of protocol for patients at high
risk of falls, no standard approach to recording falls risk
DAY 1 Patient's family express concerns about risk of falling - handover to
staff on ward inadequate
DAY 1 Admitted to MW at 21:00 five hours after arrival in bed with side
rails up - inadequate use of protective measures for patients at high
risk of falls
DAY 1 Patient has unwitnessed fall - patient in bed at end of busy
medical ward, no measures for close observation of patient in place
DAY 1 Trainee doctor mentions X-Ray but does not order during
night - failure to detect fracture in confused patient, no senior
doctor on ward round
DAY 2 Different trainee doctor reviews patient and orders hip X-Ray -
failure to escalate concerns to senior doctor, failure to detect fracture in
confused patient, no senior review
Key:
Arrows mark key points in the
evolution of the incident
ED - Emergency Department


















Fig. 3.2 Error chain describing key error points leading to an avoidable fall and a delay in diagnosis of hip fracture. 
Contributory factors (from the London Protocol) are highlighted and colour coded according to type
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Box 3.2: An Avoidable Emergency 
Laparotomy in a Case of Ectopic Pregnancy
A 28-year-old woman with abdominal pain 
and lethargy arrived in the busy emergency 
department (ED) at 16:19 and was seen by 
a triage nurse who recorded some baseline 
observations and referred the patient to the 
ED trainee doctor, stating that she was “not 
worried” about the patient. The protocol 
for the investigation and management of 
early pregnancy in ED was inadequate, and 
there was a delay in sending the necessary 
blood samples for diagnosis. The track and 
trigger score was incorrectly calculated and 
follow-up observations (for heart rate and 
blood pressure) were, therefore, not 
increased in frequency resulting in a delay 
in calling for an expert opinion from a gyn-
aecologist. The ED trainee doctor did not 
3.6.2  Case 2: An Avoidable 
Emergency Laparotomy 
in a Case of Ectopic Pregnancy
Box 3.2 provides an overview of events leading 
up to conversion to emergency laparotomy in a 
young woman with an ectopic pregnancy. The 
case resonates with the fall described above in the 
sense that it would be easy to see the delayed 
diagnosis and treatment as a result of the patient’s 
youth: her cardiovascular system was able to 
mask the signs of shock and so medical staff did 
not suspect haemorrhage. It is only when we take 
a more holistic view of the incident that we see 
the latent system and organisational issues which 
are summarised in Fig. 3.3 along with error types.
Diagnostic challenges are a part of every med-
ical student’s training and this case illustrates a 
well-recognised situation where haemorrhage is 
masked by the robust response of a healthy car-
Table 3.2 Contributory factors in a case of avoidable fall (from the London Protocol)
Contributory 
factors Examples from case of avoidable fall
Patient factors •  The patient was elderly and confused making communication and assessment more 
challenging (e.g. difficulty communicating pain in the hip after the fall)
•  Elderly confused patients find strange environments distressing contributing to the risk of 
wandering and falling
•  The patient’s comorbidities and acute illness (sepsis, poor swallow, low blood pressure) were 
a distraction to staff contributing to the delay in diagnosing the fracture




•  Protocols for the management of patients at risk of falling were not followed, a busy ED, and 
lack of adequate training in the use of the protocols contributed to this issue
•  Records of falls risk were made in different ways between clinical settings—the ED used a 
computer system and the MW had paper forms
Individual 
factors
•  The trainee doctors did not recognise the risk of fracture after a fall in elderly patients, lack of 
experience contributed to the delay in prioritising the hip X-ray
Team factors •  Missed opportunities in the handover of care within the nursing and medical teams and the 
multidisciplinary team overall
•  Trainee doctors did not provide adequate handovers regarding the fall and requirement for 
investigation to team members taking over care of the patient
• Trainee doctors did not escalate concerns to a senior member of the medical team




• Busy medical ward
•  Complicated, frail patient requiring extensive assistance with activities of daily living on top 
of the care required for the acute illness
•  Providing adequate supervision for a patient at risk of falls is challenging when a ward is 
busy and when staff numbers are lower (e.g. at night)
• The patient was in a bay at the end of the ward making it more difficult to observe him
Organisational 
factors
•  No standardised method of record keeping for falls assessment: electronic records in ED but 
paper records on MW
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recognise the urgency of the situation and 
when the referral was made to gynaecology 
the handover did not emphasise the seri-
ousness of the situation adequately. The 
trainee gynaecologist, therefore, advised 
that the patient be sent to the gynaecology 
ward for further assessment without com-
ing to ED to see the patient.
When the patient arrived on the ward, 
the senior trainee gynaecologist diagnosed 
an ectopic pregnancy and recognised that 
the patient’s condition was deteriorating 
(her haemoglobin had dropped signifi-
cantly to 99  g/L, her blood pressure was 
falling, and she was now complaining of 
shoulder tip pain). The decision was made 
to take the patient to theatre for emergency 
laparoscopic surgery and because it was 
now after 18:00, theatres in the main hospi-
tal were informed and the case was booked 
with the on-call anaesthetist. Audits had 
revealed that very few gynaecological 
emergencies came to theatre after normal 
working hours and consequently gynaeco-
logical patients were transferred to main 
theatres out of hours.
When the consultant surgeon was called 
(there was a 30 min delay in locating him), 
he agreed to come in and assist with the pro-
cedure. The patient arrived in theatre 5 h 
after the initial presentation with a very low 
blood pressure and a haemoglobin of 
67 g/L. The WHO pre-list briefing was com-
pleted without the consultant gynaecologist 
who did not arrive until the patient was 
anaesthetised and being prepared for surgery 
by the senior trainee gynaecologist and after 
the ‘time out’ section of the WHO checklist.
At this time, the patient was extremely 
unwell and there was significantly height-
ened pressure to get on with the procedure. 
Tensions were high and when problems 
arose with the laparoscopy equipment (an 
accidentally de-sterilised light source and 
diathermy forceps which were incompati-
ble with the electrical lead) behaviour dete-
riorated and exacerbated the stress felt by 
staff in theatre. The delays caused by the 
equipment problems necessitated a deci-
sion to convert to an open procedure which 
the Consultant made promptly in order to 
gain control of the bleeding. Once the 
haemorrhage was controlled and additional 
blood products were given the operation to 
remove the fallopian tube was completed 
uneventfully and the patient was stabilised 
and transferred to recovery with no further 
complications.
This case is similar to the one described 
above in that it contains the same types of 
contributory factors and errors that led to 
the eventual adverse event. The patient 
recovered well but had to stay in hospital 
longer to recover because the procedure 
was converted to a more invasive surgical 
approach.
diovascular system. However, what is not com-
monly taught in medical school curricula is the 
risk of missing diagnoses due to distraction and 
system failures. This young woman’s case illus-
trates those problems very well:
• The nurse in ED was using a poorly designed 
protocol for early pregnancy which did not 
stress the importance of urgent blood 
samples.
• The trainee doctor had limited experience, 
was busy with other cases, and was influenced 
by the nurse’s lack of concern. He therefore 
did not request an urgent review of the patient.
• Staffing problems in the hospital meant that 
emergency gynaecology cases after 18:00 had 
to be taken to main theatres and transfer time 
from the gynaecology ward was 20  min. 
Furthermore, no training was offered to sup-
port staff in acclimatising to the different work 
environment they would be in after hours.
• The WHO checklist was not used adequately 
which led to a lack of understanding of what 
type of equipment would be available and no 
opportunity for a discussion of potential prob-
lems and their mitigations.
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• The gynaecologists were not used to the scrub 
staff or the theatre environment and equip-
ment and when the situation became stressful 
the team did not function effectively and had 
to perform a more invasive operation to con-
trol the bleeding.
These are the principle error points leading to 
the emergency conversion to laparotomy in what 
could have been a more straightforward laparo-
scopic procedure. The heightened stress in this 
situation further impaired team function but the 
‘upstream’ delays in diagnosis, staff shortages, 
and the physical location of the ward and theatres 
along with organisation of the gynaecology ser-
vice out of hours all contributed to the ultimate 
crisis (see Table 3.3 for detailed categorisation of 
contributory factors).
3.7  Conducting Your Own 
Incident Investigation
There are a number of methods of investigation 
and analysis available in healthcare, though these 
tend to be comparatively under-developed in 
comparison with methods available in industry 
[10]. In the USA, the most familiar is the root 
cause analysis approach of the Joint Commission, 
an intensive process with its origins in Total 
Quality Management approaches to healthcare 
improvement [11]. The Veterans Hospital 
Administration has developed a highly structured 
system of triage questions which is being dis-
seminated throughout their system. We do not 
have space to examine all potential methods, 
which vary in their orientation, theoretical basis, 
and basic approach. All however, to a greater or 
lesser extent, uncover factors contributing to the 
final incident. We will summarise an approach 
developed at University College London by the 
Clinical Safety Research Unit known, imagina-
tively, as the London Protocol [12].
Most other approaches to analysing incidents 
in healthcare are termed ‘root cause analysis’; in 
contrast, we have described our own approach to 
the analysis of incidents as a systems analysis as 
we believe that it is a more accurate and more 
fruitful description. The term root cause analysis, 
while widespread, is misleading in a number of 
respects [13, 14]. Most importantly, it implies 
that the purpose of an investigation is to identify 
Patient's condition deteriorates conversion to open procedure required -
high stress levels in a team which does not normally work together,
consultant gynaecologist unaware of instrument problems
Young, fit woman admitted to ED with abdominal pain - urgency not
recognised by ED trainee doctor, nurse calculated track and trigger score
incorrectly
Delayed transfer to gynaecology ward - inadequate handover,
protocol for managing early pregnancy inadequate
Delayed diagnosis of ectopic pregnancy - senior gynaecology trainee
working on another site
Due to delay surgery has to be done in main theatres - all emergency
gynae surgery after hours takes place in main theatres
Variance in equipment not picked up - whole team not present for
WHO briefing
Problems with equipment for surgery - staff in main theatres unfamiliar
with laparoscopic equipment, consultant surgeon unfamiliar with main
theatres, failure to speak up about concerns re unfamiliarity
Key:
Arrows mark key points in the
evolution of the incident
















Fig. 3.3 Error chain describing key error points in a case of emergency laparotomy for ectopic pregnancy. Contributory 
factors (from the London Protocol) are highlighted and colour coded according to type
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a single or small number of ‘root causes’. If you 
look back at the two case examples however you 
will see that there is no ‘root cause’. Our analyses 
have shown a much more fluid and complex pic-
ture. Usually, there is a chain of events and a wide 
variety of contributory factors leading up to the 
eventual incident. Incident analysis, properly 
understood, is not a retrospective search for root 
causes but an attempt to use the incident as a 
‘window on the system’ to reveal the vulnerabili-
ties and hazards that are constant threats to 
patient care.
Too often the questions asked about an inci-
dent focus on “who?” rather than “how?” with 
the result that individuals rather than systems 
are targeted and blamed. High reliability organ-
isations have recognised the need to move away 
from a culture of blame, which leads to reluc-
tance to report incidents, and have developed a 
just culture where learning from incidents 
(including near misses) is encouraged and 
expected. The paradigm shift in these organisa-
tions is outlined in Table 3.4 but, unfortunately, 
is not yet well developed in healthcare [15].
Table 3.4 Critical incident paradigms (adapted from 
Woods et al. [15])
Old view New view
Human error is seen 
as a cause of failure
Human error is seen as the 
effect of systemic 
vulnerabilities deeper inside 
the organisation
Saying what people 
should have done is a 
satisfying way to 
describe failure
Saying what people should 
have done does not explain 
why it made sense for them to 
do what they did
Telling people to be 
more careful will 
make the problem go 
away
Only by constantly seeking 
out vulnerabilities can 
organisations enhance safety
Table 3.3 Contributory factors to a gynaecological emergency
Contributory 
factors Examples from case of ectopic pregnancy
Patient factors •  The patient’s initial presentation was not overtly serious (she was young and so signs of shock 
were masked) and led to a false sense of security in a less experienced member of the team 
(the ED trainee doctor)





• The protocol for the management of early pregnancy in ED was not adequate
•  The WHO briefing should have provided an opportunity to highlight the concerns about 
equipment but not all team members were present
Individual 
factors
• The trainee doctor in ED lacked experience in the management of early pregnancy
•  The scrub staff in theatre knew where the gynaecology equipment was kept but were not 
using it regularly and did not have regular training to maintain their competencies. When 
under pressure, the challenge of using unfamiliar equipment was too much
• The two gynaecologists were working in an unfamiliar theatre environment
•  During the most stressful time, the consultant gynaecologist became angry which caused 
additional stress to the other staff and led to impaired performance
Team factors • This team did not work together regularly
• The WHO briefing was not done with the whole team present
•  There was no regular programme of simulated emergency training to support the development 




• There was a shortage of theatre staff in gynaecology
•  The gynaecology ward and theatres are on another part of the hospital site, distant from ED 
and main theatres
•  It was not possible to staff gynaecology theatres out of hours. This necessitated transfer of 
gynaecology emergencies to main theatres (which took 20 min)




• Recruitment and retention of theatre staff was a problem across all theatre sites
• Theatre suites had been designed and built at different times with no standardisation
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3.8  Systems Analysis of Clinical 
Incidents
During an investigation, information is gleaned 
from a variety of sources. Case records, state-
ments, and any other relevant documentation are 
reviewed. Structured interviews with key mem-
bers of staff are then undertaken to establish the 
chronology of events, the main care delivery 
problems and their respective contributory fac-
tors, as perceived by each member of staff. 
Ideally, the patient, or a member of their family, 
should also be interviewed though as yet this is 
not yet common practice in these analyses. The 
key questions are ‘What happened? (the outcome 
and chronology); How did it happen? (the errors 
and care delivery problems); and Why did it hap-
pen? (the contributory factors)’.
Once the chronology of events is clear there 
are three main considerations: the errors and 
other care delivery problems identified within the 
chronology, the clinical context for each of them, 
and the factors contributing to the occurrence of 
the care delivery problems. Any combination of 
contributory factors might contribute to the 
occurrence of a single care delivery problem. The 
investigator needs to differentiate between those 
contributory factors that are only relevant on that 
particular occasion and those which are long-
standing or permanent features of the unit. For 
instance, there may be a failure of communica-
tion between two midwives which might be an 
isolated occurrence or might reflect a more gen-
eral pattern of poor communication on the unit.
While a considerable amount of information 
can be gleaned from written records, interviews 
with those involved are the most important 
method of identifying the contributory factors. 
This is especially so if the interview systemati-
cally explores these factors and so allows the 
member of staff to collaborate in the investiga-
tion. In the interview, the story and ‘the facts’ are 
just the first stage. The staff member is also 
encouraged to identify both the successful aspects 
of the care provided and the errors and care deliv-
ery problems. Both staff members and inter-
viewer can reflect together on the contributory 
factors, which greatly enriches both the interview 
and investigation.
Analyses using this method have been con-
ducted in hospitals, primary care settings, and 
mental health units. The protocol may be used in 
a variety of formats, by individual clinicians, 
researchers, risk managers, and by clinical teams. 
A clinical team may use the method to guide and 
structure reflection on an incident, to ensure that 
the analysis is full and comprehensive. For seri-
ous incidents, a team of individuals with different 
skills and backgrounds would be assembled 
though often only a risk manager or an individual 
clinician will be needed. The contributory factors 
that reflect more general problems in a unit are 
the targets for change and systems improvement. 
When obvious problems are identified action 
may be taken after a single incident, but when 
more substantial changes are being considered 
other incident analyses and sources of data (rou-
tine audits and outcome data) should also be 
taken into account.
3.8.1  From Analysis to Meaningful 
Action
When considering the error type in the context of 
the contributory factors at the time of the error, it 
becomes clearer how meaningful interventions 
might be made to prevent similar incidents in 
future. Sometimes incident investigations point 
to immediate changes that need to be made, such 
as replacement of faulty equipment or updating 
of misleading or inconsistent guidelines. 
Generally, however, we should not generate plans 
for major interventions on the basis of a single 
incident but draw on a wider range of informa-
tion and check that the findings of the incident 
are really indicative of more widespread prob-
lems. We can nevertheless think about usual 
intervention that might be made on the basis of 
our analyses of the two cases.
For example, in the first case there were sev-
eral rules-based mistakes. The protocol for falls 
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assessment and prevention was not used ade-
quately by the nurses. Some important contribu-
tory factors were the inconsistencies in falls risk 
assessment and recording and also the staffing 
shortages at critical times. These suggest poten-
tial interventions:
• A review of staffing levels and consideration 
of different working patterns to cover busy 
times more effectively could help
• Standardising the way falls risk assessments 
are recorded across all clinical areas (the 
use of electronic patient records can help 
here)
The second analysis reveals a rather different 
range of problems and contributory factors and, 
correspondingly, different types of potential 
interventions. Undertaking an emergency lapa-
roscopy is not an unusual occurrence in gynaeco-
logy but the knowledge-based mistake leading to 
conversion to an open procedure can be better 
understood when we realise that staff were unfa-
miliar with each other and their equipment and 
environment, the WHO checklist was done in a 
hurry and without the consultant surgeon present 
and that staff had not previously trained as a team 
to deal with crisis situations. Potential interven-
tions, therefore, might be:
• Scrub staff from gynaecology theatres could 
work on a rotational basis in the main theatres 
to ensure they used the environment and 
equipment and equipment could be stan-
dardised across sites
• Training to embed good practice in the use of 
the WHO checklist for theatre teams
• Regular simulation training to support staff in 
the management of emergencies
The design and implementation of realistic 
and sustainable interventions to prevent inci-
dents recurring is a topic outside the scope of this 
chapter. Suffice it to say that where possible the 
implementation of a physical rather than a pro-
cedural intervention is more likely to succeed 
(e.g. the design of a device to prevent retention of 
guidewires after the insertion of a central venous 
line rather than a change to the procedure requir-
ing additional checks to be made). However, in 
a financially constrained health service some-
times physical interventions may be prohibitively 
expensive and well-designed checklists with 
training to support embedding them in practice 
may be the best compromise [16].
3.9  Supporting Patients, 
Families, and Staff
In this chapter, we have focussed on understand-
ing how error and harm occur and offered mod-
els of understanding and practical approaches to 
investigation. We have hopefully persuaded you 
that understanding the wider psychological and 
organisational influences on clinical practice 
will enrich your approach to medicine and pro-
vide a foundation for improving the care pro-
vided to patients. The chapter would be 
incomplete however if we did not mention, if 
only briefly, the need to also consider the after-
math of serious errors and the needs of those 
affected [17].
The impact of a medical injury differs from 
most other accidents in two important respects. 
First, patients have been harmed, unintention-
ally, by people in whom they placed consider-
able trust, so their reaction may be especially 
powerful and hard to cope with. Secondly, and 
even more important, they are often cared for by 
the same professions, and perhaps the same peo-
ple, as those involved in the original injury. 
They may have been very frightened by what 
has happened to them, and have a range of con-
flicting feelings about those involved; this too 
can be very difficult, even when staff are sympa-
thetic and supportive. Many people harmed by 
their treatment suffer further trauma through the 
incident being insensitively and inadequately 
handled. Conversely when staff come forward, 
acknowledge the damage, and take the neces-
sary action, the overall impact can be greatly 
reduced.
In our two examples, the patients eventually 
recovered although both experienced much 
unnecessary anxiety and suffering in the process. 
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However, the long-term consequences some seri-
ous incidents can be life changing in terms of 
pain, disability, and effect on family relationships 
and the ability to work. Patients and families 
need support immediately after the serious inci-
dent and sometimes over long periods afterwards. 
The healthcare organisation concerned has a 
responsibility to provide or arrange for this care. 
Injured patients need an explanation, an apology, 
to know that changes have been made to prevent 
future incidents, and often also need practical and 
financial help. The absence of any of these fac-
tors can be a powerful stimulus to complaint or 
litigation.
Staff also suffer a variety of consequences 
when involved in serious incidents. Albert Wu 
captured the experience of making a serious error 
in his paper ‘the second victim’, not implying 
that the experiences of staff were necessarily 
comparable to those of injured patients [18]. 
Surgeons, for instance, can be seriously affected 
by serious complications that they perceive to 
have been their fault. Emotional reactions range 
from guilt and crisis of confidence, to anger and 
worry about one’s career. Even though the intense 
emotional impact progressively fades, there are 
certain cases that surgeons recollect many years 
later. Serious complications often make surgeons 
more conservative or risk-adverse in the manage-
ment of patients, which can be detrimental for 
patient care [19].
3.10  Conclusions 
and Recommendations
It is an unfortunate truth that the prevailing cul-
ture around serious incidents in healthcare 
remains one of blame. When a serious incident 
occurs, the first priority is obviously the care of 
the patient and family. The second priority how-
ever should be supporting colleagues and not 
rushing to blame or condemn people who make 
serious mistakes. Some types of behaviour 
deserve blame and sanctions, but even the best 
people make honest mistakes. When this hap-
pens, they need support from both colleagues and 
their organisation both for their own well-being 
and for the sake of all the patients they will be 
looking after in the future.
High reliability organisations have spent 
decades developing robust, standardised systems 
of investigating incidents including the establish-
ment of truly independent expert investigative 
bodies (such as the UK’s Air Accident 
Investigation Branch, https://www.gov.uk/gov-
ernment/organisations/air-accidents-investiga-
tion-branch). Healthcare has learnt from some of 
these lessons and in April 2017 the Healthcare 
Safety Investigation Branch was established in 
the NHS (https://www.hsib.org.uk) with the 
stated purpose of ‘improving patient safety 
through effective and independent investigations 
that don’t apportion blame or liability’. Their 
work has only just begun but will draw on exist-
ing expertise in the NHS to capture the widely 
shared ambition of learning from the past to 
improve the future.
Some branches of medicine, most notably 
anaesthesia, have been at the forefront of devel-
opments in patient safety [20, 21]. Human fac-
tors is a core theme throughout the postgraduate 
curricula for anaesthesia training and quick ref-
erence handbooks (much like those in the mili-
tary or civil aviation) have been developed as 
cognitive aids for diagnostic challenges particu-
larly in crises (https://anaesthetists.org/Home/
R e s o u r c e s - p u b l i c a t i o n s / S a f e t y - a l e r t s /
Anaesthesia-emergencies/Quick-Reference-
Handbook). These developments in postgraduate 
specialty curricula must be extended to under-
graduate teaching in medical and nursing 
schools. It is only by ensuring that young profes-
sionals in healthcare are equipped with the nec-
essary tools to understand the complex, rapidly 
evolving systems in which they will be working, 
that they will be able to improve them [22].
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Looking to the Future
Peter Lachman
Learning Objectives
• Understand the future challenges for patient 
safety
• Describe how psychological safety is essential 
for safety
• List the social determinants of patient safety
• Comprehend the concepts of co-production of 
safety
• List facilitators and risks of new technologies 
for safety
4.1  Introduction
In this chapter, I will explore the issues that we 
need to address as we proceed on the safety jour-
ney. This will include reflections on the beliefs 
that have resulted in the healthcare system we 
have created. It is important to consider the real 
issues of design and whether we need to change 
all aspects of healthcare delivery if we really 
want to be safe.
It is clear that the rapid progress in medical 
science over the past century has resulted in 
untold benefits for all. Foucault [1] described the 
emergence as the development of the “clinical 
gaze”, whereby the person became a patient with 
a disease, so was no longer a person, but rather a 
“clinical diagnosis” subject to tests and interven-
tions. As a result, the needs of the person were 
changed, and their narrative was not as important 
as the medical tests and investigations. There 
have been many benefits in the development of 
modern medicine and the science that was cre-
ated to provide successful interventions. People 
who became patients were cured or provided lon-
gevity. This in turn has resulted in the new chal-
lenges of chronic disease and the ageing 
population [2]. Unfortunately, in many societies, 
there are both the old problems of infection and 
late treatment of disease, as well as the new prob-
lems of ageing and chronicity. In addition, eco-
nomic and political decisions have created a vast 
challenge of poverty-related healthcare with 
poorer outcomes.
Alongside the technological advance, we also 
have the loss of the compassionate part of healing 
which has had a major impact on the psychologi-
cal safety of healthcare providers and the people 
who receive care. The improvement in outcomes 
in terms of disease management has been accom-
panied by increasing levels of adverse events and 
harm. The development of the patient safety 
movement over the past 20 years is a reflection of 
the advances in healthcare and the realisation that 
with success came a new problem of inadvertent 
harm. On reflection, healthcare delivery was not 
planned to be safe.
As we look to the future, the healthcare indus-
try is at a critical juncture. The rapid develop-
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ment of theories on how to deliver safe, 
person-centred care means that we can no longer 
rely on the excuse that “healthcare is different” 
from other industries, so cannot be reliable and 
safe. People are now demanding safety and reli-
ability in the care they receive, and they want to 
be treated as people who happen to be ill, rather 
than as a number or a disease. Currently, it is by 
chance rather than by design that one receives 
highly reliable person-centred and safe care. Yet 
we continue to build the same type of hospitals, 
educate future nurses and clinicians as we have 
always done, and operate in a hierarchical system 
that disempowers people, rather than enables 
people to be healthy.
An examination of the patient safety move-
ment provides an understanding of where we 
need to go as we plan for the future. With some 
imagination, we can redesign the processes of 
care to be compassionate and safe. Bates and 
Singh [3] note that there has been much progress 
since the publication of To Err is Human [4]. We 
have learnt many methods of quality improve-
ment, and patient safety as a science has numer-
ous theories, methodologies, and tools that, if 
implemented, can decrease harm: “Highly effec-
tive interventions have since been developed and 
adopted for hospital-acquired infections and 
medication safety, although the impact of these 
interventions varies because of their inconsistent 
implementation and practice. Progress in 
addressing other hospital-acquired adverse 
events has been variable” [3].
Amalberti and Vincent [5] have taken the view 
that the healthcare delivery system has inherent 
risk and that the focus of patient safety should be 
on the proactive management of that risk. This is 
true of any complex adaptive system, which 
makes it difficult to be safe all the time [6]. 
However, the health system has not been designed 
with safety as the core function. Given that we 
know that there is more complexity, perhaps a 
total redesign of the system is the way we need to 
go as we move to the future.
Although the provision of healthcare is com-
plex, it is possible to overcome the complexity 
and provide care that is of the highest standard in 
all the domains of quality. To achieve a safe sys-
tem, we will need to address some fundamental 
issues that we have accepted as the norm.
4.2  The Vision for the Future
The future vision is often reflected in the concept 
of Zero Harm. There are movements to apply the 
standards to medicine that we accept in other 
industries. The argument for and against zero harm 
is compelling. If we do not aim for zero, what is 
the number we need to aim for? It may be that we 
aim for zero in some specific areas while accepting 
that within the complexity of the healthcare zero, 
the totality of zero is a mirage, one that we need to 
aim for but will never reach. It has been argued 
that the ideal of Zero Harm is unrealistic [7], that 
we should accept the inherent risk in the delivery 
of healthcare and therefore actively adopt patient 
safety initiatives to improve outcomes and mini-
mise risk. Furthermore, we need to accept the 
stresses healthcare systems face in the delivery of 
care—be it of demand, finance, or morale.
4.3  The Challenges to Overcome 
to Facilitate Safety
The pursuit of a healthcare system that is safe 
will require courage, as the current power base is 
not conducive to safe care. The power of the 
medical profession, pharmaceutical industry, and 
supporting bodies is based on the current model 
of care, with hierarchies and structures. Hospitals, 
as a concept, gained their power in the last cen-
tury and were developed for the illnesses that we 
have now addressed, so the next stage is to inte-
grate that power with the wider health commu-
nity. This will result in changing the power 
imbalance in the system and the recognition that 
the design of a system with the hospital at the 
centre can be changed to the hospital as the facili-
tator of health within a system of care delivery 
which is focused closer to the home. This will 
require a reallocation of resources to primary 
care and a change of healthcare to health. There 
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is a way forward to address these key issues and 
there is hope that in time healthcare delivery and 
the promotion of health will be safe with proac-
tive minimisation of risk. People will still be 
harmed; however, the degree of harm will be dif-
ferent to the current situation. As we redesign 
services to be safer in the future, we will need a 
vision that sees beyond the current challenge and 
plans for an integrated service of care focused on 
health rather than disease (Box 4.1).
4.4  Develop the Language 
and Culture of Safety
• Use of the language that enhances safety
• Leaders asking the right questions about 
safety
• Educate people for safety
As healthcare is a complex system, so is the 
culture which is manifest within any organisa-
tion. Culture defines our belief systems and in 
turn how we behave. Within any organisation this 
will be complex, with differing safety cultures 
[8]. The culture we represent is evident in the lan-
guage we use. Patient safety is the current termi-
nology and as we move to a more people-centred 
approach, the language we use will evolve to 
being people centred rather than patient focused. 
Language reflects culture, so if we want to 
develop a safety culture, then we will need to 
critically analyse the terminology we use. 
Healthcare is a misnomer as it focuses on disease 
management, whereas we need to focus on health 
and the maintenance of both physical and mental 
well-being. Patients will be protected if we view 
them as people with a disease, with a life outside 
the disease, rather than as patients with a disease. 
This results in a loss of power and control over 
their own lives and lack of power may be a con-
tributing cause of harm.
Patient Safety is the overall science, Risk 
Management was the first intervention that was 
developed in the safety journey. In essence, this 
was not about managing risk but rather about man-
aging incidents that had occurred. While this is 
essential, it has not resulted in a decrease in harm 
and the learning from it has not been as great as it 
should be. The move to learning from investiga-
tion has been one of the greatest challenges we 
have faced. If one considers the integration of 
resilience engineering into the risk management 
approach, then the incident investigation will be a 
study of work as it really is over the pathway and 
not the incident. We now need to move to the con-
cept of looking at the patient journey and how 
health is provided, so that the person is protected 
at all parts of the journey [9]. Management of risk 
is a proactive activity and is what should happen at 
Box 4.1: Changes for the Future
 1. Develop the language and culture of 
safety
• Use the right language about safety
• Leaders ask the right questions about 
safety
• Educate people for safety
 2. Promote psychological safety
• Care for both physical and psycho-
logical safety of people
• Nurture providers of care and pro-
vide meaning in work
• Ensure that providers of care have a 
sense of belonging
• Listen to and hear person stories
 3. Design for safety
• Invest in health rather than 
healthcare
• Co-produce safety with people not 
with patients
• Place people in charge of their health, 
not their disease
• Use human factors to address 
complexity
 4. Social determinants for Patient Safety
• Recognise the importance of social 
determinants of health and their 
impact on safety
• Care is culturally sensitive and pro-
motes safety
 5. Harnessing technology for the future
• Digital health for safety
• Empowering people with 
technology
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all times, not only when there is an incident. It 
implies the acceptance of risk rather than the 
desire to eliminate risk, and constant mitigation 
will decrease the potential for harm.
Another example of language ambiguity is the 
term, “near misses”, which is used for when we 
nearly harm a person but then either due to the 
action of an individual, or by chance the person is 
not harmed. This is really a near hit and if it were 
termed as such, perhaps we would pay more 
attention to the problem.
Leadership for safety will be the foundation of 
future work in patient safety. Leaders in health-
care are at all levels in the system, as there needs 
to be a focus in every microsystem as well in the 
de facto leadership at executive level. This 
includes the appreciation of uncertainty, the inte-
gration of information from different sources and 
the setting of the goals that will allow for the 
development of safe systems. Leadership, there-
fore, needs to be encouraged at all levels of the 
organisation, with the development and facilita-
tion of local leadership at the interface with the 
patient as the key to ensure that there will be a 
safe environment. Change will require leaders 
who understand what quality, safe person-centred 
care really is, with a deep understanding of 
Systems Theory and Human Factors, as well as 
knowing how to realign the budget to facilitate 
change. This requires vision to set the direction, 
hope to provide succour in trying times, respect 
for what is being changed and for the work that is 
done, and courage to make the changes against 
the resistance that the past ways will present.
At a policy level, the wider implication of a 
total redesign of the system will require political 
will to allow the realignment and re-engineering 
of the healthcare system to one in which all pol-
icy is aimed at the long-term health of the com-
munity. Politicians need to invest in health while 
funding healthcare.
All of this change will require courage and 
imagination, vision, and hope. But more impor-
tantly, it will require co-production with all the 
people involved, particularly people who will be 
receiving care. The patient safety movement has 
tended to apply tools and methods to people, 
rather than designing with them. This implies the 
need to be open and transparent with patients and 
their families.
The healthcare workforce will require an edu-
cation that enables them to deliver health as well 
as manage disease safely. This will require an 
understanding of the theories of Complexity 
Science, Systems Theory, Patient Safety Science, 
and Human Factors. Medical curricula must be 
challenged and changed to educate the clinicians 
that we require in the future [10].
4.5  Promote Psychological 
Safety
• Care for both physical and psychological 
safety of people
• Nurture providers of care and provide mean-
ing in work
• Ensure that providers of care have a sense of 
belonging
• Address the challenge of clinician burnout
Psychological safety is the foundation for pro-
viding safe care for individuals. The work by 
Edmondson has led the way to understanding 
that, in order to deliver safe care, we need to 
engender the “psychological safety” of individu-
als in the health workplace, so that they in turn are 
part of the overall culture of safety. Edmondson 
defines psychological safety as a “shared belief 
held by members of a team that the team is safe 
for interpersonal risk-taking” [11–13]. 
The safety movement has called for organisa-
tions to facilitate safety culture, in which indi-
viduals have responsibilities to be safe and to 
carry out their work in a manner that will miti-
gate against harm. Given the complexity of the 
type of work undertaken in healthcare, this is dif-
ficult to achieve within the current hierarchical 
constructs of most health organisations. 
While some hierarchy is essential, the ability 
to take risks and feel able to challenge in order to 
promote safe practices is one of the major chal-
lenges we will face going forward. Investigations 
of clinical incidents usually identify communica-
tion issues in which hierarchy prevents the com-
munication of potential risk, teamwork being 
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problematic and blame being present. The con-
cept of psychological safety is now central to the 
development of safe systems, and is therefore as 
important as the development of tools and meth-
ods to facilitate safe care. Much of the concepts 
of building resilience in healthcare organisations 
will require attention to how we support all mem-
bers of staff to be part of teams with a sense of 
belonging in which the meaning of work includes 
safety of the individuals, supported to challenge 
and able to learn in real time. 
The concepts of safety need to build the resil-
ience by also learning from what works within the 
complexity of care delivery to address the well-
being of clinicians [14]. Included in the develop-
ment of a safe environment will be an active 
programme to prevent burnout of clinical staff as 
this has a negative impact on both their well-being 
and the safety of patients. Prevention of burnout 
has not been part of the traditional patient safety 
interventions, yet stressed clinicians are unable to 
deliver safe care. Interventions. As we take a sys-
tems and human factors approach to patient safety, 
part of that approach will be the management of 
burnout taking into account the multifactorial rea-
sons from education, hierarchies, technology, and 
overall design of the service [15].
The progress made in development of inter-
ventions will now be matched by the concept that 
the delivery of healthcare requires the concept of 
patient safety is our core business and all that we 
do need to be focused on safety. Therefore, all 
people working in the healthcare setting need to 
be supported to be safe and to proactively work to 
their own safety from a psychological and physi-
cal perspective. The safety of the people for who 
they care will then follow.
4.6  Design for Health 
and for Safety
• Invest in health rather than healthcare
• Co-produce safety with people not with 
patients
• Place people in charge of their health, not their 
disease
• Use human factors and ergonomics to address 
complexity
The patient safety movement has been focused 
on healthcare which really implies that it is con-
cerned with the negative impacts in the manage-
ment of disease. The future of the movement will 
transcend disease and focus on maintaining the 
health of people, even when they have disease. 
This approach implies that people with a disease 
need to have their physical and mental health 
beyond their disease protected at all times by 
minimising the risk of harm. To achieve this aim, 
we need to move to a new paradigm, and change 
the current design of our healthcare system, 
which is focused on physiological systems rather 
than the person as a whole. This implies a change 
in the systems we have created, which have been 
medically focused. It does not imply that we 
destroy all we have, but rather that we examine 
people flows, human factors, and safety from the 
eyes of the person receiving care.
The concept of engaging with the people who 
receive care has become central to the person- 
centred care movement. The person-centred care 
approach is more than asking about satisfaction 
and experience, but rather in sharing responsibil-
ity for health and becoming partners in health-
care provision. The realisation that we cannot be 
safe without the involvement of the people who 
we care for in the planning and design of services 
has led to the concept of co-production, in which 
people are part of the solution rather than part of 
the problem [16–18]. This approach implies a 
radical rethink on how we define adverse events, 
how we look at harm from the viewpoint of the 
family and person harmed, and how we investi-
gate safety incidents with the inclusion of the 
patient as a person, not as a patient. It will require 
a re-evaluation of clinical risk, a change in the 
power imbalance and real consultation with peo-
ple about risk and the relative benefit of interven-
tion. Co-production also implies that we co 
design safety not only with the people we call 
patients, but also with the providers of care who 
have to be safe all the time, despite the inherent 
risk of the clinical processes and especially in 
trying conditions.
To achieve safety within clinical process will 
require the integration of safety design as part of 
the day-to-day operations. Human Factors and 
Ergonomics (HFE) has been a marginal topic in 
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healthcare, pursued by enthusiasts rather than 
being core to the programmes that we run. In 
other chapters, the HFE theories have been pre-
sented. HFE will be as integral to medical educa-
tion as anatomy and physiology, so that it is a 
seam that runs through all of our thinking [19].
4.7  Social Determinants 
of Patient Safety
• Define the importance of social determinants 
of patient safety
• Design care that is culturally sensitive and 
promotes safety
In recent years, the importance of the determi-
nants of health outcomes has been highlighted 
with the studies that indicate that people who are 
less well-off economically, are from ethnic 
minorities or marginalised groups have worse 
health outcomes. Poverty, housing, education, lit-
eracy, and nutrition are a few of the factors that 
interplay to cause clinical presentations, as well 
as the outcome of treatment be it due to poor 
access, lack of health literacy, or institutionalised 
prejudice [20]. Health outcomes can be predicted 
depending on the influences of the social deter-
minants. The poorer one is, the worse is the clini-
cal outcome. Poverty influences life expectancy, 
the type of diseases to which one will succumb, 
the access to health, and the quality of healthcare 
[21]. The patient safety movement has not tradi-
tionally researched the impact of the social deter-
minants of health on the risk of harm, either for 
individuals or for communities [22].
It is logical to expect that people who are poor, 
have low health literacy, and do not have equal 
access to the healthcare system, are likely to be at 
risk of harm due to the immense power differen-
tials and the institutionalised prejudice they expe-
rience. If one adds ethnicity, gender, language 
and status, e.g. refugee or homeless, then the out-
come is likely to be even worse. The challenge 
for the patient safety movement is to acknowl-
edge the inequity and to mitigate against it in the 
design of programmes. We need to measure this 
perspective of patient safety in order to allow for 
the development of interventions that empower 
people and address the impact poverty and disad-
vantage have on safety.
From a global perspective, the work by the 
Lancet Commission on the increased risk to the 
people in the poorer nations of the Lower and 
Middle Income Countries indicates that we will 
need more than the patient safety methodologies 
to protect people in those countries from harm 
[23]. In the future, the Social Determinants of 
Patient Safety (or SDPS) will be as important in 
understanding how to prevent harm as are the 
methods and interventions we use to mitigate 
against adverse events.
4.8  Harnessing Technology 
for the Future (Reference 
Chap. 33)
• Digital health for safety
• Empowering people using technology
• Understand the opportunities and risks of 
Artificial Intelligence
The challenge we face in the patient safety 
movement is how we harness the great potential 
of the digitalisation of health and the introduction 
of Artificial Intelligence to healthcare delivery. 
The potential to use new technologies to design 
out human medical error and resultant harm is 
great. Nonetheless, it is not necessarily the solu-
tion to the challenge of patient safety, but rather 
an aid towards safer care [24, 25]. The potential 
of Electronic Health Records, electronic pre-
scribing, and computer ordering systems to 
address the communication and transcription 
challenges in patent safety are still to be realised. 
They have not overcome communication issues, 
but offer us the opportunity to have better com-
munication and easier pathways, if the imple-
mentation is successful. The challenge is to not 
replace old errors with new ones [26]. As most of 
the implementation has been in upper income 
countries, the spread of digital solutions around 
the globe will need to be carefully considered to 
ensure that the lessons learnt are applied with the 
safety of patients at the core.
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For people receiving care, the use of smart 
phone technology can empower them to manage 
their care with ready access to information, medi-
cal records, test results, and control of their own 
data. This will require careful development, with 
ceding of power from the professionals to the 
people receiving care. Co-production of safety 
solutions will be an essential part of realising the 
potential of technology.
Artificial Intelligence (AI) has the potential to 
fundamentally change the way we care for people 
and to enhance the safety of care. However, the 
future development and implementation will need 
to address numerous challenges, such as the reli-
ability of the predictions made from the newly 
developed machine learning systems. The transfer-
ability of the information and how data matches 
complexity of different health systems and how we 
as clinicians interact with the new technology [27]. 
While it is still early in the development of AI solu-
tions that can assist us in our safety journey, we in 
the patient safety field must join with AI developers 
to harness the potential of predictive modelling in 
the future. The safety movement will need to be 
integral to the development of AI solutions and 
ensure that there is a safer system in the future [28].
4.9  Conclusion
We have come a long way in the patient safety 
movement. The standards of care in the past have 
focused on the processes of care and now need to 
be redesigned by people who receive care. This 
will change their focus from measurement of 
process to a refined assessment of people’s expe-
riences and the desired outcomes. Patient safety 
in the future will not be about the interventions 
needed, but rather about the people who work in 
the system, the people who receive care, and how 
we can design systems to support them in the 
delivery of reliable and safe care.
If we truly want to aim for Zero Harm as a 
concept, then we will need to redesign our sys-
tems of care through co-production and partner-
ship, and address the challenges of the social 
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Safer Care: Shaping the Future
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5.1  Introduction
Understanding of, and commitment to, patient 
safety worldwide has grown since the late 1990s. 
This was prompted by two influential reports: To 
Err is Human [1] produced by the Institute of 
Medicine (now called the National Academy of 
Medicine) in the USA and An Organisation with 
a Memory [2] produced by the United Kingdom 
Government’s Chief Medical Adviser. Both 
reports recognised that error was routine during 
the delivery of healthcare: affecting something 
like one in ten of all hospital patients. In a pro-
portion of cases, the outcome produced was seri-
ous, even fatal.
The reports also drew attention to the poor 
performance of healthcare, as a sector, world-
wide on safety compared to most other high-risk 
industries. Notably, aviation has shown remark-
able and sustained improvements in the risk to 
passengers of air travel over four decades. Both 
reports called for greater focus on, and commit-
ment to, reducing the risks of healthcare.
Since then, the quest to improve the safety of 
care for patients has become a global movement. 
Important bodies like the World Health 
Organization (WHO) [3], the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) [4], the Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality (AHRQ) [5], the European 
Commission [6], and the Organisation for 
Economic Development (OECD) [7] have pro-
duced strategic documents, conducted studies, 
provided evidence and guidelines, initiated pro-
grammes of action, and galvanised the support of 
political and health leaders worldwide.
This has led to a remarkable transformation in 
the way that patient safety is viewed. Having 
been a subject of minority academic interest, it is 
now a firm priority for most healthcare systems.
Yet, the current state of patient safety world-
wide is still a source of deep concern. As data on 
the scale and nature of errors and adverse events 
have been more widely gathered, it has become 
apparent that unsafe actions are a feature of virtu-
ally every aspect of healthcare. Furthermore, 
there is paucity of research on the frequency of 
errors and their associated burden of harm in 
areas such as primary care and mental health. 
Reports of the apparently avoidable deaths of 
patients regularly feature in media reports in 
many countries and undermine public confidence 
in the health services available to citizens. 
Moreover, many events recur with efforts to pre-
vent them, on a large scale, proving ineffective. 
Expert commentators have explained this, in part, 
as being due to a punitive culture of individual 
blame and retribution holding back an approach 
that emphasises learning, not judgement as the 
route to improvement.
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In this chapter, I will reflect on some of per-
spectives in patient safety that the world of 
healthcare has adopted. These, and others, are 
dealt with in-depth in later chapters. I will also 
set out some of the key developments in the 
global level journey on patient safety.
5.2  Thinking About Safer 
Healthcare
By the end of the twentieth century, there was 
growing interest in avoidable adverse outcomes 
of healthcare from some clinical groups, research-
ers, and campaigners as well as victims of 
healthcare- induced harm and their families. The 
term used most widely at that time to describe 
such events was “medical error” [8]. It still is 
quite a common descriptor but the domain of 
healthcare that deals with risk of harm to patients 
and its prevention is now almost universally 
called “patient safety” [9].
In any complex system like a health service, 
human error, and mistakes—and hence adverse 
events—are inevitable. A programme to improve 
safety for patients cannot be based on eliminating 
error and mistakes—that would be impossible. A 
healthcare system, though, can reduce the occur-
rence of human error, minimise its impact on the 
patient when it does occur and learn so that 
actions can be taken to protect future patients.
5.2.1  Accidents and Incidents: 
The Importance of Systems
In exploring the reasons why things go badly 
wrong in healthcare, it becomes clear that its situ-
ation is not unique. There are many parallels with 
other sectors. Research and best practice experi-
ence outside the healthcare field has shown that 
safety comes down to appreciating that big 
improvements are not made by telling people to 
take care but by understanding the conditions that 
provoke error.
Extensive study in the non-health field has 
shown that with most unintended failures there is 
usually no single explanatory cause for the event. 
Rather there is a complex interaction between a 
varied set of elements, including human behav-
iour, technological aspects of the system, socio- 
cultural factors, and a range of organisational and 
procedural weaknesses [10, 11].
Wide scale systematic studies of these issues 
in healthcare are less common than in other high- 
risk industries, but available evidence suggests a 
similarly complex pattern of cause and effect 
relationship [12, 13].
Understanding the underlying reasons, or root 
causes, of why things go wrong is critical for suc-
cess. The deeper causes of adverse patient inci-
dents do, indeed, lie in the management and 
organisational systems that support the delivery 
of care. Research has shown that the causes are 
rooted in factors such as inadequate training, lack 
of communication, lack of information, faulty 
equipment, or poor physical environment. Asking 
staff to work in these conditions will risk causing 
harm to patients.
Building safety into health services by under-
standing the sources of risk within systems and 
eliminating them must be a core priority for all 
providers of healthcare (Table 5.1).
The key principle in safety generally (not just 
in healthcare), that unsafe systems provoke 
human error, is a different way of looking at the 
world, and requires a different philosophy of 
practice.
It was the introduction of experts from other 
fields that changed the way that healthcare looked 
at its own accidents and errors. No longer would 
Table 5.1 Ten practical questions to ask about risk in a 
clinical service
1 Describe the risks: what could go wrong?
2 What is being done to manage the potential risks?
3 What are the consequences if risks not managed?
4 Are the sources of the risks clinical, 
organisational, or both?
5 How often will the risks occur?
6 Can you rate the risks’ severity?
7 What level of control is there over the occurrence 
of the risks?
8 What action is necessary to reduce the risks?
9 How will the reduction in risks be sustained?




an incident that killed or harmed a patient be seen 
as an unfortunate one-off local occurrence with 
no more general lessons to be learned. One of the 
major figures from outside healthcare to explain 
this perspective was Professor James Reason 
from the University of Manchester in England 
[14]. He put forward a compelling metaphor to 
encourage more broad-based thinking. He com-
pared the risks of an accident or incident to the 
holes in slices of a Swiss cheese (Fig. 5.1). The 
solid pieces of cheese are the system’s defences, 
whilst the holes are the weaknesses. The holes in 
the slices of James Reason’s Swiss cheese—the 
organisation’s system—open, close, and realign 
constantly. Some of the holes or risks are unsafe 
actions by individuals: slips, lapses of attention, 
mistakes, or violations of procedure. Many more 
are due to what Reason calls “latent conditions”. 
These things like lack of training, weak proce-
dures, and faulty or poorly maintained equipment 
create preconditions for failure.
Doctors traditionally have not been trained to 
think systemically. Their concern is the patient in 
front of them. They realise, of course, that their 
treatments and decisions can have negative out-
comes, but their training puts these in the cur-
rency of “complications” or “side effects”. The 
surgeon knows that her patient can develop post- 
operative bleeding. The physician knows that his 
drug can provoke a reaction. The surgeon though 
probably thinks less about the propensity for the 
system, through its design, to make it more likely 
that she will operate on the wrong side of the 
body. The physician ordering anticoagulants 
probably thinks more about blood tests and clini-
cal monitoring data than the risk of a patient 
being given 15,000  units of heparin and killed 
when the intended dose was 1500 units but the 
abbreviation for “unit” was interpreted by the 
administering nurse as a zero.
Every day, around the world, patients die and 
are harmed because of these and similar circum-
stances. Human error occurs in weak systems: 
those that promote error rather than reducing its 
likelihood. Tomorrow’s practitioners must not 
only think about themselves and their actions. 
They must also have “systems awareness”.
It is also vital for health policymakers, health-
care leaders (not only clinical staff) to understand 
and embrace systems thinking. Frontline aware-
ness of systemic weaknesses and risks is impor-
tant but so too is strategic awareness by those 
responsible for the infrastructure, organisation, 
and delivery of care for communities and 
populations.
A system is sometimes a whole healthcare ser-
vice. It is also a collection of processes of care 
within a health facility or care setting. In a large 
Some holes due to
active failures















Fig. 5.1 The Swiss Cheese model of accident and incident causation. (Source: Professor James Reason by kind permis-
sion to the author)
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hospital, there may be 50 individual service 
groups all with their own processes and proce-
dures. So, a systems perspective when something 
goes wrong, for example, can focus on the factors 
that led to a nurse inadvertently giving an infant a 
fatal overdose of a drug intravenously. Or, it 
might take an even broader view if the problem 
necessitates it. For example, an investigation of 
high healthcare infection rates might conclude 
that a group of African hospitals cannot maintain 
clean care because they do not have a source of 
clean water. As a result, finding a way to cheaply 
and locally manufacture an alcohol hand rub 
could help staff reduce infection rates. That 
would be aligning a systemic cause of harm with 
a systemic solution.
There are good examples of large-scale sys-
temic actions led by clinicians. Global clinical 
networks of specialists and professional bodies 
are very well placed to identify common high- 
risk situations and galvanise support for action. 
The international clinical movement to reduce 
harm from sepsis [15] has shown how raising 
awareness and championing the need for action 
on a systemic patient safety issue can lead to 
change in attitudes and practice right across the 
world. Anaesthetic risk has been much reduced 
by combined research and action driven by 
organisations in this specialty either nationally, 
regionally, or globally.
5.2.2  Culture, Blame, 
and Accountability
The implications of system thinking in patient 
safety are quite profound. It means that ministries 
of health, managers of health facilities, the media, 
and the public must accept this paradigm as an 
explanation for the harm caused and cannot take 
a routinely “off with their heads” approach when 
something serious happens. Blaming individuals 
is common. It is easy, and generally popular. 
However, it is unfair, counter to developing a 
strong patient safety culture where learning ben-
efits future patients. It has led many doctors and 
nurses who have simply made an honest mistake 
to end up behind bars. The force of public out-
rage is often too great for the chief executive offi-
cer of a hospital or health minister to withstand. 
Their principles are sacrificed and they take the 
easy way out. The damage to their leadership in 
the eyes of their staff is then incalculable. They 
did not have the courage to defend the learning 
culture when the chips were down.
This is one of the most difficult and debated 
areas of patient safety and is usually referred to 
as the “blame culture” principle. There are many 
other dimensions to considering culture in rela-
tion to patient safety and the goal of promoting, 
sustaining, and consistently delivering safer care 





















Fig. 5.2 Patient safety 
culture has many strands 
(© Sir Liam Donaldson)
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tions, there are certain behavioural aspects that 
will place patients at higher risk, including: for 
example, an arrogant belief that the organisation 
is too good to fail, a tendency to avoid dealing 
with signs that all is not well, hierarchical atti-
tudes where a junior nurse dare not challenge a 
senior doctor even if he is behaving unsafely, and 
ostracising whistle-blowers and others who are 
trying to highlight dangers (Fig. 5.3).
Modern healthcare is delivered in a complex, 
fast-moving environment. With the wrong cul-
ture, together with staff that are unaware of the 
potential risks of the care that they are delivering, 
then unsafe care may burst through and begin to 
kill and harm patients (Fig. 5.4).
5.2.3  Leadership at the Frontline
There is a caveat to an entirely systemic view of 
the world. Other high-risk industries do not set 
aside the need to focus on the individual as well 
as the system. This is not to blame them but to 
ensure that they are educated in risk and its 
importance, skilled, capable, and conscientious.
For example, in the airline industry, the num-
ber of times that an airline pilot might be assessed 
during their career could be as high as a hundred. 
Rehearsing in a simulator regularly, somebody 








Fig. 5.3 Seven deadly sins: harmful behaviours within 


















Fig. 5.4 The bulging 
triangle: how unsafe 
care can break out of its 
boundaries (© Sir Liam 
Donaldson)
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medicals, these are part of the process of ensur-
ing safe air travel. In many parts of the world, 
once a doctor has finished training, they may not 
have any regular checks on their performance or 
challenges to how they would handle emergency 
situations. Simulation is playing an increasingly 
important part in healthcare, particularly in edu-
cation and training. Other industries are much 
further ahead in simulating unsafe situations and 
training their staff. It is an exciting idea to develop 
skills, away from the patient and then bring the 
practitioner to the patient when they have a higher 
level of skill. It is not the whole solution to creat-
ing “safety-wise” practitioners.
One of the great strategic needs in patient 
safety is for leadership, and role models in patient 
safety for young practitioners. There are many 
wonderful patient safety leaders at global level 
and within countries. They have been instrumen-
tal in making patient safety the priority that it is 
today within health systems around the world. 
However, there are far too few of them. Every 
clinical team in every part of every health system 
of the world needs skilled committed leadership 
in patient safety. This is needed because every 
patient must be protected from the ever-present 
risk of harm. It is here that we can look to the 
young generation of doctors, nurses, and other 
health professionals who are already demonstrat-
ing their interest and passion for patient safety.
5.3  Global Action to Improve 
Safety
Through the early years of the twenty-first cen-
tury, patient safety began to feature as a priority 
or programme of work in larger hospitals in the 
higher income countries of the world, and in 
some national health systems. It was still a long 
way from the mainstream of healthcare leaders, 
policymakers, and frontline clinical staff. 
Initially, it was a subject very much in the domain 
of a small number of thought leaders, research-
ers, and enthusiasts. Moving these deliberations 
and debates to global level catalysed action in 
country health systems on a much more extensive 
basis and served a convening function by bring-
ing health leaders, politicians, experts, research-
ers, and patient representatives into the same 
rooms.
5.3.1  Patient Safety on the Global 
Health Agenda
The World Health Organization (WHO), the 
United Nations agency responsible for health, 
first raised the profile of patient safety to global 
importance. In May 2002, the 55th World Health 
Assembly (the annual policy-making meeting of 
all 192 countries of the world) adopted 
Resolution 55.18. This urged Member States to 
pay the closest possible attention to the problem 
of patient safety and to establish and strengthen 
science- based systems necessary for improving 
patient safety and the quality of healthcare [16].
Following this, in May 2004, the 57th World 
Health Assembly supported the creation of an 
international alliance to facilitate the development 
of patient safety policy and practice in all member 
states, to act as a major force for improvement 
globally. The World Alliance for Patient Safety, a 
partnership between WHO and external experts, 
healthcare leaders, and professional bodies, was 
launched formally in October of 2004.
5.3.2  World Alliance for Patient 
Safety: Becoming Global
The World Alliance for Patient Safety formulated 
an initial programme of work framed as a series 
of six important actions intended to reduce harm 
caused to patients:
• The first Global Patient Safety Challenge, 
focusing, on the theme of healthcare- 
associated infection [17]
• A Patients for Patient Safety network involv-
ing patient organisations and led by  individuals 
who had suffered avoidable harm from health-
care [18]
• A Taxonomy for Patient Safety, ensuring con-
sistency in the concepts, principles, norms, and 
terminology used in patient safety work [19]
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• A Research for Patient Safety initiative to 
identify priorities for patient safety-related 
research in high-income, middle-income, and 
low-income countries as well as projects and 
capacity building particularly aimed at low- 
income countries [20]
• A Solutions for Patient Safety programme to 
identify, develop, and promote worldwide 
interventions to improve patient safety
• A set of Reporting and Learning best prac-
tice guidelines to aid in the design and devel-
opment of existing and new reporting 
systems [21].
The overall aims of this global partnership for 
patient safety were: to promote the development 
of evidence-based norms for the delivery of safer 
patient care, to create global classifications for 
medical errors, and to support knowledge sharing 
in patient safety between member states. There 
was also a strong advocacy role to raise aware-
ness of the risks of unsafe care and generate a 
better understanding of the reasons why harm 
occurs, to draw attention to the most effective 
preventive measures, as well as establishing the 
means to evaluate them.
At the outset, there were three core principles 
that underpinned the initial focus for action at 
global level:
• A commitment to placing patients at the cen-
tre of efforts to improve patient safety 
worldwide
• A focus on improving ways to detect and learn 
from information about patient safety prob-
lems within and across countries (with a par-
ticular emphasis on methods and tools for 
detecting patient safety problems in low- 
income countries)
• A need to build up the knowledge base of 
interventions which have been shown to help 
solve patient safety problems, together with a 
more rapid and systematic dissemination of 
information worldwide on successful 
strategies.
The World Alliance for Patient Safety, in its 
publications, its events, and when its members 
spoke at conferences, always sought to educate 
and inform about the concepts and philosophy 
that should underlie a modern approach to safety 
in healthcare.
5.3.3  The Global Patient Safety 
Challenges
As each of the foundation strands of the global 
patient safety initiative began to be implemented, 
they attracted a great deal of interest, involve-
ment, and began to shape change in healthcare 
systems around the world.
At the beginning, it had been important to 
choose a major aspect of patient safety that 
affected all countries of the world and was big 
enough to warrant intensive action on a global 
scale. Healthcare infection fitted these criteria 
immediately. It was endemic within every health-
care system. In high-income countries, there was 
great concern, not just about the persistence of 
the problem, but the emergence of life- threatening 
antimicrobial-resistant strains such as methicillin- 
resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA). In 
low-income and middle-income countries, the 
problem was even more serious especially where 
the infrastructure of care was weak.
The first Global Patient Safety Challenge, 
aimed to engage the world’s health systems in a 
movement to reduce healthcare infection. It 
began by convening all the leading experts to for-
mulate ground breaking new evidence-based 
guidelines on hand hygiene. In addition, a major 
study was mounted to assess the burden of health-
care infection (particularly in low- and middle- 
income countries). This first Challenge Clean 
Care is Safe Care [17] invited health ministers to 
personally, and publicly, sign a pledge to address 
healthcare infection in their countries.
The first Global Patient Safety Challenge was 
the flagship element of the World Alliance for 
Patient Safety’s initiative. It was highly visible 
and easily understood by politicians, health pro-
fessionals, and the public. It was relevant to all 
countries: rich, poor, and emerging economies. 
Everyone had a vested interest in its success 
because anyone could need treatment in a health 
5 Safer Care: Shaping the Future
60
facility and could therefore become the victim of 
harm by acquiring an infection.
In driving forward Clean Care is Safer Care, a 
wide range of supporting activities and cam-
paigns was implemented. The idea of this 
Challenge generated huge interest and enthusi-
asm across all six WHO regions. As ministers 
signed their pledges in country and regional 
launches and events, from a small start, eventu-
ally, the commitments covered 85% of the 
world’s population.
The WHO hand hygiene global campaign 
(SAVE LIVES: Clean Your Hands) [22] launched 
in 2009 has been particularly successful. Before 
the Challenge, alcohol-based hand rubs (hand 
sanitisers) were not commonplace in hospitals 
around the world. The core message was that the 
lack of consistent, immediate, access to a sink 
equipped with soap and single-use towels (high- 
income countries) and/or the unavailability of 
clean water (many low-income countries) put 
patients at risk. The evidence of higher efficacy, 
effectiveness, and skin tolerability of alcohol- 
based hand rubs made them the method of choice 
to assure hand hygiene. The Challenge made 
alcohol hand rubs more affordable to the poorest 
hospitals of the world by ensuring that the 
University Hospital of Geneva formulation 
became available with no patent restriction for 
local manufacture.
A further key step in achieving the global 
reach of the hand hygiene programme was the 
development of the Five Moments for hand 
hygiene model [23]. This emphasised the points 
in the process of patient care when the risks of 
transmission of an infection by a caregiver’s 
hands were highest. The Five Moments’ visual 
image (Fig.  5.5) is striking and easily remem-
bered by frontline staff; therefore, it has acted as 
a technical educational tool that succeeded in 
standardising practice worldwide but also it has 
become a brand of safety with global spread.
Overall, the first Global Patient Safety 
Challenge represented a proven change model 
that mobilised the world around infection preven-
tion through: (a) awareness raising about the bur-
den of the problem to engage stakeholders; (b) an 
approach to engage nations through demonstra-
ble commitment; (c) the availability of evidence- 
based guidance and implementation tools to drive 
improvement.
The original concept of such a Challenge was 
of a 2-year start-up period, after which responsi-
bility for its continuance would pass to WHO 
member states and their healthcare systems. 






























Fig. 5.5 Five moments 
for hand hygiene. 






much momentum, passion, and so great a sense 
of solidarity across the world that the WHO’s 
team in Geneva was continuing to play a strong 
leadership role 10  years after the launch. This 
success and the perception of the need for sup-
porting infection prevention and control improve-
ment in many countries, led the WHO to institute 
a new, formalised infection prevention and con-
trol global unit.
Other important achievements of the first 
Challenge and associated global infection pre-
vention and control work included:
• An assessment of the burden of healthcare 
infection in low- and middle-income 
countries
• WHO guidelines and 100s of associated 
publications
• Fifty-five hospital departments across six 
countries demonstrated scientifically 
 successfully implemented a hand hygiene 
multimodal improvement strategy
• Over 30 countries established WHO-guided 
local production of alcohol-based hand rub
• Over 50 countries ran successful hand hygiene 
national campaigns
• Almost 20,000 health facilities in 177 coun-
tries joined the WHO SAVE LIVES: Clean 
Your Hands campaign
• Global initiatives and engagement of thou-
sands of health workers around hand hygiene 
every year on 5th May
• Patient engagement/information tools issued
• Reports from seven global surveys, on hand 
hygiene and a range of infection prevention 
and control and antimicrobial resistance 
priorities
• Hand hygiene and infection prevention and 
control messages embedded in key pro-
grammes of work including antimicrobial 
resistance, WASH and maternal and child 
health
• Alcohol-based hand rub featured in the WHO 
List of Essential Medicines
• Guidance produced on infection prevention 
and control during the 2014–15 Ebola virus 
disease outbreak (through the leadership of 
the team)
• New evidence-based guidelines on injection 
safety and ongoing testing of an implementa-
tion campaign in three countries supported by 
more than 20 new tools
• New evidence-based guidelines for the pre-
vention of surgical site infections based on 27 
systematic literature reviews and including 29 
recommendations
• New evidence-based guidelines on the core 
components of effective infection prevention 
and control programmes to reduce harm from 
health care-associated infections and antimi-
crobial resistance
A second Global Patient Safety Challenge rec-
ognised the relatively high burden of disease aris-
ing from unsafe surgical care. Safe Surgery, Saves 
Lives [24] created a surgical checklist that was 
piloted, evaluated, and promoted for use globally. 
Initial evaluations showed that the checklist 
reduced morbidity and mortality associated with 
surgery in early studies of its use. Major profes-
sional bodies across the world endorsed it. It is in 
widespread use in hospitals in many countries 
and, increasingly, it is seen as essential if the key 
risks of surgery are to be avoided. However, the 
original checklist has been widely adapted whilst 
the experience of the surgical checklist’s use 
worldwide has not been formally revisited since 
its launch.
The checklist concept was developed further 
with the creation of the WHO Safe Childbirth 
Checklist [25], which focuses on reducing risk 
and adverse outcomes related to childbirth for 
both mothers and babies. Of the more than 130 
million births occurring each year, an estimated 
303,000 result in the mother’s death, 2.6 million 
in stillbirth, and another 2.7 million in a newborn 
death within the first 28 days of birth. The major-
ity of these deaths occur in low-resource settings 
and most could be prevented. The WHO Safe 
Childbirth Checklist supports the delivery of 
essential maternal and perinatal care practices 
and addresses the major causes of maternal death, 
intra-partum-related stillbirths, and neonatal 
deaths. The Safe Childbirth Checklist 
Collaboration has already made significant 
strides to improving maternal and neonatal 
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health. It is hoped that the Checklist can become 
an effective life-saving tool that can be used in a 
wide range of settings.
5.3.4  Patients and Families: 
Championing Change
In addition to the expert reports that had drawn 
the attention of policymakers to problem of 
unsafe care, a powerful driving force for change 
was the visibility of tragic and harrowing situa-
tions in which patients had suffered serious harm 
or died. Some of the victims of this unsafe care, 
or often surviving family members, had risen 
above their personal tragedy to tell their stories 
very publicly and call for the world’s healthcare 
systems to take action.
The World Alliance for Patient Safety estab-
lished the Patients for Patient Safety Programme as 
one of its first actions. Susan Sheridan (a contribu-
tor to this book), whose son suffered brain damage, 
and whose husband died, both associated with 
medical error, was the first external lead of this pro-
gramme. Over time, a global network of patient 
champions was established. Many were themselves 
victims of avoidable harm or they were a parent of 
a child who had died or had been harmed.
With the expanding ageing population, the 
rise in non-communicable diseases and ever- 
rising healthcare costs, there is more willingness 
than ever by healthcare providers to engage with 
patients, families, and communities. Recognising 
these challenges and opportunities, the Patients 
for Patient Safety Programme has restructured 
its approach to emphasise four key strategic 
objectives:
• Advocacy and awareness raising
• Capacity development and strengthening
• Partnerships with healthcare providers and 
policymakers
• Influencing and contributing to policy and 
research priorities
The Patients for Patient Safety network now 
has over 500 advocates, also known as Patients 
for Patient Safety champions, in 54 countries. 
Newsletters are produced quarterly to promote 
the sharing of knowledge and experiences.
The champions involved in the Patients for 
Patient Safety Programme have: acted as advo-
cates for the importance of tackling unsafe care 
in the healthcare systems of their countries; par-
ticipated in education and training programmes 
for healthcare professional staff; supported other 
victims of harm who have contacted them; and, 
served on boards and advised hospitals on the 
design of their services.
The role of patients and family members in 
the quest for safer healthcare worldwide has been 
of incalculable benefit to the advancing the case 
of patient safety globally in the last decade 
(Table 5.2). Their experience, wisdom, and cour-
age has fuelled a journey whose eventual end- 
point will be a coalescence of compassion and 
learning to eradicate serious harm from every 
healthcare system in the world.
5.3.5  African Partnerships 
for Patient Safety
African Partnerships for Patient Safety (APPS) 
[26] was launched in 2009. It was designed to fill 
a perceived gap in patient safety in Africa. It was 
part of a WHO response to the commitment to 
strengthen patient safety articulated by 46 minis-
tries of health at the 58th session of WHO’s 
Regional Committee for Africa in 2008.
Table 5.2 Value of involvement of patients and families who have suffered harm
Role Benefit
Educator Reinforces professional values of caring, compassion, and respect
Storyteller Wins hearts and minds of leaders and frontline staff; stays in the memory
Advocate Gains commitment at wider political, public, and professional levels; initiates campaigns for specific 
actions (e.g. for sepsis, for in-patient suicide)
Partner Strengthens design and delivery of future care pathways and patient safety programmes
Reporter Highlights new risks and improvement opportunities
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African Partnerships for Patient Safety devel-
oped a multi-country, hospital-to-hospital part-
nership programme. Initial support came from 
the United Kingdom Department of Health. 
Subsequently, the Government of France funded 
expansion of the programme beyond English 
speaking countries. During the period 2009–
2014, African Partnerships for Patient Safety 
oversaw the implementation of 17 hospital-to- 
hospital partnerships. The partnerships com-
prised European hospitals from three countries 
(France, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom) 
and hospitals in 17 different countries in the 
WHO African Region (Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, 
Togo, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe). Linguistic diversity 
was maintained through the involvement of 
English, French, and Portuguese speaking 
countries.
As African Partnerships for Patient Safety 
evolved, south–south patient safety partnerships 
were established between hospitals in Zimbabwe 
and between Morocco and its partnership hospi-
tal further south. In addition, a partnership was 
established involving the Johns Hopkins 
University Armstrong Institute for Patient Safety 
& Quality and institutions in three African coun-
tries (Liberia, South Sudan, and Uganda).
African Partnerships for Patient Safety 
received widespread international attention and 
recognition. It illustrated how teams skilled in 
infection prevention and control and patient 
safety can act as a bridge between disease- 
specific programmes and health systems. This 
strengthens interaction at the health facility level. 
It provided a very tangible entry point for broader 
improvement in service delivery. Evaluation of 
the programme showed gains in hand hygiene 
compliance by health workers, implementation 
of the WHO Surgical Safety Checklist, training 
and education of healthcare workers, medication 
safety, healthcare waste management, clinical 
audit, teamwork, and leadership.
A defining feature of the African Partnerships 
for Patient Safety approach is that it presented an 
alternative to traditional vertical, expert-driven, 
technical assistance improvement models. It used 
frontline expertise from across both arms of the 
partnership hospitals with a focus on co- 
development and relationship building. The tools 
developed by the programme are now being uti-
lised across the world, notably through the United 
Kingdom’s Department for International 
Development Health Partnerships Scheme, hos-
pital partnership initiatives led by Expertise 
France, partnerships supported by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Japan, partnerships supported 
by the Tuscany region of Italy and a recent major 
initiative focused on hospital partnerships initi-
ated by the Ministry of Health in Germany.
African Partnerships for Patient Safety illus-
trated how frontline passion and energy has 
driven implementation of patient safety initia-
tives through strong human interaction and soli-
darity across continents. The work has informed 
national policy direction in multiple countries in 
the WHO Region of Africa. Importantly, African 
Partnerships for Patient Safety has shone the 
light on the potential for high-income countries 
to learn from low-income countries, the so-called 
reverse innovation.
The work of African Partnerships for Patient 
Safety has provided a strong foundation for the 
development of a wider international effort on 
“twinning partnerships for improvement”. This is 
particularly relevant given the increasing impor-
tance placed on quality as part of the fabric of 
Universal Health Coverage-driven reform pro-
cesses across the world, and in particular in low- 
income countries.
5.3.6  Third Global Patient Safety 
Challenge: Medication Without 
Harm
The World Health Organization (WHO) launched 
its third Global Patient Safety Challenge in 2016 
[27]. Its aim is to reduce the global burden of iatro-
genic medication-related harm by 50% within 5 
years. The intention is to match the global reach 
and impact of the WHO’s two earlier Global Patient 
Safety Challenges, Clean Care is Safer Care and 
Safe Surgery Saves Lives. The third Challenge, 
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Medication Without Harm, invites health ministers 
to initiate national plans addressing four domains 
of medication safety, namely: engaging patients 
and the public; medicines as products; education, 
training, and monitoring of healthcare profession-
als; and systems and the practices of medication 
management (Fig. 5.6). It also commits the WHO 
to use its convening and coordinating powers to 
drive forward a range of global actions. A tool to 
empower patients is already available.
Three key areas of medication safety have 
been identified as early priorities. They will be 
the most visible and public-facing aspects of this 
latest Challenge, just as hand hygiene and the 
surgical checklist were the flagship elements of 
the first two Global Patient Safety Challenges. 
They are: high-risk medicine situations; poly-
pharmacy; and transitions of care. Each is 
 associated with a substantial burden of harm and, 
if appropriately managed, could reduce the risk 
of harm to large numbers of patients in health 
systems across the world.
5.3.7  The 2019 WHA Resolution 
and World Patient Safety Day
Further impetus and fresh momentum was 
injected into the global patient safety movement 
in 2019 when the World Health Assembly again 
considered patient safety. This came at a time 
when, despite efforts of the previous decade, 
harm due to unsafe care was recognised as one of 
the 10 leading causes of morbidity and mortality 
globally, exceeding malaria and tuberculosis and 
level with HIV.
In May 2019, the 72nd World Health Assembly 
designated patient safety as a global health prior-
ity; adopted resolution WHA72.6 [28] and estab-
lished an annual World Patient Safety Day. 
WHA72.6 requests the WHO’s Director General: 
“To emphasize patient safety as a key strategic 
priority in WHO’s work across Universal Health 
Coverage agenda”, and: “To formulate a global 
patient safety action plan in consultation with 
Member States, regional economic integration 
Fig. 5.6 Third Global 
Patient Safety 
Challenge: strategic 
framework (© World 
Health Organization 
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organisations and all relevant stakeholders, 
including in the private sector”.
This major commitment and the delivery of a 
comprehensive action plan will drive the shape of 
patient safety programmes across the world for 
the next decade.
5.4  Conclusions
In an era when the human genome has been 
mapped, when air travel is safer than ever before, 
and when information flows across the globe in 
seconds, patients cannot be reassured that they 
will not die because of weaknesses in the way 
that their care is organised and delivered.
Despite the extensive work that has been put 
in at global level and in health systems around the 
world, a sustainable model for safe healthcare is 
not in place.
Firstly, the scale of the problem is so great that 
it can no longer just be left to special interest and 
to advocacy. The ownership of the problem of 
patient safety needs to be everybody’s business. 
The action to tackle it needs to be everybody’s 
business.
Secondly, this has been going on for just too 
long. There can be no other high-risk industry 
with such a poor record in improving known 
areas of risk.
Thirdly, the WHO and other global agencies 
and leaders are calling on the 194 countries of the 
world to implement a policy of Universal Health 
Coverage. It is essential that health systems are 
built with patient safety and quality of care as 
their organising principle. Almost everyone who 
accesses healthcare will at some point be treated. 
That treatment needs to be safe. What stronger 
connection could there be between patient safety 
and universal health coverage?
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The people have a right and duty to participate 
individually and collectively in the planning and 
implementation of their own health care—WHO 
Alma Ata Declaration (1978) [1]
Unsafe care results in approximately 2.6 mil-
lion deaths per year. It is one of the top 10 causes 
of death worldwide [2]. Recognizing unsafe care 
as a growing global burden, in 2019 the 72nd 
World Health Assembly (WHA) [3], the policy 
setting body for the World Health Organization 
(WHO), ratified the Global Action on Patient 
Safety [4]. Through this document, the WHA 
urged Member States to “work in collaboration 
with other Member States, civil society organiza-
tions, patients’ organizations, professional bod-
ies, academic and research institutions, industry 
and other relevant stakeholders to promote, pri-
oritize and embed patient safety in all health poli-
cies and strategies” [4]. The WHA further urged 
Member States to “put in place systems for the 
engagement and empowerment of patients, fami-
lies and communities (especially those who have 
been affected by adverse events) in the delivery 
of safer health care, including capacity building 
initiatives, networks and associations; and to 
work with them and civil society, to use their 
experience of safe and unsafe care positively in 
order to build safety and harm minimization 
strategies as well as compensation mechanisms 
and schemes, into all aspects of the provision of 
health care, as appropriate” [4].
Simply stated, the WHA, through The Global 
Action on Patient Safety, called for Member 
States to democratize healthcare by engaging 
with the very users of the healthcare system—
patients, families, and community members—
along with other partners—in the “co-production” 
of safer healthcare.
In this chapter, I share how preventable harm 
to my son, Cal, from neonatal jaundice, and the 
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death of my late husband, Pat, from the failure 
to communicate a malignant pathology, cata-
pulted me into a global movement of patients, 
family members, communities, and civil soci-
ety advocating for safer care that became known 
as the WHO’s Patients for Patient Safety (PFPS) 
Programme (mentioned in the previous chap-
ter). I along with others around the world who 
have experienced harm from unsafe care have 
harnessed our wisdom, our grief, and our anger 
to courageously partner with passionate thought 
leaders in healthcare including clinicians, 
researchers, policy makers, medical educators, 
and quality improvement experts to co-produce 
patient safety initiatives to ensure that our 
healthcare systems “learn” from our adverse 
events and implement systematic strategies to 
reduce risk of harm. The real-world examples 
of co-production within this chapter demon-
strate the important role of civil society as well 
as how patients, families, and communities 
“that have experienced adverse events can use 
their experience of safe and unsafe care posi-
tively in order to build safety and harm reduc-
tion strategies” in developing and developed 
countries [4].
6.2  What is Co-production 
in Healthcare?
Co-production is the “interdependent work of 
users and professionals to design, create, develop, 
deliver, assess and improve the relationships and 
actions that contribute to the health of individuals 
and populations through mutual respect and part-
nership that notices and invites each participant’s 
unique strengths and expertise” [5]. Co-produced 
patient safety initiatives are “mutually benefi-
cial…at every level and in every health-related 
endeavor, from designing educational curricula 
to setting research priorities to hiring faculty and 
leadership to operating health organizations” [5]. 
Patients are not viewed as “‘users and choosers’ 
but as ‘makers and shapers’ [which] allows for 
planning and implementing new policies that can 
potentially lead to better health outcomes and 
patient experiences” [6].




In 2002, the 55th WHA passed Resolution 
WHA55.18 which established “the need to pro-
mote patient safety as a fundamental principle of 
all health systems” and resulted in WHO launch-
ing the World Alliance for Patient Safety (now 
known as the WHO Patient Safety Programme) 
[7, 8]. The World Alliance for Patient Safety con-
sisted of six action programmes, one of which 
was the Patients for Patient Safety Programme 
(the PFPS Programme), where I served as the 
External Lead for 7 years. The PFPS Programme 
is a global network of committed patients, fami-
lies, healthcare professionals, and policy makers 
who are connected by the common objective of 
promoting safer care through patient involve-
ment. They bravely advocate for and collaborate 
in patient safety efforts at the local, national, and 
international levels [9]. These individuals, known 
as PFPS Champions, teach, offer hope and pro-
vide inspiration. They have organized as individ-
uals, networks, patient associations/organizations 
and in discrete patient programs within estab-
lished public and civil society structures. Their 
dedication to co-producing safer healthcare is 
guided by the seminal document, the London 
Declaration, which was authored by representa-
tives from 21 countries who had experienced 
harm directly or indirectly as a result of unsafe 
care. The London Declaration calls for partner-
ship and the democratization of healthcare to 
improve patient safety:
The London Declaration
We, Patients for Patient Safety, envision a different 
world in which healthcare errors are not harming 
people. We are partners in the effort to prevent all 
avoidable harm in healthcare. Risk and uncer-
tainty are constant companions. So, we come 
together in dialogue, participating in care with 
providers. We unite our strength as advocates for 
care without harm in the developing as well as the 
developed world.
We are committed to spread the word from person 
to person, town to town, country to country. There 
is a right to safe healthcare and we will not let the 
current culture of error and denial, continue. We 
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call for honesty, openness, and transparency. We 
will make the reduction of healthcare errors as a 
basic human right that preserves life around the 
world.
We, Patients for Patient Safety, will be the voice 
for all people, but especially those who are now 
unheard. Together as partners, we will collabo-
rate in:
• Devising and promoting programs for 
patient safety and patient empowerment.
• Developing and driving a constructive dia-
logue with all partners concerned with 
patient safety.
• Establishing systems for reporting and 
dealing with healthcare harm on a world-
wide basis.
• Defining best practices in dealing with 
healthcare harm of all kinds and promoting 
those practices throughout the world.
In honor of those who have died, those left dis-
abled, our loved ones today and the world’s chil-
dren yet to be born, we will strive for excellence, so 
that all involved in healthcare are as safe as pos-
sible as soon as possible. This is our pledge of 
partnership [10].
By co-producing patient safety initiatives, the 
PFPS Programme, PFPS Champions, and 
Member States democratize patient safety and 
fulfill the promise and potential of the directives 
stated in both the London Declaration and the 
WHA Global Action on Patient Safety.
6.4  Co-Production in Research
There is growing awareness that patient engage-
ment in health research is not only ethically impor-
tant, but leads to evidence for developing the most 
effective interventions, policy and practice recom-
mendations, and planning for ongoing research 
[11].
6.4.1  Example: United States
6.4.1.1  Mothers Donating Data: Going 
from Research to Policy 
to Practice
My son, Cal, and other newborn babies suffered 
from preventable brain damage in the United 
States as a result of the failure to test and treat 
neonatal jaundice (hyperbilirubinemia), known 
as kernicterus. After determining that a pre- 
discharge bilirubin test would have helped pre-
vent our newborns from suffering, mothers of 
children with kernicterus formed a nonprofit 
organization (civil society), Parents of Infants 
and Children with Kernicterus (PICK) [12]. The 
PICK Board of Directors, comprised of the moth-
ers, had two specific goals: (1) co-design a safer 
healthcare system for newborns to include a uni-
versal, pre-discharge bilirubin test; and (2) co- 
design materials to empower parents with 
information. While the healthcare providers were 
sympathetic to these mothers, healthcare leaders 
stated clearly that changes to care or educational 
materials could not be made based solely on 
anecdotes; evidence-based research was neces-
sary. PICK partnered with leading published 
researchers on neonatal jaundice, treating clini-
cians and patient safety experts to engage in 
developing the evidence necessary to revise clini-
cal guidelines to include a universal newborn 
bilirubin test and revised parent education mate-
rials to empower parents to help prevent future 
harm to newborns from elevated bilirubin levels. 
Through the collaboration with the researchers, 
the PICK mothers helped to collect and donate 
clinical data of 125 newborns who were dis-
charged as healthy from the place of birth but 
subsequently sustained kernicterus. The collec-
tion of data became known as the Pilot USA 
Registry of Kernicterus [13]. PICK formed the 
Kernicterus Prevention Partnership Coalition that 
included various governmental agencies, aca-
demic institutions, and other stakeholders. These 
organizations were unified by a nonbinding 
memorandum of understanding. PICK and the 
researchers partnered with a leading public health 
agency to fund and analyze the data, the results of 
which indicated that kernicterus was an emerging 
public health issue and that implementation of a 
universal bilirubin (jaundice) test would help 
identify newborns at risk of hyperbilirubinemia 
and reduce the number of cases of kernicterus. 
PICK also partnered with a leading healthcare 
system with a large data set of clinical informa-
tion on newborns. Analysis of their data also sup-
ported the implementation of a universal bilirubin 
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test. A separate governmental health agency also 
partnered with PICK to fund the co-production, 
testing and the usability of parent education 
materials in different populations about the risks 
of newborn jaundice and included proactive steps 
they could take to identify and prevent harm to 
their newborns [14].
The outcome of PICK’s co-production in 
research contributed to the revision of clinical 
practice guidelines to include a universal pre- 
discharge bilirubin test [15] and the dissemina-
tion of a “Sentinel Event Alert” by a national 
hospital accreditor with recommendations on 
newborn jaundice management [16], established 
kernicterus as a “Never Event” per a national 
quality measures organization, developed a 
national parent education campaign [14] and 
materials and co-developed and co-delivered cur-
ricula for continuing medical education courses.
There were many factors that contributed to 
PICK’s achievements. One of the key factors was 
that a major national government agency invited 
stakeholders, including patients, to publicly com-
ment at a National Summit on Medical Errors 
and Patient Safety. The organizers of this summit 
offered guidance to those unfamiliar with public 
comment how to best craft their testimony. At 
that summit, I, testified about the preventable 
harm that my son had suffered from undiagnosed 
and untreated neonatal jaundice and advocated 
for collaboration amongst all stakeholders to pre-
vent future cases. Another success factor was the 
determination, persistence, and relentless call for 
action from the community of mothers with chil-
dren with kernicterus who formed a respected, 
independent, nonprofit organization with by-laws 
and objectives to prevent harm to future new-
borns through a model of partnership. Further 
these mothers served as a “living repository” of 
clinical data for research regarding kernicterus 
unavailable through traditional data collection 
methods and were the conduit to collecting addi-
tional data from mothers across the world with 
children with kernicterus. This enabled the 
researchers to actively collaborate with the moth-
ers as subject matter experts. As a result of these 
factors, deep, trusting, mutually beneficial rela-
tionships formed with patient safety experts, cli-
nicians, and leadership in government agencies, 
research institutions, medical education, and 
healthcare systems who willingly partnered with 
the mothers, despite criticism from peers. The 
healthcare leaders voluntarily helped the mothers 
gain capacity to be effective advocates for 
changes in jaundice management protocols. They 
helped educate the mothers about the structure of 
the healthcare system, the responsibilities of the 
various decision-making bodies, the current sci-
ence and evidence base for management of new-
born jaundice and gaps in the literature. They 
provided guidance and tips on successful story-
telling and public speaking skills, partnered as 
presenters at national conferences and in inter-
views with media and provided resources, infra-
structure and credibility that facilitated the 
development of the necessary evidence for suc-
cessful implementation of a systems-based 
approach to the prevention of kernicterus.
6.4.1.2  Civil Society: Driving Patient- 
Centered Research to Prevent 
Diagnostic Errors
Researchers estimate that up to 80,000 deaths per 
year in US hospitals can be attributed to some 
form of diagnostic error. Misdiagnosis affects 12 
million Americans in ambulatory care settings 
annually. The National Academy of Medicine’s 
2015 report, Improving Diagnosis in Health 
Care, highlights the urgent need for a research 
agenda on the diagnostic process and diagnostic 
errors and states that “patients are central to the 
solution” and there is a need to “establish part-
nerships with patients and families to improve 
diagnosis [17]. The Society to Improve Diagnosis 
in Medicine (SIDM), where I serve as the 
Director of Patient Engagement, is a US-based 
nonprofit organization (civil society) dedicated to 
reducing diagnostic errors. We believed that if 
researchers joined forces with trained patients 
and family members with lived experience in 
diagnostic error to co-produce diagnostic safety 
research projects, the research questions and out-
comes would be more relevant, effective, and 
patient centered. SIDM pursued funding from the 
Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute 
(PCORI) to (1) recruit patients and family mem-
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bers who had experienced diagnostic error and 
diagnostic safety researchers to co-develop a 
 curriculum that provides patients and family 
members with the knowledge, skills, and tools to 
effectively partner in the design, execution, and 
dissemination of diagnostic research; and (2) col-
lectively co-produce patient-centered research 
topics and questions to pursue to improve diag-
nosis [18].
SIDM collaborated with Project Patient Care, 
an independent nonprofit organization of patients, 
family members, and patient advocates and the 
Medstar Institute for Quality and Safety to help 
recruit the patient and family participants and to 
develop the curriculum. I led the project that 
included patients and family members from key 
disease-related organizations and representatives 
from Patient and Family Advisory Councils 
(PFACs) at major healthcare institutions—all 
who had experienced diagnostic error. Prominent 
diagnostic researchers from academic medical 
centers also participated in the project. Together 
with the project team, the patients and research-
ers co-produced an innovative, patient-centered 
curriculum. This curriculum was continuously 
evaluated and refined to ensure patient engage-
ment in diagnostic research. Applying the knowl-
edge and methods developed in the curriculum, 
patients and researchers co-produced a list of 
patient-centered diagnostic research topics and 
questions for future research. One of these resul-
tant research questions focused on disparities in 
diagnosis due to visible factors of age, sex, and 
race/ethnicity. This project was awarded funding 
for a 2-year research project to be led by SIDM 
and a major academic institute.
The promising results of SIDM’s project are 
due to several factors. SIDM is an established 
nonprofit organization (i.e., a civil society organi-
zation) that has embedded patient and family 
engagement as a strategic priority in its mission 
and dedicated resources to employ a PFPS 
Champion as a full-time Director of Patient 
Engagement. Having SIDM develop and lead this 
project provided the credibility to secure funding 
from a large national research institute to support 
staff, the patients, family members, researchers, 
leadership, as well as an infrastructure designed 
to support sustainability. Patients and family 
members from national disease groups who have 
firsthand experiences with diagnostic error were 
invaluable in identifying research questions and 
topic suggestions that often went unrecognized 
or unconsidered. The project developed and 
delivered an innovative, patient-centered training 
curriculum that enabled patients and family 
members to effectively distill their personal sto-
ries of diagnostic error and participate as true 
partners in the development of research ques-
tions. Because of its success, the curriculum has 
been replicated in other training efforts in acute 
care settings and methods and tools from the cur-
riculum have been shared nationally and interna-
tionally as an approach to engage patients, family 
members, and other stakeholders in diagnostic 
improvement efforts [19].
6.5  Co-production in Medical 
Professions Education 
Courses
Patient engagement is a promising avenue in the 
area of healthcare education. Having real patients 
articulate their experiences and viewpoints helps 
those taking part in training to appreciate the 
patient perspective and the importance of preserv-
ing trust between clinicians and patients. These 
core values are essential to care that is compas-
sionate, quality assured and, above all, safe. 
Exposure to patient stories during training is valu-
able and helps to motivate practitioners to improve 
safety [20].
There is evidence that teaching by patients has a 
lasting impact in the areas of technical skills inter-
personal skills, empathic understanding, and 
developing an individualized approach to the 
patient [21].
6.5.1  Example: Mexico
6.5.1.1  Leveraging a Regional Network 
of PFPS Champions to Enhance 
Medical Education
According to a study on patient safety in Latin 
America (IBEAS), “on any given day, 10% of the 
patients admitted to the hospitals… had experi-
6 Patients for Patient Safety
72
enced some kind of harm due to health care” 
[22]. Evangelina Vazquez Curiel [23], a PFPS 
champion and single mother in Mexico whose 
newborn son experienced harm soon after birth, 
along with other patients, family members and 
healthcare professionals in Latin America, identi-
fied the lack of patient safety education for 
healthcare professionals in Latin America as a 
major contributing factor to unsafe care. She 
actively collaborated with academic institutions 
in Mexico, the local Ministry of Health and the 
Pan American Network of PFPS champions to 
co-produce an online patient safety course for 
healthcare professionals in Latin America that 
would bring patient safety experts, patients, and 
healthcare professionals from various healthcare 
systems together. Course co-developers, educa-
tors, patients, speakers, and learners are from 
eight countries—Mexico, Costa Rica, Peru, 
Paraguay, Uruguay, Ecuador, Chile, and 
Columbia. The objectives of the course are to (1) 
continuously train healthcare workers from 
remote and low-resource settings about patient 
safety and quality; (2) bring patient safety experts 
from across the Latin American region together 
to serve as educators and discussion leaders; (3) 
raise awareness of health literacy and highlight 
the role it plays in preventing adverse events; and 
(4) encourage dialogue between patients, family 
members, civil society, and healthcare providers/
treating professionals to reduce power imbal-
ances. The curriculum is comprised of 11 mod-
ules, three of which focus on the WHO Global 
Challenges (Clean Care is Safer Care [24], Safe 
Surgery [25], and Medication without Harm 
[26]). The remaining eight focus on the funda-
mentals of improving patient safety and quality 
of care. At the end of the patient safety course, 
participants receive a certificate from The 
University of New Mexico of Tula.
Over 2000 healthcare professionals from a 
myriad of socio-economic backgrounds, practic-
ing in rural public hospitals to small and large 
private hospitals have participated in the online 
course. The course was launched in 2016 and 
continues to be offered in 2020.
The success of the online patient safety course 
was primarily due to Ms. Vazquez Curiel’s per-
sonal devotion, fervor, and effective networking 
in advocating for safer care. Because of her 
capacity to understand and appreciate the chal-
lenges of healthcare, and with the credibility of 
being a PFPS champion, Ms. Vazquez Curiel 
developed trusting relationships with healthcare 
leaders in Mexico, the Pan American Health 
Organization (PAHO), and other patient leaders 
and advocates in the Americas. Another contrib-
uting factor in the co-production and popularity 
of the online course was the Pan American 
Network of PFPS which is an informal group of 
like-minded, patients, family members, health-
care professionals, and policy makers with simi-
lar goals and experiences in patient safety that 
spans 10 countries in the Americas. This network 
was formed as a result of PAHO/WHO sponsored 
PFPS workshops. Its goals are to promote patient 
participation in efforts to improve quality and 
safety in healthcare and to improve patient skills 
for dialogue with healthcare planners and policy 
makers. The formation of the regional network 
has resulted in a vibrant, connected, multi- 
stakeholder regional community that shares best 
practices and risk mitigation strategies [27]. 
Finally, this course would not have succeeded 
without the volunteer healthcare professionals’, 
academic institution leaders’, and educators’ 
willingness to collaborate with the PFPS commu-
nity to co-produce a novel curriculum on patient 
safety that fosters a transparent, safe environment 
for dialogue about learning from unsafe care.
6.5.2  Example: Denmark
6.5.2.1  Patients as Educators
Communication breakdowns at crucial moments 
in the provision of healthcare were leading to 
serious adverse events, including death, in Danish 
hospitals. The Danish Society for Patient Safety, 
a civil society organization and member of the 
WHO PFPS Programme [28], organized The 
Danish Patients for Patient Safety (The Danish 
PFPS), a network of volunteer patients and/or 
family members who had experienced severe 
medical harm as a result of communication fail-
ures, to actively address this issue. The Danish 
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PFPS group believed that (1) effective communi-
cation between patients, family members, and 
healthcare providers was desperately lacking at 
crucial moments in the provision of care and that 
this failure to communicate lead to the serious 
medical errors; and (2) patients and/or family 
members who had been affected by adverse 
events sharing their real-world learning through 
storytelling would be an impactful method of 
teaching residents communications skills. Danish 
PFPS champions collaborated with medical lead-
ers and educators in different regions of Denmark 
to co-produce and fully implement a live story-
telling session as part of the compulsory three- 
day communication skills course [29]. During the 
storytelling sessions, a patient or family member 
from the Danish PFPS described his/her experi-
ence with medical error in a manner that high-
lighted the points in care where the doctor’s 
communication skills, both good and poor, were 
especially important to the outcome of the care. 
Immediately after the Danish PFPS champion 
completed his/her story, the storyteller and com-
munication course instructor guided the medical 
residents through a structured reflection process. 
The medical residents were then asked to think 
about what they could learn from the story and 
how they might incorporate these lessons into 
their clinical work.
To date, approximately 2500–2800 medical 
residents have completed the workshop. Medical 
residents consistently share that they have a 
greater appreciation of what the patient or family 
member experienced and have a better under-
standing of why truly listening to patients and 
family members is essential to provide safe and 
appropriate care. This feedback validated that 
live storytelling by patients and/or family mem-
bers is an effective method to explore the human 
experience of care. As a result, the session has 
been permanently integrated into the regional 
standard curriculum for the medical resident 
communications training course since 2012.
The successful integration of the live storytell-
ing session into the residents’ communication 
course is due to the resolve and determination of 
Ms. Katrine Kirk, who experienced an adverse 
event herself, and the Danish PFPS network to 
transform their personal stories of unsafe care 
into learning opportunities coupled with the 
receptiveness of the Head of Training and the 
Curriculum Coordinator for residents in the capi-
tal region of Denmark who valued the inclusion 
of patient storytellers as viable “teachers” for 
medical residents. Together they thoughtfully 
structured the storytelling session to optimize 
resident learning while reducing concerns of 
those instructors trained in traditional, evidence- 
based teaching methods. Another factor of the 
success of the adoption of the storytelling course 
was the ongoing support and capacity building 
for the PFPS Champions that included presenta-
tions skills training offered by the Danish Society 
for Patient Safety. It was critical for the PFPS 
Champions to learn how to constructively craft 
and share their stories in a way that would result 
in meaningful learning for the residents without 
being perceived as adversarial. The Danish PFPS 
Network hopes to spread the idea of patient sto-
rytelling in communications training to the rest 
of Denmark and to systematically analyze the 
long-term impact and effectiveness.
6.6  Co-production in Healthcare 
Organization Quality 
Improvement
Hospitals are increasingly recognizing the crucial 
role of patients’ perspectives in establishing a cul-
ture of safety. Many institutions have prioritized 
engaging patient representatives in the design and 
nurturing of safety efforts and emphasize transpar-
ency in reporting errors and care problems [30].
6.6.1  Example: Egypt
6.6.1.1  Improving Disparities in Care 
for New Mothers: The Power 
of Partnership Between a Civil 
Society Leader and a Public 
Teaching Hospital
There were significant disparities between the 
level of care provided to women delivering 
babies in Cairo at the public maternity teaching 
hospital versus the private hospital. An Egyptian 
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member of The Red Crescent, a civil society 
organization, Nagwa Metwally, now a PFPS 
champion, along with other concerned commu-
nity members believed that by integrating local 
volunteer citizens into the hospital system to 
observe and document quality and safety issues 
would help improve the quality of care and expe-
riences of mothers at the public maternity teach-
ing hospital [31]. Ms. Metwally met with the 
Dean of the medical schools and described the 
mission of the proposed quality improvement 
project. She later met with the Director of the 
public teaching maternity hospital. During this 
meeting, she thoughtfully and strategically 
described the envisioned quality improvement 
project and positioned the project as an “offer to 
help” and an opportunity for collaboration. This 
resulted in a partnership at the public maternity 
teaching hospital that embedded citizen volun-
teers in the hospital to help improve quality hos-
pital services through observation. The goals of 
the project included (1) change the culture to be 
more patient centered; (2) ensure dignity and 
proper treatment for mothers; (3) create a safe 
environment in which mothers felt they could 
share their preferences and request and receive 
parent education; and (4) provide capacity build-
ing to the healthcare team, especially nurses, for 
the provision of safer and more compassionate 
care for the new mothers. Ms. Metwally and citi-
zen volunteers joined the hospital team as 
observers to serve as an “extra set of eyes” to 
identify and record issues related to the WHO’s 
Global Patient Safety Challenges [24–26] and 
the WHO’s patient safety curriculum, which 
included hospital cleanliness, safe surgery, 
healthcare provider behavior, glove use, hand 
hygiene practices, staff and patient interaction, 
and other safety issues. Over 50 citizen volun-
teers and some residents served as observers 
conducting walking “tours” within the hospital 
noting and documenting safety and care con-
cerns which they would later share with the 
Director of the hospital for consideration for 
improvement efforts.
Successes of the quality improvement project 
included the acceptance of these citizen observ-
ers as part of the hospital team as well as mean-
ingful hospital-level policy changes. For example, 
policy change affected the hospital’s promotion 
policy for nurses. The criteria for promotion are 
now based on efficiency, skill, and education 
rather than seniority only. The hospital also 
implemented a new evaluation criterion for medi-
cal residents to advance to medical doctors. The 
medical school adopted a doctor/patient relation-
ship skills evaluation as part of the clinical skills 
final examination that medical residents must 
take to become doctors. In addition, there was an 
overall increase in awareness of patient safety 
issues, improved hospital cleanliness, as well as a 
greater use of gloves and hand hygiene practices 
[32]. The success of the quality improvement in 
the maternity hospital enabled Ms. Metwally to 
co-produce similar quality improvement projects 
in geriatrics and emergency hospitals.
Numerous factors contributed to the success 
of this co-produced quality improvement effort at 
the public maternity teaching hospital. The 
resolve and profound humanitarian commitment 
by Ms. Metwally and the Red Crescent of which 
she was a member, was crucial to highlighting 
the need to improve the equity, patient centered-
ness, and patient safety for new mothers in the 
community. Having the backing of a credible, 
trustworthy civil society organization helped 
facilitate the connection with the leaders of the 
medical schools and the hospital. Furthermore, 
framing the quality improvement project as a 
“way to help out” as well as demonstrating empa-
thy by acknowledging the challenges that the 
public hospital faced was key to developing a 
trusting, respectful collaborative relationship. 
The willingness of the Dean of the medical 
schools and the Director of the maternity hospital 
to partner with Ms. Metwally, the Red Crescent 
and citizen volunteers to implement an innova-
tive approach to quality improvement demon-
strated the courage, humility, integrity, and 
open-mindedness needed from strong leadership 
to realize the benefits of this type of collabora-
tion. Despite the fact that none of the partners in 
this active collaboration had previous training in 
implementing a co-produced quality improve-
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ment project such as this, they were resourceful 
and successful because of their trust in each other 
and in the belief that their mutual goal was in the 
best interest of all in involved, was patient cen-
tered and improved safety and quality.
6.6.2  Italy
6.6.2.1  Democratizing Healthcare: 
A Government-Driven/Citizen 
Partnership to Improve Patient 
Centeredness
The Italian National Agency for Regional Health 
(AGENAS) launched a government-driven 
healthcare organization quality improvement 
project co-produced with civil society organiza-
tions and citizens. The national program was 
aimed at evaluating and improving the level of 
patient centeredness in public and private hospi-
tals throughout the country. AGENAS developed 
an innovative participatory evaluation methodol-
ogy. The methodology was coordinated by 
AGENAS and carried out in cooperation with the 
Active Citizenship Network and the Italian 
Regions. AGENAS trained teams of healthcare 
professionals and citizens to go on site visits in 
public and private hospitals. During the site vis-
its, these teams completed a checklist comprised 
of 142 items exploring four areas of interest: 
person-oriented processes, physical accessibility 
and comfort, access to information and transpar-
ency, and patient–professional relationships. 
Following the site visits, the data was collected 
and sent to a National Database where it was ana-
lyzed and sent back to the regions, hospitals, and 
teams for local public dissemination. 
Improvement plans were jointly identified and 
carried out by hospital professionals and citizens. 
A Plan-Do-Check-Act process was then carried 
out by local teams. Over 400 accredited public 
and private hospitals participated in this national 
evaluation. Site visits were made by the trained 
teams comprised of approximately 600 health 
professionals, 300 citizen associations, and 700 
citizens. The overall results of the project indi-
cate a moderately high level of person centered-
ness, especially in the larger hospitals [33]. 
Where new assessments have been carried out in 
2019, there have been significant reports of 
improvements in all four areas of interest. This 
Italian national program has shown the effective-
ness of co-production of a quality improvement 
initiative that actively engaged organizations, 
professionals, and citizens to promote patient 
centeredness.
A major component of success of the national 
program to improve person centeredness was the 
strong leadership at AGENAS that was dedicated 
to and valued the inclusion of citizens as partners 
in the quality improvement initiative. Examples 
of this included actively engaging citizens in all 
phases of the assessment and improvement cycle, 
as well as providing feedback and publicly dis-
seminating project results. Another component of 
success was the strategic partnerships that 
AGENAS developed to maximize outreach to the 
citizen community. They formed strong alliances 
with the regional governments and health agen-
cies and partnered with Active Citizenship 
Network, the association with the widest exper-
tise in the civic evaluation of quality of health. A 
further component of success was the national 
program’s commitment to providing training and 
capacity building to the citizens and other partici-
pants to optimize engagement by developing 
joint training on materials and tools of the partici-
patory assessment of person centeredness. The 
participatory evaluation methods and tools were 
then applied to assess patient safety. The success 
of the national program has led to further imple-
mentations of this type of active collaboration 
between government, healthcare professionals, 
civil society organizations, and citizens to co- 
produce healthcare organization quality improve-
ment projects.
6.7  Co-Production in Policy
Patient and family engagement in policy develop-
ment has gained increasing recognition. For exam-
ple, patients can be engaged in the development 
and dissemination of tools, information and educa-
tional materials [20].
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6.7.1  Example: Canada
6.7.1.1  Working from Within: 
Co-producing National Policy 
as an Insider
In Canada, unintended patient harm occurs every 
1 min and 18 s throughout the healthcare system, 
with a death resulting every 13 min and 14 s. To 
address this growing concern, Patients for Patient 
Safety Canada (PFPSC) [34], a patient program 
under the Canadian Patient Safety Institute 
(CPSI) [35], a publicly funded, not for profit cor-
poration and designated WHO Collaborating 
Centre in Patient Safety and Patient Engagement, 
has co-produced seminal documents that influ-
ence policy at the national level on patient safety. 
These include the Canadian Disclosure 
Guidelines [36], Canadian Incident Analysis 
Framework [37], Engaging Patients in Patient 
Safety—a Canadian Guide [38], and Five 
Questions to Ask About Your Medications [39].
More recently, PFPSC was engaged in the co- 
production of the Canadian Quality and Patient 
Safety (CQPS) Framework, a joint initiative 
between CPSI and the Health Standards 
Organization (HSO) [40]. The framework was 
designed by a multi-stakeholder Advisory 
Committee, including patient and family mem-
bers of PFPSC, with the specific aim to “establish 
consensus on quality and patient safety goals for 
health and social services to focus action and 
resources that improve patient experience and 
outcomes and reduce care variation” [41].
Members of PFPSC have been active partici-
pants in the development and socialization of the 
CQPS Framework from the outset, as equal play-
ers, and regarded as experts through their lived 
experience and patient advocacy. PFPSC 
Co-Chairs served on the governance Steering 
Committee and Evaluation Working Group. An 
independent public affairs firm was commis-
sioned to provide public consultation; an oppor-
tunity for all stakeholder groups to provide input 
into the CQPS Framework. This independent 
evaluation demonstrated that collective impact 
initiatives, co-designed and co-led by patients as 
authentic partners, can be transformational. This 
collaborative work will continue as the 
Framework is implemented, adopted by health 
systems, and as its impact is evaluated.
The success of PFPSC and CPSI and the co- 
production of patient safety policy improvement 
efforts is largely due to the integration PFPSC 
into the organizational structure of CPSI as well 
as the trust and respect that has been developed 
by having a shared commitment to patient safety 
and healthcare system improvement.
CPSI made patient engagement a strategic pri-
ority and supported the development of a 
Canadian network of patients and family mem-
bers which resulted in the formation of 
PFPSC. CPSI assigned a budget and staff to sup-
port PFPSC and patient engagement. CPSI part-
ners with PFPSC in all of its programs, 
committees, and corporate initiatives, including 
executive recruitment and strategic planning. 
This structure is mutually beneficial in that it 
allows PFPSC to leverage CPSI resources, corpo-
rate functions and staff expertise and time, and it 
provides PFPSC credibility, increasing their 
opportunities to integrate the perspective of the 
patient community into national patient safety 
improvement efforts. Alternatively, CPSI, bene-
fits from PFPSC participation as subject matter 
experts with lived experience of harm from 
unsafe care on which to base patient safety 
policy.
The leadership and patient-centered culture of 
CPSI were fundamental building blocks for suc-
cessful partnership and integration of patients 
into the work of the Institute. Equally, the tenac-
ity of the PFPSC patients and family members in 
advocating for patient needs and the willingness 
to adapt within a structured environment were 
necessary for sustainability and co-production of 
seminal documents and policy projects.
6.8  Conclusion
Patient safety is a growing global concern. 
Parents, daughters, sons, siblings, other family 
members, community members, and our dear 
friends are harmed unnecessarily from unsafe 
care. It is essential that all stakeholders, espe-
cially those who have suffered from adverse 
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events, have the opportunity to actively collabo-
rate in co-producing patient safety solutions. 
Those who have experienced adverse events 
identify gaps in safety and quality and offer wis-
dom, data, and stories unavailable through tradi-
tional sources. Each of these case studies 
illustrates the power and potential of co- 
production with patients, families, and communi-
ties in research, medical professions education, 
healthcare quality improvement and policy. Each 
is different in scope, structure, and purpose and 
engage different stakeholders at different levels 
yet they all highlight the necessary building 
blocks for co-production of patient safety initia-
tives and each responds to the call made in the 
London Declaration, the WHO PFPS Programme, 
and the WHA to place patients at the center of 
efforts to improve patient safety.
The building blocks include:
 1. Dedicated, resilient patient, family, and 
community members who have directly or 
indirectly experienced unsafe care yet are 
willing to partner with healthcare decision- 
makers and learn how to navigate the com-
plexities, structures and limitations of different 
healthcare systems. They have become 
accomplished storytellers, networkers and 
connectors and have gained appreciation of 
the many challenges that healthcare providers 
and leaders face while remaining unwilling to 
accept the status quo.
 2. Courageous, passionate healthcare leaders 
with the moral imperative to integrate the 
patient/citizen community into patient safety 
improvement efforts. These leaders are vision-
aries who visibly demonstrate their commit-
ment to listen and learn from others. They 
value the input from others as highly as their 
own and integrate what they learn into gover-
nance, missions and strategies that promote 
patient involvement. They hard-wire the nec-
essary resources to overcome political, cul-
tural and financial barriers into budgets and 
infrastructures that support patient 
participation.
 3. Capacity building opportunities
• for patients, families and communities to 
help them develop the skills to effectively 
share their personal stories of unsafe care 
that captures the hearts and minds, builds 
trust and prompts action from the audi-
ences and to have productive dialogue with 
healthcare leaders including policy mak-
ers, researchers, medical educators and 
quality improvement experts,
• for healthcare professionals and leaders 
to learn how to utilize effective patient- 
centered methods to collaborate, commu-
nicate with, listen to and engage with 
patients, families and community members 
in a democratic way.
 4. Structure that establishes how patients, fami-
lies and communities operate to obtain their 
goals. There is no one structure that is consid-
ered the gold standard for the organization of 
patients, families and communities. Structures 
may be formal or informal. Informal structures 
tend to be loosely organized, autonomous, vol-
unteer patient networks that collaborate with 
healthcare professionals, leaders and organiza-
tions. More formal structures tend to be estab-
lished patient organizations and associations 
which operate independently from the health-
care system or government such as civil soci-
ety organizations. Finally, there are publicly 
funded structures that embed patients, family 
and community members into their strategic 
plans, budgets and activities necessary to 
achieve organizational goals. Whether formal 
or informal, it is essential that the structure 
preserves the values, preferences and out-
comes that matter most to patients, families 
and communities and that these serve as over-
arching principles that guide the actions and 
priorities of the safety initiatives. It is also 
important that the structure facilitates access 
for patients, families and community members 
to healthcare decision-makers as well as finan-
cial and human resources to systematically 
analyze the outcomes of co-produced safety 
initiatives to improve, scale and spread, or dis-
seminate the benefits of implementation and to 
ensure sustainability.
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All stakeholders must accept, value, and sup-
port meaningful patient engagement in the co- 
production of our efforts to improve patient 
safety including in the design of research, medi-
cal education, policy making, and healthcare 
organization quality improvement.
We must continue to strive to democratize our 
healthcare. We “must have a powerful voice and 
role in the decisions and systems that affect…
[our] health, and…[be given the] tools that 
help…[us] to become far more actively 
engaged…health professionals and institutions 
must value social equity and the individual in the 
context of community” [42]. I know this because 
I have lived it and witnessed the successes.
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Human Factors and Ergonomics 
in Health Care and Patient Safety 
from the Perspective of Medical 
Residents
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7.1  Introduction
Health care is about people with various roles 
(e.g., patient, caregiver, clinician) who interact 
and collaborate in connected care processes of 
diagnosis, treatment, monitoring, and manage-
ment. Ensuring that these processes produce 
“good” outcomes for patients (e.g., quality of 
care, patient safety, positive patient experience) 
as well as for clinicians involved in their care 
(e.g., quality of working life of clinicians) 
remains a major challenge around the world. The 
US National Academies’ report on Crossing the 
Global Quality Chasm [1] indicates that inappro-
priate and unsafe care remain widespread around 
the world. In particular, “between 5.7 and 8.4 
million deaths occur annually from poor quality 
of care in LMICs for … selected set of conditions 
…, which represents between 10% and 15% of 
the total deaths in LMICs … in 2015” (page S-2). 
Two other reports also published in 2018 draw 
attention to patient safety challenges and gaps in 
health care quality around the world [2]. Systems 
approaches have been recommended to address 
these complex health care quality and patient 
safety problems [1, 3], as well as to improve 
work systems and working conditions for clini-
cians [4].
The discipline of human factors (or ergonom-
ics) (HFE) provides systems concepts and meth-
ods to improve care processes and outcomes for 
patients, caregivers, and clinicians. According to 
the International Ergonomics Association, HFE 
is “the scientific discipline concerned with the 
understanding of interactions among humans and 
other elements of a system, and the profession 
that applies theory, principles, data and methods 
to design in order to optimize human well-being 
and overall system performance” [5]. According 
to this definition of HFE by the IEA, people are at 
the center of (work) systems; systems and their 
elements and interactions should be designed to 
support performance and enhance well-being of 
people. HFE emphasizes the physical, cognitive, 
and organizational dimensions of work systems. 
Medical residents are key stakeholders in deliv-
ery of high-quality, safe care; they are often at the 
center of work systems that deliver care to 
patients in hospitals, primary care or specialty 
care facilities, emergency departments, and other 
care settings. Therefore, it is important to design 
the work system of medical residents to improve 
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quality and safety of care. The discipline, 
approaches, and methods of HFE can help to 
achieve this goal.
7.2  Application of SEIPS Model 
to Medical Residents
The SEIPS (Systems Engineering Initiative for 
Patient Safety) model [6, 7] is an HFE systems 
model that can be used to describe the work of 
medical residents and its impact on patient safety 
and resident outcomes, such as well-being, safety, 
and learning. According to the SEIPS model, med-
ical residents perform a range of tasks (e.g., clini-
cal tasks, learning activities) using various tools 
and technologies; this occurs in a physical and 
organizational environment (see Fig.  7.1). The 
design of the work system, i.e., its individual ele-
ments and their interactions, influences care pro-
cesses and educational processes, which in turn 
produce outcomes for patients (e.g., patient safety) 
and for residents (e.g., well-being, learning).
Medical residents perform a range of tasks 
that have been documented and described in mul-
tiple studies. For instance, Carayon et  al. [8] 
described the work of residents in intensive care 
units (ICUs), including adult, pediatric, medical, 
and surgical units. Prior to conducting observa-
tions, researchers developed a list of 17 tasks 
(e.g., direct patient interaction). Four human fac-
tors engineers observed residents in multiple 
ICUs for a total of 242  h. Observers recorded 
time spent by residents in the following catego-
ries: (1) direct patient care (e.g., clinical review 
and documentation), (2) care coordination (e.g., 
conversation with team physician), (3) indirect 
patient care (e.g., administrative review and doc-
umentation), and (4) non-patient care (e.g., non- 
clinical conversation). Other studies of medical 
residents have also shown that significant propor-
tion of their time is spent on tasks that are indi-
rectly related to patient care [9] and that medical 
residents are often interrupted while performing 
tasks [10].
Residents perform tasks using various tech-
nologies, in particular health information tech-
nologies such as EHR (electronic health record) 
and CPOE (computerized provider order entry). 
Those technologies have significant impact on 
tasks performed by residents, including time 
spent on various tasks and the sequence or flow 
Fig. 7.1 SEIPS model applied to medical residents
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of tasks. For instance, after the implementation of 
EHR technology in intensive care units, residents 
spent significantly more time on clinical docu-
mentation and review: from 18% to 31%, respec-
tively, before and after EHR implementation 
[11]. They also performed a higher frequency of 
activities per hour after EHR implementation: 
from 117 to 154 activities per hour. This may 
reflect increased intensification of work around 
the use of EHR technology.
Eden et al. [12] described several work system 
factors in graduate medical education that inter-
act and influence residents’ educational process 
and resident learning; these work system interac-
tions impact the extent to which the resident 
workforce is able to provide high-quality, patient- 
centered, and affordable health care. For instance, 
the payment structures (organization), availabil-
ity of accredited residency positions (environ-
ment), as well as lifestyle and demographic 
factors (person) affect the residency pipeline and 
the number of physicians in specialty and sub- 
specialty fields. Other work system factors, such 
as telehealth (technology) and an increased pres-
ence of physician assistants (organization) are 
changing the roles, responsibilities, and work 
demands of physicians. The graduate medical 
education work system should be designed so 
that the educational processes produce physi-
cians that can support the health needs and goals 
of populations around the world.
A recent report by the National Academies of 
Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine demon-
strates the influence of work system factors on 
resident well-being. Forty-five to sixty percent of 
medical residents’ experience symptoms of burn-
out, which is characterized by high emotional 
exhaustion, high depersonalization, and a low 
sense of accomplishment from work [13]. In par-
ticular, the electronic health record (technology) 
is recognized as a source of burnout among phy-
sicians. For instance, in a study of residents and 
teaching physicians, 37% reported at least 1 
symptom of burnout with 75% associating burn-
out with the use of the EHR. Additionally, physi-
cians who used the EHR after work for more than 
6 h per week were 3 times more likely to report 
symptoms of burnout compared to physicians 
who spent 6 h or less per week [14]. The negative 
impact of the EHR on resident well-being is in 
part due to the increased clerical (tasks) and doc-
umentation (organization) burden. The SEIPS 
model can be used to understand how work sys-
tem factors interact and influence resident out-
comes such as burnout and learning).
We adapted a scenario from the AHRQ 
(Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality) 
WebM&M website (https://psnet.ahrq.gov/) to 
demonstrate how work system elements can 
interact and influence patient care.
A 70-year-old healthy man (person) went to a rou-
tine follow-up appointment (task) with his primary 
care doctor (person). His doctor (person) was a 
third-year internal medicine resident in his final 
month of training and would soon leave the institu-
tion to begin his fellowship. After a discussion 
with the patient, the resident decided to screen him 
for prostate cancer with the prostate-specific anti-
gen (PSA) test (person and task). In the past, the 
patient’s PSA tests had always been normal. This 
time, the patient’s PSA test returned and was ele-
vated at a level where cancer is almost certain 
(83 ng/ml). However, the resident had completed 
his training before receiving an electronic alert 
(technology) about the patient’s PSA test. The 
electronic alert remained unread (technology, task, 
organization) as there was no system in place that 
supported smooth handoffs to oncoming residents 
(organization, task, person). Several months later, 
the patient (person) presented with low back pain. 
His new physician, another internal medicine resi-
dent (person), ordered imaging tests (task) that 
confirmed metastatic prostate cancer. While the 
new resident (person) reviewed the patient’s chart 
(task and technology), he uncovered the missed 
follow-up for the patient’s elevated PSA.
This scenario includes several interacting 
work system elements (e.g., technology and 
organization) that resulted in a patient’s delayed 
diagnosis of prostate cancer.




One of the primary drivers of workplace reform 
as it relates to resident well-being and health is 
through the institution of duty hour limitations. 
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This reform is largely attributed to the death of 
Libby Zion, an 18-year-old woman who was 
under the care of residents in a hospital emer-
gency department in New York City in 1984 [15]. 
Publicity from this case spurred conversations 
about fatigue and patient safety issues connected 
to unrestricted hours worked by residents, and 
many countries began to impose work hour limi-
tations in the 1990s as a result. The European 
Working Time Directive became law in 1998 and 
included limiting physicians working hours to 
48 h per week and limiting hours for physicians 
in training [16]. Training hours in the United 
States limited work hours first in 2003 [17], then 
further in 2011 to a cap of 80 h per week, with the 
aim of improving both patient safety and trainee 
safety [18].
Measuring the impact of duty hour restrictions 
has been controversial. A systematic review in 
2015 on work hour restrictions found inconsis-
tent results, often with studies in direct contradic-
tion with expectations regarding patient safety 
and resident well-being [19]. Since then two 
large randomized controlled trials have evaluated 
outcomes more extensively, randomizing trainees 
to restrictive conditions under the 2011 limits vs 
more flexible schedules. The FIRST trial ran-
domized 118 surgical programs and first pub-
lished results in 2015. This was followed by the 
iCOMPARE trial, which randomized 63 internal 
medicine residency programs. In both studies, 
primary outcomes included no difference in 
patient safety events between groups [20, 21] and 
no significant difference in educational outcomes 
between groups [22]. Residents in the iCOM-
PARE trial were more satisfied with their educa-
tional experience in the work hour restricted arm 
of the study though this effect was not seen in the 
FIRST trial, while program directors were more 
satisfied in the flexible schedule study arm.
The exact degree of duty hour restriction nec-
essary to impact patient safety remains contro-
versial [23]. Critics of studies showing minimal 
impact argue that work hour restrictions are 
inconsistently applied or may not be carefully 
implemented [24]. For example, limiting time at 
work on duty may just shift to more work at home 
when off duty, or compressing work to a nar-
rower window and leading to increased stress 
[25]. Despite results of the FIRST and iCOM-
PARE trials, significant data exist to show that 
extended shifts in the hospital setting can have 
adverse effects on technical and cognitive perfor-
mance and lead to impairment outside the work-
place [26–28].
Work hour limitations in the EU are generally 
more restrictive than in the United States yet have 
led to similarly controversial results. A system-
atic review by Rodriguez-Jareño and colleagues 
[23] found that long working hours, defined by 
the European Working Time Directive as more 
than 48  h per week, to be associated with an 
increased incidence of physician needle-stick 
injuries and motor vehicle accidents. Additionally, 
a study by Zahrai et al. [29] found a significant 
relationship between resident hours spent in the 
hospital and poor general health and physical 
function. However, another study found no 
improvements in resident self-reported physical 
health by reducing working hours [30].
Despite these controversies, efforts should be 
made to mitigate fatigue and burnout. Burnout 
has been demonstrated to increase cognitive fail-
ures and difficulties with attention [31]. A sys-
tematic review demonstrated a strong connection 
between poor well-being and negative patient 
safety outcomes such as medical errors. This was 
particularly closely linked with depression, anxi-
ety, poor quality of life, and stress, along with 
moderate to high levels of burnout [32]. Growing 
data on the impact of burnout on both clinical 
outcomes and physician safety has led to repeated 
calls for greater emphasis on addressing this 
issue [33]. This is critical as it relates to training 
environments for residents along with the broader 
systems in which health care professionals work; 
it is becoming more apparent that fatigue and 
burnout is a significant safety issue for both 
patients and physicians, including physicians-in- 
training. Outside of duty hours, several other 
work system factors can contribute to poor resi-
dent well-being, fatigue, and burnout including 
training, work schedule flexibility, autonomy, 
clinical experience, and supervisor behavior [34, 
35]. As there are multiple, sometimes conflicting 
goals, regulations on working hours as well as 
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other work system factors (e.g., flexibility of 
schedules, technology design, training environ-
ment) should be carefully considered in order to 
mitigate negative effects on residents and patient 
safety.
7.4  Challenges and Trade-Offs 
in Improving Residents’ 
Work System
Medical residents work and learn in various care 
settings and in interaction with other clinicians. 
The challenge is how to optimize the work sys-
tem of medical residents, as well as the work sys-
tems of others that are involved in patient care. In 
a previous section, we discussed the challenge of 
designing safe and healthy work schedules for 
medical residents. Some interventions aimed at 
reducing work hours of medical residents have 
unfortunately had negative impact on the attend-
ing physicians who supervise them: work gets 
passed on from medical residents to attending 
physicians who are then experiencing overload 
and stress. Therefore, any intervention aimed at 
improving the work system of medical residents 
needs to prevent or mitigate negative conse-
quences for other health care professionals 
involved in patient care.
Improving residents’ work system can be 
challenging as it may lead to improvement in 
some outcomes, but deterioration in other out-
comes. Myers et al. [36] assessed internal medi-
cine and general surgical residents’ attitudes 
about the effects of the Accreditation Council for 
General Medical Education duty hours regula-
tions effective July 1, 2003 [37]. They surveyed 
111 internal medicine residents and 48 general 
surgical residents from six geographically 
diverse programs in the United States. The sam-
ple was limited to residents who had experienced 
residency before and after implementation of the 
duty hours regulations. The survey included 
questions on residents’ opinions of [1] quality of 
patient care and safety and [2] residency educa-
tion. Both medical and surgical residents 
reported that the quality of care decreased with 
continuity of care decreasing a lot. Medical resi-
dents reported a greater decrease in available 
opportunities for bedside learning and teaching 
than surgical residents. The authors of the study 
noted that duty hours reform may lead to teach-
ing hospitals caring for the same patient volume 
with fewer resident physician-hours; therefore, 
intensifying the work of residents. Thus, there is 
a need to optimize and improve the resident 
work system to consider all outcomes, including 
continuity of patient care and educational 
opportunities.
7.5  Role of Residents 
in Improving Their Work 
System
There is a long tradition in the HFE literature and 
practice of involving “workers” in work system 
redesign; this is known as participatory ergonom-
ics [38]. In participatory ergonomics projects, the 
“workers” participate in providing input and 
ideas about how to improve tasks, technologies, 
environments, organizations, and processes. 
Sometimes workers are actively engaged in mak-
ing decisions about how to redesign the work 
system. Participatory ergonomics projects vary 
with regard to content (e.g., improving the design 
of EHR technology), decision making (e.g., pro-
viding input or making decisions on process 
improvement), and stage (e.g., initial analysis of 
work system or implementation of redesign) 
[39]. In a project aimed at enhancing family 
engagement in bedside rounding in a pediatric 
hospital, researchers implemented a participatory 
ergonomics process in which residents along 
with attending physicians, nurses, and parent 
proposed and helped to implement a bundle of 
interventions [40]. The interventions consisted of 
a checklist of best practices for engaging families 
during bedside rounding (e.g., introducing health 
care team members) and training of residents in 
the new rounding process. Specific elements of 
the checklist (e.g., asking the family for ques-
tions, reading back orders) were related to 
improvement in perceived quality and safety of 
care by parents [41]. Involving residents in this 
work system and process redesign was critical to 
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the successful implementation of the interven-
tions as key stakeholders. In addition to involving 
residents in specific improvement projects, health 
care organizations have created dedicated struc-
tures to involve residents more systematically, 
such as involvement of residents in safety/quality 
councils [42].
The Institute of Medicine report “Resident 
Duty Hours: Enhancing Sleep, Supervision, 
and Safety” [43] spurred a significant change in 
resident work structure. It also prompted greater 
emphasis on both training and direct resident 
involvement in quality improvement and patient 
safety initiatives. Out of this movement, the 
Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical 
Education in the United States (ACGME) 
drafted its Clinical Learning Environment 
Review (CLER) guidelines in 2014 [44]. 
Included in the guidelines are requirements that 
training programs integrate quality improve-
ment and patient safety training into resident 
curricula and that residents should have direct 
involvement in organizational quality improve-
ment projects. Hospitals and health systems 
have taken a variety of strategies to fulfill this 
requirement while also integrating residents 
into quality improvement initiatives and work 
system redesigns.
A systematic review in 2010 identified com-
ponents for a resident quality curriculum, which 
should include concepts of continuous quality 
improvement, root cause analysis, and systems 
thinking [45]. Implementation of quality curri-
cula was well accepted and effective in improv-
ing knowledge. Further, 32% of studied curricula 
(13/41) resulted in local changes in care delivery 
and 17% (13/41) significantly improved target 
processes of care, indicating that direct training 
itself of trainees can improve the quality environ-
ment of an organization.
Several organizations have heeded the call for 
resident involvement in improving their work 
systems by establishing quality councils and 
safety officer positions for residents and other 
trainees [4]. This is a critical component to boost-
ing resident involvement in safety and quality 
improvement their institutions. In the following 
paragraph, we lay out a model for a resident 
safety council drawing on experiences published 
by several institutions in the United States and 
Canada [42, 46]. Similar councils have since 
demonstrated measurable improvements in 
improvements in patient safety goals [47, 48].
The following should be considered when 
designing and implementing a resident safety 
council:
• The council should be resident led.
• Appoint a resident chair who works directly 
along system administrators and other hospi-
tal groups to direct quality improvement 
projects.
• Relevant subcommittees, for example, 
Quality, Safety, Research, Education, each 
chaired by council members can further direct 
the focus of the group.
• Agendas and meeting topics are both chosen 
by and presented by residents to this helps 
assure that meetings remain interactive and 
productive, rather than becoming a series of 
lectures.
• The safety council should remain voluntary 
though with an effort to establish representa-
tion from all training programs at an 
institution.
• Encourage a multidisciplinary presence at 
council meetings. Graduate medical education 
staff, hospital administrators, representatives 
from organizational QI and patient safety 
departments, and patient–family representa-
tives should all be involved in meetings.
• The safety council should serve as a tool to 
draw residents directly onto institutional QI 
committees, such as Event Evaluation Teams, 
Root Cause Analysis, Medical Records com-
mittees, and Interdisciplinary Model of Care 
Committees.
Implementing a robust quality improvement 
and safety curriculum supported by a resident-led 
council can empower residents to implement 
large-scale quality work, to engage their peers, 
and help foster growth of the next generation of 
leaders in patient safety.
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7.6  Conclusion
In many health care organizations, especially 
academic medical centers, residents are the pri-
mary clinicians providing patient care. 
Recognizing the unique needs of medical resi-
dents both in their role of delivering safe and 
effective care and also in meeting their educa-
tional objectives requires a robust approach to 
understand the work systems in which residents 
operate. Human factors and ergonomics princi-
ples, and specifically the Systems Engineering 
Initiative for Patient Safety (SEIPS) model, can 
inform decisions when working to evaluate and 
improve resident work systems. This is particu-
larly important when addressing patient safety 
and resident well-being. As health care becomes 
increasingly interconnected and reliant on multi-
disciplinary teams, it is important to consider 
unanticipated consequences of changes in work 
systems, particularly on how they may affect pro-
cesses and outcomes for residents, but also for all 
other team members.
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“First, do no harm,” the principle of non- 
maleficence, is the fundamental principle to 
ensuring safety and quality of care. Patient safety 
is defined as the prevention of errors and adverse 
effects associated with healthcare.
The global movement for patient safety was 
first encouraged in 1999 by the report of the 
Institute of Medicine (IOM) “To err is human.” 
Although some progress has been made, patient 
harm is still a daily problem in healthcare sys-
tems around the world. While long-standing 
problems remain unresolved, new, serious threats 
are emerging. Patients are getting older, have 
more complex needs and are often affected by 
multiple chronic diseases; moreover, the new 
treatments, technologies and care practices, while 
having enormous potential, also offer new chal-
lenges. To guarantee the safety of care in this 
context, the involvement of all stakeholders, 
including both healthcare professionals and 
patients, is needed together with strong commit-
ment from healthcare leadership at every level.
8.2  Epidemiology of Adverse 
Events
Available evidence suggests hospitalizations in 
low- and middle-income countries lead annually 
to 134 million adverse events, contributing to 2.6 
million deaths. About 134 million adverse events 
worldwide give rise to 2.6 million deaths every 
year. Estimates indicate that in high-income coun-
tries, about 1 in 10 patients is harmed while receiv-
ing hospital care. Many medical practices and 
care-associated risks are becoming major chal-
lenges for patient safety and contribute signifi-
cantly to the burden of harm due to unsafe care.
About one patient in ten is harmed while 
receiving acute care and about 30–50% of these 
events are preventable. This issue is not only 
related to hospitals, in fact it is estimated that 
four patients out of ten are harmed in primary 
care and outpatient settings and, in these con-
texts, about 80% of events are preventable. 
Moreover, this problem affects both high-income 
and low- and middle-income countries.
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The burden of this issue also affects economic 
resources. The Organisation of Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) has esti-
mated that adverse events engender 15% of hos-
pital expenditures and activities. For all these 
reasons, investments in patient safety are neces-
sary to improve patient outcomes and to obtain 
financial savings which could be reinvested in 
healthcare. Prevention expenditures are lower 
than treatment ones and they add important value 
to the national healthcare systems.
8.3  Most Frequent Adverse 
Events
Adverse events affect patients in all the various 
steps of care, in both acute and outpatient set-
tings, and they are transversal globally. Although 
priorities differ according to the characteristics of 
each country and its healthcare system, it is 
essential to support the management of clinical 
risks to ensure safety of care.
Below are brief descriptions of the main 
patient safety issues and the burden each repre-
sents worldwide, as identified by the World 
Health Organization.
8.3.1  Medication Errors
A medication error is an unintended failure in the 
drug treatment procedure which could harm the 
patient. Medication errors can affect all steps of 
the medication process and can cause adverse 
events most often relating to prescribing, dis-
pensing, storage, preparation, and administra-
tion. The annual combined cost of these events is 
one of the highest, an estimated 42 billion USD.
8.3.2  Healthcare-Associated 
Infections
Healthcare-associated infections are the infec-
tions that occur in patients under care, in hospi-
tals or in another healthcare facilities, and that 
were not present or were incubating at the time 
of admission. They can affect patients in any 
type of care setting and can also first appear 
after discharge. They also include occupational 
infections of the healthcare staff. The most 
common types of healthcare-associated infec-
tions are pneumonia, surgical site infections, 
urinary tract infections, gastro-intestinal infec-
tions, and bloodstream infections. In acute care 
settings, the prevalence of patients having at 
least one healthcare- associated infection is esti-
mated to be around 7% in high-income coun-
tries and 10% in low- and middle-income 
countries, while prevalence in long-term care 
facilities in the European Union is about 3%. 
Intensive care units (ICU) have the highest 
prevalence of healthcare- associated infections 
worldwide, ICU-associated risk is 2–3 times 
higher in low- and middle- income countries 
than in high-income ones; this difference also 
concerns the risk for newborns which is 3–20 
times higher in low- and middle- income 
countries.
8.3.3  Unsafe Surgical Procedures
Unsafe surgical procedures cause complications 
for up to 25% of patients. Each year almost 7 mil-
lion surgical patients are affected by a complica-
tion and about 1 million die. Safety improvements 
in the past few years have led to a decrease in 
deaths related to complications from surgery. 
However, differences still remain between low- 
and middle-income countries and high-income 
countries; in fact, the frequency of adverse events 
is three times higher in low- and middle-income 
countries.
8.3.4  Unsafe Injections
Unsafe injections can transmit infections such as 
HIV and hepatitis B and C, endangering both 
patients and healthcare workers. The global 
impact is very pronounced, especially in low- and 
middle-income countries where it is estimated 
that about 9.2 million disability-adjusted life 
years (DALYs) were lost in the 2000s.
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8.3.5  Diagnostic Errors
A diagnostic error is the failure to identify the 
nature of an illness in an accurate and timely 
manner and occurs in about 5% of adult outpa-
tients. About half of these errors can cause severe 
harm. Most of the relevant data concern 
 high- income countries but diagnostic errors are 
also a problem for low- and middle-income coun-
tries, mainly related to limited access to care and 
diagnostic testing resources.
8.3.6  Venous Thromboembolism
Venous thromboembolism is one of the most com-
mon and preventable causes of patient harm and 
represents about one third of the complications 
attributed to hospitalization. This issue has a sig-
nificant impact both in the high-income countries, 
where 3.9 million cases are estimated to occur 
yearly, and in low- and middle-income countries, 
which see about 6 million cases each year.
8.3.7  Radiation Errors
Radiation errors include cases of overexposure to 
radiation and cases of wrong-patient and wrong- 
site identification. Each year, more than 3.6 bil-
lion X-ray examinations are performed 
worldwide, of which 10% are performed on chil-
dren. Additionally, other types of examinations 
involving radiation are frequently performed, 
such as nuclear medicine (37 million each year) 
and radiotherapy procedures (7.5 million each 
year). Adverse events occur in about 15 cases per 
10,000 treatments.
8.3.8  Unsafe Transfusion
Unsafe transfusion practices expose patients to 
the risk of adverse transfusion reactions and 
transmission of infections. Data on adverse trans-
fusion reactions from a group of 21 countries 
show an average incidence of 8.7 serious reac-
tions per 100 000 distributed blood components.
8.4  Implementation Strategy
Through the years, some progress has been made 
in raising awareness of practices that support 
patient safety. For example, in 2009 the European 
Union issued the “Council recommendation on 
patient safety, including the prevention and con-
trol of healthcare-associated infections (2009/C 
151/01)” and in 2012 it launched the “European 
Union Network for Patient Safety and Quality of 
Care, PaSQ” a network that aims to improve 
safety of care through the sharing of information 
and experience, and the implementation of good 
practices.
In many countries, support of patient safety 
practices has developed through the establish-
ment of national plans, networks, and organiza-
tions; moreover, some countries, such as the 
United States, Australia, and Italy, have also 
enacted national laws on the topic.
In 2019, an important landmark resolution 
(WHA72.6) ‘Global action on patient safety’ was 
adopted by the 194 countries that participated in 
the 72nd World Health Assembly held in Geneva. 
Based on the common agreement that this matter 
is a major global health priority, a whole day was 
dedicated to its discussion. As a result, the 17th of 
September 2019 became the first “World Patient 
Safety Day.” Every year, this day will be dedi-
cated to promoting public awareness and engage-
ment, enhancing global understanding, and 
spurring global solidarity and action. The aim is 
to engage all the categories of people involved in 
providing care: patients, healthcare workers, poli-
cymakers, academics, and researchers, as well as 
professional networks and healthcare industries.
8.5  Recommendations 
and Future Challenges
Some  progress  has been made in addressing 
patient safety issues since 1999, but in order to 
overcome this challenge it is important to imple-
ment a system that guarantees daily safety mea-
sures in all care settings and that involves all 
stakeholders, including both healthcare profes-
sionals and patients.
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First of all, it is important to promote transpar-
ency around events that have led to harm and 
open disclosure with the patient, their family, 
caregivers, and other support persons. At the 
same time, it is necessary to encourage public 
awareness of the measures taken by healthcare 
organizations for the prevention of adverse 
events. This need is underlined by the result of a 
Eurobarometer survey that found that European 
citizens perceive the risk of being harmed during 
care to be higher than in reality, both in hospitals 
and in non-acute settings—in fact more than half 
of the respondents believed that they could be 
harmed while receiving care. The model of 
patient care should switch from a “patient- 
centered” approach to a “patient-as-partner” 
approach that establishes direct and active par-
ticipation in ensuring one’s own safety in care: 
the patient should become a member of the 
healthcare team.
It is necessary to reaffirm the idea that patient 
safety is not in the hands of one professional in 
particular, but in the hands of each healthcare 
worker. All healthcare organizations have the 
unavoidable duty to introduce and support the 
training of all healthcare workers in specific mat-
ters of safety.
The probability of making mistakes decreases 
when the environment is designed with error pre-
vention in mind, incorporating well-structured 
tasks, processes, and systems. For the continuous 
improvement, healthcare systems must have 
immediate access to information that supports 
learning from experience in order to identify and 
implement measures that prevent error. Therefore, 
healthcare systems must dispense with the 
“blame and shame” culture which prevents 
acknowledgment of errors and hampers learning 
and must promote a “safety culture” which allows 
insight to be gained from past errors. A safety 
culture can only be established in an open and 
transparent environment and only if all levels of 
the organization are involved. In this context, an 
efficient reporting system should be a corner-
stone for healthcare organizations, collecting 
experiences and data (e.g., of adverse events and 
near misses) and providing feedback from pro-
fessionals. In addition, it is essential to guarantee 
support for professionals involved in adverse 
events; the “second victims” of an adverse event 
are healthcare workers who might have been 
emotionally traumatized. Without adequate sup-
port, a second victim experience can harm the 
emotional and physical health of the involved 
professional, generate self-doubt regarding their 
clinical skills and knowledge, reduce job satis-
faction to the point of wanting to leave the health-
care profession, and, as a result of all these issues, 
can affect patient safety.
Another area for improvement is the synergy 
between patient safety, safety allied programs, 
health and clinical program and healthcare activi-
ties such as accreditation and management of 
quality of care. Therefore, regardless of the way 
such functions are structured within countries 
and healthcare organizations, the branches of 
patient safety, safety allied programs and quality 
of care must collaborate to identify common pri-
orities, tools, actions, and indicators to align 
efforts and enhance outcomes.
The needs brought about by the international 
movement of people and the differences in safety 
priorities across the globe have focused the 
attention on the importance of an international, 
common strategy for patient safety. To this end, 
strong commitment is needed from the major 
international healthcare organizations for the 
creation of international networks and the shar-
ing of knowledge, programs, tools, good prac-
tices, and benchmarking according to 
standardized indicators. Thus, the global strat-
egy for patient safety must involve three distinct 
steps. The first step is to secure strong interna-
tional commitment, including both high-income 
and low- and middle-income countries, with par-
ticular emphasis on those which have not yet 
been involved, especially in the low- and mid-
dle-income group. The second step is to focus on 
specific patient safety issues that depend on local 
context and require tailored solutions. The third 
step is to coordinate between all stakeholders to 
optimize impacts, avoid the  duplication of 
efforts, and pool programs, strategies, and tools. 
It is also essential to identify trends and recur-
ring issues and evaluate shared indicators. This 
strategy should form part of a “glocal” approach 
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adopted by all countries, regions, and healthcare 
organizations: the selection of specific actions 
tailored on the particularity of each context, 
while benefitting from the new level of collabo-
ration, knowledge, and opportunities afforded by 
globalization.
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A healthcare-associated infection (HAI) is 
defined as: “An infection occurring in a patient 
during the process of care in a hospital or other 
health-care facility which was not present or 
incubating at the time of admission. This includes 
infections acquired in the hospital, but appearing 
after discharge, and also occupational infections 
among staff of the facility” [1]. The term “health-
care associated” has replaced the former ones 
used to refer to such infections (i.e., “nosoco-
mial” or “hospital”), as evidence has shown that 
HAIs can occur as a result of the provision of 
healthcare in any setting. While the specific risks 
may differ, the basic principles of infection pre-
vention and control apply regardless of the set-
ting [2].
HAIs are one of the most common adverse 
events in care delivery and pose a major public 
health problem impacting morbidity, mortality, and 
quality of life. At any one time, up to 7% of patients 
in developed countries and 10% of patients in 
developing countries will be affected by at least 
one HAI [3]. These infections also represent a sig-
nificant economic burden at the societal level, 
accounting for a considerable proportion of costs; 
for example, in 2006, the mean excess cost of HAIs 
in Belgium was close to 6% of public hospital 
spending, while in the UK it was 2.6% [4]. The 
estimated cumulative burden in disability-adjusted 
lost years (DALY) of the six top HAIs is twice the 
collective burden of 32 other communicable dis-
eases (501 DALYs versus 260 DALYs) [5].
9.2  Main Healthcare-Associated 
Infection
The main HAIs are generally distributed anatom-
ically as follows: 35% involve the urinary tract, 
25% the surgical site, 10% the lungs, 10% the 
bloodstream. The remaining 10% involve other 
sites [6].
9.2.1  Urinary Tract Infections (UTIs)
Urinary tract infections are the most common 
HAIs and most patients with healthcare- 
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associated UTIs have either undergone genitouri-
nary or urological manipulation (10–20%) or 
permanent urethral catheterization (around 80%), 
or both. Infections are usually defined by micro-
biological criteria: positive quantitative urine cul-
ture (≥105 microorganisms/ml, with a maximum 
of two isolated microbial species). Morbidity and 
mortality from UTIs are low compared to other 
HAIs, but they can sometimes lead to bacteremia 
and death [1]. The high prevalence of urinary 
catheter use—between 15% and 25% of hospital-
ized patients may receive short-term indwelling 
urinary catheters—leads to a large cumulative 
number of infections and resulting complications 
and deaths. The source of microorganisms caus-
ing UTIs can be endogenous (as in most cases) or 
exogenous, such as via contaminated equipment 
or via the hands of healthcare staff. Microbial 
pathogens can enter the urinary tract of catheter-
ized patient either via migration along the outside 
of the catheter in the periurethral mucous sheath 
or via movement along the internal lumen of the 
catheter from a contaminated collection bag or 
catheter-drainage tube junction. The most fre-
quently associated pathogens are Escherichia 
coli, Pseudomonas, Enterococcus, Klebsiella, 
Enterobacter, and Proteus. Multivariate analyses 
have underlined that the duration of catheteriza-
tion is the most important risk factor in the devel-
opment of catheter-associated bacteriuria. Other 
risk factors include colonization of the drainage 
bag, diabetes mellitus, female gender, poor qual-
ity of catheter care [7].
Antimicrobial resistance of urinary pathogens 
is an increasing problem; in Europe, Escherichia 
coli is reported to be resistant to fluoroquinolones 
in 8–48% of the isolates and to third-generation 
cephalosporins in 3–82%, and Klebsiella pneu-
moniae is reported to be resistant to third- 
generation cephalosporins in 2–82% of the 
isolates and to carbapenems in 0–68% [8].
9.2.2  Bloodstream Infections (BSIs)
Bloodstream infections represent a smaller pro-
portion of HAIs, but the associated case fatality 
rate is high [1]: 25–30% of patients with 
healthcare- associated bloodstream infections die, 
and the attributable mortality is at least 15% [6]. 
They also influence the length of stay and costs 
[9]. The incidence is increasing, particularly for 
certain organisms such as multiresistant 
coagulase- negative Staphylococcus, 
Enterobacteriales, and Candida spp.
The Surveillance and Control of Pathogens of 
Epidemiologic Importance (SCOPE) project sur-
veillance system showed that 70% of all 
healthcare- associated bloodstream infections are 
associated with a central venous catheter [6]. 
Infections may occur at the skin entry site of the 
intravascular device or in the subcutaneous path 
of the catheter. Organisms colonizing the catheter 
within the vessel may produce bacteremia with-
out visible external infection. The cutaneous 
flora, whether resident or transient, is the source 
of infection. The main risk factors are length of 
catheterization, level of asepsis at insertion, and 
continuing catheter care [1]. The leading causes 
of healthcare-associated bloodstream infections 
are coagulase-negative staphylococci, 
Staphylococcus aureus, enterococci, and Candida 
species. More than 90% of coagulase-negative 
staphylococci and 60% of S. aureus isolates are 
resistant to methicillin, more than 30% of entero-
cocci to vancomycin, and more than 10% of 
Candida organisms to first-generation triazoles 
[6]. Large and sustained reduction (up to 66%) in 
rates of catheter-related bloodstream infections 
has been obtained by implementing procedures 
recommended to reduce BSIs, such as hand 
washing, using full-barrier precautions during 
the insertion of central venous catheters, cleaning 
the skin with chlorhexidine, avoiding the femoral 
site if possible, and removing unnecessary cath-
eters [10].
9.2.3  Surgical Site Infections
Surgical site infections (SSI) are infections 
occurring in the incision site or in deep tissues 
where surgery has been performed, within 
30 days of surgery or longer if a prosthetic device 
has been implanted. SSIs are one of the most fre-
quent healthcare-associated infections, account-
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ing for about 20–25% of all HAIs and about 38% 
of the HAIs in surgical patients, with an inci-
dence up to 19%, depending on the kind of sur-
gery [11–13]. SSIs may involve the superficial or 
deep layers of the incision (in two thirds of 
cases), or the organ or area manipulated or trau-
matized (in one third of cases) [14]. SSIs can 
range from wound discharge to a life-threatening 
condition and they are associated with consider-
able morbidity. SSIs lead to an increase in the 
length of hospital stay by 3.3–32.5  days and 
patients are twice as likely to die, twice as likely 
to spend time in intensive care, and five times 
more likely to be re-admitted after discharge. 
Healthcare costs increase substantially for 
patients with SSI [15–20].
Factors influencing the potential for infection 
include endogenous (patient-related) and exoge-
nous (process/procedural-related) variables. 
Related patient characteristics include extremes 
of age, poor nutritional status, obesity (i.e., more 
than 20% above the ideal body weight), coinci-
dent remote site infections or colonization, diabe-
tes, and cigarette smoking. Process/
procedural-related variables include surgical pro-
cedure classification (e.g., “contaminated” or 
“dirty”), length of surgery, and type of postopera-
tive incision care [14, 21].
An independent risk factor for some postop-
erative infections is failure in the administration 
of perioperative antibiotic prophylaxis when 
indicated. Incorrect timing of surgical prophy-
laxis is associated with increases by a factor of 
2–6 in the rates of surgical site infection for oper-
ative procedures in which prophylaxis is gener-
ally recommended [11].
Practices to prevent SSIs aim to minimize the 
number of microorganisms introduced into the 
operative site or enhance the patient’s defenses 
against infection.
9.2.4  Healthcare-Associated 
Pneumonia
Healthcare-associated pneumonia occurs in vari-
ous patient groups. The most important group is 
that of patients on ventilators in intensive care 
units (ICU) [1], where the rate of pneumonia, the 
main type of infection, is a quality and safety 
indicator of care [22]. There is a high case fatal-
ity rate related to ventilator-associated pneumo-
nia (VAP) although the attributable risk is 
difficult to determine because of the high patient 
comorbidity. The microorganisms involved are 
often endogenous (e.g., from the digestive sys-
tem or upper respiratory tract), but may be exog-
enous, often from contaminated respiratory 
equipment. Known risk factors for infection 
include type and duration of ventilation, quality 
of respiratory care, severity of patient’s condi-
tion (e.g., organ failure), and any previous use of 
antibiotics [1].
A recent meta-analysis of randomized and 
non-randomized studies published before June 
2017 employed VAP prevention bundles and 
reported on their effect on mortality; the meta- 
analysis found that “simple interventions in com-
mon clinical practice applied in a coordinated 
way as a part of a bundle care are effective in 
reducing mortality in ventilated ICU patients” 
[23].
9.3  Antimicrobial Resistance
While there has been progress in the struggle 
against HAIs over time, antimicrobial resistance 
has become one of the greatest challenges of the 
twenty-first century and a cause for global con-
cern due to its current and potential impact on 
global health and the costs to healthcare systems. 
Recent reports suggest that absolute numbers of 
infections due to resistant microbes are increas-
ing globally [24].
Multidrug-resistant organisms (MDRO), 
which are predominantly bacteria, are resistant to 
multiple classes of antimicrobial agents. 
Antimicrobial resistance increases the morbidity 
and mortality associated with infections and 
increases costs of care because of prolonged 
 hospitalization and other factors such as a need 
for more expensive drugs. A major cause of anti-
microbial resistance is the exposure of a high- 
density, high-acuity patient population in frequent 
contact with healthcare workers to extensive anti-
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microbial use, along with the related risk of 
cross-infection.
The main MDROs are methicillin-resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), which are 
responsible for up to a third of healthcare- 
associated bloodstream infections, vancomycin- 
resistant enterococci (VREs) with mobile 
resistance determinants (e.g., VanA and VanB), 
and a range of Gram-bacteria (MDRGNs) with 
multiple classes of drug resistance to or resistant 
mechanisms against critically important antimi-
crobials. Highly transmissible resistance is a par-
ticular feature of Gram-bacteria, especially 
Enterobacteriaceae; several strains of Gram- 
bacteria (e.g., Pseudomonas aeruginosa and 
Acinetobacter baumannii) have now been identi-
fied that exhibit resistance to essentially all com-
monly used antimicrobials. These organisms are 
associated with treatment failure and increased 
morbidity [2].
While bacteria develop resistance to com-
monly used antibiotics, the number of new anti-
biotics introduced into the market is small as this 
class of medicine is not as profitable for pharma-
ceutical industries as medications for chronic dis-
ease. Moreover, the bacteria’s capacity to develop 
resistance makes new antibiotics obsolete early 
after marketing and consequently causes their 
development to be even less profitable [25].
With the increase in antimicrobial resistance, 
progress in modern medicine, which relies on the 
availability of effective antibacterial drugs, is 
now at risk, and the expectation is that medicine 
will be increasingly unable to treat infections 
currently considered to be routine.
9.4  Healthcare-Associated 
Infection Prevention
Traditionally, healthcare-associated infections 
have been considered a “stand-alone” problem 
and specific professional profiles have been 
developed as well as legislation and policies 
aimed at infection prevention and control 
(ICP).
Core competencies (i.e., competencies that 
should be a minimum prerequisite for all profes-
sionals in this field) have been defined by the 
European Centre for Disease Prevention and 
Control (ECDC) for infection control and hospi-
tal hygiene professionals [26] matching the pro-
file of a medical doctor (an ICP practitioner) or a 
nurse (an ICP nurse) working in Europe. 
Competencies are grouped into domains which 
are in turn grouped into four areas: program man-
agement, quality improvement, surveillance and 
investigation of healthcare-associated infections, 
and infection control activities.
In Italy, central regulation about infection 
control has for years been based on just two doc-
uments issued by the Ministry of Health, one in 
1985 (Fighting against Hospital Infection) [27] 
and the other in 1988 (Fighting against Hospital 
Infection: the surveillance) [28]; so, at the local 
level, policies have varied.
In all the European Region, decisions about 
infection prevention and control have often been 
made at the institutional level, with or without 
national or continental recommendations in 
mind, with available resources and dominant 
clinical cultures playing a pivotal role [29].
The large number of international guidelines 
targeting specific healthcare-associated infec-
tions that have been proposed over time by differ-
ent agencies has resulted in varying applications 
and outcomes.
In particular, the WHO has provided “WHO 
Guidelines on Hand Hygiene in Health Care” 
[30], “Global Guidelines for the Prevention of 
Surgical Site Infection” [31], and “Guidelines for 
the prevention and control of carbapenem- 
resistant Enterobacteriaceae, Acinetobacter bau-
mannii and Pseudomonas aeruginosa in health 
care facilities” [32].
In the EU, things changed with the “Council 
Recommendation of 9 June 2009 on patient 
safety, including the prevention and control of 
healthcare associated infections” [33] in which 
HAIs were covered as a safety problem. The rec-
ommendation provides guidance on patient 
empowerment and promotes a culture of patient 
safety. In terms of HAI-related actions, it states 
that member states should use case definitions 
agreed upon at the EU level to allow consistent 
reporting; European case definitions for reporting 
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communicable diseases were updated in 2012 
[34]. The council recommendation triggered the 
development of national strategies and reporting 
and learning systems in many member states. The 
ECDC network for the surveillance of healthcare- 
associated infections (HAI-Net) supports mem-
ber states in establishing or strengthening active 
surveillance systems. Decisions made at the level 
of the EU contributed to the improvement of HAI 
surveillance systems through the adoption of a 
common, specific case definition for HAI and a 
framework for national surveillance.
The 2011 Cross-border Patients’ Rights 
Directive [35] highlights the importance of trans-
parency and provides guidelines for setting up 
national contact points for the diffusion of infor-
mation about care standards, taking into account 
advances in medical science and good medical 
practices.
In fact, HAIs are recognized as part of the 
safety problems for patients and thus they should 
be addressed.
The ECRI Institute’s “Top 10 Patient Safety 
Concerns” is a list released in 2019 identifying 
top-priority safety concerns such as newly identi-
fied risks, existing concerns that have changed 
due to developments in technology or new care 
delivery models, and persistent issues that need 
focused attention or present new opportunities 
for intervention. Unsurprisingly, the list includes 
three infection-related issues: “Antimicrobial 
Stewardship in Physician Practices and Aging 
Services,” “Early Recognition of Sepsis across 
the Continuum,” and “Infections from 
Peripherally Inserted IV Lines” [36].
In 2016, the WHO issued international, 
evidence- based guidelines regarding the core 
components of IPC programs [3]. The guidelines 
were developed by international experts to pre-
vent HAIs and combat antimicrobial resistance, 
while taking into account the strength of avail-
able scientific evidence, the impact on cost and 
resources, as well as patient values and prefer-
ences. The guidelines provide a framework for 
implementing or developing IPC programs, 
applicable to any country and adaptable to local 
context, available resources, and public health 
needs.




Guidelines for tackling HAIs uniformly address 
the issue with a systemic approach. A systemic 
approach reframes IPC endeavors as components 
of a wider and more complex system which man-
ages patient safety and quality of care [37].
Individually reliable components may gener-
ate unsafe outcomes when interacting within the 
system as a whole, even if they are functioning 
appropriately. A proper surgical intervention or 
evidence-based antiblastic therapy may be under-
mined by IPC that is not effective throughout the 
care continuum.
Consequently, safety is an emergent property 
of the system, not dependent on the reliability of 
the individual components but on the manage-
ment of the interactions between every part of the 
system, including people, devices, processes, and 
administrative control [38].
Multiple studies indicate that the most com-
mon types of adverse events affecting hospital-
ized patients are adverse drug events, HAIs, and 
surgical complications [39].
HAIs are unintended, unwelcome conse-
quences of healthcare that, if serious, can have 
dreadful effects, and are often similar to other 
adverse events, in that they can prolong the length 
of stay, cause harm to the patient, and are pre-
ventable to a large extent.
Notwithstanding the fact that HAIs are inju-
ries related to management of care processes 
rather than complications of disease [40], health-
care workers perceive HAIs differently from 
adverse events. When not discussed further or 
brought under a higher level of scrutiny—even if 
they are reported to the patient and the family—
HAIs will be probably presented as complica-
tions of care and not as preventable events.
It has been proposed that this difference in 
approach toward HAIs originates from factors 
such as the widespread belief that antibiotics can 
solve infection-related problems, the weakness 
of evidence supporting HAI-preventing interven-
tions, the sense of responsibility felt by health-
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care staff, and the perceived intractability of the 
problem [25].
With this mindset, HAIs pose a significant 
challenge to the way in which clinical risk man-
agement is deployed in healthcare systems.
The International Classification for Patient 
Safety taxonomy (ICPS) [41] aids in the detection 
of failures, contributing factors, and near misses 
within an incident analysis framework. Learning 
and reporting systems are based on “lagging” 
indicators [41] as they refer to the post hoc detec-
tion of critical occurrences and aim to enhance 
incident detection capability and the potential to 
learn from failures. Consequently, these systems 
are very unlikely to detect the risks posed to 
patient safety by HAIs. Since they are designed to 
be event-focused rather than hazard- based, learn-
ing and reporting systems are fed with only events 
that have already occurred for subsequent identifi-
cation and analysis. Moreover, the preconditions 
for HAIs to occur are products of a silent behavior 
occurring most of the time when the patients are 
not “on-board” of healthcare processes. While 
both the active failure (i.e., the point of error) and 
the latent failure (i.e., the origin of error) are often 
easy to identify, in the case of an adverse event, 
the scene changes completely when an HAI is 
involved. Even with an understanding of bacterial 
spread, it is most often difficult to identify the 
source of a particular HAI within a healthcare 
organization, and so healthcare professionals have 
the tendency to view the problem as ineluctable. 
However, HAIs and other types of adverse events 
often happen due to the recurrence of similar cir-
cumstances. Therefore, in order to improve safety, 
clinicians and managers need to look more care-
fully at the context, and apply the lessons learnt.
Risk management is about reducing the prob-
ability of negative patient outcomes or adverse 
events by systematically assessing, reviewing, 
and then seeking ways to prevent, occurrence. 
Fundamentally, risk management involves clini-
cians, managers, and healthcare providers in 
identifying the conditions surrounding practice 
that put patients at risk of harm and in acting to 
prevent and control these circumstances to man-
age and reduce risks [42].
Successful approaches for preventing and 
reducing HAIs involve applying a risk manage-
ment framework to manage both the human and 
systemic factors associated with the transmission 
of infectious agents. This approach ensures that 
infectious agents, whether common (e.g., gastro-
intestinal viruses) or evolving (e.g., influenza or 
multiresistant organisms), can be managed effec-
tively [2].
Involving patients and their carers is essential 
for the successful prevention of infection and 
control in clinical care. Patients need to be suffi-
ciently informed to be able to participate in 
reducing the risk of transmission of infectious 
agents.
Although infection prevention specialists 
(IPs) have long assessed risks related to popula-
tions served, services provided, surveillance data, 
and outbreaks, and lapses in desired practices, 
new accreditation standards, and rules require 
that risk assessment and goal-setting should be 
systematic for an effective approach to infection 
prevention and control.
Risk assessment and goal-setting need to form 
a more structured, formal process to enhance a 
well-designed and thoughtful approach to infec-
tion prevention. In the case of HAIs, it may be 
misleading to place the emphasis solely on the 
reporting of adverse events and the detection of 
near misses. In order to fruitfully integrate clini-
cal risk management and IPC, surveillance must 
be merged with an epidemiological approach 
within a risk assessment framework.
Risk is defined as the combination of the prob-
ability of occurrence of a hazard generating harm 
in a given scenario and the severity of that harm. 
Risk is therefore contextual and can only be 
assessed with respect to a given scenario. 
Pragmatically, risk is the interaction between a 
hazard and present vulnerabilities.
Over the years, healthcare organizations and 
government agencies have developed numer-
ous strategies and guidelines to combat infec-
tion. But before organizations can draw up an 
effective prevention plan, they must consider 
the existing risks; organizations need a com-
prehensive and structured approach to assess 
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hazards and vulnerabilities related to HAIs 
within a healthcare system.
The Joint Commission for Accreditation of 
Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) and Joint 
Commission International (JCI) standards require 
accredited organizations to perform an assess-
ment to evaluate their infection risks and set 
goals and objectives based on the results of the 
assessment [43].
An Infection Prevention and Control (IPC) 
Risk Assessment (RA) describes the infection 
risk which is unique to that particular institu-
tion. This Infection Control Risk Assessment 
(ICRA) will help the institution assess the com-
plexity of the identified risk and define actions 
that can possibly reduce the effects [44]. In a 
healthcare organization, infection risks can 
originate from a variety of areas, such as lack of 
hand hygiene, unsafe injection practices, poor 
cleaning, disinfection, sterilization of instru-
ments and scopes, and inadequate environmen-
tal cleaning. To understand which risks are the 
most threatening, the current situation needs to 
be analyzed.
Operationally, the risk scoring will help deter-
mine the severity and the prioritization of each 
hazard and vulnerability identified: a risk can be 
categorized as high, medium, or low depending 
on the estimated severity of harm. Risk assess-
ment is an ongoing process as infection risk 
changes over time and often rapidly. An infection 
control risk assessment must consider different 
elements before establishing IPC policies and 
procedures, goals, and objectives. A comprehen-
sive, hospital-wide risk assessment plan docu-
menting how the healthcare facility is prioritizing 
patient and healthcare worker safety is essential 
in any healthcare organization. It is the first step 
in a systematic process to raise awareness and to 
create and implement a PCI Plan [44].
The important issues are whether a known or 
potential risk is likely to occur, its significance 
should it occur, and whether the organization is 
adequately prepared to handle it so that the nega-
tive effects are eliminated or minimized. The 
hospital identifies risks for acquiring and trans-
mitting infections through thoughtful examina-
tion of what could cause harm to patients, staff, 
families, and visitors.
Ideally, RA in IPC is best performed by an 
experienced IPC practitioner, maybe with input 
from staff in the clinical area concerned. The IPC 
practitioner may need assistance from clinicians, 
laboratory staff, or data managers, depending on 
the location and type of hazard being 
investigated.
Risk assessment should be performed when:
• a new IPC service is established, in particular 
standard precautions, transmission-based pre-
cautions, infection surveillance, cleaning, 
laundry and waste management, reprocessing 
of reusable instruments, and renovation 
projects
• a new piece of clinical equipment or an instru-
ment is procured
• a new procedure or diagnostic test is 
implemented
• a problem in IPC practice or policy, or a 
related issue is identified
• at least annually to re-evaluate the IPC pro-
gram priorities
Conducting a risk assessment is a crucial task 
for healthcare organizations. The point of the 
process is not to identify and compile risks, but to 
serve as the basis for developing actionable goals 
and measurable objectives for the infection con-
trol program. In other words, assessment should 
form the foundation of the organization’s infec-
tion prevention plan.
Once the most menacing risks have been iden-
tified in a healthcare facility and understood, 
goals and measurable objectives can be devel-
oped to combat these threats.
The Joint Commission’s Infection Prevention 
and Control standards require organizations to 
use the risk assessment process to set goals for a 
comprehensive infection control plan. 
Specifically, Standard IC.01.04.01 states that 
“based on the identified risks, [the organization] 
sets goals to minimize the possibility of transmit-
ting infections” [43]. The standard includes the 
following elements of performance:
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• The organization’s written infection preven-
tion and control goals include the following:
 – Addressing prioritized risks.
 – Limiting unprotected exposure to 
pathogens.
 – Limiting the transmission of infections 
associated with procedures.
 – Limiting the transmission of infections 
associated with the use of medical equip-
ment, devices, and supplies.
 – Improving compliance with hand hygiene 
guidelines.
• A goal is a broad statement indicating the 
change we want to make. It identifies a main 
issue and it is not measurable. For example, 
goals may include:
 – Improving hand hygiene.
 – Implementing disaster preparedness kits.
 – Reducing the risk of surgical site 
infections.
• A measurable objective specifies quantifiable 
results in a specific length of time. It defines 
the who, what, when, where, and how of our 
strategy.
• Successful risk management in IPC needs the 
following key elements that will help to pro-
duce effective projects:
 – An active IPC committee that assists with 
risk assessment and implementation of IPC 
measures.
 – Robust policies and procedures that lay the 
foundation for good institutional IPC 
practice.
 – Committed leadership supporting IPC.
 – A safety culture.
9.4.2  Risk Management Tools
Risk management tools are applicable in infec-
tion risk assessment including both reactive and 
proactive methods. The first, based on the infor-
mation of internal reporting, will analyze the 
causes of adverse events (AEs) already occurred, 
as epidemics or serious infections, in order to 
propose some corrective actions. They include 
the following.
9.4.2.1  Root Cause Analysis
Root cause analysis (RCA) is a process for iden-
tifying the basic or causal factor(s) underlying 
variation in performance that can produce unex-
pected and undesirable adverse outcomes. A root 
cause analysis focuses primarily on systems and 
processes, not individual performance. The 
objective of an RCA must not be to assign indi-
vidual blame; rather, through RCA, a team works 
together to understand a process and the causes 
or potential causes of variation that can lead to 
error, identifying process changes that would 
make such variation less likely to recur.
A root cause is the most fundamental reason 
(or one of several fundamental reasons) a failure 
or underperformance has occurred. In contrast 
with the usual use of the word, “cause” does not 
carry an assignment of blame or responsibility in 
the context of RCA. Here, the focus is on a posi-
tive, preventative approach to changes in a sys-
tem and its processes following a sentinel event, 
a near-miss sentinel event, or a cluster of less 
serious yet potentially harmful incidents. 
Although root cause analysis is associated more 
frequently with the investigation of a single 
event, the methodology can also be used to deter-
mine the cause of multiple occurrences of low- 
harm events. When analyzing events as a cluster, 
RCA can result in the identification of common 
error causes.
Root cause analysis is designed to answer the 
following three questions: (1) What happened? 
(2) Why did it happen? (3) What can be done to 
prevent it from happening again? [45].
9.4.2.2  Significant Event Audit
A significant event audit (SEA) is a process in 
which individual episodes, whether beneficial or 
deleterious, are analyzed in a systematic and 
detailed way to ascertain what can be learnt about 
the overall quality of care and to indicate any 
changes that might lead to future improvements. 
Put simply, an SEA is a qualitative method of 
clinical audit. In this respect, it differs from tradi-
tional audits that tend to deal with larger scale, 
quantifiable patient data sets and involve criteria 
and standards which can be measured and com-
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pared against. However, SEA should still involve 
a systematic attempt to investigate, review, and 
learn from a single event that is deemed to be sig-
nificant by the healthcare team.
The seconds are performed before the occur-
rence of AEs and aim to reduce their frequency 
and/or severity. The seconds should be applied 
above all in risky environments such as in the 
ICU. The following subsections provide further 
detail.
9.4.2.3  Process Analysis
A process is defined as a sequence of successive 
steps in the service of a goal. Each step is a pro-
ducer of a specific contribution that needs to be 
identified in terms of issues, content, and quality- 
security. The analysis can involve either an exist-
ing, high-stakes practice that generates actual or 
potential dysfunctions or a new practice to be 
verified before it is implemented.
The steps of analysis are:
• describing a process from start to finish: its 
objectives, successive steps, actors, etc.
• identifying and analyzing the critical points
• proposing improvements to management for 
the organization, especially in terms of inter-
faces between services
This analysis is carried out by all the stake-
holders involved and can be completed using the 
method presented in the nest subsection [46].
9.4.2.4  Failure Modes and Effects 
Analysis
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a 
systematic, proactive method for evaluating a 
process to identify where and how it might fail 
and to assess the relative impact of different fail-
ures in order to recognize the parts of the process 
that need change. FMEA includes the following 
steps: failure modes (i.e., What could go wrong?), 
failure causes (i.e., Why would the failure hap-
pen?), failure effects (i.e., What would be the 
consequences of each failure?). Teams use FMEA 
to evaluate processes for possible failures and to 
prevent such failures by correcting the processes 
proactively instead of reacting to adverse events 
after failures have occurred. This emphasis on 
prevention may reduce risk of harm to both 
patients and staff. FMEA is particularly useful in 
evaluating a new process before its implementa-
tion and in assessing the impact of a proposed 
change to an existing process.
9.4.3  The Best Practices Approach
The United Nations Population Fund’s (UNFPA) 
“Glossary of Monitoring and Evaluation Terms” 
defines “best practices” as planning or opera-
tional practices that have been proven successful 
in particular circumstances and which are “used 
to demonstrate what works and what does not 
and to accumulate and apply knowledge about 
how and why they work in different situations 
and contexts.”
UNESCO describes best practices as having 
four common characteristics: being innovative; 
making a difference; having a sustainable 
effect; having the potential to be replicated and 
to serve as a model for generating initiatives 
elsewhere.
Even if there is not a universally accepted def-
inition, a best practice is a practice that, upon rig-
orous evaluation, has demonstrated success, has 
had an impact, and can be replicated. Some best 
practices in the ICP field are presented in the fol-
lowing subsections.
9.4.3.1  Hand Hygiene
Hand hygiene has long been recognized as the 
single most effective way to prevent the spread of 
infections.
The most common cause of HAIs is transient 
flora acquired and spread by direct contact with 
patients or with environmental surfaces. If trans-
ferred to susceptible sites such as invasive devices 
(e.g., central venous and urinary catheters) or 
wounds, these organisms can cause life- 
threatening infections.
Several studies have demonstrated the effect 
of hand cleansing on HAIs rates and on the reduc-
tion in cross-transmission of antimicrobial- 
resistant pathogens.
Ease of access to hand washing facilities (e.g., 
soap and water) and alcohol-based hand rubs can 
influence the transmission of HAIs.
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In 2009, the World Health Organization pro-
duced guidelines on hand hygiene in healthcare 
in which are outlined the “five moments” to per-
form hand hygiene:
• before touching a patient
• before a clean or aseptic procedure
• after risk of body fluid exposure
• after touching a patient
• after touching a patient’s surroundings
Hand hygiene must also be performed before 
putting on gloves and after their removal.
Evidence suggests that compliance with 
proper hand hygiene after contact with a patient’s 
surroundings is generally very poor in hospitals, 
as healthcare workers underestimate the role of 
environmental surfaces in the transmission of 
HAIs.
Effective hand hygiene relies on appropriate 
technique as much as on selection of the correct 
product. Inappropriate technique may only par-
tially remove or kill microorganisms on hands, 
despite the superficial appearance of having com-
plied with hand hygiene requirements.
To wash hands correctly, both hands and 
wrists need to be fully exposed to the product and 
therefore should be free from jewellery and long- 
sleeved clothing—in other words, they should be 
bare below the elbow. Each healthcare facility 
should develop policies regarding jewellery, arti-
ficial fingernails, or nail polish worn by health-
care workers.
Alcohol-based hand rubs are recommended 
because of their ease of use and availability at the 
point of care. They are suitable for use except 
when hands are visibly soiled or potentially con-
taminated with body fluids, or when caring for 
patients with vomiting or diarrheal illness. Soap 
and water should be used in these instances, as 
well as after contact with patients with C. difficile 
infection or their environment, as alcohol hand 
rubs are not effective in reducing spore 
contamination.
When using alcohol gel, hands should be free 
of dirt and organic material and the solution must 
come into contact with all the surfaces of the 
hand; hands should be rubbed vigorously until 
the solution has evaporated. When washing hands 
with a liquid soap, the solution should come into 
contact with all the surfaces of the hands and 
hands should be rubbed together for a minimum 
of 10–15 s. Particular attention should be paid to 
the tips of the fingers, the thumbs, and the areas 
between the fingers. Hands should be thoroughly 
rinsed and then dried with a good-quality paper 
towel [30].
Each year, the “WHO SAVE LIVES: Clean 
Your Hands” campaign aims to progress the goal 
of maintaining a global profile on the importance 
of hand hygiene in healthcare and to bring people 
together in support of hand hygiene improvement 
around the world.
9.4.3.2  Antimicrobial Stewardship
Antibiotics, like all medication, may have side 
effects, including adverse drug reactions and 
Clostridioides difficile infection (CDI). 
Nevertheless, the misuse of antibiotics has also 
contributed to the growing problem of antibiotic 
resistance. Unlike other medications, the poten-
tial for the spread of resistant organisms means 
that the misuse of antibiotics can adversely influ-
ence the health of patients who are not even 
exposed to them.
The relationship between the unrestrained use 
of antimicrobials in all human health settings as 
well as agriculture and animal husbandry and the 
emergence of bacterial resistance is well docu-
mented [47].
Infection prevention and control practices are 
recognized as a key part of an effective response 
to antimicrobial resistance, as they reduce the 
need for antimicrobials and the opportunity for 
organisms to develop resistance. Vaccination can 
also reduce antimicrobial resistance by prevent-
ing infectious diseases, even primary viral infec-
tions, often inappropriately treated with 
antibiotics [2].
Programs dedicated to improving antibiotic 
use, commonly referred to as “Antibiotic 
Stewardship Programs” (ASP), can both opti-
mize the treatment of infections and reduce 
adverse events associated with antibiotic use, 
thus improving not only the quality of patient 
care but also patient safety by increasing the fre-
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quency of correct prescriptions for both therapy 
and prophylaxis.
Successful antimicrobial stewardship pro-
grams have been associated with reduced facility 
resistance rates as well as reduced morbidity, 
mortality, and costs.
Antibiotic stewardship consists of the imple-
mentation of policies that support optimal anti-
biotic use through interventions which are 
tailored and prioritized depending on the needs 
of the hospital, the organizational context, and 
factors such as size of the facility, staffing, and 
resources.
A systemic integration of antimicrobial, infec-
tion prevention, and diagnostic stewardship 
(AID) has been proposed in order to reduce the 
need for antimicrobials and the opportunity for 
organisms to develop resistance [48]. It is neces-
sary for cross-disciplinary borders and approach 
infection management in an integrated, multidis-
ciplinary manner. Microbiology laboratories and 
clinical microbiologists can provide significant 
contributions to ASPs, including the dissemina-
tion of antimicrobial susceptibility reports and 
enhanced culture by means of fast microbiology 
[49] and diagnostic stewardship [50]. 
Participating in ASPs is mainly seen as a task for 
clinical microbiologists and/or infectious disease 
specialists, together with (hospital) pharmacists. 
However, such an endeavor deeply involves bed-
side doctors and nurses, boards of directors, and 
diagnostic laboratories since patients commonly 
transition between different healthcare settings. 
Antimicrobial stewardship programs require 
multidisciplinary efforts which depend also on 
the support of the hospital’s administration, the 
allocation of adequate resources, and the coop-
eration and engagement of prescribers.
Only a comprehensive healthcare network 
using an integrated approach may contain the 
spread of antimicrobial resistance. From this per-
spective, infection management is thus a respon-
sibility for all stakeholders involved in such a 
network.
It is vital that infection control and prevention 
measures are integrated into a unified AID pro-
gram to improve overall infection management. 
Without the proper infection prevention mea-
sures, other interventions such as ASPs and 
Diagnostic Stewardship Programs (DSP) will not 
achieve the optimal effect.
Stewardship interventions can be listed in 
three categories: broad, pharmacy-driven, and 
infection and syndrome specific. Broad interven-
tions include:
• Antibiotic timeouts accompanied by a reas-
sessment of the continuing need for and choice 
of antibiotics when more information is 
available.
• Prior authorization, restricting the use of cer-
tain antibiotics bound to preventative evalua-
tion performed by an antibiotic expert.
• Prospective auditing and feedback, with 
reviews of antibiotic therapy by an expert in 
antibiotic use not involved in the treatment 
(e.g., a day-2 bundle with face-to-face case 
audits performed by the antimicrobial stew-
ardship team) [51].
Pharmacy-driven interventions include:
• Automatic changes from intravenous to oral 
antibiotic therapy in appropriate situations.
• Dose adjustments in cases of organ dysfunc-
tion (e.g., renal adjustment).
• Dose optimization including dose adjustments 
based on therapeutic drug monitoring.
• Automatic alerts in situations where therapy 
might be unnecessarily duplicative.
• Time-sensitive automatic stop orders for spec-
ified antibiotic prescriptions.
• Detection and prevention of antibiotic-related 
drug interactions.
Infection and syndrome-specific interventions 
are intended to improve prescribing for specific 
syndromes and situations such as community- 
acquired pneumonia and urinary tract infections, 
skin and soft tissue infections, empiric coverage 
of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus 
(MRSA) infections, Clostridioides difficile infec-
tions, and treatment of culture proven invasive 
infections; however, prompt and effective treat-
ment for severe infection or sepsis should be pro-
vided in any case [52].
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Antimicrobial stewardship programs need to 
be monitored both at the process level (i.e., Are 
policies being followed as expected?) and at the 
outcome level (i.e., Have antibiotic use and 
patient outcomes improved?) [2, 52].
9.4.3.3  Care Bundles
“Care bundling” is an approach developed by the 
United States Institute of Healthcare Improvement 
[53] to help healthcare workers consistently 
deliver the safest possible care for patients under-
going treatments known to increase patients’ risk 
of healthcare-associated infections. A bundle is a 
set of evidence-based practices (generally three 
to five) that improve patient outcomes when per-
formed collectively and reliably.
The elements of a bundle are well-established 
practices, combined into a structured protocol 
that is agreed upon and is the responsibility of the 
whole clinical team. Characteristics of a bundle 
include the following:
• All elements are necessary and make up a 
cohesive unit of steps that must be completed 
in their entirety to succeed; while getting some 
of them right may be an improvement, it is not 
as good as getting them all right. The more 
reliably all the bundle elements are delivered, 
the better the outcomes [54].
• Each element is based on randomized and 
controlled trial evidence.
• The bundle involves an all-or-nothing mea-
sure which makes implementation clear-cut.
Existing care bundles can be used as tools and 
developed further by each facility to meet its 
needs.
Two examples of bundles are described below.
CAUTI Maintenance Bundle
One example of a bundle procedure for the main-
tenance of urinary catheters includes the follow-
ing steps:
• Perform a daily review of the need for the uri-
nary catheter.
• Check the catheter has been continuously con-
nected to the drainage system.
• Ensure patients are aware of their role in pre-
venting urinary tract infection, or if the patient 
is unable to be made aware, perform routine 
daily meatal hygiene.
• Empty urinary drainage bags frequently 
enough to maintain urine flow and prevent 
reflux, using a separate urine collection con-
tainer for each patient and avoiding contact 
between drainage bags and the container.
• Perform hand hygiene and put on gloves and 
apron before each catheter care procedure; on 
procedure completion, remove gloves and 
apron and perform hand hygiene again.
Ventilator Bundle
Ventilated patients are at high risk for several 
serious complications: ventilator-associated 
pneumonia (VAP), venous thromboembolism 
(VTE), and stress-induced gastrointestinal bleed-
ing. Five elements of care have been identified 
for the prevention of these events in ventilated 
patients and are supported by solid level-one 
trials:
• elevation of the head of the bed (HOB) to 
between 30° and 45°
• daily sedative interruption and daily assess-
ment of readiness to extubate
• peptic ulcer disease (PUD) prophylaxis
• deep venous thrombosis (DVT) prophylaxis 
(unless contraindicated)
• daily oral care with chlorhexidine [55]
9.5  Engaging Patients 
and Families in Infection 
Prevention
Engaging patients and families in improving 
healthcare safety means creating effective part-
nerships between those who provide care and 
those who receive it—at every level, including 
individual clinical encounters, safety commit-
tees, executive suites, boardrooms, research 
teams, and national policy-setting bodies. An 
effective partnership can generate benefits, 
both in the form of improved health and out-
comes for patients and in safer and more pro-
A. L. Costa et al.
111
ductive work environments for healthcare 
professionals [56].
In healthcare facilities, patients and visitors 
should be informed about what they can do to 
prevent the spread of infection and keep them-
selves infection-free.
Healthcare workers should, where possible:
• explain the processes of infection prevention 
and control to patients and their caregivers
• engage patients and their caregivers in the 
decision-making process regarding their care 
and how it is delivered
• be sure that patients and their caregivers are 
aware that they can ask questions to healthcare 
professionals
Written material such as brochures and post-
ers can be used to reinforce verbal discussions 
with patients as part of their care.
Engagement in hand hygiene can be encour-
aged by sharing hand hygiene videos with 
patients and families, asking them to demon-
strate proper technique, providing family mem-
bers and visitors access to hand washing stations 
and hand hygiene supplies, and asking patients 
to speak up if they observe staff not following 
safe practices.
With regard to personal protective equipment 
(PPE), patients and family members can be pro-
vided information at admission about why PPE is 
being used along with a demonstration of how to 
don and doff it. It is useful to explain what the 
hospital is doing to prevent the spread of infec-
tions, answering questions with clear and 
straightforward explanations.
Engagement in antibiotic stewardship involves 
educating patients on the risks related to the inap-
propriate use of antibiotics and on what the hos-
pital is doing to monitor the use of antibiotics and 
to implement good stewardship practices. Patient 
advocates should be part of the antibiotic stew-
ardship team and data on efforts to reduce inap-
propriate antibiotic use should be shared, 
soliciting patient feedback on how best to be 
included in the efforts [57].
9.6  Identification and Rapid 
Management of Sepsis: 
A Test Bed for the Integration 
of Risk Management and IPC
9.6.1  Sepsis and Septic Shock Today
Sepsis was recently defined as a life-threatening 
organ dysfunction caused by dysregulated host 
response to infection [58]. If not recognized early 
and managed promptly, it can lead to septic 
shock, multiple organ failure, and death. Any 
type of infectious pathogen can potentially cause 
sepsis. Sepsis and septic shock are time-critical, 
evolving syndromes. The guidelines of the 2017 
Surviving Sepsis Campaign [59] identify the cru-
cial components of treatment: resuscitation with 
fluids, administration of antibiotics, administra-
tion of vasopressors, and surgical control of the 
infectious source.
In the case of suspicion of sepsis and septic 
shock, it is necessary to act immediately by car-
rying out the actions of the “sepsis six” [60] bun-
dle complemented by the surgical source control 
of infection.
For patients with suspected sepsis, the goal is 
to start antibiotic therapy immediately but with 
the commitment of all operators to reduce the 
therapy’s duration while maintaining all safety 
margins and the greatest possible benefits. In 
2018, the American society of Infectious Diseases 
took a critical position with respect to the 2017 
Surviving Sepsis Campaign guidelines because 
they appeared to be excessively inclined to pro-
pose standardized indications on the administra-
tion of antibiotic therapy, including the clinical 
management of patients in whom the diagnosis 
of infection is uncertain. Patients with uncertain 
diagnosis of infection need to be placed on a clin-
ical path that allows the acquisition of more 
information by means of appropriate diagnostics 
and the consequent re-evaluation of their level of 
risk, as they would not benefit from a standard-
ized and prolonged antibiotic therapy. The bene-
fits of treating patients who are infected need to 
be weighed against the dangers of treating 
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patients who are not but at first appear to be. 
Antimicrobial resistance is a major factor in 
determining clinical unresponsiveness to treat-
ment and a rapid evolution to sepsis and septic 
shock. Sepsis patients with resistant pathogens 
have been found to have a higher risk of hospital 
mortality.
Septic shock is defined as a sub-type of severe 
sepsis with lactate greater than or equal to 
4  mmol/L or hypotension (i.e., mean arterial 
pressure (MAP) <65 mm Hg and systolic blood 
pressure  <90  mm Hg) not responsive to fluid 
bolus [61].
Sepsis is a severe complication of an infec-
tion. Anyone affected by an infection can prog-
ress to sepsis conditions but some vulnerable 
populations are at a higher risk, including elderly 
people, pregnant women, neonates, hospitalized 
patients, and people with HIV/AIDS, liver cir-
rhosis, cancer, kidney disease, autoimmune dis-
eases, or no spleen [62].
By this new definition, sepsis is a medical 
emergency. However, as an evolving, syndromic 
condition with multiple causative organisms, 
sepsis can present in patients various signs and 
symptoms at different times. Warning signs and 
symptoms include fever or low temperature and 
shivering, altered mental status, difficulty breath-
ing or rapid breathing, increased heart rate, weak 
pulse or low blood pressure, low urine output, 
cyanotic or mottled skin, cold extremities, and 
extreme body pain or discomfort.
Suspecting sepsis is a first major step toward 
early recognition and diagnosis [63–65].
There are two main steps to prevent sepsis:
 1. prevention of microbial transmission and 
infection
 2. prevention of the development of an infection 
into sepsis conditions
In both community and healthcare facilities, 
the prevention of the development of sepsis 
requires appropriate antibiotic treatment of infec-
tions, including reassessment for optimization, 
seeking medical care promptly, and early detec-
tion of sepsis signs and symptoms. Scientific evi-
dence has clearly demonstrated the effectiveness 
of infection prevention. For instance, improved 
hand hygiene practice in healthcare can reduce 
infection by as much as 50% [66].
Identifying and not underestimating signs and 
symptoms along with detecting biomarkers such 
as procalcitonin are crucial elements for the early 
diagnosis of sepsis and the timely establishment 
of appropriate clinical management. After early 
recognition, diagnostics that help identify the 
causal pathogen of infection leading to sepsis are 
also important to guide targeted antimicrobial 
treatment. Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) can 
jeopardize clinical management of sepsis because 
empirical antibiotic treatment is often required. 
Therefore, it is important to understand the epi-
demiology of AMR in the local setting. Once the 
source of infection is determined, source control 
such as drainage of an abscess is also critical. 
Early fluid resuscitation to improve volume sta-
tus is important in the initial phase of sepsis man-
agement. In addition, vasopressors may be 
required to improve and maintain tissue perfu-
sion. The appropriate management of sepsis over 
time should be guided by repeated exams and 
diagnostics, including vital signs monitoring.
9.6.2  Sepsis as an Adverse Event: 
Failures in Identification 
and Management
In a recent paper, Rhee et  al. [67] reported the 
findings of a retrospective review of hospital 
deaths and discharges to hospice in three large 
academic medical centers and three affiliated 
community hospitals.
Detailed medical record reviews were per-
formed on 568 in-hospital deaths and discharges 
to hospice to determine if sepsis was present dur-
ing the hospitalization and if it was a cause of 
death. For patients who died with or due to sep-
sis, investigators identified potential signs of 
suboptimal sepsis care, including delays in initi-
ating antibiotic therapy or source control, and 
inadequate fluid resuscitation, and made an over-
all assessment of the preventability of sepsis- 
associated death. 264 of the 300 deaths from 
sepsis (88.0%; 95%CI, 83.8–91.5%) were con-
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sidered unpreventable (4–6 rating on the Likert 
scale) and only 36 deaths (12.0%; 95%CI, 8.6–
16.2%) were considered potentially preventable, 
of which 11 (3.7%) were definitely or moder-
ately likely preventable and 25 (8.3%) were pos-
sibly preventable. There were no identifiable 
suboptimal aspects of care in 232 sepsis-associ-
ated deaths (77.3%). Of the 68 cases with subop-
timal care (22.7%), the most common problems 
were:
 1. delays in antibiotics, in 33 cases (48.5%)
 2. delays in source control, in 19 cases (27.9%)
 3. inappropriate empirical antibiotic therapy, in 
16 cases (23.5%)
Of these 68 cases, 32 deaths (47.1%) were 
judged to be definitely, moderately likely, or pos-
sibly preventable. Generally, the non- preventable, 
sepsis-associated deaths occurred in patients with 
major underlying comorbidities, severe, acute, 
concurrent illnesses, and/or florid sepsis that pro-
gressed despite optimal care. A total of 42 major 
errors were identified in the 36 sepsis-associated 
deaths that were potentially preventable. Most of 
the errors were related to:
 1. delays in recognition and treatment of sepsis 
(n = 16)
 2. inappropriate antibiotic therapy administered 
after recognition of sepsis (n = 10)
 3. delays in source control (n = 7)
Two patients had potentially preventable 
hospital- acquired infections, while three had pro-
cedural complications (i.e., bleeding and isch-
emia) and three had medication-related adverse 
events (i.e., bleeding from excessive oral antico-
agulation) that triggered a cascade of events lead-
ing to sepsis and death. One patient was 
inadequately monitored in a hospital ward after 
admission and there was delayed recognition of 
an unstable arrhythmia. Of the 36 potentially pre-
ventable deaths, only 1 patient met criteria for 
hospice on admission (i.e., due to end-stage liver 
disease). This patient’s death was still considered 
possibly preventable as he did not receive Gram- 
negative antibiotic coverage for pneumonia 
caused by Escherichia coli. The authors con-
cluded that only a minority of sepsis-associated 
deaths in this cohort were preventable through 
better hospital-based care. Conclusions about the 
prevention of sepsis-associated deaths through 
better hospital-based care must be contextualized 
based on the care that is delivered. This study 
cohort was assembled from patients of three 
highly regarded academic medical centers and 
three affiliated community hospitals. The rate of 
suboptimal sepsis care reported in this cohort—
just under 23%—is substantially lower than in 
other studies. For comparison, in a recent publi-
cation from New  York State’s sepsis improve-
ment efforts, adherence to a 3-h sepsis bundle 
increased from 53.4% to 64.7% in 183 acute care 
hospitals during the 27-month study period [68]. 
An international point prevalence study found 
only a 19% completion rate of all elements of a 
3-h sepsis bundle [69]. The lower rate of subopti-
mal care reported by Rhee and colleagues sug-
gests that sepsis care in the hospitals included in 
this study may have been substantially better than 
that in many other hospitals, with correspond-
ingly less room for improvement and fewer 
sepsis- associated deaths deemed to be prevent-
able through better hospital care; in hospitals 
with more deficiencies in sepsis care, more deaths 
from sepsis may be preventable. Despite the chal-
lenge of identifying which sepsis-associated 
deaths may be potentially preventable, Rhee’s 
study does reflect the reality that some sepsis- 
associated deaths are not preventable with the 
tools currently available for the recognition and 
management of sepsis. This finding should serve 
as a call to action to advance the sepsis research 
agenda [70]. Early recognition and prompt man-
agement of sepsis have been associated in numer-
ous studies with improved patient outcomes, and 
current clinical practice guidelines emphasize 
this concept [59].
9.7  Conclusions
Successful approaches for preventing and reduc-
ing HAIs involve implementing a risk manage-
ment framework to manage both human and 
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systemic factors associated with the transmission 
of infectious agents.
Infection prevention in healthcare facilities 
mainly relies on properly functioning infection 
prevention and control programs and teams, 
effective hygiene practices and precautions, 
including hand hygiene, along with clean, well- 
functioning environments and equipment.
The implementation of best practices and the 
replication of improvement actions deserve a 
context-focused approach that targets the specific 
risks and hazards appearing in given scenarios. In 
the future, infection prevention needs to become 
adaptive by embodying an array of techniques 
and methods to assess risks and design targeted 
solutions that rely on the fostering of multidisci-
plinary healthcare teams.
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Almost 20  years after publication “To Err is 
Human: Building a Better Health System” (Kohn 
et al. 1999), patient safety is still not widely imple-
mented. This report from the Institute of Medicine 
is the milestone that constituted a turning point for 
improving quality of care and patient safety iden-
tifying the need to rethink healthcare delivery to 
provide safe, effective, and efficient care.
The barriers of implementing patient safety as 
a driving force for change towards more effective 
healthcare include multiple factors: insufficient 
involvement of all stakeholders contributing to 
the care process, lack of willingness of organiza-
tions and individuals to learn from errors and 
scarce investments in patient safety improvement 
and research.
There is a growing need to promote systems 
approaches to finding solutions in healthcare to 
improve the safety of care, the quality of healthcare 
delivery, patients’ health and citizens’ well-being.
The discussion paper “Bringing a Systems 
Approach to Health” defines the systems 
approach as one “that applies scientific insights 
to understand the elements that influence health 
outcomes; models the relationships between 
those elements; and alters design, processes, or 
policies based on the resultant knowledge in 
order to produce better health at lower cost” [1].
A multidisciplinary approach must include the 
involvement of citizens and patients as funda-
mental contributors to the design, implementa-
tion, delivery, and evaluation of health services.
This means that citizen participation plays an 
essential role, bringing the unique point of view 
of patients and family members into the debate 
on patient safety and quality of care.
Patients and more generally citizens, when 
actively and systematically engaged, bring ideas 
and experiences which can support a collaborative 
and reciprocal learning process among the health-
care stakeholders. This produces knowledge that 
leads to improved practices, a real knowledge cre-
ation process where the dynamic participation of 
all actors in healthcare systems contribute to an 
active learning environment where the identifica-
tion, the investigation, and the planning of solu-
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tions related to health  incidents is a cyclic process 
enabling healthcare knowledge creation.
The added value of involving patients in 
healthcare is, respect to other more complex 
interventions, a low cost opportunity to take into 
consideration unconventional points of view cre-
ating and building knowledge and providing 
original insights and ideas that otherwise would 
not be considered.
Health professionals and patients’ skills and 
knowledge are acquired through individual expe-
rience or education and transferred to the health 
organizations in a perspective of co-production of 
healthcare. It is a merging of the efforts of those 
who produce and those who use the solutions to 
address health problems. It serves to establish a 
strengthened and long-term relationship in terms 
of trust and effectiveness and to distribute the 
responsibilities among all stakeholders [2].
In light of these arguments, the systems 
approach—inspired by the fundamentals of ergo-
nomics and human factors (HFE)—creates new 
alliances between healthcare and engineering, of 
which patient journey is a challenging example [3].
Applying the systems approach to patient 
safety allows the analysis of the factors that char-
acterize the encounters and the interactions 
between healthcare professionals and patients 
during the entire course of care. The observation 
of possible critical issues to the individual and 
specific encounter between clinician and patient 
is crucial in widening the scope of observation 
and research of the entire “journey” of the patient, 
taking into consideration the complexity of 
patient, their values and needs, their preferences, 
the economic and social context in which they 
live, and language and communication issues.
These observations and research should be 
carried out considering the interconnections and 
interactions together with the components of the 
processes; importance should be given to the 
context, and to manage the complexity, the value 
of a holistic approach.
10.2  The Patient Journey
A modern health system looks to the future in the 
context of the challenges imposed by the real 
world. It must manage the gap between guide-
lines and health protocols and what effectively 
happens and how reality is perceived by patients 
and family members.
It is more and more necessary to bring the 
patient’s point of view in the analysis of the care 
process, in the incident reporting and analysis, in 
the design and implementation of solutions and 
guidelines in healthcare.
Vincent and Amalberti in “Safer Healthcare” 
(2016) [4] stated that the incident analysis should 
broaden the class of events having consequences 
on patient safety. Incidents reported from the 
patient’s point of view should be included in 
addition to those suggested by health profession-
als. Additionally, when analyzing an incident, it 
should be done in the context of the patient jour-
ney rather than a single episode.
Instead of focusing on the individual encoun-
ter, it is necessary to extend the observation time-
frame by applying the examination of contributing 
factors to each of the encounters that compose 
the patient journey (temporal series of encounters 
with healthcare facilities, a hospital unit, a spe-
cialist visit, a primary care clinic, a home health 
agency), considering both the negative and posi-
tive events and the points for improvement that 
were revealed (Fig. 10.1).
The adoption of this wider approach is unique 
in that it incorporates the patient’s perspective of 
safety and includes new features in the incident 
analysis such as asking patients to recount the 
episode of care, including patient and family in 
the investigation team when possible, asking 
patients the contributory factors from their point 
of observation and perception and involving 
patients and families in the reflections and com-
ments on the disclosure process [4].
The episodes patients and families can high-
light are often different from those that profes-
sionals are more accustomed to reporting. 
However, patients could be involved in further 
ways in incident reporting and assessment, and 
today patient-derived information constitutes a 
free and little used resource.
As per McCarthy’s definition, “patient jour-
ney mapping describes the patient experience, 
including tasks within encounters, the emotional 
journey, the physical journey, and the various 
touch points” [5]. Carayon and Woldridge 
define “patient journey as the spatio-temporal 
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distribution of patients’ interactions with multi-
ple care settings over time” [3], where at each 
point of touch with each healthcare service along 
the patient journey, the patient interacts with sev-
eral system elements (task interaction, physical 
environment, interaction with tools and technolo-
gies, organization interaction, interaction with 
other organizations and other people, interaction 
with other people and teams within the organiza-
tion) (Fig. 10.2).
The patient journey represents the time 
sequence of what happens to the patient, espe-
cially during transitions of care, in particular con-
sidering that the health professional who takes 
care of the patient only sees the portion of care 
for which he is responsible and in which he has 
an active role. Conversely, the patient is the only 
person who has a continuously active and first- 
hand role during their health journey. They alone 
are in possession of information that character-
izes the entire care experience.
Moreover, when patients navigate their jour-
ney, they contact and interface with multiple 
work systems at several time points, where the 
sequence of interactions in the work systems 
determine the outcome experienced by patients 
and families, healthcare professionals, and health 
organizations. (Fig. 10.3). Each local work sys-
tem is influenced by a wider socio-organizational 
context, which can be formal healthcare organi-
zation (such as hospital, primary care facility, 
nursing home) or informal (home).
Every point of the patient journey offers data 
on health outcomes and patient experience out-
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comes that should be used as feedback to rede-
sign healthcare work systems in terms of 
adaptation, learning, improvement.
Patient’s experience represents an important 
resource in participatory collaborative design, 
especially in the patient journey where this expe-
rience is the result of multiple interactions across 
space and time.
10.3  Contextualizing Patient 
Safety in the Patient Journey
Many of the incidents or near-misses during 
healthcare are not due to serious errors, but to the 
combination of small failures, such as limited 
experience of a recently qualified doctor, use of 
obsolete equipment, an infection difficult to diag-
nose or inadequate communication within a 
team.
We know that the analysis of an incident 
requires looking back to the succession of events 
that have occurred and that led to the problematic 
episode, considering both active and latent errors, 
and all the aspects connected directly or indi-
rectly. It is fundamental to examine the safety of 
the entire patient journey, all the encounters that 
make up the entire care process, to study the 
whole medical history of the patient in an attempt 
to reconstruct all the elements that characterize 
the “health journey”, not only from the viewpoint 
of the health professionals, but also from that of 
the patient and family.
In light of these arguments, new concepts, 
tools, models, and methods need to be embraced 
to support patient safety in the patient journey.
A significant contribution in terms of con-
cepts, frameworks, and models is offered by 
Industrial and Systems Engineering, and often 
human factors and systems engineering (HF/SE) 
have an approach to include the preferences and 
the needs of stakeholders when designing solu-
tions to address the critical aspects of a health 
process.
Human factors and ergonomics are described 
as “the scientific discipline concerned with the 
understanding of interactions among humans and 
other elements of a system, and the profession 
that applies theory, principles, data and methods 
to design in order to optimize human well-being 
and overall system performance. Practitioners of 
ergonomics and ergonomists contribute to the 
design and evaluation of tasks, jobs, products, 
environments and systems in order to make them 
compatible with the needs, abilities and limita-
tions of people. Ergonomics helps harmonize 
things that interact with people in terms of peo-
ple’s needs, abilities and limitations” [6].
Process models have found widespread use in 
drug management, visit planning, care transition, 
to name a few, and can offer tools and methods to 
investigate interprofessional and physician–
patient communication, interruptions and health 
information handover.
Drawing from the finding of Carayon’s stud-
ies [3], the Systems Engineering Initiative for 
Fig. 10.3 SEIPS 3.0 model: sociotechnical systems approach to patient journey and patient safety
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Patient Safety (SEIPS) model gives a description 
of five work system elements which when 
applied to a definite patient journey model 
should outline who (person) is doing what (tasks) 
with tool and technologies, taking into consider-
ation the physical and organizational environ-
ment where all these activities take place. All 
these factors have to be examined for both 
patients and workers and the process analysis 
and modelling have to consider what patients 
and families/caregivers, healthcare professionals 
and workers actually do (work-as-done versus 
work-as-imaginated).
Patients, families, and caregivers are deeply 
involved in the healthcare process due to the 
tasks they carry out in the intermediate sectors of 
care between encounters. Away from direct inter-
actions with professionals, they have to perform 
multiple actions requiring understanding of what 
behaviour to adopt, which instructions to follow, 
how to administer a medication and how to com-
municate with hospital doctors, general practitio-
ner, and home healthcare professionals [3].
Taking into account what has been highlighted 
so far, one of the leading and most challenging 
keys to success in improving patient safety is to 
adopt a systems approach to patient safety which 
includes the patient’s perspective about their 
health journey throughout the time of care and 
across all the care settings.
This assumption highlights that patients and 
their families are valuable resources and can play 
an important role in patient safety improvement 
efforts. Viewing health systems as “co-producing 
systems”, patients can engage as partners in co- 
producing patient safety improvement activities 
individually, in groups and collectively. Individual 
patient and family member participation/co- 
production of safer care is fundamental. Equally 
as important is the co-management and co- 
governance of healthcare services, in addition to 
the engagement of communities in policy defini-
tion and designing activities.
In fact, patient engagement directs the design 
of healthcare systems towards the preferences, 
the values, the real-life experiences, and—not 
less important—the skills of the people to 
enhance patient safety in the patient journey.
Such a change of perspective involves multi-
ple dimensions of interactions and relationship 
between patients and professionals, encompass-
ing cooperation, dialogue and listening, trust, 
reciprocity and peer-to-peer work [2].
It follows that on the one hand the healthcare 
organizations have to demonstrate the willing-
ness to support health professionals to effectively 
engage patients in the patient journey to achieve 
the common goal of reducing the risk of patient 
harm or incidents as well as the willingness to 
integrate patients and family members as part-
ners into quality and safety improvement efforts. 
On the other hand, it is necessary to motivate and 
encourage patients and families/caregivers to 
actively participate during the individual care 
process for safer care as well as partner in organi-
zational patient safety improvement efforts to 
ensure safer care for others.
The working group Patient and Family 
Involvement for the delivery of Safe and Quality 
Care [7] stated that the utmost priority to realize 
the patient involvement is the training of 
patients, followed by the promotion of interdis-
ciplinary training programmes for healthcare 
professionals to promote patient and family 
engagement, the implementation of multilevel 
structures that allow for participatory processes 
by patients and smarter allocation of resources 
in healthcare that supports involving citizens in 
patient safety improvement efforts for better 
healthcare.
This working group was part of the activities 
of the “1st International Meeting about Patient 
safety for new generations—Florence, 31st 
August and 1st September 2018” organized by 
the Centre for Clinical Risk Management and 
Patient Safety, Tuscany Region—WHO 
Collaborating Centre for in Human Factors and 
Communication for the Delivery of Safe and 
Quality care [7].
Therefore, training for both patients/families/
advocates and health professionals is a pillar on 
which to build active engagement of patients and 
consequently an effective and efficient patient 
journey. From this perspective, the participation 
of patients (i.e. representatives of patients’ asso-
ciations and organizations, patient and citizen 
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advocates) in training courses—specifically 
designed for this target audience of trainees and 
aimed to encourage co-production of care—is an 
essential and effective activity to co-produce a 
better healthcare system in terms of quality and 
safety of care.
Sharing a common language, promoting citi-
zens’ and patients’ awareness of importance of 
co-production of care, teaching the key role that 
patients can play in making treatments safer 
(investments in health literacy), learning to work 
together and within a network (locally, region-
ally, and nationally/internationally) on priority 
safety and quality of care issues: these are some 
of the main strengths of training courses aimed to 
be at the basis of active engagement of patients 
and citizens.
Examples of successful training courses 
include “PartecipaSalute” and “Accademia del 
Cittadino” organized in Italy by Laboratory for 
Medical Research and Consumers Involvement 
of the Istituto di Ricerche Farmacologiche Mario 
Negri IRCCS and the Centre for Clinical Risk 
Management and Patient Safety, Tuscany Region. 
The following paragraph describes this educa-
tional experience which is specifically designed 
for citizens and patients to improve their knowl-
edge and skills in patient safety and quality of 
care, with the aim of co-producing better health-
care services.





Over the last few years in the field of health and 
research and with regard to participation and 
involvement of citizens and patients, we have 
witnessed the transition from a paternalist to a 
partnership model. Individual citizens and those 
citizens involved in patients’ associations or 
groups have acquired a new role: no longer pas-
sive but actively involved in decision-making 
regarding health, healthcare, and research in the 
health field [8, 9].
This is a progressive step-by-step process 
based on the recognition and implementation of 
the key concepts such as health literacy and 
empowerment. Health literacy, more properly 
used at individual level is defined as the capacity 
to obtain, read, understand, and use healthcare 
information in order to make appropriate health 
decisions and follow instructions for treatment 
[10]. Empowerment, more used at the community 
level, is a process that, starting from the acquisi-
tion of accurate knowledge and skills, enables 
groups to express their needs and more actively 
participate to request better assistance, care, and 
research. At this level, the availability of orga-
nized independent and evidence-based training 
courses is essential to allow people to be able to 
critically appraise and use information about the 
effects of healthcare interventions. Consequently, 
they will have the skills to participate in the mul-
tidisciplinary working groups (composed of 
researchers, health professionals, patient and citi-
zen advocates, institutional representatives).
In the late 1990s, the Istituto di Ricerche 
Farmacologiche Mario Negri IRCCS held the 
first training courses of this kind focused at breast 
cancer associations. Some years later, within the 
project PartecipaSalute—a not-for-profit research 
project designed to foster a strategic alliance 
among healthcare professionals, patients, and 
their organizations—an ad hoc training pro-
gramme for representatives of citizens’ and 
patients’ organizations was defined with a multi-
module format [11, 12]. This was an innovative 
approach, at least in the Italian setting in that 
period.
PartecipaSalute training programme has com-
bined different experiences: the Mario Negri 
Institute IRCCS experience in collaborative 
research activities with patients’ associations, the 
Italian Cochrane Centre with the activities aimed 
at promoting the principles of evidence-based 
medicine, and Zadig long-term experience in 
health communication. The above promoters 
jointly developed the PartecipaSalute training 
programme on the belief that data are more 
important than opinions, and that every decision 
should be supported by well-conducted research 
data.
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The spread of this belief to patients and citi-
zens with the purpose of stronger involvement 
was a key point of PartecipaSalute training 
courses.
Therefore, patient, family, and community 
knowledge of the principles of how evidence is 
developed through clinical research is essential to 
make or support decisions in the health debate, to 
promote better clinical research, or to convey 
correct information. The strength of the 
PartecipaSalute programme was based on the 
exchange of experiences in an interactive way 
aimed at creating opportunities for discussion, 
overcoming the teacher–learner model. Each ses-
sion started with an interactive discussion of a 
real situation—such as a screening, vaccination, 
therapy—and after sharing data, opinions or arti-
cles from media, evidence was presented and dis-
cussed, underlining significant methodological 
aspects. The programme offered the opportunity 
to debate the value and significance of the meth-
odology offering critical appraisal tools. Each 
participant was invited to take an active part, 
starting from direct personal or associative expe-
rience. Table 10.1 presents the topics considered 
in the first three editions of the training pro-
gramme. The participation was free, and different 
types of materials were provided including an ad 
hoc manual published by PartecipaSalute, copies 
of the PowerPoint presentation and articles.
Considering the characteristics of the pro-
gramme and its modular structure, the 
PartecipaSalute training programme could be 
adapted to specific contexts. In fact, the experi-
ence of PartecipaSalute was adopted at the 
regional level by Regione Toscana (Centre for 
Clinical Risk Management and Patient Safety 
and the Quality of healthcare and Clinical path-
ways of Health Department, Tuscany Region) 
developing a more specific training programme 
called PartecipaSalute-Accademia del Cittadino 
(Academy of Citizen), focused on patient safety 
and risk management. In particular, after some 
modules on methods related to evidence-based 
medicine, uncertainties in medicine and informa-
tion and communication in health, the training 
was mainly dedicated to regional and local activi-
ties on clinical risk management, the role of 
patients’ associations to improve patient safety 
and to support the implementation of best prac-
tices, the analysis and data of adverse events and 
risk assessment in terms of quality and safety in 
the care processes (Table 10.2).
The PartecipaSalute-Accademia del Cittadino 
joint training programme has been implemented 
in three editions over the last decade and has 
trained about 100 members of patient and citizen 
advocates representing 38 patients’ associations. 
The courses ranged from 5 to 3 modules of 2 days 
each in residential mode to allow participants to 
get to know each other and create a network of 
associations committed to be engaged in clinical 
research, quality, and healthcare safety issues.
Table 10.1 Topics considered in PartecipaSalute [4, 5] 
and PartecipaSalute-Accademia del Cittadino training 
courses
ABCs of clinical research
Aimed to offer conceptual and practical bases and 
technical tools to critically appraise the methodology 
of epidemiological/clinical research; to know and 
discuss relationships between ethics and clinical 
research, including participation on Ethics 
Committees.
Uncertainties in medicine
Aimed to discuss the probabilistic nature of the 
medical knowledge; to understand the intrinsic 
variability of the clinical practice; to deepen the 
relevance of values and preferences in medical 
decisions.
Conflicts of interest in medicine
Aimed to encourage critical awareness about conflicts 
of interest in medicine, in clinical research, and among 
citizens’ and patients’ associations; to discuss the 
impact of conflicts of interest on clinical practice and 
clinical research.
Health information
Aimed to present the strategies and methods behind 
the communication, in particular, related to marketing 
of drugs and devices; to coach a critical reading of 
medical and scientific literature, lay people articles, 
and mass media health campaigns.
Credibility and strength of consumers’/patients’ 
associations
Aimed to discuss the requirements needed to raise the 
credibility of patients’ associations; to identify the 
possible role of advocacy of patients’ associations in 
healthcare.
Participate equally in multidisciplinary groups
Aimed to discuss the model, role, and activities of 
representatives of consumers and patients within the 
working groups evaluating feedback and results 
obtained.
E. Beleffi et al.
125
The entire educational experience was charac-
terized by the use of participatory training meth-
ods, based on working groups, practical exercises, 
lectures from experts with opportunities for dis-
cussions. As a result of this training course 
model, the participants were recognized as 
“expert patients” and were regularly involved in 
basic activities for promoting patient safety as 
auditors on significant events and helping to 
define policies on patient safety at the Tuscany 
regional level. In addition, they have participated 
in patient safety walkarounds in hospitals and in 
developing eight cartoons intended to promote 
the education of citizens for the prevention of the 
most diffused risks (such as prevention of infec-
tions, prevention of falls and handovers).
Feedback on the satisfaction on tutors, topics 
discussed and knowledge gained was regularly 
requested from participants through question-
naires distributed before and after the programme. 
In general, positive feedback was received; par-
ticipants appreciated the interactive methods of 
work, the clarity of the language, and the effort to 
make difficult problems easy to understand. An 
ad hoc questionnaire was provided to the partici-
pants regarding the methodology of clinical 
research, always showing an improvement in the 
self-evaluated knowledge before and after the 
course. Feedback of the results of the evaluation 
was also shared with each participant. Most of 
participants reported their experience to other 
members of the organization. In particular, in the 
case of the Regione Toscana training, the possi-
bility of immediately transferring what was 
learned in the course in all the activities in col-
laboration with the health institutions, policy 
makers, and health professionals—such as work-
ing groups on patient safety best practices, par-
ticipation to audits, development of tools to 
improve health literacy—was appreciated.
Some limitations emerged from these experi-
ences. The selection of participants is the first 
issue, not only because the training course is 
accessible to a small number of participants (in 
general no more than 30 participants), but also 
because the groups comprised of middle-aged 
and retired participants, with few younger ones. 
Additionally, there were few individual patient or 
family member representatives from patient asso-
ciations. The majority of those representing 
patient associations were in managerial or leader-
ship positions. Furthermore, it is difficult to 
choose between small, local, or bigger regional 
associations. Residential training courses also 
restricted the participation for geographical 
reasons.
The PartecipaSalute and ParteciaSalute- 
Accademia del Cittadino training experiences 
show that patients and citizens are willing to get 
actively involved in healthcare and the research 
debate. There is a real desire to improve their 
knowledge and skills on health and research 
issues and allow some general considerations 
regarding the active engagement of citizens rep-
resenting associations and advocacy groups.
In conclusion, it is very important to invest in 
a process of empowerment aimed to have well- 
trained activists involved vigorously and con-
structively in the debate, design, and assessment 
of health and research. Switching from tokenism 
to active participation is necessary to effectively 
Table 10.2 Topic integration in the PartecipaSalute- 
Accademia del Cittadino joint courses
Adverse events and safety of care
Aimed to explain what are the adverse events in 
healthcare, how they arise, and how it can become an 
opportunity for improvement; methods to analyze 
incidents and near-miss events with the 
multidisciplinary approach of ergonomics and human 
factors; and what reporting and learning systems are 
and the role of patients in reporting medical error.
The new role of patients and citizens in the 
evaluation of quality and safety in the health 
system
Aimed to help participants learn the best practices for 
patient safety and the accreditation system for quality 
and safety of care, to enable active participation in the 
co-design of the practices, the implementation, the 
evaluation, and the diffusion of safety solutions to 
make patient safety a reality.
The interpretation of health quality and safety 
data, the participation tools to empower patients 
and citizens in the healthcare experience
Aimed to enable trainees how to identify complete and 
reliable data on the quality and patient safety, how to 
interpret them and what they are for. Which are the 
tools that patient and citizen associations can use to 
participate in the planning and assessment of 
healthcare.
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partner with patients and the general population 
to design, plan, and co-produce safer more effec-
tive healthcare, while also supporting better more 
patient-centred research [13, 14].
Also, the training courses are feasible and use-
ful, as has recently been discovered also by 
pharma or other groups that organize courses 
mainly focused on drugs and drug development, 
thus directing the participation of the groups 
more to market needs than to public health.
Furthermore, this training initiative facilitates 
the networking among associations in part over-
coming the difficulties that derive from personal-
ization and division among the associations 
representing citizens and patients.
Finally, this illustrates the importance of the 
design and promotion of training courses with 
institutions, such as the Regione Toscana, in 
order to be able to implement projects of real col-
laboration between institutions, healthcare pro-
fessionals, and consumers’ and patients’ 
representatives.
10.5  Recommendations
A systemic approach to health can provide valu-
able models for wider implementation of patient 
safety. A multidisciplinary approach includes the 
involvement of citizens and patients as unique 
stakeholders in the design, implementation, 
delivery, and assessment of health services.
Involving patients in healthcare is an opportu-
nity to bring uncommon points of view into pol-
icy making and to create shared knowledge 
between healthcare professionals and patients.
The implementation of patients’ and fami-
lies’/caregivers’ perspectives in the patient jour-
ney is the golden opportunity to leverage crucial 
input, such as experiential knowledge, safer care, 
patient motivation, and trust and social cohesion 
into the co-production of safety solutions in 
healthcare. This represents a way to get closer to 
person-centred care, to create opportunities for 
patients to meet and share information and 
knowledge, to develop structures and policies for 
patient involvement at different levels (with 
healthcare systems, universities, and policy 
makers).
However, little has been done to overcome 
some healthcare systems barriers: the power 
imbalance between the doctor and patient, lan-
guage differences, the lack of diffusion of non- 
technical skills and, last but not least, the lack of 
evidence about the value of patient involvement.
To be widely implemented, patient engage-
ment in the patient journey requires courageous 
leadership, organizational efforts, a wider culture 
of safety of care, the implementation of multi-
level structures for the engagement of patients 
and resources from smarter spending in 
healthcare.
Education is the landmark to integrate mean-
ingful patient and citizen engagement in health-
care. Training of patients is the fundamental 
starting point to develop shared knowledge, co- 
produce projects, and implement an active multi-
level participation of patients and families for the 
improvement of quality and safety of care.
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11.1  Risk Management 
in Complex Human Systems 
and Organizations
11.1.1  Living with Uncertainty
Risk is an integral part of human activities, both 
in living and working environments. Every day, 
an individual performs a considerable number of 
actions, which, in most cases, are “inter-actions” 
with other people or tools or work environments. 
Interactions are more complex than elementary 
actions because the people, objects, or contexts 
with which we interact and offer opportunities 
for (affordance) and constraints on action [1–3]. 
Interactions have consequences that can change 
the status of objects or people. In the worst sce-
narios, an object used in an unexpected way can 
break or even cause fatal damage; inappropriate 
communication with another person may offend 
or provoke violent reactions.
The consequences of an interaction are not 
always predictable. For this reason, in the devel-
opment of humanity, organizations have pro-
gressively emerged, places and structures in 
which, more or less formally, legitimate and ille-
gitimate behaviors are distinguishable [4], in 
order to contain the risk associated with the 
intrinsic unpredictability of interactions. 
Organizations are socially regulated contexts, in 
which more or less explicit norms influence the 
choices and behavior of individuals. The rules, 
however, can be sometimes fallacious or defi-
cient, consequently favoring the wrong choices 
or inhibiting the correct actions. Rules are the 
bureaucratic expression of power and can there-
fore benefit some subjects to the detriment of 
others, sometimes fostering environments that, 
in hindsight (the “historical truth”) are recog-
nized as harmful for the organization itself or for 
the individuals who belong to it [5].
In today’s world, practically all human activi-
ties take place within organizations, subject to 
rules, involving the use of tools and interper-
sonal relationships. It is these interactions that 
determine the development of an environment of 
greater or lesser safety for the subjects who are a 
part of it or who, for some reason or another, are 
involved in its dynamics. It is exactly starting 
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from these interactions that people attribute 
meaning to their being and to the world around 
us, in the constant attempt to find reasons for the 
activities we find ourselves performing. The 
activities are to be considered as aggregates of 
tasks more or less driven by objectives along 
with the material conditions in which they are 
carried out.
11.1.2  Two Levels of Risk 
Management in Healthcare 
Systems
First of all, it is necessary to embed the two 
activities of “risk assessment” and “investigation 
of adverse events” in the organizational pro-
cesses of health systems. Both activities may 
provide reasons for study and research, or be 
linked to organizational objectives such as 
patient safety, cost containment or, compliance 
with regulatory obligations. Setting aside the 
dynamics of research, from an operational point 
of view the assessment of risk as an organiza-
tional function should permeate both the choices 
of clinicians and managers, if we accept that 
patient safety is an essential goal of health orga-
nizations. On the other hand, the analysis of 
adverse events could be an activity entrusted to 
specialists in the investigation of accidents, or 
shared between both the frontline and the bottom 
end as an integral part of the risk assessment pro-
cess, if it is meant and used for organizational 
development.
Highly reliable organizations [6] manage to 
effectively reduce risk, thanks to a constant com-
mitment to safety from top management, which 
establishes high-level objectives and provides a 
source of inspiration and vision for the opera-
tional lines which, on their end, have the respon-
sibility of planning and control over operations, 
thanks to a true distribution of the decision- 
making process. In practice, these organizations 
work because they are structured to deal with 
risk, anticipating situations in which a problem is 
more likely to occur and knowing how to miti-
gate the possible consequences. Of course, this 
organizational competence emerges from the 
knowledge of its members who, at various levels, 
are trained to detect errors promptly, analyze 
them and understand their causes, quantify the 
probability of system failure, and take action to 
reduce their reoccurrence according to a priority 
scale. If we adopt the systemic perspective, then 
safety culture, which influences the knowledge 
and decisions of individuals, must be based on 
the values of participation and transparency to 
empower everyone to report an error, to under-
stand processes and procedures, and to enable the 
development and modification of rules, tools, 
environments, and relationships between people. 
In other words, the organizational development 
has to be understood as a systematic monitoring 
and adjustment of critical interactions between 
system components.
Even in healthcare organizations therefore, 
risk management should involve both manage-
ment and frontline operators. Starting with the 
integration of patient safety into the strategic 
objectives of the institution, risk management 
must become an integral part of health practices 
as well as technical and administrative support 
operations. At the board level, patient safety 
management can be established, responsible for 
planning and linking operational and support 
functions to involve risk assessment in decision- 
making processes at all levels. Acting as a true 
knowledge broker, this management would be 
able to uphold the strategic objective of patient 
safety in the various communities of practices 
that make up an organization [4]. At the level of 
the operating units, clinical risk management is 
established, responsible for analyzing adverse 
events, understanding the incidents from the sys-
temic perspective and, subsequently, guiding 
learning from errors in anticipation of risk in real 
time.
In order to effectively and efficiently assess 
risks in hevalthcare, it is necessary to use theo-
ries and methods consistent with the level of 
complexity of health activities. The systemic 
approach [7] provides a lens capable of visual-
izing health activities by tracking the dynamics 
of the interactions between the subjects involved, 
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the tools, and the environments in which they 
take place. It also takes into consideration the 
reasons and interpretations that underlie the 
choices and behaviors of individuals and com-
munity practices.
Ergonomics, or human factors engineering 
(HFE), as “interaction science” has its focus on 
systems’ dynamics and design of interfaces. 
Therefore, HFE provides a valid and robust theo-
retical and methodological knowledge base to 
address health risks within an integrated frame-
work, encompassing patient safety and clinical 
risk management [8, 9] (Fig. 11.1).
11.2  Patient Safety Management
The patient safety function must first of all 
contribute to organizing the data relating to the 
possible risks present in the health system, so 
that they can be accessed systematically and 
whenever necessary. There are both data gener-
ated specifically for patient safety, and data 
produced routinely for other purposes, but 
which may be useful for risk assessment. Both 
types of data refer to a range of activities of 
healthcare organizations, as shown in 
Table 11.1.
Fig. 11.1 Ergonomics and human factors (HFE), the science of interactions. Source: https://iea.cc/what-is-ergonomics/
Table 11.1 Data integration for patient safety
Data for patient safety Nonspecific data
Delivery of clinical and 
care processes
Incident reports and analysis Administrative data (i.e., discharge records, 
emergency admissions, drug prescriptions)
Structured record reviews Digital archives of clinical tests (i.e., Radiology 
and Laboratory Information Systems)
Quality management Reliability analysis
Registry of non-conformities
Process indicators
Reports of safety walkarounds
Self-evaluations of accreditation/
certification requirements
Reports of accreditation/certification surveys
Patient reported 
measures
Patient reported experiences and 
outcomes including safety events
Claims and complaints
Public enquiries
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Data integration is certainly the best way to 
have the widest representation of possible risks 
[10] even if, as mentioned, it is necessary for the 
Patient Safety Manager to help define the method 
of collection and the structure of specific data, 
possibly also intervening in information flows of 
nonspecific data to obtain ad hoc or periodic 
reports of relevant information, such as the indi-
cation of a possible sentinel event included in a 
claim and not previously reported. In other 
words, the corporate patient safety function must 
transform large masses of qualitative and quanti-
tative data into information useful for assessing 
the current risk and for producing organizational 
knowledge [11] relating to the appropriate 
response to mitigate future risk.
In risk assessment, in addition to the classical 
criteria of frequency with which dangerous 
events occur and of the severity of possible con-
sequences, the criteria of imputability of the 
event to patient care and of corresponding pre-
ventability of adverse events are becoming more 
relevant. Thanks to the emergence of novel stud-
ies and research in various clinical contexts, 
some events considered historically as complica-
tions or “accidents” have actually been demon-
strated to be preventable and therefore attributable 
to the treatment provided or omitted rather than 
to the patient’s underlying pathology or to an 
acceptable side effect of the treatments. A clear 
example of a type of complication that is now 
considered an adverse event is an infection 
related to the central venous catheter. Evidence 
demonstrated that in many situations [12, 13] this 
type of infections have been cleared, thanks to 
good practices. In the category of “accidents,” we 
can consider patient’s falls, where adequate evi-
dence is available: to evaluate risk factors and 
classify patients at risk; to apply preventive 
actions so to reduce their frequency and contain 
their consequences [14, 15].
Studies and records of performance evaluation 
and healthcare outcomes are also possible sources 
of risk assessment data although they should be 
appropriately investigated in the context of clini-
cal audits to reconcile the variations that may 
appear due to the quality of the data essentially 
coming from administrative flows, affected by, as 
an example, the limited validity of hospital mor-
tality data [16].
11.3  Clinical Risk Management
The clinical risk management function exists to 
anticipate adverse events and to mitigate the pos-
sible consequences when they occur. It is a matter 
of implementing the Hippocratic principle “pri-
mum non nocere” in clinical and care practice, 
using the technological and organizational 
resources available at a given time and in a spe-
cific operating context. At this level, risk man-
agement takes place in real time, in front of and 
with patients, following good practices for safe 
care and continually re-evaluating the correctness 
of diagnoses and the effectiveness of treatments. 
In this sense, the analysis of adverse events and 
especially near-misses can and must become a 
fundamental activity in the management of 
patients and departments because, if carried out 
as a systematic review of clinical cases, almost in 
real time, within operating structures, it can limit 
the negative effects of adverse events on patients, 
clinicians, and organizations. Beyond the techni-
calities which sometimes intimidate those who 
would like to apply an instrument such as signifi-
cant event auditing or root cause analysis, it is 
actually a question of integrating the two phases 
of clinical reasoning. It includes diagnosis and 
therapy, with almost real-time reflection on the 
effects of diagnostic and therapeutic decisions 
and actions, starting from the cases that give rise 
to doubts, which for one reason or another cause 
surprise or concern and interfere with the ordi-
nary flow of activities, and which, therefore, 
demand an analysis and an explanation, drawing 
the attention of the operator in charge of that 
patient.
The process just described is the aforemen-
tioned “Sensemaking” [17], i.e., the need to find 
a valid explanation in the face of a problematic 
situation. The specific knowledge of risk man-
agement can help healthcare workers to take into 
consideration the complex interactions between 
human, technical, and organizational factors 
underlying the problematic situation, restoring to 
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the classical “clinical picture” the colors and 
shapes that constitute the substance, and the 
frame that is the reference context. Table  11.2 
lists the operational phases for the analysis of the 
adverse event, which we will see in detail in the 
next paragraph.
The level of formalization and depth of the 
analysis may vary in consideration of health sys-
tems’ policies and available resources; however, 
all the methods of systemic analysis of adverse 
events have in common the five activities 
described in Table 11.2.
The activity of analyzing adverse events and 
near-misses can therefore become the third pillar 
of clinical competence to complement diagnos-
tic and therapeutic activities, keeping the focus 
on patient safety. The risk of a drift to bureaucra-
tize Significant Event Audit (SEA) and Root 
Cause Analysis (RCA), or, even worse, the risk 
of the exploitation of formally non-punitive 
analysis to identify a scapegoat, are still present. 
The true measure of cultural change and organi-
zational development towards patient safety lies 
precisely in the effective integration of the anal-
ysis of adverse events into clinical and care prac-
tices. These are activities that can be made 
professional certification requirements for 
healthcare workers, to be evaluated both through 
retrospective review of cases subjected to sys-
temic analysis and through prospective checks in 
which the same clinical case becomes the object 
of simulation in which the decisions and actions 
of clinicians are evaluated using behavioral 
markers related to technical and non-technical 
skills. Both methods require the establishment of 
teams of investigators composed of clinicians 
from the specialist branch and experts in ergo-
nomics and the human factor, possibly but not 
necessarily external to the structure. Examples 
of systemic efficacy evaluations can be traced 
both in the Netherlands [18] and in the United 
States Veteran Health Administration [19], while 
in France the participation in the reporting and 
learning system is a real professional certifica-
tion requirement defined by the Haute Autorité 
de Santé. The evaluation of technical and non-
technical competences in simulated scenarios 
taken from clinical cases of adverse events is 
found in many works, now also the subject of 
in-depth reviews [20, 21].
11.4  Systemic Analysis of Adverse 
Events
11.4.1  The Dynamics of an Incident
For the purpose of this chapter, we take the defi-
nition of a “patient safety incident” to include 
near-misses, adverse events, and sentinel events, 
usually distinguished by the severity of the con-
sequences. Also, we do not differentiate between 
the terms “accident” and “incident,” where the 
former is generally used in high-risk industry 
referring to an event that affects quite a large 
number of victims, while the latter usually refers 
to individual harm.
Incidents in healthcare should be studied 
according to the systemic perspective, in order to 
be able to fully understand them and to foster 
organizational learning. The actions and failures 
of the individual play a central role, but the indi-
vidual’s way of thinking and acting is strongly 
conditioned by the clinical context and by the 
broader organizational dynamics. Incubation of 
an incident begins with defects in high-level 
Table 11.2 Steps for adverse events investigation
Activity Description
Selection of the 
incident
Spontaneous reporting, clinical 
record review, informal 
discussion of clinical cases
Data collection 
about the incident 
and its 
circumstances
Analysis of clinical records; 
interviews with operators and 
with the patient/family 
members; collection of 
procedures, protocols, 
guidelines, or reference 
literature
Analysis of the 
incident
Timeline, checklist, or diagram 
of contributing factors; peer 
review
Report Summary description of the 
event, of the criticalities 
detected, and of the 
improvement actions
Follow-up Sharing report, selection, and 
adoption of improvement 
actions; evaluation of results
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organizational processes, such as the planning 
and programming of production of services, the 
forecasting of activity volume, the planning and 
maintenance of environments and technologies, 
the development strategies and personnel poli-
cies. Failures at this level create latent conditions 
of danger that penetrate and spread in operational 
contexts such as the operating room or the emer-
gency room. There they can cause local condi-
tions, such as excessive workload or poor 
interaction with the equipment, which contribute 
to errors or violations. Many unsafe actions may 
be performed at the frontline, but few are able to 
penetrate the defenses of the system and generate 
the adverse patient outcome. The fact that the 
safety barriers engineered in the system, such as 
alarms and procedures, have deficiencies due not 
only to latent errors but also to active errors is 
illustrated in Fig. 11.2 by an arrow that pierces 
the barriers defense system generating the acci-
dent. Figure  11.2 is an adapted version of the 
famous Swiss-cheese model of accident dynam-
ics, in which clinicians who work on the frontline 
are represented as the last barrier before the 
 accident and as the inheritors of the system’s fail-
ures rather than those responsible for the unsafe 
actions that cause incidents. However, the model 
should not be understood as an invitation to shift 
the assignment of responsibility from frontline 
professionals to managers at the organizational 
level, given that managers also work in a com-
plex environment, in which the ramifications of 
decisions and actions are not immediately obvi-
ous. Therefore, according to Reason [22] manag-
ers are neither more nor less to blame than the 
operators of the frontline, since, as human beings, 
they can also make mistakes in planning and exe-
cution. It is therefore appropriate for the safety 
culture to be shared at all levels so that managers 
and designers take into account the dangerous 
conditions that may arise from their decisions or 
actions. Sometimes the perception of risk is 
Learning from errors to prevent harm
Tommaso Bellandi –PhD Eur.Erg.
Adapted from Reason, 1990
Some holes are due
to active failures


















Fig. 11.2 Swiss-cheese model of accident dynamic adapted to healthcare
T. Bellandi et al.
135
lower in those who work at a great distance from 
the frontline because the lack of direct contact 
with production processes and the context of 
operations pushes blunt end managers and 
designers to underestimate the dynamics of per-
formance safety. To blame is the attitude of man-
agers and designers who decide and act without a 
constant confrontation with the reality of the 
frontline and without involving in the strategic 
decisions those who are in direct contact with the 
production process.
In healthcare, the distance between the blunt 
end and the sharp end is in some cases accentu-
ated by the fact that some political and organiza-
tional choices take place outside healthcare 
facilities and are based on risk and benefit assess-
ments that are not always consistent with the mis-
sion of health facilities. There are therefore 
problems of an inter-organizational type that go 
beyond the boundaries of health facilities and 
which, sometimes, can be decisive for the quality 
and safety of care. As observed in the aviation 
context [23], the pharmaceutical and biomedical 
equipment industry, the government, and related 
agencies, professional associations and scientific 
societies make a substantial contribution to the 
design of the structures and of the processes of 
diagnosis and treatment, introducing a further 
level of complexity in the system that is lacking 
in the representation depicted in Fig. 11.2.
The problem of hyper-regulation in healthcare 
is particularly critical because, if it is true that 
this is a sector in which the autonomy of profes-
sionals of the first line is so accentuated that any 
attempt to standardize the practices may clash 
with established professional traditions, and in 
which the personalization of care is an important 
part of the clinical touch, then a blind standard-
ization of the procedures can have a negative 
impact on patient safety [24].
11.4.2  A Practical Approach: 
The London Protocol 
Revisited
Vincent and colleagues [25, 26] extended the 
Reason model to apply to the analysis of patient 
safety incidents, classifying the conditions of the 
clinical context that favor errors and the charac-
teristics of the organizational system in a single 
frame of factors that influence clinical practices. 
The model originally included seven factors of 
which the environmental and technological factor 
was then split into two different classes, given the 
increasing relevance of devices and digital appli-
cations (Table  11.3). At the forefront of clini-
cian–patient interactions are factors relating to 
the patient’s condition. In all clinical situations, a 
patient’s condition directly affects practices and 
outcomes of health services. Other factors, such 
as a patient’s personality, communication style, 
and any psychosocial problems, can be very 
important because they affect communication 
with healthcare professionals. The design of 
activities and tasks, the availability and useful-
ness of protocols, and the results of diagnostic 
tests can also influence the care process and the 
quality of the results. Individual human factors 
include the knowledge, skills, and experience of 
each health professional, and also affect the qual-
ity and safety of services. Each staff member is 
part of a group within an operating unit, as part of 
a large hospital or out-patient facility which is in 
turn embedded in a healthcare system. The way 
in which an individual works and their impact on 
the patient is bound and influenced by the other 
members of the group, by the way they commu-
nicate, support, and supervise each other.
The group is influenced by the organizational 
actions and decisions of the management of the 
unit and of the healthcare system. These include 
allocation of human and technological resources, 
staff training, objectives and periodic manage-
ment verifications, and so on. Management of the 
health system is in turn influenced by the prop-
erty and the institutional contexts, including eco-
nomic constraints, current legislations, and the 
broader political and economic climate.
The framework of eight factors is a useful 
scheme for the analysis of patient safety inci-
dents, which include both clinical factors and 
high-level organizational conditions. It repre-
sents therefore a useful guide for the analysis of 
adverse events as it invites clinicians and risk 
managers to take into consideration a wide range 
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of factors that at different levels determine the 
results of health services. When applied in a sys-
tematic way to the analysis of incidents, it allows 
for a ranking of the factors that highlights those 
with a greater bearing on patients’ outcomes and 
for the prioritization of interventions to prevent 
system failures in the future.
A clinical case can be examined from many 
perspectives, each of which can highlight facets 
of the care process. Cases have always been used 
to train health professionals and to reflect on the 
nature of diseases. They also serve to illustrate 
the dynamics of decision-making, the evaluation 
of clinical practices, and above all, when errors 
are discussed, the impact of accidents or failures 
on people. The analysis of accidents, for the pur-
poses of clinical risk management, covers all 
these aspects and includes broader considerations 
regarding the reliability of the health system.
There are different techniques for analyzing 
cases in healthcare. In the United States, the most 
common technique is root cause analysis (RCA). 
This approach to case analysis, employed by the 
Joint Commission, is very thorough and inten-
sive, requires time and resources, and originated 
from the “Total Quality Management” approach 
to health safety. RCA is promoted and has been 
adopted in many countries, with results that do 
not always correspond to investment in time and 
resources [27].
For a wide range of reasons, the so-called 
London protocol [26] approach to system analy-
sis seems more convincing and, in fact, it has 
been translated into many languages and is 
widely used in health systems all around the 
world. The term “Root Cause Analysis,”, an anal-
ysis of the root cause, even if widespread, is mis-
leading because it implies the possibility of 
tracing the incident back to a single cause. Given 
the complexity of the healthcare world, this is 
very difficult because clinical practices are deter-
mined by many factors that interact at various 
levels. The performance outcome is therefore the 
result of a chain of failures instead of the evident 
consequence of a single root cause. An even more 
important objection to the use of the term “Root 
Cause Analysis” concerns the purpose of the 
investigation. The analysis of adverse events does 
not aim, in fact, to search for the cause but for the 
overall improvement of a system that has not 
been able to prevent the accident. Of course, it is 
necessary to understand what happened and why, 
if only to explain it to the patient and their family. 
If the purpose is to improve the safety of the sys-
tem, we must go beyond the cause and reflect on 
Table 11.3 Scheme of contributory factors
Contributory factor Description




Personality and social factors
Task/activity Design and structural clarity 
of the task/activity
Availability and use of 
procedures
Availability and accuracy of 
diagnostic test results
Support in decision-making




Physical and mental health
Team Verbal communication
Written communication









Ordinary and extraordinary 
maintenance
Work environment Staffing and skills mix







Financial resources and 
constraints
Organizational structure
Policies, standards, and 
objectives
Safety culture and priorities
Institutional context Economic and regulatory 
context
Health policy
Links with external 
organizations
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what the accident reveals about the holes and 
inadequacies of the system in which it occurred.
The incident is a window into the system, a 
breakdown [28] that allows us to grasp the 
dynamics which are impalpable when everything 
is going well: we speak therefore of “System 
analysis,” that is the analysis of interactions 
within the system in which the events took place. 
In this sense, the study of cases is not a retrospec-
tive search for the root cause, but an attempt to 
look to the future to prevent risks to patient safety. 
The root cause is not important because it con-
cerns the past, not the future and risk prevention 
activities. The shortcomings of the system 
revealed by the incident remain present until 
action is taken to remove them, after a careful 
analysis of the factors that contributed to them.
The London protocol is the model we have 
adopted for the analysis of cases of adverse 
events in the context of peer reviews, i.e., audits 
and mortality and morbidity reviews. The sources 
of information used to reconstruct the case are 
the spontaneous reports of the operators, the 
review of the clinical documentation, or the 
observations made in the field. The main ques-
tions that guide the analysis are:
 1. When did it happen? (timeline of events and 
consequences)
 2. What happened? (type of problem and clinical 
conditions)
 3. Why did it happen? (contributory and latent 
factors)
Although clinical documentation is an excel-
lent source for reconstructing the dynamics of 
accidents, interviews with the subjects involved 
in the management of the case under analysis are 
very important to piece together the reality of the 
situation because in official documents one 
sometimes tends to report only non- compromising 
information. In some cases, on-site observation 
can help to understand patient flows within the 
clinical context and critical interactions between 
professionals and technologies in the real 
environment.
Once the timeline of events has been recon-
structed, through the analysis of clinical docu-
mentations, interviews of people involved in the 
case and eventual on-site visits, we proceed to the 
identification of the type of care delivery prob-
lems and to the description of the factors that 
contributed to it.
Care delivery problems are actions, omis-
sions, or deviations in the diagnostic-therapeutic 
process that have direct or indirect effects on the 
quality of care. Some problems concern the mon-
itoring of the patient’s condition, the timing of 
the diagnosis, errors in the treatment, etc. Clinical 
conditions concern basic patient health status and 
the intrinsic risks of the treatments that contrib-
uted to the accident.
Factors that contribute to the event are the 
conditions in which the accident occurred, inher-
ited from previous decisions by the professionals 
who were acting in the place and at the time of 
the adverse event. Any combination of determi-
nants can contribute to a problem in care. Analysts 
must distinguish the factors relevant only to the 
particular instance from those that consistently 
appear in the operational context or throughout 
the entire organization. For example, there may 
be a communication problem between two doc-
tors that contributes to an adverse event. If this 
problem is not usual, it may not require further 
consideration, but the fact that it has been found 
indicates shortcomings in the system, which must 
be explored in order to find a solution and prevent 
the problem from invalidating the quality of com-
munication in critical situations.
The factors that have contributed to the 
adverse event are the target of improvement 
actions, which in some cases are instituted after a 
single accident, especially when the conse-
quences are very serious. To implement more 
extensive and costly interventions, it is necessary 
to collect a series of incidents to detect latent fac-
tors that require priority prevention measures. It 
is advisable to always provide indicators to assess 
over time the impact of the improvement actions 
undertaken.
In the Tuscan model, unlike the one proposed 
by Vincent and colleagues, the analysis of prob-
lem type and latent factors [27] takes place in the 
context of peer meetings with all the actors who 
have managed the case. In fact, the London pro-
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tocol requires one or more external analysts to 
reconstruct the case and analyze it with reference 
to clinical documentation, interviews with opera-
tors, and any observations made in the field. In 
the Tuscan model, on the other hand, the clini-
cians, with the help of an internal facilitator pre-
pared for this role, analyze the incidents in their 
own operational reality. This favors the develop-
ment of a shared perspective on problems and a 
commitment to promote and implement improve-
ment initiatives that arise from the analysis, in a 
more informal atmosphere and focused on indi-
vidual behaviors through the review of morbidity 
and mortality, a more profound and detailed way 
when conducting a significant event audit. 
Table 11.4 describes the different techniques of 
incident analysis included in the Tuscan model 
for patient safety management.
Table 11.4 Tuscan technical standard for patient safety incident analysis
SEA = Significant event audit
SEA is an interdisciplinary and interprofessional peer review method for the in-depth analysis of a single patient 
safety incident with the aim of identifying improvement actions that concern the different aspects of the system: 
technology, people, and organization. SEA is inspired by the London Protocol, which provides for the 
reconstruction of what happened and the circumstances in which the events occurred, the analysis of possible care 
delivery problems and contributing factors compared with the standards of good practice, the definition and 
implementation of possible improvement actions. The reconstruction of the chronology of the facts takes place 
through an individual or group structured dialogue with the operators of the service concerned, the revision of the 
clinical documentation, and the possible observation in the field of welfare practices. The analysis of the 
contributing factors and the proposal for possible improvement actions is the product of the group work generally 
coordinated by an expert facilitator, with the possible support of the staff from the trust patient safety unit.
SEA concludes with the preparation of an Alert Report, which includes:
  1. The summary description of the case examined
  2. The classification of the type of accident
  3. The classification of contributing factors and mitigating factors
  4. The standards and reference bibliography
  5. Any immediate corrective action to take care of patients and family members
  6. Any immediate corrective actions at organizational level to prevent the repetition of the event
  7. Any improvement actions, including quantitative or qualitative monitoring indicators
At SEA can participate external experts to support the analysis of the case and the definition of improvement 
actions. It is desirable to consider the involvement of patient, family members or representatives of patient 
associations in the discussion phase of the case and the presentation of the results, as required by the Ministry’s 
Guideline for the Management and Communication of Adverse Events and the Recommendation of the European 
Council on patient safety. The SEA is part of the continuous training plan and participation is part of the training 
obligations of health and social-health workers.
M&M = Review of mortality and morbidity
M&M is an interdisciplinary and interprofessional peer review method aimed at periodic analysis of critical clinical 
cases with the aim of identifying behaviors and practices that can improve criticality management and decrease risk 
levels. The M&M can be configured as a Review for Security, in which are faced problems of organizational type 
inside the service that can have repercussions on the safety of the patients, in particular in the structures that do not 
have functions of type clinical care. Cases or problems are selected by the FQS, taking into account the reports of 
the operators. The FQS prepares the review meeting by collecting the available documentation and company or 
literature standards related to the topics to be discussed in a group. At the end of the M&M, a summary report is 
prepared in which this information is traced: the title of the cases addressed, the brief description of what was 
analyzed, the reference bibliography, the number, names, profile, and organizational unit to which the participants. 
M&M is part of the continuous training plan and participation is part of the training obligations of health and 
social-health workers.
RCA = Root cause analysis
RCA is the structured method for in-depth analysis of sentinel events envisaged by the Ministry of Health under the 
SIMES protocol. The analysis modality foresees the same phases of the SEA, with the addition of the compilation 
of a standard questionnaire for the identification of at least one cause or contributing factor, from which must 
necessarily result a subsequent risk prevention action, subjected to monitoring by the Regional Center for Patient 
Safety and by the Ministry of Health. RCA is generally conducted by experts in risk management.
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11.5  Analysis of Systems 
and Processes Reliability
The analysis of the cases of adverse events can be 
illuminating, permitting the detection of deficien-
cies of the system and the creation of improve-
ment plans following a bottom-up approach. 
Once the systemic perspective is learned, we can 
also proceed by adopting a diametrically opposed 
approach to patient risk analysis. In other words, 
one can start from the analysis of diagnostic- 
therapeutic processes instead of one or more 
cases of accidents that actually occurred, system-
atically examining the possibilities of failure, fol-
lowing the approach of Human and System 
Reliability Analysis—HRA [29].
HRA was defined as the application of relevant 
information to the behavioral characteristics of 
human beings and of systems to the design of 
objects, infrastructures, equipment, and environ-
ments used in places of life and work. HRA tech-
niques are used both in accident analysis and more 
generally in the analysis of organizational processes 
and have been used for over 50 years in high-risk 
industries and in the military sector. Of these, the 
most famous is Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
(FMEA), which we will discuss later.
HRA techniques are applicable at all stages of 
the life cycle of a production process. The tech-
niques developed to predict in advance the pos-
sible failures of a system and the prevention and 
containment measures of damages have been 
associated in particular with the growth of the 
nuclear power industry [30]. To obtain the con-
sent of populations for the installation of nuclear 
power plants, the results of risk assessments 
made with HRA have been widely disseminated, 
in order to demonstrate the designers’ ability to 
anticipate risks and to reassure the inhabitants of 
areas near plants. This type of analysis involves 
the detailed specification of the characteristics of 
the processes, the quantification of probability 
and failure modes, the measurements of the pos-
sibility of different types of human error, and 
finally consideration of the effects resulting from 
all possible combinations of error and system 
failure, in order to obtain an overall assessment 
of system security.
Reality has shown on several occasions that 
this risk assessment method is not sufficient to 
guarantee the safety of high-risk production pro-
cesses and even less the safety of workers and 
inhabitants of areas near plants [31]. The com-
plexity of many safety-critical systems makes an 
a priori analysis of possible system failures and 
human errors impossible and unreliable. Despite 
this, it is considered useful to apply this type of 
healthcare technique to promote reflection among 
frontline operators before introducing technical 
or organizational innovation. For example, before 
introducing a new procedure, it is useful to reflect 
on the possible, critical aspects of the different 
phases of the procedure, or, in the case of techno-
logical innovation, back-up solutions can be pre-
pared to deal with any malfunctions of the 
instrument. Given the tendency towards 
improvization rather than planning in health 
practices, the use of HRA techniques can foster 
the development of systemic thinking aimed at 
anticipating risk situations and preparing opera-
tors to manage them to protect patients.
There are numerous risk prediction techniques 
that have been developed in the industry, in many 
cases for commercial purposes, without scientific 
validation or supporting publications. For those 
confronting this type of technique, difficulty 
arises from the use of various acronyms to name 
instruments that are often similar but originating 
in different environments, such as FMEA, PSA, 
PRA, SLIM, HEART, THERP, HAZOP, and 
other acronyms that in some cases are proprietary 
variants of the HRA approach [32].
Some techniques are primarily aimed towards 
the detailed description of a task or a sequence of 
technical actions. For example, in “hierarchical 
task analysis,” the activity is broken down into a 
series of tasks, sub-tasks, and operations, down 
to a considerable level of detail that can be useful 
to detect the risks of each individual operation, 
quantify and classify them, and to determine the 
security measures to be adopted to avoid failure 
of the task, while also taking into account situa-
tional and systemic factors.
The purpose of quantifying the risks is to 
develop probabilistic models that should allow us 
to predict errors and to estimate the probability of 
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system failure. Quantification is the most contro-
versial aspect of the HRA because assigning 
numerical values to uncertain events caused by 
multiple factors, i.e., the expected probability 
that an operator makes a mistake, is an enormous 
challenge from the scientific and the practical 
point of view. Quantification is often entrusted to 
the judgment of a group of experts and is not the 
fruit of rigorous observation of operational prac-
tices and of recording the frequency of actual 
errors. These techniques have a normative char-
acter in and of themselves, that is, they tend to 
describe activities as they should be and errors as 
can be expected on the basis of “a priori” knowl-
edge of the problems.
They are descriptions of synthetic and non- 
analytical things, which therefore cannot take 
into account the complexity of the operations and 
the dynamic trend of practices at the sharp end. In 
healthcare, they have been successfully applied, 
especially in areas such as the blood transfusion 
sector that, due to the nature of the activities per-
formed, allow a detailed synthetic description 
and a precise guide to the application of 
procedures.
The technique of greatest interest to the 
health field is the “old” Failure Modes and 
Effects Analysis (FMEA). Many organizations 
that promote clinical risk management have pro-
posed its use to assess the risks linked with the 
various steps of a diagnostic-therapeutic process 
both proactively and reactively. The FMEA is 
a methodology that guides security officers in 
analyzing the criticality of a work-related pro-
cess and identifying possible improvement 
actions to reduce the risk of accidents. It is a 
prevention tool that identifies the weak areas 
of a process and develops improvement actions 
based on subjective judgments provided by the 
process stakeholders. The purpose of the analy-
sis is to understand the risks of a process, i.e., 
what could go wrong (failure mode) and what 
the possible consequences could be (failure 
effects), in order to make the process safer and 
more efficient.
Created in 1949 by the US military to deter-
mine the effects of system and equipment fail-
ures, it has been used by NASA since 1960 to 
predict bankruptcies, and to plan preventive mea-
sures and back-up systems for the Apollo space 
program [29]. Since then, the FMEA has been 
used in many safety-critical sectors such as the 
aerospace industry, industrial chemical pro-
cesses, nuclear and automotive.
FMEA is a particularly flexible and rather 
simple tool; for this reason, it is sometimes used, 
in reactive mode, in the analysis of cases together 
with the systemic model. It is predominantly 
used in a proactive manner, which requires 
accredited facilities to perform at least one analy-
sis with FMEA each year.
The application of FMEA in proactive mode 
involves the description of the steps in a process, 
failure modes (what could go wrong?), contribu-
tory factors (why should failure happen?), and 
effects of each failure (what could be the conse-
quences of any failure?).
The application of FMEA is divided into 
seven steps:
 1. Select a process to be evaluated with FMEA, 
bearing in mind that this technique works best 
for the analysis of linear processes that do not 
have many sub-processes. In the case of many 
sub-processes, it is advisable to apply the 
technique to each individual sub-process.
 2. Organize a multidisciplinary group with all 
the actors who have been involved in the pro-
cess being analyzed, some of whom may be 
included only for the part of the analysis that 
concerns them.
 3. Set a meeting to analyze the process starting 
with the description of steps in the process, 
trying to describe each phase in a detailed 
manner and without any bias.
 4. For each step of the process, list all the possi-
ble failure modes (FM), that is all that could 
go wrong, including rare and minor problems. 
Then proceed to identify the possible contrib-
utory factors and consequences of each failure 
mode.
 5. For each failure mode identified, have the 
group assign a numerical value on a scale 
from 1 to 10 for the frequency of the FM 
(where 1 represents a very low frequency and 
10 a very high one), the severity of the possi-
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ble consequences (where 1 represents a low 
severity and 10 a very high one) and the prob-
ability of identifying FM on the part of the 
operators (where 1 represents a high probabil-
ity of identification and 10 a low one).
 6. Calculate the Risk Priority Index (RPI) for 
each FM, taking the product of the frequency 
score (F), the severity score (S), and the prob-
ability of identifying the failure by the opera-
tors (I). The possible calculation results range 
from an RPI equal to 1 to an RPI equal to 
1000.
 7. Define improvement plans, starting from the 
FM that have accumulated a higher RPI score 
and therefore require priority interventions.
While defining the improvement plan, it is 
useful to keep in mind that if the FM has a high 
frequency it would be advisable to eliminate 
the contributory factors, or to add technological 
or organizational constraints, such as a proce-
dure that envisages an independent double con-
trol, so as to change the process and reduce the 
probability of failure. If, on the other hand, the 
failure mode is difficult to identify by the oper-
ators, it is necessary to increase its visibility, 
for example by an appropriate use of alarms or 
other warning systems, or by including a pas-
sage in a procedure that anticipates the event. 
Finally, if the failure mode can generate very 
serious consequences, it is necessary to draw up 
emergency plans to counteract a decay towards 
disaster or a repetition of the event at a short, 
temporal, and spatial distance in the same 
healthcare facility or in others of the same 
healthcare system.
11.6  An Integrated Vision 
of Patient Safety
Due to the limitation of resources available for 
health systems, in high-income as well as in low- 
and middle-income countries, risk assessment 
and the analysis of adverse events can ultimately 
contribute substantially to the reduction of waste 
and to the better use of human and technological 
resources. Many industries have learnt to renew 
their systems in the crisis, starting from the reduc-
tion of waste and the improvement of the reliabil-
ity of processes and products. Healthcare systems, 
in the same way, could emerge from any crisis 
disseminating the analysis and prevention of risks 
on the operational lines, with the active involve-
ment of all health professionals and, at the same 
time, by centralizing patient safety management 
to embed risk prevention in corporate strategies.
The connection between clinical risks and 
financial risks related to the direct and indirect 
costs of adverse events is an indispensable rea-
son for top management to act on patient 
safety, as highlighted by those institutions and 
insurance companies that reward health sys-
tems that do well and sanction those that fall 
short, with respect to value for patients as well 
as accountability of management and health 
professionals.
In conclusion, patient safety departments or 
units, clinicians, and citizens must make a com-
mon commitment to rethink and reorganize 
health services, to have the courage to change 
consolidated habits, and to finally replace the 
paternalism that has determined for centuries the 
doctor–patient relationship so that, under a ban-
ner of open and transparent communication 
around the risks and opportunities of every health 
service, they may walk together through the 
realm of uncertainty.
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12.1  Introduction
12.1.1  Characteristics of Healthcare 
and Its Complexity
The increasing complexity and dynamicity of our 
society (and world of work) have meant that 
healthcare systems have and continue to change 
and consequently the state of healthcare systems 
continues to assume different characteristics. The 
causes of mortality are an excellent example of 
this rapid transformation: non-communicable dis-
eases have become the leading cause of death, 
according to World Health Organization (WHO) 
data, but at the same time there are new problems 
emerging such as infectious diseases, like Ebola 
or some forms of influenza, which occur unex-
pectedly or without advanced warning. Many of 
these new diseases diffuse rapidly through the dif-
ferent parts of the globe due to the increasingly 
interconnected nature of the world. Another 
example of the healthcare transformation is the 
innovation associated with the introduction and 
development of advanced communication and 
technology systems (such as minimally invasive 
surgery and robotics, transplantation, automated 
antiblastic preparation) at all levels of care. 
Consequently, the social and technical dimen-
sions of healthcare are becoming more and more 
complex and provide a significant challenge for 
all the stakeholders in the system to make sense of 
and ensure high quality healthcare. These stake-
holders include but are not limited to patients and 
their families, caregivers, clinicians, managers, 
policymakers, regulators, and politicians. It is an 
inescapable truth that Humans are always going 
to be part of the healthcare systems, and it is these 
human, who by their very nature introduce vari-
ability and complexity to the system (we do not 
necessarily view this as a negative and this chap-
ter will illustrate). A microlevel a central relation-
ship in focus is that between the clinician and the 
patient, two human beings, making the health sys-
tem a very peculiar organization compared to 
similarly high-risk organizations such as aviation 
or nuclear energy. This double human being sys-
tem [1] requires significant effort (good design) in 
managing unpredictability through the develop-
ment of personal and organization skills, such as 
the ability to react positively and rapidly to unex-
pected events and to adopt a resilient strategy for 
survival and advancement. In contrast to other 
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similar industries, in terms of level of risk and 
system safety, healthcare settings are still plagued 
by numerous errors and negative events involving 
humans (and other elements) at various levels 
within the system. The emotional involvement is 
very high due to the exposure to social relation-
ships daily and results in significant challenges to 
address both technical and non-technical issues 
simultaneously.
The context becomes a key element for under-
standing how to find a balance in this continuous 
struggle to manage the social and technical 
aspects of the healthcare system, to standardize 
the evidence-based clinical process and personal-
ization of the care related to the diversity of the 
patients. The analysis of the situational character-
istics is vital to understanding how to apply solu-
tions that consider the peculiar dynamicity of 
healthcare settings. It is also important to under-
line that, among the general acknowledged diver-
sity, there are some settings which have similar 
patients and common practices, different risks 
and a different way to look at safety [2]. The 
implications are that each context in which care 
is provided presents with its own unique chal-
lenges, practices, risks, and approaches to pro-
mote safety. Thus, risk identification and analysis, 
quality and safety strategies should also be differ-
ent according to the contextual nuances. For 
example, a trauma center cannot have the same 
strategy to improve safety as a blood transfusion 
service: the trauma center is based on managing 
the unexpected due to emergency situations while 
the blood transfusion process is more a planned 
standardized process. In the trauma center to stay 
safe, you have to adapt and develop team-based 
skills, in a blood service you need to make sure 
the blood is not contaminated and is administered 
to the right person, and this work that you can 
easily standardize. This complexity and diversity 
of healthcare is the main characteristic to keep in 
mind when trying to understand healthcare sys-
tems, and it should be included in any design of 
the system and in any research intervention proj-
ect and thus to be able to define effective actions 
for improvement. Therefore, the purpose of this 
chapter is to firstly highlight some of the key 
issues in healthcare relating to adverse events and 
medical errors. Secondly, to discuss the 
approaches adopted to ensure quality and safety 
in healthcare, including some of the new 
approaches being advocated in the human factors 
and ergonomics community. Lastly, we will pro-
vide some suggests for opening a discussion on 
the way forward through the integration of vari-
ous approaches into a coherent transdisciplinary 
view of healthcare.
12.1.2  Epidemiology of Adverse 
Events and Medical Errors
According to the last Consensus Study Report 
released by The National Academies of Sciences, 
Engineering and Medicine “Crossing the Global 
Quality Chasm Improving Health Care 
Worldwide” healthcare in all global settings today 
suffers from high levels of deficiencies in quality 
across many domains, causing ongoing harm to 
human health [3]. According to WHO global esti-
mates, at least five patients die every minute 
because of unsafe care. In High Income Countries 
(HICs), the incidence of adverse events is approx-
imately 9%, of which around 60% could be pre-
vented [4]. A recent Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) analysis 
found that 15% of all hospital costs in OECD 
nations are due to patient harm from adverse 
events [5].
In countries with limited resources, every year 
there are 134 million adverse events related to 
unsafe care, causing more than 2.6 million deaths 
annually. Many of these adverse events are 
largely preventable as they result from unsafe 
treatment systems, and not patient pathology. In a 
study on frequency and preventability of adverse 
events, across 26 low- and middle-income coun-
tries, the rate of adverse events was around 8%, 
of which 83% could have been prevented and 
most alarmingly 30% led to death [6].
In low- and middle-income countries, a combi-
nation of unfavorable factors such as understaff-
ing, inadequate structures and overcrowding, lack 
of healthcare infrastructure/resources, a shortage 
of basic equipment, and poor hygiene and sanita-
tion are common place, all of which can be attrib-
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uted to limited financial resources, contribute to 
unsafe patient care. A weak safety and quality 
culture, flawed processes of care and disinterested 
leadership teams further weaken the ability of 
healthcare systems and organizations to ensure 
the provision of safe and effective healthcare [7].
Errors can be classified according to their out-
come, the setting where they take place (e.g., 
inpatient versus outpatient), the kind of proce-
dure involved (medication, surgery, etc.) or the 
probability of occurrence (high versus low). 
Error categories are analyzed by taking into con-
sideration their prevalence, avoidance, and asso-
ciated factors as well as the different strategies 
for detecting medical errors [8]. Among the prob-
lems that commonly occur in healthcare provi-
sion are adverse drug events, improper 
transfusions, misdiagnoses, under and over treat-
ment, unsafe injection practices, surgical injuries 
and wrong-site surgery, radiation errors involving 
overexposure to radiation and cases of wrong- 
patient and wrong-site identification, sepsis, 
venous thromboembolism, unsafe care in mental 
health settings including use of restraint, suicide, 
absconding and reduced capacity for self- 
advocacy; falls, pressure ulcers, and mistaken 
patient identities. High error rates with serious 
consequences are most likely to occur in inten-
sive care units, operating rooms and emergency 
departments. Medical errors are also associated 
with extremes of age, new procedures, urgency 
and severity of medical condition being treated 
[9–12]. Medical errors occur right across the 
spectrum of the assistance process, from pre-
scription to administration and can be attributed 
to both the social and technical components of 
the system. In spite of the high prevalence of 
medical errors and the very evident harm to 
patients, in many contexts, fear around the report-
ing of these errors is commonplace, which in turn 
impedes progress and learning for improvement 
and error prevention [13].
12.1.2.1  Barriers to Safe Practice 
in Healthcare Settings
The experience of countries that are heavily 
engaged in national efforts to reduce error and 
increase safe provision of healthcare services, 
clearly demonstrate that, although health systems 
differ from country to country, many threats to 
patient safety have similar causes and often simi-
lar solutions. Zecevic (2017) and Farokhzadian 
(2018) identified the following barriers to safe 
care provision: heavy workloads, lack of time, 
lack of resources and poor communication, inad-
equate organizational infrastructure, insufficient 
leadership effectiveness, inadequate efforts to 
keep pace with national and international stan-
dards and overshadowed values of team partici-
pation [14, 15]. Leape and Berwick (2005) argue 
that the barriers to the reduction of errors in the 
context of healthcare remain rooted in the nature 
and the culture of medicine. Regarding the con-
text of healthcare, the shear complexity of the 
system, given the many different specialties and 
parts of the system that are involved in the care 
process, increases the likelihood of poor interac-
tions and risk of failure [16]. Linked to this, with 
respect to the culture of medicine, continued pro-
fessional fragmentation and a lack of teamwork, 
characterized by different medical specialists or 
parts of the care process continuing to work in 
silos, further contribute to the risk of errors in the 
healthcare system, as found by Hignett et  al. 
(2018) in their study of barriers to the provision 
of effective healthcare in England. This status 
quo is perpetuated by a very strong hierarchical, 
authoritarian structure and the perceived threat 
that enhanced collaboration and communication 
may undermine or threaten professional indepen-
dence and autonomy [16]. Poor or disturbed 
communication (due to fragmented work struc-
ture and poor design of the physical environment, 
respectively) also present additional barriers to 
effective and safe practice [17].
Aligned to this is the continued culture of fear 
around reporting of mistakes or errors made, given 
the person-centered blame culture that Leape and 
Berwick (2005) and more recently, Holden (2009) 
maintains still very much a part of most industries, 
including aviation and  healthcare. In response to 
this, there is still a need for the development of 
effective and appropriate reporting and learning 
systems [18, 19], which, if introduced alongside a 
just culture, may play an important role in identify-
ing systemic weaknesses, which Woods and Cook 
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(2002) argue is a more effective method of recover-
ing from errors than identifying problematic or 
“flawed humans” (p. 140). However, in their small 
study, Mitchell et al. (2016) report that poor report-
ing processing, a lack of engagement on the part of 
medical staff to report, poor or no feedback and 
inaction on events reported, a lack of institution 
level support and funding and inadequate integra-
tion and leveraging of ever-changing health infor-
mation technology remain as barriers to effective 
reporting and learning system development and 
integration.
12.1.3  Error and Barriers to Safety: 
The Human or the System?
In 1999, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) released 
a landmark report—to Err is Human, which many 
authors argue was a turning point for patient safety 
in the United States and more globally [20]. 
Amongst many important recommendations, sig-
nificant points outlined in the report included the 
fact that errors, although common and costly, can 
be prevented to improve patient safety, provided 
that the systems-related contributory factors to 
these errors become the focus of addressing safety 
issues in healthcare (IOM 1999). While many 
commentators argue that there is an increased 
appreciation of the systemic nature of errors in the 
healthcare setting [16, 18–20] some still assert 
that, unfortunately, there is a very prevalent per-
son-centered blame culture in high reliability orga-
nizations such as aviation and healthcare, which to 
some extent is a “psychological tendency and an 
industry norm” [21]. This way of thinking and 
error assignment is referred to by Reason (2000) 
and Dekker (2002) as person approach, which 
holds that errors occur because of unwanted 
human variability and fallibility that happens in 
safe system. This view of error stresses that people 
working at the sharp end perform unsafe acts, 
characterized by various errors and violations that 
arise from abnormal cognitive processes such as 
forgetfulness and inattention, which can only be 
rectified by reducing human variability, setting 
better boundaries through training and discipline 
and possibly even naming and shaming [22, 23].
In contrast, as highlighted by the IOM and 
other authors [22, 23] errors can be better under-
stood by taking a systems approach or view. This 
holds that safety is an emergent property of the 
way in which a system is designed and not a 
product of the action of its individual compo-
nents [21, 24]. From this perspective, errors 
which occur at the sharp end, are the result of a 
host of latent systemic conditions or design flaws, 
or what Reason refers to as “resident pathogens” 
(2000; p. 769) and active failures of people while 
performing their work. Therefore, it is not neces-
sarily the human who causes the error (no matter 
the context) but rather the human’s interactions 
with the broader system (the tools, tasks, envi-
ronment, other people in a certain organizational 
framework and context) which, if the system has 
latent failures, result in the occurrence of error. 
Woods and Cook (2002) stress that in order to 
recover from error there is a need to search for 
systemic vulnerabilities, while understanding 
work as it is performed at the sharp end. This 
enables the detection of latent failures within the 
design of the system by those who operate within 
in it, a critical step to informing decision-makers 
on what needs to be prioritized to improve safety 
and reduce the likelihood of the same thing hap-
pening again.
Effectively, it is critical to understand whether 
there is compatibility between the social side of 
work (humans, their beliefs and cultures) and the 
technical side of work (how it is designed orga-
nized and actually executed). This requires an 
appreciation of sociotechnical systems theory, 
which is expanded below. Additionally, as articu-
lated in the seminal paper by Rasmussen (1997), 
to effectively manage risk associated with work, 
no matter the context, there is a need to consider 
the various levels of stakeholders involved in the 
control, regulation, and execution of work. This 
is captured in Rasmussen’s Hierarchical Risk 
Management Framework, which stresses the 
importance of the vertical integration of knowl-
edge and decisions across all stakeholders 
(which, in this model include Government, 
Regulators, Company executives, and manage-
ment and staff at the sharp end) [25]. In other 
words, knowledge and actions of how work is 
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done and its associated challenges at the sharp 
end should be communicated up the hierarchy to 
inform decisions made higher up. Equally, deci-
sions at higher levels should also influence the 
decisions and action at lower levels [25, 26]. This 
repeated assertion of the need for vertical integra-
tion between different levels of stakeholders 
within systems, support calls from other authors 
[16, 18–20] who all argue for more national and 
institutional support for programs aimed at 
enhancing patient safety, combined with a con-
tinued need for multidisciplinary scientific 
research and management teams. This research, 
as asserted by Bindman et al. (2018) and Bates 
and Singh (2018), should be embedded within 
the context of specific healthcare systems and 
contribute to the better understanding of prob-
lems within specific systems, solutions for which 
can be developed through learning laboratories 
and pilot interventions in situ. In order to become 
more responsive to the calls to understand error 
from a systemic perspective in the context of 
healthcare (rather than just as the fault of the 
human), while fostering better cross-field and 
cross-hierarchy collaboration amongst relevant 
stakeholders, the application of different meth-
ods, such as implementation science, ethnogra-
phy, and Human Factors and Ergonomics, may 
provide a more holistic overview of the chal-
lenges within different context. This knowledge 
can then be leveraged to develop context-specific 
and culturally sensitive interventions. Following 
sections therefore highlight these important 
approaches for ensuring quality and safety in 
healthcare systems.
12.2  Approaches to Ensuring 
Quality and Safety




Treating and caring for people in a safe environ-
ment and protecting them from healthcare-related 
avoidable harm should be national and interna-
tional priorities, calling for concerted interna-
tional efforts [13]. Achieving a culture of safety 
requires an understanding of the values, attitudes, 
beliefs, and norms that are important to health-
care organizations and what attitudes and behav-
iors are appropriate and expected for patient 
safety [27]. Differences between contexts (e.g., 
policies, culture, and healthcare organization 
characteristics) may explain variations in the 
effects of patient safety solutions implementa-
tion. Problematically, knowledge of which con-
textual features are important determinants of 
patient safety solutions is limited. The lack of 
understanding could in part be due to the com-
plex nature of unpacking context. As Øvretveit 
and colleagues have reported (2011), few studies 
assessed the effect of context on the implementa-
tion of safety and quality interventions. In the 
field of patient safety research, there is little evi-
dence or consensus around which contexts are 
the most salient for patient safety practice imple-
mentation and which contextual factors impact 
improvement interventions [28]. At the same 
time, it is hard to identify a unique model for 
designing and implementing safety interventions 
that can build a sufficient understanding of highly 
complex systems such healthcare. Implementation 
science is one of the most recognized frameworks 
for transferring evidence-based solutions from 
the theory of the research to the everyday life of 
the real world at the frontline. Implementation 
research is indeed defined in the literature as “the 
scientific study of methods to promote the sys-
tematic uptake of research findings and other 
evidence-based practices into routine practice, 
and, hence, to improve the quality and effective-
ness of health services. It includes the study of 
influences on healthcare professional and organi-
zational behavior” [29].
The aim of implementation research is broader 
than traditional clinical research as it proposes a 
systemic analysis not limited solely to assessing 
the effect of the introduction of a new variable, 
but rather to verify how this variable impacts on 
operators, the organization, the physical environ-
ment, and up to the highest level of health poli-
cies [30]. Implementation-research studies and 
ethnographic methods of investigation, applied 
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for research in patient safety and clinical risk 
management, have stressed the importance of 
organizational and cultural characteristics of the 
context in the implementation process of inter-
vention. At the core of implementation research 
lies the idea that every improvement solution has 
to be oriented to bring an organizational and 
behavioral improvement triggering virtuous pro-
cesses toward safety that over time become part 
of the heritage of the system [31]. Therefore, 
interventions to improve patient safety would be 
most effective when developed by those with 
local “expertise” and local knowledge, while tak-
ing into account evidence-based solutions from 
other contexts [32]. Local expertise and knowl-
edge are indeed critical resources for understand-
ing of what is culturally appropriate, the different 
priorities and capacities to answer the needs of 
the populations (resources and infrastructures), 
and the characteristics and relationships of differ-
ent health system stakeholders.
According to this approach, the analysis tends 
to be more holistic, system oriented and amena-
ble to adaptation rather than simply assessing the 
impact of change factors on the individual com-
ponents of the system [33]. Here the complexity 
is not explained in terms of the sum of the indi-
vidual parts, but in terms of the relationships 
between the software (non-physical resources 
such as organizational policies and procedures), 
hardware (physical resources as workplace, 
equipment, tools), environment (such as climate, 
temperature, socioeconomic factors), and live-
ware (human-related elements as teamwork, 
leadership, communication, stress, culture), the 
so-called SHELL model [34].
Implementation science provides research 
designs that combine methods of quantitative 
analysis and qualitative investigation. Both quali-
tative and quantitative methods are essential dur-
ing the development phase of the intervention 
and during the evaluation. They combine epide-
miological data with an ethnographic analysis 
[35]. The relevance of ethnographic studies has 
been highlighted in patient safety since the publi-
cation of several reports during the 1970s in the 
United States [36]. These qualitative studies 
enable the analysis of the traditional structures 
and cultural aspects by using methods such as 
interviews (semi-structured, structured), observa-
tion (direct or video), and focus groups [37]. The 
added value of the ethnographic method lies in its 
ability to analyze what actually happens in the 
care settings, to understand how the work is actu-
ally done rather than the work as imagined and 
prescribed [38]. This helps to identify factors and 
variables that can influence the process at differ-
ent stakeholder levels, namely patient, caregiver, 
department, structure, organization, community, 
and political decision-makers [30].
Several models for translating the implemen-
tation science approach into practice have been 
defined by international agencies and organiza-
tions working in the field of safety and quality of 
care. Some focused on how to build bidirectional 
collaboration for improvement between stake-
holders in different geographical areas and in 
particular between HICs and LMICs—with one 
such example being the World Health 
Organization (WHO) Twinning partnership for 
improvement (TPI) model [39]. Other approaches 
focused more on the process to be followed in 
order to propose safety solutions that are suitable 
for the specific context, respondent to multidisci-
plinarity, scalable, sustainable, and adaptable to 
context and user-needs changes—for example, 
the Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI)’s 
Collaborative Breakthrough [40] model, while 
the International Ergonomics Association (IEA) 
General Framework Model [41] is oriented to 
understanding the interactions among humans 
and other elements of a system in order to opti-
mize human well-being and overall system 
 performance. The following sections provide a 
brief outline of each of these approaches.
12.2.1.1  WHO Twinning Partnership 
for Improvement (TPI) Model
The hospital-to-hospital model developed in the 
WHO African Partnership for Patient Safety 
(APPS) program provides the foundation on 
which the “Twinning partnership for improve-
ment” was developed. APPS aimed to build sus-
tainable patient safety partnerships between 
hospitals in countries of the WHO African Region 
and hospitals in other regions. TPI takes the 
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learning and experience from across the African 
region and moves the role of partnership working 
into new and critical areas to support the develop-
ment of quality, resilient, and universal health 
services [39]. At the heart of this model is the fact 
that partnerships provide a vehicle for dialogue 
that generates ideas and opportunities to address 
the multiple barriers to improvement. The focus 
on solution generation co-developed by hospital 
partnerships support improvement and generates 
mutual benefits to all parties involved. The TPI 
approach to improvement is based on a six-step 
cycle and facilitates the development of partner-
ships, the systematic identification of patient 
safety gaps, and the development of an action 
plan and evaluation cycle according to the fol-
lowing steps:
 1. Partnership development that supports the 
establishment of fully functioning, communi-
cative twinning relations between two or more 
health institutions.
 2. Needs assessment that allows the baseline sit-
uation to be captured, so priority technical 
areas can be identified to form the basis for an 
evaluation of the implemented activities.
 3. Gap analysis that allows for the identification 
of key priority areas for focused improvement 
efforts.
 4. Action planning that provides twinning part-
nerships with the opportunity to jointly agree 
and develop targeted action plans.
 5. Action is the stage of the implementation of 
the agreed plan of activity with focused action 
on both arms of the twinning partnership to 
help deliver effective health services.
 6. Evaluation and review enables twinning part-
nerships to assess, against their baseline, the 
impact of both their technical improvement 
work.
12.2.1.2  Institute for Healthcare 
Improvement Breakthrough 
Collaborative
A reference model widely used for the imple-
mentation of improvement interventions is the 
Collaborative Breakthrough model proposed by 
the Institute for Healthcare Improvement [40]. 
The principle that underlies the use of this model 
is that for every intervention to be successful it 
must be adapted to the context, taking into 
account the organizational and cultural specifics 
and the available human and economic resources. 
Once the area that needs improvement has been 
identified, actions must be based on evidence in 
literature, solutions promoted by international 
actors or experiences already made in other con-
texts and that have already produced evidence of 
effectiveness. Multidisciplinary groups of experts 
evaluate the hypothesized solutions with respect 
to the available literature, reference standards, 
and characteristics of the context of application. 
Social, organizational, anthropological, eco-
nomic, human factors, and ergonomics knowl-
edge, combined with the clinical knowledge can 
facilitate a better understanding of the emergent 
characteristics of the system, which in turn can 
develop interventions that try to take into account 
the complexity of the system. According to the 
model, each intervention—which could be an 
organizational change, the implementation of a 
new cognitive support tool or a tool for decision- 
making—become the object of a pilot project in 
the specific context and evaluated in terms of 
usability, feasibility, and impact on quality and 
safety. In this phase, the Plan-Do-Study-Act 
model (reference) allows the improvement 
hypothesis to be periodically reassessed and 
reformulated in relation to what emerges from 
the study phase. In the evaluation phase, qualita-
tive and quantitative methods of analysis can be 
used: questionnaires, interviews, field 
 observations along with pre-post intervention 
prospective analysis. The results of the tests and 
the analysis of the data are the basis for a possible 
redesign of the solution to make it more appropri-
ate for the context of application.
12.2.1.3  Case Study: Kenya
The Centre for Clinical Risk Management and 
Patient Safety—WHO Collaborating Centre in 
Human Factors and Communication of the 
Delivery of Safe and Quality Care (Italy), in col-
laboration with the Centre for Global Health of 
the Tuscany Region and the University Hospital 
of Siena in 2015 promoted a partnership with a 
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hospital in Kenya with focus on patient safety 
and quality improvement. The operative approach 
promoted for introducing improvement solutions 
and strategies in the hospital combined the WHO 
African Partnership for patient safety approach 
with the Institute of Healthcare Improvement 
Collaborative Breakthrough model. Following 
the six-step cycle approach of the APPS, on the 
ground quantitative self-assessment, a gap analy-
ses and need assessment were conducted, from 
which it emerged that there was a need to work 
on the safety and quality of maternal and neona-
tal care. Partners thus decided to focus on build-
ing a collaborative project for the implementation 
of the Safe Childbirth Checklist and to evaluate 
the locally adapted version of the tool in terms of 
impact on safety and quality, its usability, and 
feasibility.
The process of implementation has combined 
the Collaborative Breakthrough model and the 
Twinning Partnership for Improvement and has 
foreseen the following steps:
 1. Evaluation of the specific characteristics of 
the context in terms of: safety culture, 
resources and technology available, organiza-
tion of the work, work flows, characteristics of 
the workers, their relations and needs, cogni-
tive workload.
 2. Administration of a questionnaire to assess 
the level of maturity of the safety culture 
(Surveys on Patient Safety Culture™ 
(SOPS™) Hospital Survey released by the 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 
(AHRQ) [42].
 3. Creation of a multidisciplinary group for the 
personalization of the SCC: gynecologists, 
midwives, and nurses form the maternal and 
child department, safety and quality team of 
the hospital, quality and safety, and HFEs 
experts from partner institution.
 4. Coaching of the frontline workers on the use 
of the SCC tool.
 5. Six-month piloting of the SCC.
 6. Evaluation of the impact of the SCC on some 
selected process indicators related to the care 
delivered to the mother and the new-born.
 7. Administration of a questionnaire to evaluate 
the usability and feasibility of the tool.
 8. Application of the PDSA for re-evaluating the 
first version of the SCC and re-customization 
of the tool according to the results of clinical 
record review and the usability questionnaire.
The analyses of the AHRQ Hospital Survey 
on Patient Safety administrated to a group of 50 
hospital workers to measure their perception 
about patient safety issues, medical errors, and 
reporting showed that workers felt that top man-
agement was committed to improving patient 
safety and that this represented a positive plat-
form for developing quality and safety interven-
tions. Additionally, about 50% of the staff 
associate the occurrence of an adverse event to 
potentially being blamed rather than the event 
being used as a learning opportunity. Linked to 
this, most of the health workers reported that 
there is a limited culture of reporting events 
related to near-misses and that when a few 
adverse events have been reported and discussed, 
this produces positive change. Lastly, staff indi-
cated that they wanted to be part of a positive 
environment for teamwork and collaboration 
with top management.
The second source of evaluation of the intro-
duction of the SCC was a questionnaire adminis-
trated to users aiming at understanding whether 
the checklist was usable, coherent with the work-
flow and work organization, whether it over-
loaded workers or it facilitate communication, 
teamwork, and adherence to best clinical 
 practices. The result of the questionnaire showed 
that: 70% of the midwives considers the checklist 
easy or very easy to us; 56% said that the tool had 
significantly improved their practice around 
childbirth, and 50% reported that it had signifi-
cantly improved communication and teamwork.
Finally, the evaluation of the impact of the 
SCC on quality and safety of care was conducted 
through a prospective pre- and post-intervention 
clinical records review on a randomly selected 
sample of clinical records. The analyses shown 
that the introduction of tool had led to a signifi-
cant increase in the evaluation of heart rate during 
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pre-partum, the administration of the antibiotic 
therapy in case of mother’s temperature >38° or in 
case of membranes’ rupture >24 h, the adminis-
tration of antihypertensive treatment in case of 
diastolic blood pressure >120 [43].






The implementation of the Safe Childbirth 
Checklist in Kenya represented one of the first 
attempts to merge internationally validated mod-
els for quality and safety improvement in health-
care. The positive results obtained in terms of 
clinical and organizational outcomes demon-
strated that the integration of the two models can 
give significant support for understanding and 
identifying what should be done to promote 
improvement, what kind of interventions are the 
most suitable and effective for a specific context. 
Following the TPI six-step cycle and the QI 
approach, it is possible to describe the level of 
maturity of a system in terms of safety culture 
and safety “logistics” (needs assessment); to 
identify possible gaps in the care process and the 
clinical areas where an intervention is necessary; 
to plan actions according to the gap analyses and 
act according to the characteristics of the envi-
ronment while testing hypotheses aimed at 
improvement and possible prototypes. However, 
the understanding of the key technical and social 
aspects that required changing for effective 
implementation were not always made explicit 
by these approached. Therefore, what needs to be 
further investigate and discussed is how HFE can 
become a driving component of safety and qual-
ity improvement programs. A more HFE-oriented 
approach aimed at promoting behavioral changes 
toward safer healthcare systems, could promote a 
deeper understanding of technical, socioeco-
nomic, political and environmental sub-systems 
when trying to build an understanding of the 
work system characteristics. Moreover, a more 
comprehensive understanding of the relation 
between all the component of the systems, differ-
ent stakeholders that act in the context at different 
levels, their relation and needs could help to 
scale-up solution from the local to the national 
level keeping a bottom-up approach for the 
design of the solution. In other words, HFE could 
make it explicit how to make changes toward 
safety of care happen, how to fit theory into the 
real world, in the specific context, taking into 
account peculiarities of the system and promot-
ing multidisciplinary collaboration for facing, in 
an holistic manner, multidimensional issues such 
as those that arise from a high-complexity sys-
tems as the healthcare.
12.2.3  Human Factors 
and Ergonomics
According to the International Ergonomics asso-
ciation “Ergonomics (or human factors) is the 
scientific discipline concerned with the under-
standing of interactions among humans and other 
elements of a system, and the profession that 
applies theory, principles, data and methods to 
design in order to optimize human well-being 
and overall system performance.” Wilson (2014) 
further argues that HFE has six fundamental 
notions that define the approach that should be 
adopted by practitioners and researchers: (1) 
Systems approach; (2) Context; (3) Interactions; 
(4) Holism; (5) Emergence; (6) Embedding. In 
other words, HFE takes a systems approach that 
acknowledges the importance of context, emer-
gence and holism in elucidating interactions 
between various system elements and developing 
this understanding requires being embedded in 
the system. This suggests that HFE should always 
be embedded in the practice of healthcare for 
effective patient safety and therefore HFE (and 
consequently those responsible for implementa-
tion) should be viewed as part of the organization 
and not as outside consultants. At the heart of the 
embedded approach to HFE is the participation 
of all key stakeholders and subject matter experts 
[44]. In fact, participatory ergonomics is well 
established, for example, almost 20 years ago 
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Haines et al. (2002) proposed and validated a par-
ticipatory ergonomics framework. The participa-
tory ergonomics approach focuses on the 
involvement of people in both the planning and 
controlling a significant amount of their own 
work activities. This is coupled ensuring that they 
have sufficient knowledge and power to have an 
influence on processes and outcomes [45]. Due to 
the focus on and acknowledgment of stakehold-
ers at all levels in the system HFE also promotes 
a micro, meso, and macro view of the system. At 
a micro level, the focus would be on the individ-
ual and their interactions with their task (e.g., 
between a nurse and their patient), while the 
meso level takes a slightly broader view at a 
group or team level and their interaction with 
work. Lastly, at the macro level the characteris-
tics of the whole system is taken into account and 
organizational factors need to be considered. 
Important models at this level of analysis would 
be those developed by Rasmussen (1997), the 
specifics of which are discussed elsewhere in this 
chapter as they promote both a top-down and 
bottom-up approach.
Human factors and ergonomics has its focus 
on the interactions between humans, technolo-
gies, and organizations within a physical and cul-
tural environment. Fundamental notions of HFE 
mean that the tools and methods that support the 
implementation of patient safety interventions 
can be adapted to the context needs of local 
stakeholders. Further the approach considers the 
interaction with healthcare operators, acknowl-
edging several dimensions of the implementation 
site at the different level of the system: micro, 
meso, and macro (i.e., it promotes a systemic 
view of the implementation process). The main 
interactions are those that are derived from the 
complexity of the system and in particular hospi-
tal organization (design of clinical pathways, 
healthcare operator workloads and shifts, proto-
cols, procedures, tasks, and activities), environ-
ment/physical organization (facilities, furniture 
and device design; technical and economic 
resources) and human aspects influencing care 
delivery (religion, customs, social behaviors, 
social organization, social hierarchies).
From a healthcare perspective the dual out-
comes of HFE could be reoriented as patient out-
comes (quality of care and patient safety) and 
employee and organization outcomes [46]. 
Importantly, HFE acknowledges the interdepen-
dence of these two outcomes. That is, in order to 
promote patient safety outcomes it is necessary 
to promote organizational outcomes (including 
the well-being of those working within these 
organizations). The ability of HFE to support 
these two outcomes is dependent on its under-
standing of sociotechnical systems theory and its 
values. Considering the clear social and technical 
characteristics of healthcare highlighted earlier in 
this chapter, an understanding of sociotechnical 
systems theory is of obvious benefit here. Clegg 
(2000) argued that sociotechnical systems theory 
“has at is core the notion that the design and per-
formance of new systems can be improved, and 
indeed can only work satisfactorily, if the social 
and the technical are bought together and treated 
as interdependent aspects of a work system.” 
Human factors and ergonomics practitioners 
therefore take the technical (processes, tasks and 
technology used to transform inputs to outputs), 
social (attributes of people (such as skills, atti-
tudes, values), relationships among people, 
reward systems) and environmental sub-systems 
(outside influences such as stakeholders) into 
account when trying to build an understanding of 
the work system characteristics. Sociotechnical 
systems principles were first proposed by Cherns 
in 1976 and have subsequently been developed 
by several authors including Clegg (2000). 
Recently, Read et al. proposed a set of values for 
HFE and sociotechnical systems theory based on 
these principles:
 1. Humans as assets
 2. Technology as a tool to assist humans
 3. Promotion of quality of life
 4. Respect for individual differences
 5. Responsibility to all stakeholders
HFE therefore places an emphasis on seeing 
the humans within the system (patients, caregiv-
ers, etc.) as assets rather than “problems” or 
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potential for introducing error. These principles 
and values are again consistent both with the par-
ticipatory ergonomics principles and with recent 
calls for transdisciplinary teams focused on 
engaging with all relevant stakeholders. It is 
therefore clear that HFE is a salient discipline for 
the problems faced by the healthcare system 
relating to patient safety.
The application of the HFE participatory 
approach within healthcare has been extensively 
researched with Hignett et al. (2005) illustrating 
the numerous benefits associated with such an 
approach. Within the context of this book chap-
ter, the ability of participatory ergonomics tactics 
to promote transdisciplinarity in team character-
istics [47], is also an important consideration 
[46]. This is vital as earlier aspects of this chapter 
highlight the increasing need for transdisci-
plinary team collaboration for solving complex 
healthcare and patient safety issues. 
Unfortunately, currently HFE is only well estab-
lished in the West and has little traction in many 
countries in the Global South (see Thatcher and 
Todd 2019 for further details [46]). Furthermore, 
when there are multinational transdisciplinary 
teams working in healthcare in emerging econo-
mies, the nature of the collaboration is typically 
poor; this is in spite of good practice frameworks 
existing. Schneider and Maleka (2018) and Hedt- 
Gauthier et  al. (2018) have both illustrated the 
problematic nature of these relationships in 
healthcare. These problems are not isolated to 
healthcare settings, with Thatcher and Todd 
(2019) that it is necessary to foster respectful 
progress through a program of action that 
acknowledges the lessons that the people of the 
Global South can teach the North.
12.3  Way Forward
12.3.1  International Ergonomics 
Association General 
Framework Model
International Ergonomics Association in response 
the problems identified above has developed a 
General Framework Model that is focused on 
using the values of HFE to guide their interac-
tions and collaborative development efforts in 
LMICs. Evidence of patient safety interventions 
have been mainly based on high cost projects in 
HICs. This evidence needs translation and adap-
tation when developed for LMICs. Human 
Factors and Ergonomics (HFE) and in particular 
the IEA General Framework Model are the sug-
gested research approaches to adapt tools to the 
context within which they will be applied. Indeed 
Thatcher and Todd (2019) recently argued that 
training and implementation models must focus 
on up skilling local capacity allowing LIC and 
LMIC countries to solve their own problems, 
thus recognizing the emergent characteristics of 
patient safety issues and the emergent nature of 
organizational culture. The IEA approach is con-
sistent with this and is underpinned by several 
philosophical standpoints published in the inter-
national development standing committee of the 
IEA triennial report from 2018. These focus on:
 1 An engagement with, and understanding of, 
how knowledge and technology are effectively 
diffused across countries. That is, diffusion 
occurs within sociotechnical systems and as 
such should be negotiated, enabled, and dif-
fused (Greenhalgh et al. 2004)
 2 Using the relationship between stakeholders, 
emergence and networks as promoted by 
Wheatley and Frieze to promote the develop-
ment of communities of good practice and 
then translate these into systems of influence
 3 Closer alignment and integration of science 
and practice
The IEA general framework model was 
developed based on the aforementioned princi-
ples and focused on the provision of a participa-
tory framework to facilitate the systematic 
design of HFE- related projects. The GFM out-
lined in Fig. 12.1 although presented in an eight 
step model is in fact a highly iterative process, as 
the characteristics at one step are made explicit 
they may require the reexamination of previous 
steps. For example as the understanding of who 
stakeholders are (step 4) and what the relation-
ships are between stakeholders (step 5) is devel-
12 From Theory to Real-World Integration: Implementation Science and Beyond
154
oped so the understanding of what a value-added 
topic is (step 1) and what the actual needs are 
(step 3) may need to be refined. Through this 
iterative process, the various stakeholders within 
the system are able to discover shared objectives 
and goals, and consequently collaborate in the 
generation of ideas on the solutions to be imple-
mented within the constraints of system they are 
attempting to shape. The framework therefore 
promotes an interrogation of the social charac-
teristics of the system (through a detailed exami-
nation of the various stakeholders and their 
relationships to each other) and how the techni-
cal aspects of the system can be aligned with the 
strengths and weaknesses of various stakehold-
ers through the development of benefits and 
implementation strategies. The framework also 
promotes the use of contextually appropriate 
tools and methods at each step that meet the 
requirements of elucidating the necessary infor-
mation. For example, in more advanced systems 
the initial steps (1–3) can be facilitated through 
the use of existing HFE tools such as cognitive 
work analysis, while in less mature systems 
alternative tools may be more appropriate.
As mentioned in Sect. 12.2.2 and as emerged 
from the overview on barriers and facilitating 
factors that can influence the positive results of 
an improvement project, context, and its actors 
(stakeholders) represent the main elements to 
take into account when designing and imple-
menting solutions. This requires an apprecia-
tion of both the social and technical components 
of the system within which the improvement 
project is to take place. Therefore, just under-
standing the context is not sufficient for the 
success of interventions that aim at creating a 
long-lasting behavioral change that become 
part of the cultural heritage of a specific system 
and a shared and recognized attitude. In order 
to make this cultural change lasting over time, 
it has to be embedded in the system, it need to 
be thought of, designed, and implemented by 
actors that  participate in the system, that are 
part of the system and that are recognized as to 
be parts of that systems. Furthermore, the 
emerging characteristics of safety and culture 
need to be taken into account, and those that 
remain within the system once the improve-
ment project is complete need to be empowered 
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to understand the system and to respond appro-
priately to new emergent problems.
Considering the case study on the introduc-
tion of the SCC in one hospital of Kenya, we 
argue that the application of the GFM model 
would have possibly represented for the imple-
menters a fundamental step before the start of 
the collaborative to better understand the socio-
technical characteristics of the setting and thus 
reduce possible challenges and improve the sus-
tainability of improvement made. At the begin-
ning of the project, no HFE experts where 
available within the hospital nor experts in safety 
and quality of care. External experts with little 
knowledge about the particular characteristics of 
and the level of maturity of the systems in terms 
of safety culture and safety “logistic” would 
have been facilitated in the understanding how to 
make the new improvement solution working in 
the everyday local way of working at the front-
line by the application of the GFM. This would 
be an initial step in ensuring that all local stake-
holders are identified, valued, empowered, and 
included in problem identification and solution 
finding. As such an important first step in the 
process of making HFE knowledge and princi-
ples (and for that matter safety and quality 
healthcare) available on the ground through 
transfer of knowledge and coaching would have 
taken place.
For sure the bottom-up approach followed in 
the introduction of the SCC has been made pos-
sible to have a direct participation of hospitals 
stakeholders from the very beginning of the proj-
ect but to date it has not be sufficient in order to 
turning it into a large-scale project and to involve 
also macro-systems level actors such as institu-
tional bodies.
As we continue to seek to improve the provi-
sion of healthcare across the globe, a deeper inte-
gration between quality and safety improvement 
models and the HFE models would be an impor-
tant and useful departure point. Implementation 
science and HFE promote a systemic view of 
patient safety and advocate for a movement 
aware from disciplinarily to multi- and transdis-
ciplinary approaches to solution finding. It is our 
contention that integrating our models to foster 
such an approach coupled with an acknowledg-
ment of local knowledge and skills in LMICs are 
vital for future improvement projects. In such an 
integrated manner would it be possible to take 
implementation of both quality and safety 
improvement and human factors and ergonomics 
projects beyond their current scope.
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Learning Objectives/Questions Covered in 
the Chapter
• Most frequent errors and adverse events in 
anesthesiology and the intensive care unit 
(ICU).
• Strategies to reduce the occurrence of medica-
tion errors both in the operating room and in 
the ICU.
• Basic principles for the provision of safe anes-
thesia care: monitoring, knowing, and taking 
care of the equipment, planning, non- technical 
skills.
• Application of cognitive aids to improve the 
safety of surgical patients. Cognitive aids have 
been developed for intra- and perioperative 
crises.
• Proposals of models aimed at implementing 
safety solutions.
• Implications of the psychological status of 
staff for patient safety and possible 
interventions.
• Typical building issues when designing ORs 
and ICUs.
13.1  Introduction
Given the wide range of medical disciplines 
afferent to anesthesiology (anesthesia, periopera-
tive care, intensive care medicine, pain therapy, 
and emergency medicine), anesthesiologists have 
always had a great, cross-specialty opportunity to 
influence safety and quality of patients’ care. In 
recent decades, several efforts have been made to 
establish a model of safety and different risk- 
reduction strategies have been engaged: for 
example, the establishment of the American 
Society of Anesthesiologists (ASA) Committee 
on Patient Safety and Risk Management in 1984 
and the birth of the Anesthesia Patient Safety 
Foundation in the subsequent year, which were 
significant moments for the improvement of 
patients’ healthcare quality and for the history of 
anesthesiology at large.
Indeed, quality and safety in this field have 
improved, thanks to upgrades of the anesthesia 
delivery equipment, better monitoring, improved 
airway management and emergency devices, 
availability of recovery rooms, and better train-
ing; pharmacological advances have led to the 
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development of new receptor antagonists of opi-
oids and hypnotics, and new anesthetic drugs, 
characterized by shorter and more predictable 
onset and offset times and fewer side effects. The 
development of simulation training has changed 
the approach to crises and contributes to the 
development of a safety culture beginning in the 
residency period.
Nevertheless, operating rooms (ORs) and 
intensive care units (ICUs) remain settings bur-
dened by an extremely high risk of error. Surgery 
increasingly involves older and sicker patients 
undergoing more complex interventions; in the 
meantime, anesthesiologists have been requested 
to become rapidly competent at using new drugs, 
devices, and monitoring systems. The situation is 
not different in the ICUs, where physicians and 
nurses are expected to provide high-quality care 
to critically ill patients, often making life- 
threatening decisions very quickly in a stressful 
environment while managing high-tech equip-
ment and applying complex procedures.
13.2  Epidemiology of Adverse 
Events
A study of reported adverse events under anes-
thesia [1] estimated that about 1.5% of surgical 
interventions are complicated by critical events, 
but the true incidence is likely underestimated; 
moreover, a systematic review [2] found that sur-
gical and anesthetic adverse events, many of 
them deemed preventable, contribute to 12.8–
52.2% of unplanned ICU admissions. In industri-
alized countries, major complications are 
reported [3] to occur in 3–16% of impatient sur-
gical procedures, with permanent disability or 
death rates of approximately 0.4–0.8%; the 
anesthesia- specific mortality is estimated [4] to 
be about 1/100,000 cases. Hence, even if the 
overall anesthetic risk is estimated to be a small 
proportion of the total risk of the surgical proce-
dures, with an estimated [5] 312.9 million opera-
tions in 2012, anesthesia-related perioperative 
mortality represents a small but relevant propor-
tion of cases and, given the ubiquity of surgery, 
the implementation of strategies aimed at improv-
ing safety of surgical care has significant implica-
tions for public health [3].
Across medical specialties, preventable 
patient harm is more prevalent in the ICU [6]. 
ICUs are complex environments where the sever-
ity of illnesses, the high levels of stress, the vari-
ety of therapies and routes of administration 
make medical errors and deaths due to prevent-
able harm more common [7]. In the Critical Care 
Safety Study [8], Rothschild et al. found a daily 
rate of 0.8 adverse events and 1.5 serious errors 
for 10 ICU beds, with a rate for serious errors of 
149.7 per 1000 patient-days. Notably, 45% of all 
adverse events were judged preventable.
13.3  Most Frequent Errors
A recent review [9] suggests that cognitive errors 
(Table 13.1) are the most important contributors 
to patient harm in anesthesiology: growing evi-
dence shows that mere technical errors or errors 
caused by a lack of knowledge account for only a 
small part of incorrect diagnosis and treatment in 
this setting. The role of non-technical skills for 
patient safety has progressively become more 
evident through the years and, on this topic, one 
of the most striking moments of reflection for the 
healthcare community was Martin Bromiley’s 
report [10] on the death of his wife in 2005. 
Fixation errors, absence of planification, team-
work breakdown, poor communication, unclear 
leadership, lack of situational awareness, and 
other non-technical aspects of performance in 
anesthesiology and critical care medicine can 
negatively impact patient outcome. This could be 
even more relevant during intraoperative crises 
and emergencies, where failure of adherence to 
best practices can be common [11].
Another important source of patient harm is 
represented by medication errors, which can 
occur at four steps of the drug treatment process: 
prescription, transcription, dispensation, and 
administration. As reported by the Anesthesia 
Quality Institute [12], 44% of medication error 
claims involve incorrect dosing, 30% substitution 
of an unintended drug for the correct one, 10% 
administration of a contraindicated drug, and 8% 
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timing errors. Factors most frequently leading to 
medication errors or near-misses [13] are distrac-
tion (16.7%), haste, stress, or pressure to proceed 
(production pressure, 12.5%), and the misreading 
of labels on medication vials or ampoules 
(12.5%).
Poor design and lack of familiarity with equip-
ment and monitoring devices are likely sources 
of error and have been identified as major deter-
minants in many adverse events; in this context, 
the anesthetic delivery equipment is the most 
common source of problems. Remarkably, equip-
ment misuse is far more common than pure 
equipment failure, highlighting the fact that 
human error is responsible for equipment-related 
mishaps in as high as 90% of cases [14].
Table 13.1 Cognitive error catalogue (from Stiegler et al. [9])
Cognitive error Definition Illustration
Anchoring Focusing on one issue at the expense of 
understanding the whole situation
While troubleshooting an alarm on an 
infusion pump, you are unaware of sudden 
surgical bleeding and hypotension
Availability bias Choosing a diagnosis because it is in the 
forefront of your mind due to an emotionally 
charged memory of a bad experience
Diagnosing simple bronchospasm as 
anaphylaxis because you once had a case of 
anaphylaxis that had a very poor outcome
Premature 
closure
Accepting a diagnosis prematurely, failure to 
consider reasonable differential of possibilities
Assuming that hypotension in a trauma 
patient is due to bleeding, and missing the 
pneumothorax
Feedback bias Misinterpretation of no feedback as “positive” 
feedback
Belief that you have never had a case of 
unintentional awareness because you have 
never received a complaint about it
Confirmation 
bias
Seeking or acknowledging only information that 
confirms the desired or suspected diagnosis
Repeatedly cycling an arterial pressure cuff, 
changing cuff sizes, and locations because 
you “do not believe” the low reading
Framing effect Subsequent thinking is swayed by leading aspects 
of initial presentation
After being told by a colleague, “this patient 
was extremely anxious preoperatively”, you 
attribute postoperative agitation to her 
personality rather thon low blood sugar
Commission 
bias
Tendency toward action rather than inaction. 
Performing unindicated maneuvres, deviating 
from protocol. May be due to overconfidence, 
desperation, or pressure from others
“Better safe than sorry” insertion of 
additional unnecessary invasive monitors or 




Inappropriate boldness, not recognizing the need 
for help, tendency to believe we are infallible
Delay in calling for help when you have 
trouble intubating because you are sure you 
will eventually succeed
Omission bias Hesitation to start emergency maneuvres for fear 
of being wrong or causing harm, tendency toward 
inaction
Delay in calling for chest tube placements 
when you suspect a pneumothorax because 
you may be wrong and you will be 
responsible for that procedure
Sunk costs Unwillingness to let go of a failing diagnosis or 
decision, especially if much time/resources have 
already been allocated. Ego may play a role
Having decided that a patient needs an 
awake fiber optic intubation, refusing to 
consider alternative plans despite multiple 
unsuccessful attempts
Visceral bias Countertransference; our negative or positive 
feelings about a patient influencing our decisions
Not troubleshooting an epidural for a 
laboring patient because she is “high 
maintenance” or a “complainer”
Zebra retreat Rare diagnosis figures prominently among 
possibilities, but physician is hesitant to pursue it
Try to “explain away” hypercarbia when 
malignant hyperthermia should be considered
Unpacking 
principle
Failure to elicit all relevant information, 
especially during transfer of care
Omission of key test results, medical 
history, or surgical event
Psych-out error Medical causes for behavioral problems are 
missed in favor of psychological diagnosis
Elderly patient in post-anesthesia care unit 
(PACU) is combative—prescribing 
restraints instead of considering hypoxia
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Physician burnout and the psychological sta-
tus of staff are significant concerns for both qual-
ity of care and patient safety in critical care. 
Burnout syndrome has been identified in all cat-
egories of healthcare professionals and several 
studies have shown a high prevalence in ICU 
staff [15], up to 40%. Risk factors include [16] 
continuous or long shifts, night shifts, work over-
load, and poor workplace organization. 
Healthcare staff who are burned out, depressed, 
or anxious are unable to fully engage in patient 
care and are more likely to make errors, increas-
ing the risk to the safety of patients; moreover, 
burnout personnel may be more reluctant to 
report medical errors [17]. Depression symptoms 
were shown to be an independent risk factor for 
medical error in a prospective observational 
study [15] involving 31 ICUs.
13.4  Safety Practices 
and Implementation 
Strategies
13.4.1  Medication Errors
Errors in medication are defined [18] as the mis-
takes that occur in the drug treatment process and 
that lead to, or have the potential to lead to, harm 
to the patient; such errors typically occur when a 
drug is prescribed, dispensed, prepared, or 
administered. In a review of more than 10,000 
case forms, Cooper et al. [13] reported an inci-
dence of one in 113–450 patients; in ICU, they 
are reported in a large proportion of incidents, 
accounting for up to 78% of serious errors [8].
The high-stress, time-sensitive nature of work 
in the operating room may explain the high risk 
of medication errors in this setting; consistently, 
it has been demonstrated [19] that their rate of 
occurrence for ICU patients is greater than that 
for patients admitted to general medical wards. In 
both environments, the high number of drugs and 
the IV route of administration, which often 
requires multiple infusion pump setups or calcu-
lations of infusion rate, create more opportunities 
for error. Moreover, the potency of many drugs 
utilized in these settings (vasopressors and ino-
tropes, strong opioids, general anesthetics) even 
at small doses increases the risk of harm to criti-
cal patients, which typically have little physio-
logical reserve.
Being a substantial, potentially lethal, source 
of patient harm, several institutions have hence 
targeted this issue. For example, recently, the 
European Board of Anaesthesiology has pro-
duced recommendations for safe medication 
practice [20] (Table 13.2).
Chartaceous prescriptions have a high risk of 
errors due to misinterpretation of handwriting; 
the use of informatized prescription can surely 
bring down the number of medication errors due 
to failure in interpretation. Also, electronic medi-
cal records can alert physicians and nurses to 
potential mistakes (e.g., contraindications, dou-
ble prescriptions, drug interactions, dilution 
incompatibilities) and allow a timely documenta-
tion of drug administration, granting trackability 
of every phase of the pharmacological treatment 
process.
Errors which involve administration of the 
wrong medication or giving medication to the 
wrong patient can be reduced by 40% with the 
implementation of bar-code medication adminis-
tration technology [21] which matches each and 
every patient’s electronic order with patient iden-
tifiers (wristbands), thus enhancing the adher-
ence to the “five rights of medication 
administration” (right patient, medication, time, 
dose, and route).
A critical point in the process is the admission 
of a patient from the emergency department or 
the OR to the ICU, and from the ICU to the OR: 
clinicians should investigate the types of drugs 
and the lines to which they are infusing. Before 
the discharge, extreme attention must be paid to 
vasoactive medications, ensuring that they do not 
run out during transport. Drug concentrations 
must be clearly reported and known both pre-
cisely and accurately to the ICU personnel, that 
often has its own dilution protocols, so that 
pumps can be programmed correctly; in this 
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phase, communication is crucial: a proper sign- 
out should occur directly between the OR anes-
thetist and nurses and the ICU physicians and 
nurses. In the ICU, the adoption of shared dilu-
tion protocols could be of help, creating a stan-
dard for clinical practice.
13.4.2  Monitoring
Monitoring is the cornerstone for the provision of 
a safe anesthesia and a fundamental prerequisite 
for the effective care of critical patients. In a sci-
entometric analysis, Vlassakov et al. [22] found 
that the rapid development of anesthesia monitor-
ing may be one possible explanation for the 
increased safety of anesthesia over the past 
40 years.
Standards for basic monitoring during anes-
thesia have been well established and several 
guidelines exist. Firstly, ASA [23] highlights that 
qualified anesthesia personnel shall be present in 
the room throughout the conduct of all general or 
regional anesthetics and monitored anesthesia 
care, mainly because of the rapid changes that 
may occur in patient status during anesthesia. In 
the case of a known hazard (e.g., radiation), 
remote observation is allowed, under the condi-
tion that some provision for monitoring the 
patient is made. Remote observation is also fun-
damental during radiologic investigations for 
critical patients.
Basic anesthesia monitoring implies the con-
tinuous evaluation of the patient’s oxygenation, 
ventilation (including capnography), circulation, 
and temperature during all anesthetics [23]. 
Nevertheless, technological advancements over 
the past few years have provided advanced moni-
toring systems that should be adapted to the dif-
ferent settings and levels of care, mainly 
depending on a patient’s history and the proce-
dure planned (Fig. 13.1).
Hemodynamic monitoring has evolved con-
siderably, shifting from invasive techniques to 
less invasive hemodynamic monitoring for the 
estimation of cardiac output and other measures 
of circulatory function, both in anesthesia and in 
the ICU. For example, the use of pulse contour 
analysis avoids the complications related to a 
pulmonary artery catheter, while still providing 
valuable information for effective therapeutic 
changes.
Noticeably, a useful and quite recent tool that 
helps anesthesiologists optimize anesthetic admin-
Table 13.2 Main principles for the correct preparation 
and administration of drugs
•  All the drugs prepared for use in anesthesia, 
intensive care, emergency medicine, and pain 
medicine should be clearly labelled by the use of 
pre-printed labels for syringes, including peel-off 
flag labels on ampoules and vials, whenever 
possible; in their absence, handwritten labels or 
permanent marker pens may be used.
•  Similarly, all drug infusion bags, catheters, and 
infusion lines should be labelled.
•  Each syringe should be labelled immediately after 
that a drug has been drawn into, and anyway before 
it leaves the operator’s hand.
•  The medication name on the user-applied label 
should be matched with the drug name on the 
ampoule.
• Prepare one medication and one syringe at a time.
• Never put labels on empty syringes.
•  Avoid distraction or interrupting others during the 
preparation and administration of patients’ 
medications.
•  In the preparation of high-risk medications (e.g., 
potassium chloride, heparin, adrenaline), it is 
recommended a double-check at any stage.
•  The anesthetic work surface should be standardized 
for drawing up, arranging and holding syringes; for 
example, emergency drugs separated from agents 
for the induction of general anesthesia.
•  Cannulae should be flushed after administration of 
drugs (e.g., at the end of general anesthesia) to 
reduce the risk of inadvertent administration of 
drugs in the recovery room or on the ward.
•  Any medicine or fluid that cannot be identified at 
any time during a procedure (e.g., an unlabelled 
syringe) should be considered unsafe and 
immediately discarded.
•  Drugs should be stored in ways designed to 
facilitate their easy identification and minimize the 
risk of error or misidentification and ALERT labels 
on look-alike, sound-alike medications should be 
used.
•  Vials and ampoules should be stored in their original 
packaging until just before they are drawn up.
•  To minimize the risk of cross-infection, the content 
of any one ampoule should be administered to only 
one patient.
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istration, both in the OR and in the ICU, is the pro-
c e s s e d 
EEG of the frontal lobes (i.e., BIS™—Medtronic, 
Boulder, CO, USA; Entropy®—GE Healthcare, 
Helsinki, Finland; SedLine™—SEDline, Masimo 
Corp., Irvine, CA, USA). Tracking the depth of 
sedation was highly effective in reducing the risk of 
intraoperative awareness in 7,761 high-risk patients 
when compared with guiding the dose based on 
clinical signs [24]; at the same time, it improves 
anesthetic delivery, preventing the risk for overseda-
tion and reducing recovery times [25]. This could 
also be of utmost importance to the ICU, where 
oversedation is associated with higher rates of ven-
tilator-associated pneumonia and longer ICU stays 
[26]. In the recent ENGAGES study [27], EEG-
guided anesthesia using BIS in elderly patients 
undergoing major surgery was associated with a 
significantly lower 30-day mortality and lower 
intraoperative use of phenylephrine, even though 
these were investigated as secondary endpoints.
Whenever muscle relaxants are given during 
anesthesia, the use of a peripheral, neuromuscu-
lar transmission monitor (nerve stimulator) is 
recommended [28] to allow for a rational admin-
istration of neuromuscular blocking and reversal 
agents, and to reduce the risk of residual curari-
zation and its associated complications, as clini-
cal tests alone cannot reliably exclude the 
presence of residual curarization [29].
Transesophageal echocardiography is mainly 
a diagnostic tool, but it can provide important 
information about a patient’s hemodynamic sta-
tus (preload, cardiac contractility, calculation of 
cardiac output) and it is estimated [30] that its use 
in critical patients, together with transthoracic 
echocardiography, can lead to relevant therapeu-
tic changes in about 25% of cases.
Finally, the efficacy of monitoring for safety 
may be impaired by poor design and inactivated or 
inappropriate alarms. Default settings for ventila-
tors, monitors, and alarms should always be 
checked to determine if they are appropriate [31]. 
Monitors should clearly display readings and ASA 
states [23] that alarms should be audible to the 
anesthesiologist and the anesthesia care personnel. 
Nevertheless, alarm fatigue is a well- known prob-
lem, especially in the critical care setting: excessive 
false alarms occur frequently and can interfere with 
clinical activity, contribute to work stress, and 
desensitize the personnel, leading to a delayed or 
inadequate response [32]. Several solutions have 
been proposed (smart alarms taking into account 
multiple parameters, adaptive time delays, noise 
reduction strategies, setting of sensible and targeted 
thresholds) but need to be further investigated.
Fig. 13.1 In the image to the left an example of monitoring for the operating room; to the right monitoring of the depth 
of sedation in ICU
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13.4.3  Equipment
The care of critically ill patients and patients 
under general anesthesia is dependent on the use 
of complex medical equipment; monitoring 
devices, ventilators, renal replacement therapy 
machines, extracorporeal circulation technolo-
gies, infusion pumps, point-of-care diagnostic 
tools, each with different designs and characteris-
tics, are increasingly populating the market, add-
ing complexity to the intra- and perioperative 
settings. Unfortunately, this equipment has the 
potential to develop faults, to be used incorrectly, 
or to fail: in the ICU, it is estimated that context 
equipment and supply issues account for 15.8% 
of total adverse events [33]; similarly, equipment 
is involved in approximately 14–30% of all intra-
operative problems and the anesthetic delivery 
equipment is the most common source of prob-
lems [14].
Besides the wide range of products available 
in the market, each anesthesia and critical care 
provider must be familiar with the products avail-
able in the provider’s own setting, including not 
only their correct use, but also their indications 
and limits. Anesthesia providers should be aware 
of the common causes of equipment malfunction 
and should be trained in the recognition and man-
agement of these events. Study and training ses-
sions and on-site training can be useful for this 
purpose; simulation programs can further rein-
force practitioner competency in the use of new 
equipment and provide experience in the man-
agement of common equipment failure in both 
straightforward and crisis situations, anticipating 
its occurrence in the real clinical setting [14].
In 2008, ASA updated pre-anesthesia check-
out guidelines (PAC) and provided general prin-
ciples for all anesthesia delivery systems, 
summarizing checkout tasks to be completed 
daily and prior to each procedure. Any anesthesia 
or ICU department should adapt them to their 
own anesthesia machine design and practice set-
ting [31]. When correctly implemented, PAC can 
prevent equipment failure and subsequent patient 
injury; furthermore, it ensures that backup equip-
ment is ready to use in case of intraoperative fail-
ures. For example, it is fundamental that a backup 
machine, an alternative oxygen supply, and man-
ual ventilation devices (Ambu Bag) are always 
ready to use. In order to meet these requirements 
and as the responsible party for the proper func-
tioning of all the equipment used to provide anes-
thesia care [31], anesthesiologists should be 
competent in performing all the tasks of the PAC.
13.4.4  Cognitive Aids
It has been demonstrated that cognitive function 
is compromised as stress and fatigue levels 
increase, as often happens in the operating room 
and in intensive care settings, during intraopera-
tive crises and emergencies for example. Here, 
the complexity of medical conditions and thera-
pies available, the multiple layers of professional 
roles involved, and the high workload can easily 
lead to increased errors, decreased compliance 
with recommended practices, and decreased pro-
ficiency in the delivery of care. In this setting, the 
development of checklists and other cognitive 
aids has recently risen to prominence and certain 
procedures or critical events that have been tar-
geted with the use of checklists have shown sig-
nificant improvements in outcome [34].
Apart from the famous study [35] conducted 
by Pronovost and collaborators (see the “Building 
a safety culture” paragraph), another successful 
application of checklists for the improvement of 
patient outcomes has been the Surgical Safety 
Checklist, presented by the WHO in 2008 within 
the Safe Surgery Saves Lives initiative and devel-
oped after a comprehensive consultation with 
experts in surgery, anesthesia, and other related 
specialties from across all WHO regions. This 
checklist was developed with the aim of reducing 
the occurrence of patient harm [3] in the form of 
errors and adverse events, and increasing team-
work and communication among surgical team 
members; it targets a routine sequence of events 
at three cardinal points of the surgical process: 
preoperative patient evaluation, surgical inter-
vention, and preparation for postoperative care 
[3]. The use of surgical safety checklists during 
routine operative care has been associated with 
significant reductions in both complications and 
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mortality and has rapidly become a standard of 
care in the vast majority of countries [36].
The experience of their use in ordinary care 
has triggered investigations of the potential bene-
fits deriving from cognitive aids in emergency 
situations; here, time and cognitive resources are 
limited and it has been demonstrated that the abil-
ity to rapidly put in place the right therapeutic 
interventions is crucial, as outcomes are often 
time dependent. Moreover, evidence suggests 
that, during emergencies, failure to adhere to best 
practices and to recall previously learned protocol 
is common [11]; in Advanced Cardiac Life 
Support (ACLS) scenarios, for example, it is 
known [37] that there is a significant decay in cli-
nicians’ knowledge retention over time after the 
completion of certification and it has been 
 demonstrated [38] that errors and omissions of 
indicated steps are associated with decreased sur-
vival odds. These premises formed the basis for 
the development of crisis checklists for the oper-
ating room (Fig.  13.2), a type of cognitive aid 
designed to help the surgical team remember criti-
cal steps during intraoperative crises [11]. Some 
examples are the Anaesthetic Crisis Manual, the 
Operating Room Crisis Checklists developed at 
Brigham and Women’s Hospital of Boston, the 
Stanford Emergency Manual, and the Crisis 
Management Handbook from the Australian 
Patient Safety Foundation. Arriaga et  al. [36] 
found that the use of surgical crisis checklists was 
associated with a nearly 75% reduction in failure 
to adhere to critical steps in management during 
operating-room crises in a high-fidelity simulated 
operating room [11]; these data are consistent 
with that of Ziewacz et al. [39].
Fig. 13.2 A checklist 
from the Emergency 
Stanford Manual
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There are also numerous other cognitive aids 
that have been developed for the perioperative 
and critical care settings, including ACLS algo-
rithms and anesthesia adaptations for the periop-
erative setting, Malignant Hyperthermia 
Association of the United States protocols, a 
checklist for the treatment of local anesthetic sys-
temic toxicity (LAST) from the American Society 
of Regional Anesthesia and Pain Medicine, pedi-
atric critical events checklists from the Society 
for Pediatric Anesthesia, Emergency Neurological 
Life Support checklists by the Neurocritical Care 
Society, checklists for the preparation of the 
operating room, for anesthesia in traumatic 
patients, and for general emergency protocols, as 
well as other resources [11].
Globally, many major anesthesia societies 
support and have adopted cognitive aids [11]: 
among them the Anesthesia Patient Safety 
Foundation, the American Society of 
Anesthesiologists, and the European Society of 
Anesthesiology. Interestingly, the American 
Society of Regional Anesthesia and Pain 
Medicine published in 2010 a practice advisory 
on local anesthetic systemic toxicity, which 
included a checklist on the treatment of LAST, 
and recommended keeping the LAST checklist 
available in any area where high doses of local 
anesthetics are used. In 2014, the Society for 
Obstetric Anesthesia and Perinatology developed 
a consensus statement on the management of car-
diac arrest in pregnancy, recommending that a 
checklist emphasizing key tasks be immediately 
available; the American Heart Association 
encourages institutions to create point-of-care 
checklists to be used during obstetric crises 
including maternal cardiac arrest.
13.4.5  Communication 
and Teamwork
The connection between safety and communica-
tion has been known for a long time. Given the 
complexity of ICUs and the multiple team hando-
vers required during patient care, critical care 
units are areas where patients are more vulnera-
ble to communication breakdowns.
The quality of the relationships between 
nurses, doctors, and other staff working in peri-
operative settings affects patient outcomes: good 
teamwork, when team members communicate 
efficiently and respect each other while working 
toward a common goal, allows the team to reduce 
complications and mortality [7]. Conversely, 
communication failures and bad relationships 
can lead to increased risk of error, length of stay, 
resource use, caregiver dissatisfaction, and turn-
over. In the ICU, the implementation of a daily- 
goals form can help to set and share tasks and 
care plans and to improve communication among 
caregivers [40].
Insight can also be gained from Crisis 
Resource Management, a well-known approach 
that refers to all the non-technical skills that have 
been demonstrated to optimize teamwork and 
make the teamwork more effective during an 
emergency. It holds effective communication as 
one of its key principles [41], underlining the 
importance of a climate of open information 
exchange among all personnel.
Simulation training could be a good way to 
improve relationships and trust within teams and 
is rapidly becoming part of resident education, 
even if the relationship between simulation train-
ing in anesthesiology and improved outcomes 
still needs to be clearly defined. In fact, besides 
helping with technical skills training, simulation 
can reinforce the non-technical skills needed to 
work as a team, such as communication behav-
iors, leadership skills, collaboration, task man-
agement, situation awareness, and 
decision-making [42].
13.4.6  Building a Safety Culture
The success of many interventions that aim to 
improve patient safety depends not only on the 
application of evidence-based practices, but also 
on changes in workplace culture and on group 
implemented strategies. Many efforts have been 
made toward the development of a culture of 
safety in this discipline, in order to improve 
patient safety and care quality. Safety culture is 
the collection of beliefs, values, and norms relat-
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ing to patient safety and shared among the mem-
bers of an organization, unit, or team [43]. It 
influences behavior, attitude, cognition, and one’s 
perception of one’s own work, promoting safe 
practices and the prioritization of patient safety 
over other goals (e.g., efficiency).
The implementation of a safety culture 
requires sustained involvement across multiple 
levels of an organization, through a series of steps 
including the engagement of frontline providers, 
the selection and creation of team-based projects, 
the development of safety education programs 
(including communication and teamwork skills), 
and the implementation and evaluation of strate-
gies [7]. Despite the fact that its implementation 
may be a difficult and challenging process 
(Table  13.3), current evidence [7] supports the 
efficacy of a strong safety culture in the reduction 
of adverse events and lower mortality.
One of the clearest examples of successful 
implementation of safety culture in critical care 
was the milestone study conducted by Pronovost 
et al. [35], which reported a large and sustained 
reduction in rates of catheter-related bloodstream 
infection in 103 ICUs across Michigan through a 
quality improvement framework that included:
• a daily-goals sheet to improve clinician-to- 
clinician communication
• training of team leaders across medical and 
nursing staff
• a checklist to ensure adherence to evidence- 
based infection-control practices for central 
line insertion (Fig 13.3)
• empowerment of all ICU staff to intervene in 
case of non-adherence to any of the aforemen-
tioned practices
• periodic feedback reports
• tracking and sharing of collected data
Other means of implementation could be 
interdisciplinary rounding, encouragement of 
error reporting, and team training; importantly, 
this includes simulation training. Engaging 
patients and families in safety culture is deemed 
important too, since patients can be a relevant 
source of information in the reporting of adverse 
events [7].
It should be further considered that financial 
pressures may lead administrators to limit invest-
ments in patient safety improvements, with the 
additional risk of spreading safety culture prob-
lems among the staff. Many aspects of the finan-
cial performance of a hospital may lead to 
hazardous changes in staffing, quality control, 
physician education, investment in up-to-date 
equipment, monitoring of adverse events, and 
may cause other safety issues which eventually 
may affect patient outcomes. Several pieces of 
evidence [44, 45] show that there can be a trade- 
off between financial objectives and patient 
safety, and that this should be taken into account 
by a hospital’s administration.
Table 13.3 Barriers to the implementation of a safety 
culture in anesthesia and critical care medicine
•  Environmental and organizational complexity: 
multiple professional layers are involved in the 
care of patients, each with divergent occupational 
responsibilities and expertise.
•  Necessity of bundling multiple interventions at 
several time points throughout the process of care.
•  Cultural barriers: for example, clinicians may think 
that the use of cognitive aids to manage 
emergencies reflects a lack in knowledge or in 
decision-making skills.
•  Punitive responses to errors and the fear of legal 
consequences are obstacles to the creation of a 
reporting culture and reduce the opportunity to 
learn from errors.
•  Patient safety in high-stakes sectors requires 
training and education, thus time and resources: 
this may discourage some clinicians and cause 
conflict with the economic interests and staffing 
policies of healthcare institutions.
•  Production pressure (e.g., tight operating room 
schedules, need for high patient turnover in 
post- surgical ICUs) threatens the implementation 
of safe patient care and might negatively influence 
the operator’s perception of safety practices.
•  Lack of communication between frontline workers 
and senior management regarding their perspective 
on patient safety culture and their respective 
professional expectations.
•  Communication failure between different 
professional backgrounds, for example, between 
surgeons and anesthesiologists and between 
physicians and nurses.
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13.4.7  Psychological Status of Staff 
and Staffing Policies
Human factors and well-being at work are rele-
vant issues when discussing patient safety. 
Regarding this topic, burnout syndrome has 
recently gained popularity: it is a complex, work- 
related, psychological status, resulting from 
chronic workplace stress that has not been suc-
cessfully managed. It is defined in ICD-11 as the 
combination of:
• high exhaustion
• increased mental distance from one’s job or 
feelings of negativism or cynicism related to 
one’s job
• reduced professional efficacy
A variety of interventions have been proposed 
to address the psychological status of staff and 
can be divided into two categories [47]: (1) inter-
ventions focused on improving the ICU environ-
ment; (2) interventions focused on the individual’s 





To work as a team to decrease patient harm from catheter-related blood stream infection
During all central venous or central arterial line insertions or re-wires
Bedside nurse
1.    Today’s date
2.    Procedure
3.    Procedure regimen
Before the procedure, did the housestaff:
Wash hands (Chlorhexidine) immediately prior
Sterilize procedure site
Drap the entire PATIENT in a sterile fashion
During the procedure, did the housestaff:
Use sterile GLOVES
Use hat, mask and sterile gown
Maintain a sterile field
4.
After the procedure:
Was a sterile dressing applied to the site
Please return completed form to the designated location in your ICU
Did all personnel assisting with procedure follow
the above precautions
_____ /_____ / _______
month
New line Rewire
Yes No Don’t know
EmergentElective
day year
Fig. 13.3 Example of central line insertion checklist
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ability to cope with the working environment. 
Multidimensional interventions are more likely 
than single interventions to succeed in preventing 
and treating psychological disorders among the 
staff.
Since 2005, the American Association of 
Critical Care Nurses has defined [46] six stan-
dards to establish and sustain a healthy work 
environment: (1) skilled communication; (2) true 
collaboration; (3) effective decision-making; (4) 
appropriate staffing; (5) meaningful recognition; 
(6) authentic leadership. Other levels of interven-
tion that have been proposed [47] for a healthy 
ICU environment are the improvement of end-of- 
life care and of ethical team deliberations, the 
utilization of team debriefing, structured commu-
nication, the employment of time and stress man-
agement skills, interdisciplinary discussions, and 
the sharing of critical decisions with team mem-
bers. Family conferencing to discuss prognosis 
and treatment goals could mitigate moral distress 
in ICU clinicians.
Intensivist- and nurse-to-patient ratios can 
also impact patient care and staff well-being, and 
are associated with improved safety and better 
outcomes for patients [16]. In 2013, the Society 
of Critical Care Medicine addressed this issue 
and published a statement [16] to aid hospitals in 
determining their intensivist staffing, recognizing 
that proper ICU staffing impacts patient safety 
and staff well-being. Assessments of staff satis-
faction, burnout, and stress should be part of 
institution policies. Moreover, staffing policies 
should factor in surge capacity and non-direct 
patient care duties (family meetings, consulta-
tions, teaching).
Finally, the presence of acute or chronic psy-
chological disorders among healthcare providers, 
due to private or work-related stress, as well as 
addiction or substance abuse, sleep disorders, 
mood disturbance, and overall well-being should 
be investigated in the context of occupational 
medicine examinations and should never be 
underestimated. Critical care providers should be 
taught how to recognize the risk factors and 
symptoms for burnout and should be encouraged 
to seek assistance when needed [47].
13.4.8  The Building Factor
The environment of operating rooms and ICUs is 
perceived as static by architects and engineers. 
Consequently, workplaces are often designed 
smaller than they actually need to be. For 
instance, the aisles of the operating rooms should 
be at least 2 m large to allow the easy and safe 
transfer of stretchers, but this space is often nar-
rowed by drug carts, echo machines, and other 
empty stretchers. Similarly, it should be taken 
into account that the new technologies and 
devices continuously introduced in clinical prac-
tice are usually cumbersome, running the risk of 
making poorly designed workplaces very uncom-
fortable [48]. Small ICU rooms may slow down 
the process of care and hamper the management 
of critical situations, especially when more clini-
cians are required.
Relaxation areas or other environments in 
which the staff may take a break should be con-
sidered when planning operating rooms and 
ICUs, and natural lighting should be guaranteed 
when feasible [49]. Indeed, breaks should be reg-
ularly planned in order to reduce the risk of 
fatigue and consequently improve the well-being 
of workers and patient safety. Shifts longer than 
8 h should be avoided, and, when this is not pos-
sible, adequate recovery time between the shifts 
should be ensured [50, 51]. For instance, in Italy 
the employment contract of NHS hospitals 
includes rules on shift and work breaks, but they 
are often disregarded in practice.
The regular use of assessment tools [52], such 
as the Health and Safety Executive’s Fatigue and 
Risk Index Tool, is paramount to identify work-
ers that are at risk of injury.
13.5  Recommendations
One of the main duties of anesthesia and critical 
care providers is to provide patient safety.
Medication error is a substantial source of 
patient harm in anesthesiology. Recommendations 
for safe medication practices exist and must be 
respected. The use of electronic medical records 
should be favored over chartaceous prescriptions, 
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eventually coupling with bar-code medication 
administration technology.
A proper sign-out that also addresses medica-
tion infusions should occur during the admission 
to or the discharge from the ICU.
Standards for monitoring have been well 
established by ASA and are fundamental 
 requisites for the provision of safe anesthesia 
care since they can detect physiologic perturba-
tions and acute events allowing for intervention 
before the patient suffers harm. Nevertheless, 
anesthetist and perioperative physicians should 
be familiar with advanced monitoring techniques, 
such as pulse contour analysis, depth of general 
anesthesia monitoring, neuromuscular monitor-
ing, and transesophageal echocardiography; their 
use could have important implications for a clini-
cal practice, for example, allowing the rational 
administration of anesthetic drugs and fluids. As 
highlighted by ASA, qualified anesthesia person-
nel shall be present in the room throughout the 
conduct of all general or regional anesthetics and 
monitored anesthesia care.
Anesthesia providers must be familiar with 
the equipment available in their own settings, 
including not only the equipment’s correct use, 
but also its indications and limits. Every anesthe-
sia provider should know and be competent in the 
performance of all the items of the ASA pre- 
anesthesia machine checklist. Competency in 
early recognition and management of common 
equipment failure is a requisite for patient safety.
The WHO surgical safety checklist improves 
compliance with safety practices and has been 
demonstrated to have an impact on surgical 
patient outcome; it is able to prevent patient harm 
and perioperative complications. The use of cog-
nitive aids during intraoperative crises and emer-
gencies should be encouraged; their use may 
contribute to better patient outcomes, reducing 
failure of adherence to the best evidence-based 
practices and mitigating the effect of stress and 
ineffective teamwork on performance. Checklists 
should be integrated into clinical practice through 
effective training and implementation strategies. 
Institutions should encourage the creation of 
adapted point-of-care checklists at critical points 
of a patient’s treatment in the hospital (e.g., oper-
ating room, ICU, obstetrics).
Simulation training of critical events need to 
be incorporated into the education of all clini-
cians who work in the operating room and in the 
ICU. Anesthetists should receive this type of for-
mation since residency. Simulation training 
should include the use of crisis checklists and 
emergency manuals, and the simulation of equip-
ment failure.
Efforts should be made to establish a culture 
of safety in critical care, as safety culture could 
promote effective improvements in patient safety 
and sustain them over time. Efforts should be 
conducted at a multidisciplinary level including 
administrations, while engaging patients and 
families in this process is also deemed important. 
Reporting of errors and adverse events should be 
encouraged and collected data should be tracked 
and shared among the personnel. Hospitals’ 
financial plans should include investments in 
patient safety since overlooking this aspect may 
increase the probability of adverse patient safety 
events.
Institutions should regularly assess the appro-
priateness of their ICU staffing models via objec-
tive data. Critical care providers should be taught 
how to recognize the risk factors and symptoms 
for burnout and should be encouraged to seek 
assistance when needed. Policies of routine 
screening of ICU staff members for symptoms of 
depression, burnout, and anxiety should be 
implemented.
The size, layout, and organization of the work-
place impacts staff well-being and patient safety. 
It is crucial that administrators, architects, and 
engineers involve lead clinicians and focus on 
input from clinical staff when designing operat-
ing rooms and ICUs.
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Safe Surgery Saves Lives
Francesco Venneri, Lawrence B. Brown, 
Francesca Cammelli, and Elliott R. Haut
The World Health Organization (WHO) Safe 
Surgery Saves Lives campaign aimed to imple-
ment safe surgical procedures and patient safety 
best practices to reduce the incidence of adverse 
events both in the operating room and in the 
ward. For decades, the main objectives of safe 
surgery were mainly focused on the technical 
procedure. More recently, the implementation of 
non-technical skills and interpersonal communi-
cation have been found to play a significant role 
in preventing harm in surgical care settings.
A surgeon is educated with the focus on clini-
cal care, decision-making, and technical skills 
required to perform surgical procedures tech-
niques that yield the best outcome. Surgery 
requires skill, adaptation, accuracy, and knowing 
when it is appropriate to operate. Despite these 
factors, mistakes still occur in the pre-operative 
clinic, operating theater, intensive care unit, and 
surgical ward. Surgeons (and all physicians) 
should be willing to discuss unsuccessful cases 
and learn from mistakes throughout their career. 
These issues should be shared with surgical train-
ees at all levels including students, residents, and 
fellows at teaching hospitals, as they are essential 
for their clinical development. They also provide 
a context for lifelong learning and personal 
growth throughout every successful career.
14.1  Safety Best Practices 
in Surgery
Best practices in medicine have become a must 
and many health care institutions and systems 
have embedded safety practices in their goals and 
quality achievement policies. Patient safety itself 
has become an “institution” on its own and since 
the 1999 Institute of Medicine publication “To 
Err is Human,” risk management programs in 
health care facilities worldwide have been lead-
ing the trends in reducing patient harm and 
implementing quality assurance in health care so 
as to contribute to a solid reduction in costs and 
expenses.
Evidence-based medicine and evidence-based 
health care data prove that when best practices 
are well applied in health care procedures, the 
return in terms of adverse event reduction and 
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patient well-being are assured and are measur-
able according to standards of health care models 
recognized worldwide. Physicians, nurses, other 
health care professionals, policy makers, and 
stakeholders in medicine rely on a teamwork 
basis and this must encourage managers and poli-
ticians to enhance among professionals the urge 
to apply best practices, measure them on an 
appropriateness, efficacy, and efficiency basis 
and implement all to let them be compliant 
among health care workers.
This is particularly true and peculiar in the 
field of surgery. Surgery on its own is considered 
a craftsman attitude discipline, where individual-
ity and self-appraisal are the most reliable factors 
for quality assurance; but this is not reliable in 
terms of outcomes and evidence-based medicine 
or nursing principals. In other words, surgery 
relies on evidence-based best practices and sur-
geons must have this evidence of their success 
and compliance; otherwise, all may be reluctant 
of their application and implementation.
14.2  Factors Which Influence 
Patient Safety in Surgery
Despite its complexity, health care institutions 
are widely considered to be reliable systems, 
with the primary intent of “doing no harm.” 
However, compared to true high reliably organi-
zations such as airlines or nuclear power indus-
tries, health care is nowhere close to the safety 
patients expect. In order to understand the real 
meaning of safety in surgery, we must first under-
stand the numerous steps required in every surgi-
cal setting and the pathway of the surgical patient.
All physicians require strong cognitive skills 
for decision-making in order to optimize patient 
outcomes. In addition to these competencies, a 
surgeon is a specialist in the field of the “manual 
arts.” In other words, an artisan who uses their 
hands as a means of cure. The surgical profession 
throughout the years has radically changed as 
techniques, procedures, instrumentation, gender, 
training, costs, risks, and infection control are 
concerned. Each of these factors play a signifi-
cant role in patient safety and should be consid-
ered with respect to field of surgery.
14.3  Techniques and Procedures
In the last two decades, surgical procedures have 
radically changed a surgeon’s approach to 
patients presenting with surgical pathologies. 
Additionally, less severe pathologies, such as 
inguinal hernia or varicose veins, have led to 
changes from inpatient hospitalizations to outpa-
tient in settings for surgical management. In the 
1970s and 1980s, inguinal hernia repair was fre-
quently treated with an overnight hospital stay. 
Now, this procedure is routinely performed on an 
outpatient basis. This new way of approaching 
many surgical diseases has inclined hospitals to 
place emphasis on outpatient surgery cases. 
These changes have affected every aspect of sur-
gical care, including the focus on patient safety.
These changes in setting also require higher 
levels of patient empowerment and improved 
communications. Patients now must understand 
the setting in which their surgery will occur and 
the resulting decreased length of stay be educated 
on the potential complications that might arise, 
especially as they may occur at home, rather than 
in a hospital setting. Changes in techniques and 
procedures also require that surgical trainees 
should be compliant to best practices to lower the 
incidence of adverse events occurring in settings 
where human factors play a major role. 
Prosthetics, biological stitches, antibiotic pro-
phylaxis, and prevention of deep venous throm-
bosis have also radically changed and modified 
protocols, requiring adjustments and implemen-
tation. Patient safety is not static, changes occur 
frequently and the entire health care community 
must keep up with them in these ever-changing 
times. The importance of updating guidelines, 
searching for evidence-based standards and rede-
signing the process of surgery were challenges 
that hospitals, private clinics, and other major 
surgical settings have had to grapple with. 
Additionally, attending surgeons have had to 
rethink how to train residents and fellows in a 
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manner that optimized efficiency without com-
prising patient outcomes.
14.4  Surgical Equipment 
and Instruments
Industries manufacturing surgical instruments 
have gradually updated their knowledge and ded-
icated all efforts to design and usability of surgi-
cal equipment. Many surgeons assist with 
usability trials before companies introduce new 
products, equipment, and/or instruments. These 
steps in human factors engineering (or ergonom-
ics) are important to undertake to maximize 
patient safety in the operating theater and surgi-
cal/procedural suites. Ease of use with minimal 
training and intuitive designs allows surgeons to 
rapidly learn how to use the technology and mini-
mize any safety risks to patients due to a long, 
steep learning curve.
In the field of inguinal hernia repair, prosthetic 
mesh options have improved over the years. The 
improved ergonomics of these materials have 
made them particularly attractive to surgeons per-
forming these procedures. This means that patient 
may not only stand up a few hours following sur-
gery, but it is a “must” to go home and perform 
simple maneuvers as walking, driving, and there-
fore a much faster return to work or other day 
activities. The aim therefore is a faster recovery 
from disability and/or discomfort. The concept of 
minor surgery has been introduced yet it must not 
be considered less important, but instead as a 
quicker return to ordinary life. This is also true for 
less or minor invasive procedures, such as laparo-
scopic surgery. Laparoscopy radically changed 
not only the approach to certain pathologies but 
changed surgeons minds and behaviors.
14.5  Pathways and Practice 
Management Guidelines
In recent years, the surgical community has 
implemented guidelines for Enhanced Recovery 
After Surgery (ERAS) procedures. This type of 
protocol has been shown to improve patient out-
comes and provide safer care. Standardized 
guidelines can ensure optimal care to all patients, 
decrease variation, cut costs, and reduce dispari-
ties in care.
Other pathways allow patients to leave the 
hospital settings following minor surgical proce-
dures such as breast, orthopedic, anorectal, and 
urologic procedures.
These factors all influence patient safety 
issues because changes in hospital settings, 
instrument implementation, training, and health 
care policies may affect health care profession-
als, patients, and institutions.
14.6  Gender
Surgery was once considered a “masculine” dis-
cipline, with the stereotype of a hard-working 
man with a great deal of self-confidence and 
self- esteem. Since the early 1990s, medical 
schools have enrolled fewer male students and 
increased the proportion of women. In the United 
States, approximately 50% of medical school 
graduates are now women. This trend has also 
had an effect on resident trainees in surgery. 
While this ratio has changed in some surgical 
fields (i.e., general surgery), it has not changed 
as much in others (i.e., neurosurgery, urology). 
The field of surgery has noted many successful 
female surgeons both in the hospital and in aca-
demic domains.
This change in gender population of a spe-
cialty, historically linked to male figures, has had 
an effect on patients’ awareness and way of 
thinking, yielding a change in behaviors and out-
comes. Gender diversity must not only be con-
sidered in the surgical field but all across 
medicine and medical specialties, as it relevant 
to patient safety and trust. Studies have shown 
that this gender diversity is associated with 
improved patient outcomes. Teamwork studies 
have shown that having even a single woman on 
the team (as opposed to a team of all men) 
improves team dynamics, decision-making, and 
patient safety.
14 Safe Surgery Saves Lives
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14.7  Training
The relationship between surgical safety and 
training on the use of emerging technologies is 
important to consider. This issue has been most 
hotly debated since the development of mini-
mally invasive, laparoscopic, and robotic surgery. 
While these new technologies may provide less 
invasive, less painful procedures, the risks com-
pared to open surgery may be the same, or pos-
sibly higher. Residents in surgery must follow an 
accurate training log and acquire not only skills, 
but also consider the appropriateness and benefits 
of operating with these approaches. These factors 
are critically linked to patient safety and risk 
management. A surgeon never reaches a 100% 
safe and sure learning curve, but is constantly 
exposing patients to risks and uncertainty. 
Teaching hospitals and scientific associations 
worldwide are focused on reducing learning gaps 
in the way care is delivered around the globe.
Training must include all aspects of care 
including decision-making and problem-solving, 
as well as the manual, technical skills required to 
physically perform complex surgical procedures. 
Laparoscopy and robotic surgery have dramati-
cally changed training steps and protocols; many 
residents are well acquainted with these highly 
technological approaches. However, open 
approaches to certain surgery has become less 
commonly performed; this may represent a gap 
in problem-solving among young trainees or 
newly assessed surgeons on their first rounds in 
hospitals or in operating theaters. A highly trained 
efficient surgeon in laparoscopic approaches or 
robotics may find difficulty in approaching an 
open surgery in case of an emergency situation. 
This may become a patient safety issue, and 
patients should be informed of their surgeons’ 
abilities and case-history if rapid conversion to 
open surgery is required.
14.8  Costs and Risks
Surgery has true financial costs, and it is expen-
sive as it relates to patient safety and outcomes. 
These should be issues of main concern not only 
to hospital managers, but to patients, politicians, 
and health care policy makers worldwide. Quality 
indicators and plans for surgical safety should be 
a point of discussion when a Chief Executive 
Office (CEO) examines a hospital budget in 
terms of efficacy and efficiency. Costs and risks 
influence patient safety in terms of appropriate-
ness; accurate patient selection contributes to 
limiting not only adverse events, but also imple-
menting quality assurance among health care 
professionals for their patients. It has been sug-
gested that spending money upfront for quality 
care and ensuring patient safety will save cost in 
the long run as outcomes improve. These 
improved outcomes are also often associated 
with shorter length of stays, fewer diagnostics 
tests, and less overall care to mitigate the effects 
of complications after surgery.
14.9  Infection Control
Hospital acquired infections are a major cause of 
patient morbidity and mortality and represent an 
important area of concern as it relates to patient 
safety overall. One area of concern within the 
realm of surgery is that of surgical site infections. 
Many approaches have been undertaken to pre-
vent these infections. Some are exceedingly data 
driven such as the use of pre-operative prophy-
lactic antibiotics before surgical incision. Others, 
however, are promulgated without strong evi-
dence. Many hospitals are increasingly restrict-
ing the use of fabric surgical scrub caps in the 
operating room, instead favoring disposable 
bouffants. In 1973, very scant literature demon-
strated that providers who carry Staphylococcus 
aureus in their hair could spread those bacteria to 
patients. However, more recent data demonstrates 
that there is no difference in surgical site infec-
tions between physicians who wear fabric versus 
disposable scrub caps. It has also been suggested 
that personalized fabric scrub caps (identifying 
name and position) as popularized with the 
#TheatreCapChallenge hashtag on social media 
improve closed loop communication within the 
operating room, which may have implications on 
improving patient safety. The final decision has 
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not yet been made between the competing goals 
of improved communication vs. decreasing infec-
tions although the authors of this chapter do favor 
the cloth caps with clinicians’ names.
14.10  Surgical Safety Checklist
The checklist approach to improving medical 
care has been promoted by many physicians, 
most notably; Dr. Peter Pronovost in his seminal 
work on checklists to prevent central line- 
associated bloodstream infections (CLABSI) in 
the intensive care unit. The concept was intro-
duced into surgery by Dr. Atul Gawande, a sur-
geon at Harvard Medical School, and who studied 
the application of a safety instrument in the oper-
ating theater. In 2008, The World Health 
Organization (WHO) promoted a campaign to 
encourage all health care institutions performing 
surgery globally to apply the Surgical Safety 
Checklist in their settings. Studies have demon-
strated a 33% reduction of potentially lethal 
adverse events when this simple surgical check-
list is applied. It is based on a simple list of dis-
crete actions to be performed when the patient is 
admitted to the operating room, before surgical 
incision, and after the procedure (before return-
ing to the ward). The aim of this instrument is to 
ensure appropriate equipment is available, reduce 
wrong-site surgery, confirm patient identity, cor-
rect management of the surgical site, avoid or 
reduce surgical site infection, reduce incidence of 
DVT (deep venous thrombosis) or pulmonary 
embolism (PE), prevent the risk of unintention-
ally retained foreign objects, and assure the 
appropriate postoperative setting for the patient.
The items included in the checklist are simple 
to detect and the time required to apply this best 
practice is estimated to be only 3–4  min. The 
checklist is divided into actions to be performed 
before and after the procedure and are named as 
follows: sign-in, time-out, sign-out. These three 
phases refer to main issues controlled as correct 
site, correct procedure, correct patient, equip-
ment control and assessment, antibiotic adminis-
tration, consolidation of central venous access, 
sponge count, surgical specimen control and 
identification, blood availability, and correct 
postoperative assignment. Surgeons, anesthetists, 
nurses, and other health care workers in the oper-
ating theater, and moreover also in the ward, 
must believe in this checklist, as it is a cognitive 
artifact to improve safety and reduce errors.
The above best safety practices may be men-
tioned all together being an integrated part of the 
WHO Safe Surgery Saves Lives Campaign man-
ual which enhances safe surgery policies among 
professionals and institutions to reduce adverse 
events and prevent harm to patients undergoing 
surgery. Most of these best practices are pro-
moted on a national basis according to each 
country’s health care policies and strategies.
14.11  Overlap Between Surgical 
and Other Safety Initiatives
While some safety issues are unique to surgery 
(i.e., wrong-site surgery, unintentionally retained 
foreign objects), other safety issues overlap with 
other areas of medicine, although they may be 
found in surgical patients as well (i.e., prevention 
of venous thromboembolism, risk of blood trans-
fusion). Surgeons, anesthetists, and nurses must 
consider all risks to patient safety, not only those 
unique to surgery. We all need to ensure best 
practices for every decision in the care of surgical 
patients. This may include optimal blood pres-
sure, anticoagulation, blood sugar, and other 
comorbidity management to prevent pre- 
operative complications including myocardial 
infarction, stroke, venous thromboembolism, 
hypoglycemia, delirium, and many others.
Most of the best practices above are a pecu-
liarity of the clinical risk management and patient 
safety organization within health care facilities. 
Clinical audit, morbidity and mortality rounds, 
incident reporting and learning system, sentinel 
and never event analysis are tools used to diffuse 
the culture of risk assessment and management in 
health care and are majorly based on a human 
factor and cognitive approach promoting a no 
blame culture and systemic approach method. 
Global trigger tool assessment is considered to be 
a best practice because through some error 
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 indicators traced within clinical records and other 
items may easily outline mishaps and errors 
within the health care system and allow profes-
sionals to identify criticalities and promote 
implementation strategies. These are trigger 
items identified on a major occurrence basis 
which prove to surely favor the onset of mistakes 
or mishaps within a clinical pathway. Sentinel 
and never events are those which cause either 
severe harm to patients or death; these are consid-
ered to be lethal events that compromise trust-
worthiness in health care services and 
professionals. Informed consent, communica-
tions errors, and patient empowerment are all 
best practices on the same threshold; in other 
words, they are all aligned to assure clear com-
munication to patients, acquire a satisfactory 
informed consent for procedures and pathways 
using a simple language and explanations which 
are understood by all levels of individuals under-
going medical treatment.
14.12  Technical and Non-technical 
Skills
Health care is considered to be a complex system, 
accounting a high reliability level of care and 
ultrasafe practices to assure no harm to patients 
as well as to professionals. This may not be true 
for some realties worldwide. The health care 
environment is not only complex, but dealing 
with human beings and events correlated to 
behavior and disease may lead to harmful out-
comes. Due to potentially dangerous nature of 
medicine, a systems approach is necessary to 
understanding what went wrong and in what 
manner may surely help to build safer hospitals, 
health care settings, equipment and training.
Approaches to improve patient safety include 
both technical and adaptive work. The technical 
component has a relatively clear, “right” answer 
to solve a problem or prevent a safety occurrence 
in the future. More commonly, the problem 
requires an adaptive solution. These solutions 
rely on a change in attitudes, beliefs, and/or 
behaviors. Cognitive psychology helps us under-
stand why humans make errors and how the 
human mind manages to deal with them–some-
times detecting unsafe actions before causing 
harm. This is one of the most important goals of 
clinical risk management. In order to understand 
the onset of human errors in health care, we must 
first understand human factors and their interac-
tions in systems.
Non-technical skills are the cognitive and 
social skills of experienced professionals. The 
importance of these skills and their application 
to surgical safety are largely diffused within the 
medical institutions since the 1990s when 
researchers started to observe teamwork, com-
munication, situational awareness, and leader-
ship among surgical teams and their influence 
on the team itself and on patient outcome. The 
research performed yielded extraordinary 
results and since then, many medical institu-
tions began to focus their improvement work on 
human factors rather than working to improve 
only technical skills. We know from accident 
analysis and other psychological research that 
they contribute to enhance technical perfor-
mance, reduce error, and improve safety. 
Therefore, we may summarize these aspects as 
behavioral aspects of performance necessary to 
enhance good clinical practice. These behaviors 
are not directly related to the use of clinical 
expertise, drugs, or surgical equipment. The 
most frequent non-technical skills known in 







• managing fatigue and stress
• task analysis
The interactions among persons, settings, 
relationships, attributions, and behavior rely on 
the way human factors across these situations and 
how they may improve safety in health care 
settings.
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In a surgical setting, failures to communicate 
(both speaking up, or listening), to be assertive, 
lack of decision-making, and problems related to 
leadership and low situational awareness often 
contribute to adverse events. These mishaps 
account for performance failures and bad out-
comes. It is very important to detect failures in 
communication early, but this capability requires 
training on human factors and human 
interactions.
14.13  Simulation
A training method often used in health care set-
tings is simulation. Simulation allows trainees to 
practice both technical and non-technical skills in 
a safe, educational environment. They can be 
taught new skills by using either low fidelity or 
high-fidelity simulation equipment. For example, 
laparoscopy can be practiced using a simple card-
board box-based training system. Or robotic sur-
gery can be practices on the equivalent machine 
that the surgeons would use in the operating the-
ater. Experts can walk trainees through uncom-
mon scenarios, situations, or experiences and 
coach trainees to adjust behaviors, adapt a model, 
use techniques, be resilient to undesired situa-
tions, communicate effectively, and/or manage to 
deal with stress and fatigue.
Effective simulation requires experienced per-
sonal dedicated to training both technical non- 
technical skills, such as crew management teams 
in aviation settings where pilots and crew mem-
bers are trained to face unexpected situations and 
apply rescue procedures. While surgeons will 
clearly be the experts on the technical side, many 
other types of clinicians (or non-clinicians) can 
be effective for the non-technical portions. This 
pursues safety and quality improvement in a 
complex setting such as a cabin crew emergency 
plan for an airline cockpit team. The same occurs 
in health care and emergency medicine and sur-
gery offer many of these unexpected situations 
where professionals sometimes make errors due 
to the lack in teamwork and communication 
among members of the same team. A surgical set-
ting is complex and human interactions among 
persons, equipment, status, organization, and 
other factors may lead to either a successful result 
or a failure; this failure might be patient death, 
disability, or other negative outcome.
Trainees at every level (medical students, 
interns, residents, registrars, etc.) should all train 
on non-technical skills interaction on a regular 
basis. In addition, faculty, or consultants, can also 
benefit from this type of training and practice 
even after their formal surgical training is com-
pete. Many other non-health care organizations 
train their employees (i.e., airline pilots) or other 
technical professionals on teamwork behavior 
and communications; these are human factors 
which help to reduce errors, increase perfor-
mance status, and improve safety.
14.14  Training Future Leaders 
in Patient Safety
The Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical 
Education (ACGME) has mandated that all 
affiliated United States teaching hospitals, med-
ical centers, health systems, and other clinical 
settings receive feedback through the Clinical 
Learning Environment Review (CLER) 
Program. The CLER program was established 
in 2012 to provide educational leaders and 
health care executives formative feedback to 
improve patient care. The six focus areas of this 
program are patient safety, health care quality, 
care transitions, supervision, well-being, and 
professionalism.
In regard to patient safety, the CLER program 
has been designed to assess whether clinical sites 
have processes in place to identify and imple-
ment sustainable, systems-based improvements 
to address patient safety vulnerabilities. The fol-
lowing seven patient safety pathways are assessed 
through the CLER program:
• Pathway 1: Education on patient safety
• Pathway 2: Culture of safety
• Pathway 3: Reporting of adverse events, near- 
misses/close calls, and unsafe conditions
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• Pathway 4: Experience in patient safety event 
investigations and follow-up
• Pathway 5: Clinical site monitoring of resi-
dent, fellow, and faculty member engagement 
in patient safety
• Pathway 6: Resident and fellow education and 
experience in disclosure of events
• Pathway 7: Resident, fellow, and faculty 
member engagement in care transitions
Significant work remains on how to ensure the 
highest level of care for patients. Resident and 
fellow trainee physicians are a critical part of this 
process. The Institute of Medicine has recom-
mended that health professional training includes 
quality improvement (QI) education in an effort 
to promote safe, high-quality, and patient- 
centered care.
Some major efforts to engage physicians in 
training are also underway. For example, the 
inaugural “Patient safety for the new medical 
generation: Promoting human factors culture in 
young medical doctors” meeting was held in 
Florence, Italy, in the summer of 2018. This 
meeting invigorated international collaborations 
(including getting three of this chapter’s authors 
to meet for the first time.)
Local institutional efforts to train junior doc-
tors in the field of patient safety abound through-
out the world as well. Locally, at The Armstrong 
Institute at Johns Hopkins there is ongoing dedi-
cation to improving patient safety through qual-
ity improvement education for its trainees. The 
graduate medical education leadership at Johns 
Hopkins recognized a need to increased training 
for residents in fellows in both QI leaders. 
Consequently, the Armstrong Institute Resident/
Fellow Scholars (AIRS) program was developed. 
Although the program has changed over the years 
in scope and specifics, the overall goal to give a 
combination of didactic and hands on education 
opportunities remain. The program includes 
didactics such as a 2-day worship in Lean Six 
Sigma methodology, frequent interactive group 
lectures, and practice-based components to 
observe frontline QI efforts in the health care set-
ting. In addition, participants undertake a men-
tored QI project to put their newly learned skills 
to use in a real-world setting. Ultimately, this 
intensive curriculum creates physicians who are 
well versed in QI methodology and whom can 
lead these efforts in the future. With the imple-
mentation of such a curricula, resident and fellow 
physicians are empowered to design and execute 
QI projects based on deficiencies they have noted 
within the clinical environment.
In addition to this intensive in-person training, 
there exist many online longitudinal courses that 
allows for anyone to study patient safety topics 
remotely. This is currently a free massive open 
online course (MOOC) offered by Johns Hopkins 
University through Coursera (https://www.cours-
era.org/specializations/patient-safety). In the 
course, you will learn to identify core aspects of 
a strong patient safety culture, analyze safety and 
quality measures, describe the attributes of sys-
tems processes that support a strong safety cul-
ture, and develop a patient safety plan or QI 
strategic plan. Many other online and in-person 
educational materials are available in numerous 
languages and from many organizations around 
the world.
14.15  Clinical Cases
In this section, we share clinical cases of adverse 
events that occur more than they should at major 
surgical departments and teaching hospitals 
around the globe. While the cases may sound 
familiar, they are not actual patients, but are con-
glomerations of scenarios that we have heard of 
and have been studied by local patient safety 
teams. The approach to these events was to 
understand, on a systemic basis, what went 
wrong and as Gawande mentions in his book 
“The Checklist Manifesto,” how to make things 
go right. These clinical cases represent an educa-
tional basis towards patient safety issues in 
surgical settings. Situational awareness, commu-
nication failures, and other non-technical skills 
are leading issues in these cases and are often the 
leading causes of errors occurring in surgery 
patients.
F. Venneri et al.
185
14.15.1  “I was rather sure that they 
were here!!!” The Case 
of the Missing Forceps
14.15.1.1  Case Analysis According 
to Risk Management 
Approach
• Setting: A major teaching hospital. A 72-year- 
old male patient undergoing general surgery 
for right-sided colon cancer.
• Procedure: Open right hemicolectomy under 
general anesthesia.
• Team: Performing surgeon, assistant surgeon 
(trainee), scrub nurse, anesthetist, assistant 
nurse.
• Procedure time: 3 hours without any delay.
A 72-year-old male patient was submitted to 
general surgery for a right-sided colon cancer. 
The surgeon performing the procedure clearly 
informed the patient that the procedure was a 
right colon resection by an open laparotomy 
approach. The patient was admitted to ward; pre-
pared for surgery according to recent protocols 
applied in the hospital and surgery began at 
9:45 a.m. The day of surgery was Thursday; no 
apparent organizational mishaps; the performing 
surgeon had 20 years of experience and the assis-
tant surgeon (a trainee) has 4 years of experience. 
Both had performed a sufficient number of bowel 
surgeries to be comfortable. The scrub nurse has 
15 years experience in abdominal surgery proce-
dures and has been recently trained on laparo-
scopic procedures. The anesthetist is a 20-year 
veteran, experienced specialist and chief of the 
intensive care staff. The assistant nurse has 
7 years of experience in the operating theater. No 
particular concerns are noted until at nearly 1 h 
from beginning the performing surgeon came 
across massive bleeding due to an incidental 
lesion of a mesenteric vein branching form an 
unusual site. This event caused some confusion 
amongst the team, and many sponges were used 
to pack the bleeding site and surgically ligate and 
repair the damaged vessel. The vessel damage 
also required an extension of bowel resection—
due to involvement of the remaining bowel so as 
not to cause severe hypoxia to the remaining 
organ tract. This accident caused the surgical 
team to apparently “lose control” of the setting 
and situation, having been concentrated on avoid-
ing massive bleeding and shock. The procedure 
resumed after 1  h and finished 1  h later. Much 
confusion was perceived in the theater and the 
anesthetist urged to finish as quickly as possible 
because patient had several critical low blood 
pressure episodes.
The performing surgeon left the operating the-
ater and asked the assistant to suture and close 
the laparotomy incision. The assistant nurse was 
occupied with another patient and called another 
nurse to attend the sponge and instrument count-
ing procedure. The assistant surgeon left the 
operating theater without confirming the sponge 
or instrument count. The patient was accompa-
nied to the ward and discharged after 10  days 
from the hospital.
The patient returned for surgical and oncolog-
ical follow-up and a first visit was scheduled 
1  month from surgery. The surgeon visits the 
patient and asks him several questions regarding 
his health status after surgery. The patient states 
that no particular symptom or situation occurred 
after surgery except for recurrent episodes of 
lower right back pain responding to common 
analgesia medications. The patient was sent to 
ambulatory for blood sampling and then 
addressed on the same day for a plain X-ray of 
the abdomen. Blood test values were normal in 
range but the X-ray demonstrated a metal foreign 
body in the lower right abdominal quadrant 
which clearly represented a 12  cm surgical 
forceps.
This case was submitted to the clinical risk 
management and patient safety team of the hos-
pital and a root cause analysis approach was pro-
posed to investigate the unintentionally retained 
foreign object (URFO). The entire surgical staff 
was invited, the case was discussed, and an 
improvement plan was agreed upon. Since then, 
no member of the surgical team leaves the 
 operating room without assuring sponge and 
instrument count is correct and all parties agree. 
A surgical safety checklist was implemented that 
explicitly tasks individual team members with 
certain steps based on their roles. For example, 
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the surgeons re-inspect the surgical wound while 
the circulating nurse calls early for X-ray to rule 
out a retained object. Quality assurance controls 
performed every 6 months to assess compliance 
to safe surgery issues.
The importance of a clinical risk management 
and patient safety policy is a fundamental mana-
gerial aspect of safe health care and these princi-
ples must be embedded into all levels of 
leadership governing hospitals and health care 
institutions. Patient safety awareness must be a 
convincing issue to deal with when quality per-
formance indicators are discussed and monitored 
to achieve best levels of safety and safe care. 
Teamwork, communication, and a shared sense 
of responsibility are useful practices to encour-
age a culture of safety in the surgical setting.
14.15.2  “I used to move my left arm 
before surgery” A Case 
of Patient Positioning 
on the Operating Table
14.15.2.1  Case Analysis According 
to Risk Management 
Approach
• Setting: A regional hospital. 54–year-old 
female patient undergoing breast surgery
• Procedure: Left external quadrantectomy for 
a suspected breast cancer and sentinel lymph 
node detection
• Team: Performing surgeon, assistant surgeon, 
scrub nurse, anesthetist, assistant nurse
• Procedure time: 3 hours without any delay
A 54-year-old female patient was admitted to 
a general surgery ward in a regional hospital. The 
patient presented with a suspected breast cancer 
nodule located in her left breast in the upper left 
quadrant. The surgery was posted for an upper 
left quadrantectomy and sentinel lymph node 
biopsy. She was placed on the operating table 
according to usual and routine position indica-
tions by the surgeon prior to surgery. Two assis-
tant nurses positioned the patient and extended 
her left arm and positioned it according to sur-
geon’s directions. The operation was performed 
and lasted 3 h.
Upon awakening, the patient was unable to 
move her left arm and had sensation of paralysis. 
This symptom was investigated further and a par-
tial temporary paralysis of the brachial plexus 
was revealed by electromyography examination. 
A root cause analysis revealed a series of mishaps 
and pitfalls that were discussed in a morbidity 
and mortality conference with all surgeons and 
operating room personal.
Improvement suggestions were to provide the 
operating room with diagrams and/or pictures or 
any other visual means of patient positions on the 
operating table in relationship to the specific sur-
gical procedure. Each performing surgeon and 
anesthetist must control patient position before 
surgery and nurses must be trained on safe 
maneuvers. Specific risks based on the patient 
positioning should be understood by all team 
members to ensure appropriate prevention tech-
niques are undertaken. Peripheral nerve injury is 
a common potentially preventable complication 
of poor patient positioning. Nerves can be injured 
by either of two mechanisms: stretch or compres-
sion. Common nerve injuries from patient posi-
tioning during surgery to consider are to the 
brachial plexus and its branches (commonly seen 
during breast surgery) or peroneal nerve injury 
during surgery performed in lithotomy position. 
Pressure injury is another common risk from 
ineffective postponing or padding and can be 
seen in numerous areas including the sacral 
region for supine cases or the face in prone cases.
14.15.3  “My clinic note said 
to remove the left lung 
nodule” A Case of Wrong Site 
Surgery
• Setting: A major teaching hospital. 65-year-
old male undergoing video-assisted thoraco-
scopic (VATS) wedge resection.
• Procedure: Right Video-Assisted 
Thoracoscopic Surgery (VATS) Wedge 
Resection.
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• Team: Surgical Attending, Surgical Resident, 
Scrub Nurse, anesthetist, circulating nurse, 
pre-op nurse.
• Procedure time: 1.5 h.
The patient is a 65-year-old male a history of 
pancreatic adenocarcinoma s/p pancreaticoduo-
denectomy in 2015 who presented to clinic with 
bilateral pulmonary nodules. Recent CT imaging 
demonstrated a 1 cm nodule on the right side in 
the lower lobe and a 7  mm nodule in the left 
lower lobe. Both nodules were peripherally 
located within the lower lobes. CT guided biopsy 
revealed a metastatic nodule on the right and 
benign disease of the left lower lobe nodule. He 
was referred to the thoracic surgery clinic for 
evaluation and surgical management for tissue 
diagnosis. The consulting surgeon planned for a 
VATS wedge resection of the right lower lung 
nodule and documented the existence of both 
nodules in his assessment and plan. He was 
posted on the surgery schedule for a right VATS 
lower lobe wedge resection. However, the plan 
on the most recent clinic note indicated that the 
patient would undergo a left lower lobe wedge 
resection.
On the day of surgery, the patient presented to 
the pre-op area and was consented by the surgical 
team for a left lower lobe wedge resection after 
the plan on the clinic note was reviewed. The 
patient was marked on the left side, which was 
confirmed by the nurse in the pre-op area. In the 
operating theater, during the “operative time out” 
the left side was again noted to be the correct side 
and all the parties in the operating theater agreed. 
The patient underwent a left VATS wedge resec-
tion. This nodule was sent to pathology as a fro-
zen specimen and was noted to be benign. At this 
point, the surgeon broke scrub to review all the 
previous documentation, pathology notes and CT 
imaging. He realized that he had performed a 
wedge resection of the incorrect site—a “wrong 
site procedure.” The team proceeded with the 
VATS resection on the correct side, and the 
patient recovered uneventfully.
When discussed, numerous points of failure 
were noted and the team realized there were les-
sons to be learned. First, they all realized that 
the discrepancy between the posting (Right 
VATS) and the procedure they agreed to per-
form (Left VATS) should have raised suspicion 
and led to a more thorough double check. 
Second, they did not include the patient in the 
discussion. When asked in retrospect, he stated 
that he did not want to speak up since he just 
assumed “the doctors and nurses knew what 
they were doing.” Third, they agreed that the 
imaging should have been displayed (which 
would have shown two nodules) and then, the 
pathology should have been double checked to 
ensure the correct side was operated on. Other 
contributing factors included the fact that the 
team felt pressure to proceed quickly to get all 
the multiple cases for the day completed in a 
timely fashion.
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• The epidemiology of adverse events in emer-
gency department.
• The importance of measuring quality of per-
formance (quality indicators).
• The necessity of providing safety practices 
and implementation strategy.
• The necessity of finding tools to avoid or 
reducing adverse events in emergency 
medicine.
• The importance of implementation infrastruc-
ture requirements.
15.1  Background of Emergency 
Departments
The emergency department (ED) of any institu-
tion is an entry point for a significant number of 
patients to any health care organization. It has to 
be conveniently located on the ground floor with 
direct access to the patients and ambulance. The 
entrance of the emergency department is always 
separate from the outpatient department (OPD) 
entrance. The department caters to various trauma 
and medical emergencies in both adults and in 
children round the clock and is adequately staffed 
with emergency physicians, and nursing staff to 
handle such emergencies at all times and days.
The common medical emergencies handled in 
the emergency department includes neurological 
emergencies like seizures or stroke, respiratory 
like asthma or any breathing difficulty, cardiac 
emergencies like myocardial infarction or car-
diac arrest or any acute arrhythmia, varied 
abdominal and gastrointestinal emergencies and 
trauma emergencies that may include head injury, 
facial and oromaxillary injuries, chest injury, 
abdominal injury, musculoskeletal injuries and 
fractures. Apart from this, the department also 
caters to patients with poisoning, drowning, 
hanging, acute allergy, and anaphylaxis and also 
handles any mass or multiple casualty events and 
medico legal cases. During non-outpatient hours, 
the department also handles outpatient-based 
complaints and nonemergency cases who gener-
ally are triage out to OPD during OPD hours.
Unlike wards or ICU, the beds in the emer-
gency department are utilized on a continuous 
basis for different patients on a given day for ini-
tial stabilization and are eventually transferred to 
appropriate inpatient care areas of the Health 
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Care Organization for continuity of care under 
different specialties (or) discharged from ED 
after initial treatment with follow-up advice. 
There are no recommendations or scope for pro-
viding continuity of care in the emergency 
department/beds. The department also oversees 
operations of the prehospital emergency medical 
services (ambulance) and coordinates their 
services.
Maintaining quality and developing error-free 
systems have been the focus of engineering over 
the last few decades. The “non-health care” sys-
tem quality assurance program summarizes their 
quality assurance in two practical headings, 
namely paying attention to detail and handling 
uncertainties.
More recently, quality issues have received 
much attention in the medical field, and there has 
been some wisdom from the airline industry, rep-
licated to health care in error prevention by intro-
duction of safety checklists. There are however 
some fundamental differences between the medi-
cal and engineering field (man and machine).
The first aspect is dealing with uncertainties. 
One of the primary differences between man and 
machine is the degree of variability. Unlike 
machines that can be “cloned,” every individual 
human being is different and each responds and 
reacts differently to illness and treatment. While 
there is a general pattern of presentation and 
response to illness, the uncertainties that one 
need to be prepared and deal with is more in the 
medical domain than in the engineering domain.
In emergency medicine, the uncertainties are 
particularly enormous as mostly the presenting 
illness is not well defined by the patients and he/
she is not fully coherent or conscious to give his 
symptoms, signs not obviously evident, no sup-
port documents or prior medical history available, 
short therapeutic window, delayed or denied con-
sent and affordability to emergency medical care.
The second aspect is paying attention to detail. 
Although on the surface this appears to be similar 
between the medical and engineering field, there 
is a fundamental difference. Domain experts in 
the engineering field have made a remarkable dif-
ference for machines.
However, the domain experts in medicine 
need to start understanding the key performance 
metrics and measure for ensuring better out-
comes but still need to have a holistic approach 
and expertise in order to be successful and have a 
low margin for error. There is also a lack of ade-
quate expertise in emergency medicine available 
all over the world.
In light of the above, how do we approach 
quality issues in the emergency departments?
Prerequisites of a good quality assurance pro-
gram are:
 (a) It should be reasonably simple
 (b) It should be locally relevant
 (c) Easily implementable
 (d) Should not be resource intense
 (e) Should have tangible outcomes which can be 
measured
15.2  Epidemiology of Adverse 
Events in Emergency 
Department
The emergency department (ED) is considered 
particularly high risk for adverse events (AE): 
60% of ED patients experienced Medication 
Error [1].
An AE is defined as “an injury caused by med-
ical management rather than by the underlying 
disease or condition of the patient” [2]. It repre-
sent a significant threat to patient safety and pub-
lic health.
From a systematically review about AE related 
to emergency department care [3], appears that 
many studies conducted in multiple countries 
have reported a prevalence of AE among hospi-
talized patients ranging from 2.9% to 16.6%, 
with 36.9% to 51% of events considered prevent-
able [4–8].
Some studies indicate that adverse events 
related to medical conditions as myocardial 
infarction, asthma exacerbation, and joint dis-
location reach up to 37% [9]. They have shown 
also that 33% of the near-misses were 
intercepted.
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For what concern chief complain, “alert 
fatigue” is one of the significant reasons for 
errors when there is an EMR/HIT [10].
The 29% doctors reported adverse event or 
near-miss of their ER patients due to poor hand 
off [11].
The 12% of ED revisits within 7 days is due to 
adverse events [12].
15.3  Most Frequent Errors 
Depends on: Patient, 
Provider, and System
Reasons because the ED is considered particu-
larly high risk for AE include:
• First of all, patient complexity, it depends on 
many issues: age estreme, communication 
barrier, vague complaints, undifferentiated 
presentation, mental status changes, cognitive 
impairment, complex medical condition, 
delayed presentation, myths and traditional 
beliefs, and lack of awareness/education or 
knowledge of a disease.
• Secondly, care workers, they could risk mak-
ing mistakes due to the lack of knowledge and 
experience on diseases and procedural skills, 
fatigue (they disrupt sleep cycles for health 
care), prejudice, and risk-taking behavior (not 
use personal protective equipment during 
procedures).
• Thirdly, the relationship patient–doctor. 
Many AE depends on bad communication: at 
average discharge, the verbal exchange 
between doctor and patient lasts 76 s. So the 
incomplete information during an average dis-
charge is 65% [13]. Only 76% of the ED 
patients get a written diagnosis at discharge 
and only 34% of the ED patients get instruc-
tions on when and how to return to ER/
Hospital [14].
• Fourthly, the work environment is character-
ized by time constraints, staff inadequacy, 
staff’s lack of experience, team/communica-
tion problems, overcrowding, equipment lack 
or failures.
• Lastly, there are other emerging factors: 
multicultural/multilingual patient, relocation/
migration of doctors to various countries and 
health care systems, multi-electronic health 
recorder (EHR) systems with poor integration 
for seamless flow.
15.4  Safety Practices 
and Implementation 
Strategy
To guarantee the safety practices and avoid AE, 
we have to do implementation strategy in many 
settings [15–25]:
 1. Infrastructure requirements
 2. Basic clinical management process and proto-
cols for quality emergency care
 3. Establishing a unit quality department
 4. Measuring quality of performance (quality 
indicators)
 5. Sharing best practices
 6. Adapting to changing realities
15.4.1  Infrastructure Requirement
The factors which influence the emergency 
department size and design include a general 
scope of clinical services provided in the Health 
Care Organizations (HCO), average volume of 
ER visits, total number of beds in the HCO, avail-
ability of other support services like Radiology & 
Lab, total floor space, geographical location, 
demography of the patients who will be handled 
in the ER (pediatric vs geriatric), or (medical 
emergencies vs trauma) maximum number of 
possible users in a given time.
The emergency department design includes:
• Entrance with:
 1. Direct access from the road for ambulance 
and vehicles—clearly marked and with 
temporary vehicle parking space for cars 
and other means of patient transport.
 2. Ramp for wheel chair/stretcher.
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 3. Stretcher and wheelchair placing area.
 4. Well lit entrance with wide doors which 
can open both ways or one way opening 
into the ER.
 5. The doors should be wide enough to move 
a patient in an emergency trolleys comfort-
ably in and out. The ideal width would be 
minimum 6 ft when both the door are wide 
open.
• Waiting area can be of a total size that 
includes seating, telephones, display for liter-
ature, public toilets, and circulation space.
• Triage area should be able to accommodate 
patients in wheel chair/emergency stretcher/
walking in. The ideal space would depend on 
the volume of patients received in the depart-
ment. There is a close operational relationship 
between triage and reception where registra-
tion counter is located.
• Resuscitation room (priority 1)
 1. Should be at least one resuscitation room 
with  a single dedicated bed in the ER.
 2. Ideally there should be an individual closed 
space with provision for emergency 
stretcher bed, multi-paramonitor, defibril-
lator, crash cart, ventilator in each room.
 3. The room should accommodate 4–5 staffs 
including doctors comfortably and to be 
able to move around the patient.
• Urgent care (priority 2, 3)
 1. Minimum recommended space between 
centers of two adjoining beds is 2 m.
 2. Each bed can be separated by a screen on 
all three sides for providing privacy.
• Consultation room (priority 4) for examina-
tion and treatment of priority 4 patients.
• Emergency short stay unit (if applicable)
 1. This facility may be provided either within 
or adjacent to the emergency unit for the 
prolonged observation and ongoing treat-
ment of patients who are planned for sub-
sequent discharge (directly from the ED). 
Mostly applicable to high volume ED.
 2. The types of patients planned to be admit-
ted to this unit will determine the number 
and type of beds provided, and the design 
of associated monitoring and equipment 
however 8 beds is considered to be the 
minimum functional size.
 3. The configuration of the short stay unit 
should be a minimum of 1 bed per 4000 
attendances per year.
• Nursing station: a staff room/utility storage 
room/security room/toilets/pharmacy substores.
The design described below is important to 
manage patient flow:
The emergency department can have two 
types of patient input-throughput and output flow 
based on the volume and space available in the 
health care institution.
• For a large volume department, the entry and 
exit point of the emergency department are 
separate. The triage room and registration can 
be done at the entry, and there is also facility 
for registering the patient at the entry point. 
After triage, the patients are moved to the 
appropriate pre-identified bed space/area for 
further care. All priority 1 patients are moved 
to the resuscitation room. Priority 2 and 3 are 
treated in the urgency care areas which can 
also be the observation area. Priority 4 patients 
are triaged out to outpatient department (OPD) 
or can be handled in emergency room in a pre-
designated fast track room or doctor consulta-
tion room (especially in non-OPD hours) in 
the emergency department, and an emergency 
bed is not necessary for these category of 
patients. On disposition, the patients are 
moved into the hospital or discharged through 
an exit, away from the entry area. Billing 
counters can be situated at the exit. Bed side 
billing can also be done.
• For low volume emergency departments and 
HCOs with limited space, the entry and exit is 
through the same point and the registration 
and billing counter is essentially located at the 
entry/exit point. No separate triage room or 
space is provided and all the patients visiting 
ER are allotted a bed straight away and a bed 
side triaging is done. All priority 1 patients are 
either moved to the bed identified for resusci-
tation purpose or resuscitation can happen in 
the same bed. Priority 2, 3, and 4 are treated in 
emergency beds (Priority 4 can also be treated 
in ER doctor consultation room (if available). 
On disposition, the patients are moved into the 
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hospital or discharged through the same entry/
exit point. Billing counters can be situated 
here and bed side billing can also be done.
15.4.2  Basic Clinical Management 
Process and Protocols 
for Quality Emergency Care
Each emergency department is unique as the 
patient profile varies with locality of the hospital 
infrastructure within the same city and level of 
acuity which that particular hospital can handle. 
Also the disease profiles and health care systems 
vary across the globe.
Clinical management protocols are based on 
evidence-based recommendations and best prac-
tice recommendation where a clinical evidence is 
not possible.
Clinical protocols have to be region based 
applicable to the population demography of the 
hospital and their health needs.
For example, a trauma center hospital may 
look into how efficiently they can manage a 
patient of poly trauma and process to better clini-
cal outcome, like initiating a massive transfusion 
vs a peripheral pediatric hospital where the nature 
of emergencies tend to be more medical in nature 
than surgical.
Irrespective of the locality—the protocols 
need to be tested and constantly upgraded based 
on recent updates.
Appropriate mock assessments periodically 
and audits are a must to ensure the policies and 
processes and implemented at the ground level.
15.4.3  Establishing a Unit Quality 
Department
Establishment of quality department is essential 
in order to examine the association between the 
scope of quality improvement (QI) implementa-
tion in hospitals and hospital performance on 
selected indicators of quality. Various key perfor-
mance indicators (KPI) may be set by an identi-
fied champion from the emergency department 
who may be certified through various national or 
international training programs for being an 
internal auditor program or quality implementa-
tion in hospital and with help from external 
accrediting agencies.
Reviews on various aspects of improving KPI 
must be taken up as a continuous process in order 
to reduce errors. Coordinate care among settings 
and practitioners and ensure relevant, accurate 
information is available when needed as critical 
elements in providing high level of care.
• It is extremely important in achieving qual-
ity control of the highest standard in medi-
cal equipment: Periodic checks at least once 
a year is essential in achieving this goal. Can 
be done for a range of equipment including 
defibrillators, ventilators, pulse oxymeters, 
infusion pumps, patient monitors, etc. This 
may be done as part as set of national and 
international standards by trained engineers 
with the help of specialized testing and cali-
brating equipment as per manufacturer recom-
mendations. It should be concluded by 
documenting test results and issuing a calibra-
tion report. Any measuring equipment or 
device needs to be tested and checked for its 
accuracy and calibrated whenever need arises. 
Testing is done as per domestic standards 
which implies in accordance with manufac-
turer specifications, for both safety and perfor-
mance tests. The results need to be formally 
documented.
• Key parameters for testing and calibrating 
in emergency department may include
 1. Defibrillators: Electrical safety tests, 
biphasic energy measurements, ECG, per-
formance and arrhythmia simulation, wave 
form simulation
 2. Pulse oxymeter: Electrical safety, O2 satu-
ration, heart rate, pulse amplitude, select-
able pigmentation, and ambient light 
condition
 3. Infusion pumps: Flow rates, occlusion 
alarm tests, pressure
 4. Ventilators: Modes, lung parameters, etc.
• The entire activity must be subjected to appro-
priate methods of internal control and 
inspection.
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15.4.4  Measuring Quality 
of Performance (Quality 
Indicators)
However, institutions need to adapt appropriate 
quality indicators, and the following quality indi-




• Door-to-needle time in stroke thrombolysis
• Pain score assessment
• Investigation return time
• Nurse/patient ratio
• Patient satisfaction level
• Time taken for discharge
• Mortality (Adjusted)
• Length of stay
• Left without been seen by a doctor
• Pain assessment/reassessment
• Safety—patient falls, medication error, failed 
intubation rate
• Incident reporting and RCA
• Infections—hand-hygiene compliance
• Door-to-triage time
 – Description: Time interval of patient arrival 
to nurse triage
 – Type of parameter: Outcome
 – Formula: Time from patient arrival to time 
when triage is completed for a particular 
category of patients
 – Benchmark: Does not exist
 – Action plan: Ensures quality in design, 
conformance
• Door-to-doctor time
 – Description: In case of emergency the time 
shall begin from the time the patient’s 
arrival at the emergency till the time that 
the initial assessment is completed
 – Type of parameter: Outcome
 – Formula: Sum of the time taken for assess-
ment/total number of patients in 
emergency
 – Benchmark: Does not exist
 – Action plan: Ensures quality in design, 
conformance
• Door-to-needle time in stroke thrombolysis
 – Description: In case of acute onset isch-
emic stroke in window period
 – Type of parameter: Morbidity in stroke
 – Formula: Number of stroke patients throm-
bolyzed/number of eligible stroke patients 
for thrombolysis
 – Benchmark: Does not exist
 – Action plan: Ensures quality in design, 
conformance
• Mortality parameter
 – Description: Standardized mortality rate 
(SMR)
 – Type of parameter: Outcome
 – Formula: Number of deaths/number of dis-
charges and deaths × 100
 – Benchmark: None
 – Action plan: Ensures quality in design and 
conformance
• Patient satisfaction (effective 
communication)
 – Description: Efficacy of communication
 – Type of parameter: Process
 – Formula: Quarterly average score/Max 
score possible × 100
 – Benchmark: Not known
 – Action plan: Through patient satisfaction
• Patient fall rates
 – Description: Patient fall rate
 – Type of parameter: Safety; morbidity
 – Formula: Number of falls/number of bed 
days
 – Benchmark: 8.46/1000 bed days
 – Action plan: Ensures quality in design 
(beds) and conformance (sedation)
• Medication errors
 – Description: Medication error
 – Type of parameter: Safety
 – Formula: (Number of errors/number of bed 
days) × 1000
 – Benchmark: 1.2 to 947/1000 bed days 
(reported)
 – Action plan: Clinical pharmacists; process 
(2-people check)
• Compliance to hand-hygiene protocols
 – Description: Compliance to hand hygiene
 – Type of parameter: Infection; outcome; 
safety
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 – Formula: (Number adhered/total number 
of procedures) × 100
 – Benchmark: 90% adherence
 – Action plan: Surveillance; health 
education
• Investigation return time
 – Description: Radiology CT investigation 
report
 – Type of parameter: Adherence to protocol
 – Formula: Time of order to time of 
reporting
 – Benchmark: 60 min
 – Action plan: Clinical audit
• Length of stay in ER
 – Description: Average length of stay
 – Type of parameter: Adherence to protocol, 
safety
 – Formula: Total length of stay of all patients 
in hours/total number of patients
 – Benchmark: 240 min
 – Action plan: Audit
• Nurse patient ration in ER
 – Description: Nurse per bed per shift
 – Type of parameter: Safety, mortality, 
morbidity
 – Formula: Number of nurse/number of beds 
in each shift
 – Benchmark: Does not exists
 – Action plan: Audit
• Pain management in ER
 – Description: Proportion of patients pre-
senting with pain in whom validated pain 
score is documented
 – Type of parameter: Key performance 
indicator
 – Formula: Patients with pain assessment 
using validated score/total number of 
patients presented with pain × 100
 – Benchmark: Does not exists
 – Action plan: Audit
• Time taken for discharge
 – Description: Discharge is the process by 
which a patient is shifted out from the ED 
with all concerned medical summaries 
after ensuring stability
 – Type of parameter: Safety
 – Formula: Sum of time taken for discharge/
number of patients discharged
 – Benchmark: Does not exists
 – Action plan: Audit
• Left against medical advice
 – Description: Percent of patients who leave 
the ED before examination
 – Type of parameter: Safety
 – Formula: Total number of patients who 
leave ER before seen by doctor/total num-
ber presented to ER during the time of 
study × 100
 – Benchmark: Does not exists
 – Action plan: Audit
• Non-conformance control and 
management
 – Any non-conformance observed should be 
properly reported through incident report-
ing system which will be reviewed by a 
multidisciplinary committee and quality 
department of the hospital.
 – The non-conformances could be
 (a) Near-miss
 (b) Medical error
 (c) Sentinel event
• Configuration control and management 
under quality of design
 – Any process change in hospital flow sys-
tem or physical layout or functions related 
to assignment pattern of doctors/staff need 
to be reported and discussed in the leader-
ship team meet of the institution along with 
the justification of such a change and 
approval.
15.4.5  Sharing Best Practices
A “Best Practice” can be defined as a technique 
or methodology that has proven reliably to lead 
to a desired result.
At a minimum, a best practice should:
• Demonstrate evidence of success
• Affect something important (e.g., safety, wait 
time)
• Have the potential to be replicated to other 
settings
• Evidence-based protocols/guidelines must be 
incorporated to deliver care
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• Guidelines can improve patient safety, stream-
line methods of care, lower costs and increase 
efficiency
• Communication and academic discussions 
among Clinicians and Department staff may 
ensure a smooth process for implementation 
of guidelines, e.g., hand washing practices/
reducing rates of central venous catheter- 
related infection
• Ensure guidelines are updated regularly
• Institutional support from leadership and 
making evidence-based guidelines a habit 
among all levels of staff
15.4.6  Adapting to Changing 
Realities
15.4.6.1  Digitization
Opportunities for using data to improve the health 
system are partially driven by technological 
advances. New analytical methods, more effi-
cient processing, and automation of routine anal-
yses and analytics, for example, make it easier to 
draw insights from health data and to present the 
resulting information in an actionable format.
In the clinical setting, secondary use of health 
data can improve quality initiatives and the effec-
tiveness of frontline care. For health system man-
agement, health data can be used to manage and 
improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
health system by informing program, policy, and 
funding decisions. For example, costs can be 
reduced by identifying ineffective interventions, 
missed opportunities, and duplication of services.
To facilitate health research, health data can 
be used to support research that informs clinical 
programs, health system management, and popu-
lation and public health. Such research spans 
multiple fields.
15.4.6.2  Measuring Patient Feedback
Patient feedback systems are used to know their 
experiences when visiting the hospital, under-
standing of the services hospitals offer and opin-
ions on changes you may have recently introduced 
or plan to make.
With a good feedback system, one can increase 
your understanding of what patients think about a 
hospital, understand areas of concern and take 
action to transform the experience for patients. 
One can make changes and use the system to 
monitor patient reaction, gradually improving the 
practice based on accurate feedback.
Patient experience measures:
• should be developed with patient input to 
ensure that they are representative of their 
needs, values, and preferences
• reveal critical information about the extent to 
which care is truly patient centered
• provide a rigorous, validated alternative to the 
subjective reviews that are posted on a large 
number of review sites
Service Excellency
Other than the time lines mentioned at the 4 pri-
ority levels, other measures that may be under-
taken to reduce times:
• Gather prior information about arrival of 
patient
• Delegate documentation to other trained staff
• Create appropriate policies in order to reduce 
time
• Use telecommunication systems to deliver rel-
evant information about patient from the time 
of first paramedic contact
Clinical Audit
• The review of clinical performance against 
agreed standards, and the refining of clinical 
practice as a result—a cyclical process of 
quality improvement in clinical care.
• The systematic critical analysis of the quality 
of health care, including the procedures used 
for diagnosis, treatment and care, the use of 
resources, and the resulting outcome and qual-
ity of life for patients.
• Monitor the use of particular interventions, or 
the care received by patients, against agreed 
standards. Any deviation from “best practices” 
can then be examined in order to understand 
and act upon the causes.
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There are different modalities with which we 
can do a clinical audit:
• Standards-based audit (criteria-based 
audit)
This is the recommended process. Current 
practice is compared against defined criteria, 
standards, or best practices, through the “audit 
cycle”
• Peer review audit
With the benefit of hindsight, the quality of 
services provided is assessed by a team, 
reviewing case notes and seeking ways to 
improve clinical care. This is especially appli-
cable in “interesting” or “unusual” cases.
• Significant event audit
Adverse occurrences, critical incidents, 
unexpected outcomes, and problematic cases 
causing concern are reviewed systematically 
and solutions implemented. Surveys targets 
for opinions or suggestions may include 
patients or special focus groups. Information 
gathered is then analyzed and change imple-
mented as appropriate.
Stages of an audit
 1. Prepare and plan for the project
 2. Select an area to audit
 3. Defining criteria and setting up standards
 4. Collection of data
 5. Analyze results
 6. Identify solutions for improvement and imple-
ment changes
 7. Re audit to monitor the impact of changes 
(close audit loop)
This must be led by senior clinicians in the 
department and must be reported to the audit 
review boards and discussed with higher stake-
holders for implementation and continuous 
improvement.
15.4.6.3  Test Optimization
In the emergency department, accurate diagnosis 
in a minimum of time is critical to ensure the best 
patient outcomes. Every minute is essential. 
High-risk patients with potentially life- 
threatening conditions must be identified quickly 
and appropriate treatment initiated. At the same 
time, cost containment and optimized patient 
flow management are also essential.
Use of protocols play an important role, for 
example, the latest guidelines for diagnostic 
management of acute venous thromboembo-
lism, which recommend using algorithms that 
combine clinical probability assessment with a 
quantitative D-Dimer test. This limits the num-
ber of required imaging tests, offering cost sav-
ing and prevention of patient harm or Troponin 
I may safely rule-out and accurately rule-in 
acute Myocardial infarction (non-ST elevation 
myocardial infarction) in 70% of suspected 
chest pain patients when sent at an appropriate 
time.
Patient-centered outcomes research as 
applied to optimization in tests such as those 
mentioned above or diagnostic imaging 
includes the engagement of patients in the 
decision-making process to order imaging, 
deliver the results to patients and caregivers, 
and follow-up incidental findings from the 
diagnostic test. One aspect of patient- centered 
care is the process of shared decision- making, 
which allows patients and their providers to 
make health care decisions together, taking 
into account the best scientific evidence avail-
able, as well as the patient’s values and 
preferences.
Clinical decision rules (CDRs) are evidence- 
based algorithms derived from original research 
and are used to provide guidance for clinical 
decision-making. They can either be “directive” 
(suggesting a course of action) or “assistive” 
(providing evidence to enhance clinical 
judgment).
Well-validated CDRs can potentially reduce 
the use of diagnostic tests and empower clini-
cians with risk assessments for a given constella-
tion of clinical symptoms and signs. They can 
also serve to reduce inappropriate variation in 
practice by offering evidence to assist the clini-
cian at the point of care.
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15.4.6.4  Work Culture
Safety
Various factors compromise the security of work-
ing doctors in the emergency rooms. Few of these 
include:
 1. 24  h accessability of the emergency 
department
 2. Lack of adequately trained armed or security 
guards
 3. Patient pain and discomfort
 4. Family member stress due to patient’s condi-
tion and fear of the unknown
 5. Family member anger related to hospital poli-
cies and the health care system in general or 
cramped space
 6. Long wait times
At a minimum, workplace violence preven-
tion programs should:
 1. Create and disseminate a clear policy of zero 
tolerance for workplace violence, verbal and 
nonverbal threats and related actions.
 2. Ensure that managers, supervisors, cowork-
ers, clients, patients, and visitors know about 
this policy.
 3. Ensure that no employee who reports or expe-
riences workplace violence faces reprisals.
 4. Encourage employees to promptly report inci-
dents and suggest ways to reduce or eliminate 
risks.
 5. Require records of incidents to assess risk and 
measure progress.
 6. Outline a comprehensive plan for maintaining 
security in the workplace. This includes estab-
lishing a liaison with law enforcement repre-
sentatives and others who can help identify 
ways to prevent and mitigate workplace 
violence.
 7. Assign responsibility and authority for the 
program to individuals or teams with appro-
priate training and skills.
 8. Ensure that adequate resources are available 
for this effort and that the team or responsible 
individuals develop expertise on workplace 
violence prevention in health care and social 
services.
 9. Affirm management commitment to a worker- 
supportive environment that places as much 
importance on employee safety and health as 
on serving the patient or client.
Reference to Standards
Developing benchmarks to incorporate best prac-
tices is absolutely essential to maintain quality in 
health care. Quality governing bodies such as 
QCI and accreditation boards like the NABH 
work in collaboration with hospitals across the 
country to achieve the same. Benchmarking of a 
particular standard may be derived from the best 
evidences in clinical practice or standards set by 
external agencies such as the WHO. Further, con-
tinuous audits and statistical analysis by existing 
quality departments across hospitals may ensure 
implementation and impact of implementation as 
a prerequisite to continuous quality improve-
ment. Potential key performance indicators may 
also be identified. Also benchmarks can be inter-
nal based on the measured performances of the 
department.
Communication Best Practice
All emergency departments have to ensure that 
the patients, relatives, the primary physician are 
well informed about the clinical status of the 
patient through a structured communication pro-
tocol. A communication checklist to ensure ade-
quate communication has taken before disposition 
needs to be implemented in all emergency 
departments.
Culture of Safety
Culture of safety with promotion of reporting 
errors, teamwork, communication openness, 
transparency with feedback, learning from errors, 
and administrative collaboration. Identify cham-







• Measures (e.g., kgs vs lbs)
• Documentation





• Public posting/reporting of quality data
• Patient satisfaction and experience scores
• Feedback reviews




• Maintenance of certification
• External accreditation
• Leadership program for emerging units
Financial Incentive
• Incentive for performance
• “No pay” for preventable complications
• Accountable care organization—Group incen-




• Administrative compensation systems or 
health courts
15.5  Clinical Cases About Worse 




15.5.1  Non-Technical Skills Case
A 50-year-old white man with a history of hyper-
tension, hyperlipidemia, obesity (body mass 
index, 34.9 kg/m2), and chronic tobacco use pre-
sented with presyncope symptoms.
Severe pressure-like chest pain had started 
24  h previously and had completely resolved 
spontaneously 12 h before the current presenta-
tion. An electrocardiogram (ECG) showed per-
sistent ST-segment elevation in the anterior leads. 
He was hemodynamically well compensated. 
Initial laboratory reports showed cardiac tropo-
nin I elevation to a level above 50 ng/mL. After 
15  min he came into the hospital, the patient 
experienced sustained ventricular tachycardia 
and then lost consciousness. He had no spontane-
ous respirations, and neither the carotid nor fem-
oral pulses could be palpated. So the resuscitation 
team came into the patient room. The team mem-
bers are good staff who came from different hos-
pitals and they had not ever worked together, so 
they were able to perform the functions of their 
role but they did not understand how they have to 
interface with the other members of the team.
The team leader did not know the team mem-
bers and tried to ensure that the resuscitation 
effort flows smoothly and that each task is com-
pleted properly, but he failed.
He did not organize the team because he did 
not know the abilities of each of the team mem-
bers. He did not monitor the performance of each 
role. He did not clearly define each task and ver-
ify that assignments are understood.
The team member did not let the team leader 
know if a task was beyond one’s own skill level 
and did not inform the leader that the task was 
understood completed.
They did not speak clearly, nobody kept the 
time of the drugs, the shock time, neither revalu-
ation’s time, and the resuscitation was getting 
worse.
The team was out of control.
Fortunately, a nurse draws attention to changes 
in the patient’s status and she notes that the 
patient had ROSC.
This is an example that what happens to team 
members and the leader when each one did not 
meet the expectations of own role in the team, 
there was not clear, property, closed-loop com-
munication; there was no knowledge sharing.
Below you could find ACLS’ team dynamics 
guidelines [26]. One of the new features in the 
2015 guidelines is an emphasis on team dynam-
ics. In order to provide optimal outcomes, each 
team member must be able to perform the func-
tions of his role and must understand how his role 
interfaces with other roles on the team. Usually, a 
resuscitation team will have one team leader. 
This leader is responsible for ensuring that the 
resuscitation effort flows smoothly and that each 
task is completed properly. This role is often 
filled by a physician but can be done by anyone 
who can:
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• Organize the team
• Monitor the performance of each role
• Perform any skills if necessary
• Model appropriate behaviors
• Coach other members of the team as 
necessary
• Focus on provision of exceptional care
• Mentor the group by providing a critique of 
team and individual performance when the 
resuscitation is over
Team members should be assigned to roles 
based on their scope of practice and training for 
the assigned tasks. A team member must be able 
to:
• Understand his role in this resuscitation
• Perform the tasks assigned
• Understand the ACLS protocols and 
algorithms
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15.5.2  Technical Skills: Central 
Venous Line
A 77-year-old man presented to the emergency 
department with abdominal pain. His medical 
history included treated hypertension and hyper-
cholesterolemia, previous heavy alcohol intake, 
and mild cognitive impairment. He was drowsy 
and confused when roused and was peripherally 
cold with cyanosis. The systemic arterial blood 
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pressure was 75/50  mm Hg, and the heart rate 
was 125 beats/min. The abdomen was tense and 
distended. After the administration of 20 mL/kg 
of intravenous crystalloid, the blood pressure was 
not restored, so the EM physician decided to start 
vasopressor infusion to support blood pressure.
In order to avoid phlebitis or sclerosis, the 
doctor decided to place a central venous line in 
the right internal jugular vein. Considering the 
urgent clinical scenario, he did the procedure 
without ultrasound using anatomical landmarks.
He was very scared about the patient’s vital 
parameters that were getting worse, so he settled 
on to not prepare the site in a sterile fashion nei-
ther wear sterile dressing nor place the patient in 
the appropriate position for the site selected 
(IJV).
He did not infiltrate the skin with 1% lido-
caine for local anesthesia around the site of the 
needle insertion.
Using anatomical landmarks, he inserted the 
introducer needle with negative pressure, but 
suddenly the patient turned his head due to pain 
and he misplaced the needle in the carotid artery. 
So he went out with the needle and squeezed the 
punctured site to avoid hematoma. He tried again 
but he did pneumothorax and he had to put a 
chest tube to decompress it.
Finally, he placed the CVC line; a computed 
tomographic scan of the abdomen showed 
extraluminal gas and suspected extraluminal 
feces consistent with a perforated sigmoid colon. 
He was treated with intravenous antibiotics and 
taken to the operating room for laparotomy and 
was admitted to ICU.
This is an example of what happens if you do 
not follow procedures, do not use guidelines and 
checklist, and do not do it again and again over a 
fake patient in simulation laboratory. Following 
procedures, guidelines, checklist, and simula-
tion’s experience, it could be possible avoiding 
CVC’s complications that include pain at cannu-
lation site, local hematoma, infection (both at the 
site and bacteremia), misplacement into another 
vessel (possibly causing arterial puncture or can-
nulation), vessel laceration or dissection, air 
embolism, thrombosis, and pneumothorax requir-
ing a possible chest tube.
What was the doctor supposed to do?
 1. Prepare the equipment, syringe and needle 
for local anesthetic, small vial of 1% lido-
caine, syringe and introducer needle, scalpel, 
guidewire, tissue dilator, sterile dressing, 
suture and needle, central line catheter. If it 
is difficult to remind everything, it is possi-
ble to use a checklist with all the equipments 
and you have to put a tick near the material 
you bring.
 2. Place the patient in the appropriate position 
for the site selected, then prepare the site in 
a sterile fashion using the sterile solution, 
sterile gauze, and sterile drapes. For the 
internal jugular and subclavian approach, 
place the patient in reverse Trendelenburg 
with the head turned to the opposite side of 
the site.
 3. Infiltrate the skin with 1% lidocaine for local 
anesthesia around the site of the needle 
insertion.
 4. Use the bedside ultrasound to identify the 
target vein, if anatomical landmarks are not 
clear.
 5. Insert the introducer needle with negative 
pressure until venous blood is aspirated. 
Whenever possible, the introducer needle 
should be advanced under ultrasound guid-
ance to ensure the tip does not enter the 
incorrect vessel or puncture through the dis-
tal edge of the vein.
 6. Once venous blood is aspirated, stop advanc-
ing the needle. Carefully remove the syringe 
and thread the guidewire through the intro-
ducer needle hub.
 7. While still holding the guidewire in place, 
remove the introducer needle hub.
 8. If possible, use the ultrasound to confirm the 
guidewire is in the target vessel in two differ-
ent views.
 9. Next, use the scalpel tip to make a small stab 
in the skin against the wire just large enough 
to accommodate the dilator (and eventually, 
the central venous catheter). Insert the dila-
tor with a twisting motion.
 10. Advance the CVL over the guidewire. Make 
sure the distal lumen of the central line is 
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uncapped to facilitate passage of the 
guidewire.
 11. Once the CVL is in place, remove the guide-
wire. Next, flush and aspirate all ports with 
the sterile saline.
 12. Secure the CVL in place with the suture and 
place a sterile dressing over the site.
15.6  Recommendation
Research on AE in multiple care settings has 
identified that the emergency department (ED) is 
considered particularly high risk for adverse 
events (AE).
To guarantee the safety practices and avoid 
AE, we have to do implementation strategy in 
many settings: infrastructure requirements, basic 
clinical management process and protocols for 
quality emergency care, establishing a unit qual-
ity department, measuring quality of performance 
(quality indicators), sharing best practices, adapt-
ing to changing realities and create and dissemi-
nate a clear policy of zero tolerance for workplace 
violence, verbal and nonverbal threats and related 
actions.
Developing benchmarks to incorporate best 
practices is absolutely essential to maintain qual-
ity in health care is very important too. Further, 
continuous audits and statistical analysis by 
existing quality departments across hospitals 
may ensure implementation and impact of imple-
mentation as a prerequisite to continuous quality 
improvement. Potential key performance indica-
tors may also be identified.
Structured communication protocol allows the 
patients, relatives, the primary physician are well 
informed about the clinical status of the patient. 
A communication checklist to ensure adequate 
communication has taken before disposition 
needs to be implemented in all emergency 
departments.
Furthering the promotion of reporting errors, 
teamwork, communication openness, transpar-
ency with feedback, learning from errors, and 
administrative collaboration.
Identify champions of quality and patient 
safety in ER.
Furthering standardize communication, time 
shifts, checklists, patient satisfaction and experi-
ence scores, feedback reviews.
In the clinical practice, it is important doing 
alias clinical audit to examine any deviation from 
“best practices” to understand and act upon the 
causes.
The simulation also has to become a way to 
avoid AE in emergency department improving 
care workers’ technical and no-technical skills.
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16.1  Introduction
In healthcare, the patient safety system which has 
been developed following the study of the vari-
ous phases necessary for its determination, sup-
plies strategies to avoid the repetition of 
circumstances that originally has led an individ-
ual to make mistakes. In fact, the culture of risk 
management, starting from the consideration that 
the errors are not eliminable, is based on the 
belief that they need to be properly analyzed, 
implementing intervention strategies that avoid 
its repetition, in order to become good learning 
opportunities.
The risk is the condition or potential event, 
intrinsic or extrinsic to the process, which can 
modify the expected outcome. It is measured in 
terms of probability and consequences, as a prod-
uct of the probability that a specific event can 
occur and the seriousness of the damage that can 
follow this. In the calculation of risk, human abil-
ity to identify and contain the consequences of 
the potentially harmful event is also considered 
[1].
In obstetrics, there is cultural confusion 
regarding the concept of risk, as a measurement 
of the probability of damage in a given popula-
tion, and the concept of risk as the presence of 
danger for an individual.
That is, the approach which considers all 
women to be at risk, without systematically 
defining the degree of probability with which a 
complication can occur in a specifically assisted 
obstetric condition, is not functional, nor positive 
regarding assistance for several reasons:
• Cultural: the culture of risk increases the anx-
iety of operators and women. While scientific 
investigation of uncertainty promises to 
increase safety; in actual fact, it increases our 
insecurity, distorting the emphasis on the pre-
vention of impending risks, and transforming 
the majority of healthy pregnant women into 
pre-sick people.
• Organizational: no healthcare system can 
always guarantee maximum efficiency. It is 
useful that the organization is optimized for a 
significant event, while it is reasonable to 
apply low intensity assistance in the normal 
course of activity.
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• Pragmatic: in a healthcare system, operators 
cannot be kept on continuous alert so as not to 
let down their guard precisely in the circum-
stances in which they should be fully present.
• Epidemiological: the value of a diagnostic 
test useful to highlight the presence of a mater-
nal or fetal pathology depends on the knowl-
edge of the a priori probability that pathology 
occurs in the population under investigation.
For Bayes’ theorem, the positive predictive 
value of a diagnostic test is directly related to the 
prevalence of the negative outcome, to be avoided 
in the population under investigation [2]. In other 
words, the presence of a pathological test is really 
indicative of pathology, the greater the a priori 
prevalence of the same in the subject undergoing 
the test. Vice versa, the percentage of false posi-
tives of the test is greater the lower the probabil-
ity of the appearance of pathology in the subject 
undergoing the test.
If the prevalence is not taken into account, 
there will be a much more frequent alarm than 
necessary. For example, in a physiological popu-
lation with low probability (<1%) of having a 
fetal acidosis, the presence of a pathological car-
diotocographic tracing implies an effective pres-
ence of acidosis in 16% of cases. Vice versa, in a 
pre-eclamptic patient, who has a high probabil-
ity of an acidosis risk (about 30%), due to pla-
cental hypoperfusion and the consequently 
reduced reserves in the underdeveloped fetus, 
the same tracing implies the presence of acidosis 
in 89% of cases. From these considerations it 
follows that it is appropriate to have a greater or 
lesser diligence or interventionism in the pres-
ence of pathological traces in physiology and 
risk.
A rational attitude is therefore that of getting 
used to mentally cataloging the a priori probabil-
ity of possible pathologies, which the woman or 
fetus that is seen during pregnancy or in labor 
could present. Although it is not possible to fore-
see everything, it is necessary to be aware that a 
pathology is not equally distributed in all preg-
nancies, but will depend on specific variables that 
we must take into account every time we take 
care of a woman, to optimize assistance in a per-
sonalized way [3]. In conclusion, it is not possi-
ble to define a woman at risk without defining the 
type of risk and the probability that this risk can 
develop.
A further problem directly related to the safety 
of the obstetric patient derives from the fact that 
in obstetrics, perhaps more than in other medical 
disciplines, we can witness a rapid transition 
from a situation of well-being to an acute pathol-
ogy, moreover in a context such as birth that is 
usually accompanied by positive, celebratory 
emotions. This immediately leads both operators 
and families to think that something has not been 
done as it should have been [4].
But it is a fact that adverse events are ubiqui-
tous in today’s clinical practices despite the best 
intentions to improve patient health. If complica-
tions related to the course of a certain disease or 
specific treatment have been accepted for centu-
ries as part of the care process; another matter is 
the question of error. It is only since the end of 
the last century that we have started talking about 
the prevention of adverse events or claims for 
damages related to an error. Human and systemic 
errors are intrinsic to the complex care system 
and we are well aware of their weight in medi-
cine. So this is why all possible strategies must be 
put in place to avoid a foreseeable error through 
risk management. Getting and making things 
right when things go wrong defines a successful 
safety program [5].
16.2  Patient Safety
Risk management identifies a set of actions 
which improve the quality of health services in 
order to guarantee patient safety. Risk manage-
ment tools are represented by four processes: 
identification, analysis, control, and financial 
coverage of risk.
Risk investigation is the process by which sit-
uations, the user and the procedure are identified, 
which can lead, or have led, to a loss. The 
approach is based on the assumption that any 
error is the consequence of problems that precede 
it and that such problems could become manifest 
even before the adverse event occurs.
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The map of critical areas identifies various 
criticalities in different ways; it presupposes the 
presence of a surveillance epidemiological obser-
vatory and can be carried out according to the 
needs of the research, the time, the concentration 
of adverse events in a given sector, the severity of 
the adverse events, etc. Its interpretation must 
always be very cautious as a starting point for a 
critical analysis and not used as the conclusive 
outcome of an investigation.
Risk control consists of the implementation of 
prevention procedures and strategies that lead to 
the creation of a specific risk prevention/mitiga-
tion plan. The control focuses on the training of 
employees in terms of information, consent, 
accurate compilation of a medical record, hospi-
tal discharge sheets, and reporting of unwanted 
events. It should also concentrate on the develop-
ment of protocols, procedures, and/or control 
measures that can improve the safety of the 
assisted person and on the efficiency of the risk 
management units understood as monitoring 
capacity, interpretation of the causes of unwanted 
events, and identification of clinical corrective 
factors.
In the context of control measures, particular 
importance is given to the audit which is a formal 
process of clinical verification that controls the 
effectiveness of the interventions while evaluat-
ing the assistance in its various components. It 
aims to improve the quality and outcomes of 
patient care through a structured review con-
ducted by groups of colleagues, that is with peer 
reviews, which after examining the clinical prac-
tice used and its results, based on the standards 
adopted and the elements that emerge from the 
verification, provide any necessary indications to 
modify it. The audit must give answers to ques-
tions concerning the service provided to the 
patient by all the professionals involved. Financial 
risk coverage must identify the funds necessary 
to cover the risk management plan and must nec-
essarily also include insurance coverage of the 
settings most exposed to financial risk.
Integrated management must involve changes 
in clinical practice aimed at promoting a culture 
of safety that is more attentive and closer to the 
dual patient mother/fetus and infant, as well as to 
operators. Therefore, in the first instance it is use-
ful to identify the training, organizational and 
technological criticalities encountered in the 
maternal–infant clinical path with reference to 
pregnancy, childbirth, and assistance to the new-
born. The training criticalities are also to be con-
sidered in relation to the reduced volume of 
activities, while the organizational ones are 
mostly linked to a lack of continuity in the terri-
tory/hospital care and due to the lack of neonatal 
intensive care beds. A recent review also suggests 
that educational interventions aimed at improv-
ing the quality of care and training health work-
ers may improve the safety of women and their 
infants during childbirth [6]. In the second 
instance, all risk management actions must be 
reported through the prevention of their realiza-
tion, so as to constitute a sort of “risk control plan 
in the maternal and child area” [7].
In the maternal and child care area, risk 
management must involve all sectors in which an 
error can materialize in various phases of the 
mother and the newborn to be effective. In terms 
of obstetrics, attention to the three types of criti-
cality: training, organization, and technology 
must focus on prevention in the preconception 
phase, during pregnancy and during childbirth 
assistance.
The clinical assistance to pregnancy and 
labor begins in the preconception period 
because it is an important time concerning the 
prevention of some risks, which should be iden-
tified and corrected before the concretization of 
these risks. The main risks are malformations, 
genetic, teratogenic caused by physical and 
toxic agents, infectious, deficiency, coming 
from maternal–fetal incompatibility and pre-
maturity. In this phase, the anamnesis plays an 
important role in the identification of the risk, 
and criticalities that can emerge are of exclu-
sive pertinence training. Folic acid supplemen-
tation, the abolition of incorrect lifestyle habits 
(e.g., drugs and alcohol use, smoking), close 
glycemic control of diabetic women, lengthen-
ing the interval between pregnancies, are just 
some of the examples of malformation and pre-
maturity risk containment already in the pre-
conception phase.
16 Obstetric Safety Patient
208
Risks associated with pregravidical anamnes-
tic factors involved right from the start of preg-
nancy, especially if they have not already been 
carried out in the preconception period, must be 
identified, along with a timely diagnosis of extra-
uterine pregnancy. The speed here avoids, first of 
all, the need to intervene in emergency situations 
due to serious hypovolemic maternal shock 
related to hemopertoneal as a consequence of 
extrauterine pregnancy rupture, and secondly, it 
allows for more conservative treatments and less 
invasive interventions, such as medical treatment 
with methotrexate and video laparoscopy of the 
tubes. In this context, the critical points that can 
be detected often concern training aspects. The 
use of a sort of checklist aimed at identifying 
anamnestic risk factors important for pregnancy 
management right from the beginning of a preg-
nancy can be of great help, and it is the first step 
of the obstetric triage whose task is to highlight 
specific care pathways for the assessment of the 
risk profile which is a dynamic concept in con-
tinuous evolution during pregnancy. The minimal 
number of maternal screening tests to be carried 
out in the antenatal period which must be guaran-
teed to every woman are identified by the 
Maternity Clinical Risk Management Standards 
(CNST) [8]. The fetal screening involves fetal 
anomalies and Down Syndrome, the maternal 
screening involves infection in pregnancy such as 
rubella, hepatitis B, HIV, syphilis, and hemoglo-
binopathies such as sickle cell anemia and thalas-
semia [9].
During pregnancy, the correct surveillance 
of pregravidic diseases such as heart disease, 
respiratory failure, and hypertension is essential 
in order to monitor their possible deterioration, 
for the protection of maternal health and life. To 
safeguard the health of the future newborn, the 
timely diagnosis of fetal growth restriction and 
the realization of the risk of spontaneous prema-
ture birth allows optimization of the survival and 
quality of life of “small” infants both by optimiz-
ing the timing of birth in the case of fetal growth 
restriction, and by centralizing pregnant women 
(transport in utero) to hospitals equipped with 
neonatal intensive care whenever a premature 
baby is expected to be born.
Childbirth labor remains, however, the most 
critical phase for the safeguarding of the health 
and life of women. Obstetric emergencies such as 
postpartum hemorrhage, eclampsia, sepsis, 
thromboembolism, and anesthetic intervention 
are clinical aspects that must be monitored to pre-
vent maternal death or serious disease related to 
labor and delivery.
During labor, cord prolapse, uterine rupture, 
uterine inversion, and shoulder dystocia are 
among obstetric emergencies that require timely 
and adequate treatments that not only require 
specific protocols, but also a pre-ordered and rou-
tinely monitored organizational support network 
using checklists, simulations, “mnemonic” and 
“reminder” posters.
Even vaginal delivery after a cesarean section, 
operative delivery and the so-called cardiotoco-
graphic emergencies are clinical pathway events 
that deviate from physiology, but since they are 
part of obstetric pathology they must, in any case, 
be foreseen. For each of these occurrences the 
risk factors must be identified a priori, as they are 
often, but not always present, for their realization 
and the treatment plans to be implemented [10].
In the clinical path, the analysis of errors rep-
resents an effective tool for prevention through 
the construction of barriers that prevent the real-
ization of the damage that can result. In the 
obstetric area, as well, efforts have been and are 
still being made in order to identify errors and 
causes of mortality and morbidity in advance in 
order to offer safety indicators [11].
16.3  Most Frequent Errors 
and Adverse Events
The creation of these barriers is facilitated by the 
identification of missed missions, the so-called 
near-misses, defined as unscheduled events 
caused by errors that, however, do not determine 
the damage that they were potentially able to 
achieve. Through identification and analysis of a 
system of errors that create damage and near- 
miss events in the labor and delivery room, it is 
possible to identify interventions to reduce poten-
tial damage. The first systematic review of 
A. Ragusa et al.
209
 near- miss events in obstetrics is recent and 
reports an incidence of 0.69%, but refers to a con-
text with a careful multi-year organization on 
patient safety and, as such, the data cannot be 
generalized. In that context, the analysis of unex-
pected events, including near-misses, in the 
labor-delivery room was 3959 cases in 2010 out 
of a total of 203,708 births, with an incidence of 
1.9%. For each near- miss event, the hazard score 
is reported based on four parameters: (a) the 
worst possible outcome; (b) the identification 
method; (c) the number of barriers encountered; 
and (d) the quality of the barriers. Through the 
hazard score, it is possible to outline four classes 
of events: (1) high-risk frequency and low hazard 
score; (2) high frequency and high hazard score; 
(3) low-risk frequency and high hazard score; (4) 
low-risk frequency and low hazard score [12].
Since interventions based on the use of check-
lists integrated into clinical practice have proven 
to be effective in reducing death and complica-
tions both in the area of intensive care and sur-
gery, the World Health Organization for 
Developing Countries has developed a checklist, 
the WHO Safe Childbirth Checklist, which 
focuses on the major causes of morbidity and 
mortality in the mother and newborn during 
delivery [13]. In fact, patient safety has a measur-
able economic effect, saves lives, and reduces 
morbidity. The reduction in mortality associated 
with birth is a priority of global health and low 
quality care is recognized to be the factor that 
most contributes to birth-related harm.
A systematic analysis describes global levels 
and trends in maternal mortality between 1990 
and 2015. The global maternal mortality ratio 
(MMR) has a relative decline of 43.9% (34.0–
48.7) from 1990 to 2015. The MMR reduced 385 
deaths per 100,000 live births (80% uncertainty 
interval ranges from 359 to 427) in 1990 to 216 
deaths (207–249) in 2015 with 303,000 (291,000–
349,000) maternal deaths globally. Even though 
there is a global decrease of maternal mortality, 
this progress should be accelerated and immedi-
ate action is necessary to substantially reduce 
preventable maternal deaths [14]. The percentage 
of maternal deaths that can be foreseen and there-
fore preventable varies from 28% to 50% 
[15–17].
In order to introduce the patient safety concept 
to those making decisions especially in poor 
resources settings, the WHO Safe Childbirth 
Checklist guides the selection of patient safety 
policy points to ensure that the national policy is 
comprehensive and adequately detailed.
The items on this document identify the major 
causes of maternal and neonatal death in devel-
oping countries. Examples include postpartum 
hemorrhage, dystocic labur, hypertensive disor-
ders, intrapartum events such as suboptimal 
assistance to the mother, neonatal infections, and 
prematurity. The items are grouped to be used in 
four critical and crucial moments: (a) on admis-
sion of the woman to the hospital; (b) at the 
beginning of the expulsion period or before the 
cesarean section; (c) 1 h after birth and (d) before 
discharge [18].
The pilot study of implementation of the 
checklist showed a clear improvement in terms of 
maternal–fetal neonatal health which makes it 
very promising. For the preparation of checklists, 
the priority identification of recurrent errors is 
useful, as only by recognizing them can they be 
avoided. Table 16.1 shows in descending order, 
the most common and frequent errors for some 
obstetric emergencies, highlighted during simu-
lations [19].
Another risk control tool in obstetrics is that 
of the MEOWS (Modified Early Obstetric 
Warning System), an early alarm system for the 
timely recognition and treatment of all acute 
pathological situations, developed on the basis of 
the Confidential Enquiry into Maternal and Child 
Health report of 2003–2005, the validation of 
which has proved to be a useful aid to be used at 
the patient’s bedside to predict morbidity, whose 
diagnostic criteria and alarm threshold parame-
ters, and “trigger points,” are well defined [20, 
21] and reported in Table 16.2 [22].
Furthermore, this system can be easily learned, 
implemented, and interpreted. Available evidence 
suggests that MEOWS should enhance surveil-
lance programs and action plans in order to 
reduce severe maternal morbidity and mortality 
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by identifying, managing, and possibly avoiding 
preventable maternal adverse events [23].
A further element on which to base prevention 
is communication both between operators and 
with women and their relatives, focusing on 
information useful for current assistance.
In 2005, the Royal College of Obstetricians 
and Gynaecologists declared: “Essential ele-
ments of providing a good standard of practice 
and care are professional competence, good rela-
tionships and communication with patients and 
colleagues and observance of professional ethical 
obligations” [24]. Clear communication is syn-
onymous with resolutive and cognitive skills, it 
also implies an accurate transcription of the event 
in the medical record and can mitigate the fallout 
of negative outcomes [25].
When an adverse event occurs, closing the 
circle with the patient is an essential component 
in doing things correctly. Many times, it is diffi-
cult to admit the incident, but the establishment 
of a relationship of trust at the basis of the doc-
tor–patient relationship allows a better outcome 
also in medico-legal terms. Given the difficulty in 
communicating bad news, many different strate-
gies have been develop regarding the disclosure 
method. For example, a real protocol has been 
developed at Yale University where communica-
tion with the patient is structured like all the vari-
ous care processes [4, 26–28].
16.4  Recommendation
The cornerstones on which control and risk man-
agement in obstetrics is based are:






Incorrect treatment of MgSO4 
intoxication
Underdetection of MgSO4 
intoxication
No ventilation performed in an 
apneic patient
Essential blood tests (liver and renal 
function, coagulation) not carried out
Unfamiliarity with hydralazine 
dosage
Incorrect dosage or dilution of 
MgSO4
Foley catheter not inserted
Postpartum 
hemorrhage
Underestimation of blood loss
Unfamiliarity with prostaglandin 
administration to achieve myometrial 
contraction
Late transition to the operating room
Delayed administration of blood 
products
Unfamiliarity with ergot myometrial 
stimulators dosage
Essentials blood test (fibrinogen, PT, 
PTT, cross and match) not carried 
out
Under detection of consumption 
coagulopathy
Source of bleeding (episiotomy 
wound exploration, uterine cavity 
revision, etc.) not explored
Urinary bladder not drained
Shoulder 
dystocia drill










Incorrect fixation of the limbs
Hasty attempt to deliver the arms
Inappropriate Mauriceau and Bracht 
maneuvers
No episiotomy performed
Table 16.2 Limits of trigger thresholds for MEOWS 
parameters
Yellow trigger Red trigger
Temperature (°C) 35–36 <35 or >38
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 (a) obstetric triage for the identification of pro-
tocols and specific care paths.
 (b) the application of guidelines and protocols 
for different clinical situations related to the 
birth path.
 (c) the use of checklists to analyze the most vul-
nerable points of the process accurately.
 (d) simulations.
 (e) the collection of data in delivery rooms must 
be precise and systematic, if the data col-
lected will not be truthful or will be collected 
and described incorrectly, all the conclusions 
and consequent corrective measures will be 
wrong [26].
Additional elements on which accident pre-
vention is based are: optimization of internal and 
external communication, communication with 
the patient, organization of the team and clinical 
documentation. However, intervening in these 
areas does not represent a specificity of the 
maternal infantile path but that of the prevention 
of adverse events in all medical-surgical 
disciplines.
In conclusion, the resulting safety system, 
developed following the study of the various 
phases of error determinism in three areas (train-
ing, organizational and technological), allows the 
implementation of risk control strategies that 
avoid the repetition of circumstances that lead to 
mistakes. The set of actions identified constitute 
a sort of risk control plan in the maternal and 
child area which, by improving the quality of the 
services provided to the mother and the newborn, 
should guarantee their safety [27].
Safeguarding the health and life of the mother 
and the future baby are the main objectives of a 
correct clinical course of pregnancy [28].
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Aldo Bonaventura, and Domenico Prisco
Learning Objectives/Questions Covered in 
the Chapter
• How many are the adverse events (AEs) in 
Internal Medicine (IM)?
• What are the most frequent errors?
• How to prevent medication or identification 
errors?
• How to prevent AEs in invasive procedures in 
IM?
• How to prevent clinical reasoning errors?
• How to improve team working and communi-
cation among health operators in IM?
• What are the safety practices to be imple-
mented in IM?
17.1  Epidemiology of Adverse 
Events
There are few specific studies on epidemiology 
of AEs in IM. Most of them are focused on par-
ticular events, such as medication, interventional 
procedures, or diagnostic reasoning errors.
The first historical study conducted in IM was 
that by Schimmel in 1960 [1]. He found that 20% 
of patients admitted to a university medical service 
in USA experienced one or more untoward “iatro-
genic” episodes. Anyway, such pioneering study 
was not based on the current definition of AE and 
reported only drug reactions and untoward effects 
of diagnostic and therapeutic procedures  —  the 
so-called diseases of medical progresses, the price 
to pay for modern medical care [2, 3]. Twenty 
years later, Steel et al. [4] reported a rate of 36% 
AEs in the medical service of a teaching hospital. 
Then, the Harvard Medical Practice Study I [5] 
found a rate of AEs of 3.6 ± 0.3% (30.9 ± 4.4% of 
them due to negligence) in IM and 7  ±  0.5% 
(28 ± 3.4% of them due to negligence) in general 
surgery, and the Quality in Australian Healthcare 
Study (QAHCS) displayed an incidence of 6.6% 
in IM versus 13.8% in general surgery [6]. More 
recently, studies from the UK [7], the USA [8], 
Portugal [9], and Spain [10] reported an incidence 
ranging from 10% to 23.2%. Fatality ranges from 
2% [2] to 20% [6] in the various studies. Such 
large variability of incidence and severity can 
depend on differences in AEs definition, settings 
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(only IM wards or all medical wards), study 
design, and severity threshold of investigators in 
the adjudication of events.
Medical errors  —  compared to surgical 
ones — are more preventable (73% vs 53% [6]; 
75% vs 41% [7]), and often less overt because 
diagnosis and time of occurrence can be less 
clear and multiple providers are involved [11]. 
They are also associated to longer hospitaliza-
tions being directly related to the time spent in 
hospital [1, 12]. Indeed, they have been defined 
“the hazards of hospitalization” [1]. They are 
more common and severe in the elderly [10, 12, 
13], and more events can occur in the same 
patient [1]. Lower educational level, transfer 
from other institutions, associated chronic condi-
tions, severe prognosis on admission, general 
functional status on admission, level of aware-
ness on admission and at discharge, associated 
kidney/liver failure or impaired function on 
admission and at discharge, number of drugs 
taken (on admission, during hospital stay, and at 
discharge), patients’ knowledge about disease, 
medications, and their side effects [9] are other 
known risk factors for AEs in IM.
17.2  Most Common Errors
In IM, errors can occur in any step of inpatient jour-
ney from admission to discharge, and in any clinical 
process from clinical history collection to diagnos-
tic work-up, drug therapy, invasive procedures, and 
so on. Further, they can occur before admission to 
IM and be recognized later, on the ward.
The words “error” and “AE” do not have the 
same meaning. AEs are “injuries caused by medi-
cal management rather than by the underlying 
disease or condition of the patient”. Medical 
errors can result or not in patient harm, but not 
all of them lead to AEs. Generally, only prevent-
able AEs imply medical errors [14]. Table 17.1 
displays the most frequent AEs occurring in IM, 
according to hospitalization phase and process.
Table 17.1 List of the most frequent AEs in internal medicine according to hospitalization phase and process
Phase Process Adverse event Contributing factors
Pre- 
admission




Reactions to drugs or transfusions
Inappropriate admission
Admission to inappropriate ward
Lack of patient information
Incorrect clinical reasoning
Busy and noisy environment
Fatigue, distraction
Bed unavailability
Lack, inadequacy, or violation 
of policies on admission 
appropriateness and hospital 
patient flow
Admission Patient identification Tests and treatment to the wrong patient Identity documents not available
Patient cognitive impairment
Poor social support
Busy and noisy environment
Misunderstanding
Typing error
Inadequate or lacking 
information technology
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(continued)
Phase Process Adverse event Contributing factors






Busy and noisy environment
Outlier status
Initial diagnosis and 
therapy








Busy and noisy environment







Unexpected death or clinical worsening
Unexpected intensive care transfer




Patient unable to ask for help
Lack, inadequacy, or violation 
of policies
Medication process Adverse drug reactions due to: ordering/
storing errors, inappropriate, or wrong 
prescription, wrong administration
Drug–drug and drug–disease 
interactions
Wrong identification or 
transcription
Knowledge deficit
Medical record not available, 
illegible, not informative
Allergy or contraindications not 
assessed




Lack, inadequacy, or violation 
of policies
Distraction, fatigue
Busy and noisy environment







Medical record not available, 
illegible, not informative
Missed request





Inadequate or lacking 
computerized order entry
Distraction, fatigue
Busy and noisy environment
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Table 17.1 (continued)
Phase Process Adverse event Contributing factors
Consultations Identification errors














Busy and noisy environment
Invasive procedures Wrong procedure, wrong patient, or 
wrong site
Omitted or delayed procedure




Inappropriate timing or 
indication
Patient not informed and 
informed consent not signed
Uncooperative patient
Medical record not available, 
illegible, not informative or 
updated
Poor planning





Lack or inadequacy of devices
Inadequate or lacking 
computerized order entry
Distraction, fatigue
Busy and noisy environment
Lack, inadequacy, or violation 
of policies
General care Falls, delirium, healthcare-related 
infections (HAI), suicide, entrapment, 




Busy and noisy environment
Inappropriate or omitted basic 
care
Gloves, soap, water, or alcohol 




Lack, inadequacy, or omission 
of risk stratification
Medical record not updated, 




Poor or omitted patient education
Fragile patient
Patient cognitive impairment
Lack, inadequacy, or violation 
of policies
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AEs in IM have been classified variously, e.g. 
according to the clinical process or the nature of 
disorder caused by AEs [7, 9] (see Tables 17.2 
and 17.3). It is disappointing how the frequency 
of certain AEs has worsened in decades: 
healthcare- associated infections (HAIs) passed 
from 9.5% in 1960 [1] to 21.4% in 2008 [10].
When you think about the potential most fre-
quent errors in IM, you probably think mainly 
about medication and diagnostic errors since 
Table 17.1 (continued)
Phase Process Adverse event Contributing factors
Handover Diagnostic or therapeutic omission or 
delay
Unexpected death or clinical worsening
Unexperienced team
Inadequate skills
Lack of structured handover
Busy and noisy environment
Distraction, fatigue
Poor teamwork






Communications provided to people not 
authorized by the patient
Diagnostic or therapeutic omission or 
delay due to poor or absent compliance 












Organizational failure (lack of 
reference operators)
Last day Discharge planning Canceled or delayed discharge
Lack of planning controls and follow-up








Lack, inadequacy, or violation 
of policy
Discharge Discharge letter to the wrong patient
Incomplete discharge letter




Omitted or delayed diagnosis 
communication
Omitted or delayed treatment
See identification errors
Medical record not available, 
illegible, not informative or 
updated
Pending tests results
Busy and noisy environment
Distraction, fatigue
Pressure to discharge






Medical devices not available or 
malfunctioning
No patient recall ongoing results
Poor patient/caregiver education
Lack, inadequacy, or violation 
of policies
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medical diagnosis and therapy are its core busi-
ness. Diagnostic errors  —more appropriately 
defined as “decision-making errors”—  account 
for 10–15% in complex disciplines, such as IM, 
compared to 2–5% of perceptive ones (dermatol-
ogy or radiology) [15]. Medication errors are 
highly prevalent among older patients or patients 
with multiple comorbidities and polypharmacy 
[16], all patients typically admitted to 
IM. Moreover, healthcare-acquired infections are 
likely to be another common AE in IM, favored 
by intravascular catheters and immunosuppres-
sant treatments [17].
17.2.1  Patient Identification Errors
Identification errors (IEs) are commonly associ-
ated with surgery, but they can occur in every set-
ting. Many other medical errors, included in this 
review, such as medication or blood transfusion 
errors, can result from patient misidentification at 
the point of care as well as at registration. IEs usu-
ally affect more people. When a patient receives a 
medication intended for another patient, the harm 
is done to the patient receiving the wrong medica-
tion and to that who fails to receive the correct 
treatment [18]. A recent review from ECRI insti-
tute disclosed that 72% of IEs occur at the point of 
care and 12.6% at registration. Diagnostic and 
therapeutic procedures are involved in 36% and 
22% of cases respectively, and consequences may 
be fatal [18]. Information technology amplified 
the problem, as IEs can generate duplicate medi-
cal records or mistaken identity. There are no spe-
cific studies on IEs in IM, but increasing staff 
workload and patients cognitive impairment make 
them a non- negligible problem.
The main barrier to IEs is cultural: the aware-
ness of the correct identification and of misiden-
tification consequences must be improved, so 
that health operators spontaneously abandon 
incorrect practice. Figure 17.1 summarizes what 
to do and not to do to prevent IEs. Technology 
(patient’s palm scan, bar-code wristband, radio-
frequency identification system, etc.) can help 
but cannot substitute the role of humans. One can 
scan the bar-code wristband of the right patient, 
but administrate the drugs to another one. 
Patients’ education and empowerment are equally 
important [18].
17.2.2  Clinical Reasoning Errors
Errors in diagnostic and management process can 
be considered together as clinical reasoning 
errors (CREs) [19] or decision-making errors, as 
diagnostic and management reasoning can be 
similarly conceptualized.
According to the American National Academy 
of Medicine (previous Institute of Medicine), a 
diagnostic error is a failure to: (a) establish an 
accurate and timely explanation of the patient’s 
health problem(s) or (b) communicate that expla-
nation to the patient. This definition includes: 
wrong, delayed, or omitted diagnosis [20]. The 
incidence of diagnostic errors varies according to 
definition, discipline, and research approach. For 
instance, 1 in 10 diagnoses are wrong (according 
to “secret shoppers” approach that uses “secret 
patients” to provide detailed, unbiased insights, 
and feedback on healthcare processes), 1  in 
10–20 autopsies identifies major diagnostic dis-






General care 16.4 47.8




Invasive procedures 21.4 40
Diagnostic process 2.8 100
Table 17.3 Types of AEs, classified according to the 
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crepancies, 1  in 3 patients have experienced a 
diagnostic error (according to patients’ survey), 
1 in 20 patients will experience a diagnostic error 
every year (according to chart review). They are 
the most common cause for malpractice claims 
[21], and about half of physicians admit at least a 
diagnostic error per month and perceive diagnos-
tic errors as the most dangerous (according to 
physicians’ survey) [22].
The most commonly missed or delayed dis-
eases are: pulmonary embolism and drug reac-
tion or overdose (2.5%), lung cancer (3.9%), 
colorectal cancer (3.6%), acute coronary syn-
drome (3.1%), breast cancer (2.9%), and stroke 
(2.6%) [23]. Physicians overestimate their diag-
nostic ability: only 10% of clinicians admit they 
performed any error in diagnosis over the past 
year, but up to 40% of diagnoses about which cli-





















to minimize the risk,
especially in case of
invasive procedures or
high risk medications
do not use closed-
ended questions
do not mix up patients
with similar names














Fig. 17.1 What 
healthcare operators have 
to do and not to do to 
avoid patient 
identification errors
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nicians were certain resulted wrong at autopsy 
[24]. Further, even when diagnosis is right, man-
agement errors can arise: 1  in 2 patients with 
acute or chronic diseases do not receive evidence- 
based therapies and 1 in 3–5 receive unnecessary 
and/or potentially dangerous drugs or investiga-
tions [19].
A third of CREs derive from deficits of execu-
tion (slips, lapses, or oversights in carrying out 
appropriate management in correctly diagnosed 
patients), but almost half are errors of reasoning 
or decision quality (failure to elicit, synthesize, 
decide, or act on clinical information).
Death or permanent disability result in 25% of 
cases, and at least three quarters of them are con-
sidered highly preventable [22].
A cornerstone of research on CREs in IM is 
the work by Graber et al. [25]. They analyzed 100 
cases and grouped diagnostic errors in three 
categories:
 – no-fault errors (in case of masked or unusual 
disease presentation or non-collaborative 
patient) 7%
 – system-related errors (technical failure and 
equipment problems or organizational flaws) 
19%
 – cognitive errors (faulty knowledge, data gath-
ering, or synthesis) 28%.
Coexisting system-related and cognitive errors 
were reported in 46% of cases. Further, wrong 
diagnosis was characterized by a predominance 
of cognitive errors (92% vs 50%), whereas 
delayed diagnosis by the predominance of 
system- related ones (89% vs 36%). Cases where 
discrepancy resulted from autopsy were mainly 
due to cognitive factors (90% vs 10%). Overall, 
228 system-related factors and 320 cognitive fac-
tors, averaging 5.9 per case, were identified [26]. 
Among cognitive factors, faulty data gathering 
(14%) or synthesis (83%) resulted more fre-
quently involved than faulty knowledge (3%) 
[26].
Clinical reasoning can proceed analytically or 
non-analytically (Table  17.4) to generate diag-
nostic hypotheses, investigations, and treatment. 
Analytical reasoning (also called “hypothetic- 
deductive model”) is commonly used by younger 
physicians or in unfamiliar or unusual cases and 
is based on lists of differential diagnoses and 
gathering of information to validate such 
 diagnoses. Non-analytical reasoning is faster and 
based on mental heuristics (maxims, shortcuts, 
rules of thumb) or pattern recognition. In prac-
tice, physician compare current patient’s symp-
toms/signs with previous cases, collected through 
clinical experience and/or study and get the right 
diagnosis in few seconds [27]. One type does not 
exclude the other and they can be mutually used 
in the same patient. None of them is error-proof. 
If mental heuristics and pattern recognition are 
efficient and accurate in many situations, they 
can also predispose to errors, as patient’s picture 
does not always fit the expected pattern, because 
of an atypical presentation, comorbidities, or 
Table 17.4 Types of clinical reasoning: a comparison [27]
Non-analytical (system 1) Characteristics Analytical (system 2)
Intuitive (based on pattern 
recognition and heuristic)
Modality Hypothetic- deductive
Developed through clinical 
experience and study
Development Generation of list of diagnoses to 
be validated
Commonly used by expert/senior 
physicians
Application Commonly used by not expert/
younger physicians




Awareness Major cognitive load
Conscious
Faster
Diagnosis in 10 s
Time Slower
Diagnosis in minutes/hours
More efficient Efficiency Less efficient (based on memory 
work)
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evolving diseases [28]. Another Achille’s heel of 
non-analytical reasoning (N-AR) are biases, 
 constructs founded on perceptions, prejudices or 
ideologies, outside of critical thinking. Bias can 
be distinguished in internal or external to the cli-
nicians [19] either in cognitive or affective bias 
[27] (see Table 17.5). Breakdowns in analytical 
reasoning most often derive from not following 
appropriate diagnostic “rules” and include: miss-
ing key data, inadequate review of existing data, 
deficits in medical knowledge, lacking skills in 
evidence-based practice and decision-making, 
Table 17.5 Bias and heuristics in clinical reasoning: examples and corrective strategies [19]
Bias Description Example Corrective strategy
Anchoring Tendency to fixate on first 
impression and not to 
consider further 
information available
The physician diagnosed a viral 
meningitis instead of cervical 
osteomyelitis on the basis of high 
fever and neck pain, ignoring 
neck pain worsened not only on 
flexion, but also on palpation and 
previous fore-harm wound
Think beyond your 
favorite diagnosis or first 
impression
Reconsider initial 
diagnosis when new data 
or unexpected clinical 
course
Availability Tendency to accept the 
diagnosis that more easily 
comes to mind because of 
recent observation rather 
than to consider 
prevalence and incidence 
of such diagnosis
The physician diagnosed a viral 
meningitis instead of cervical 
osteomyelitis, as he had just seen 
a case of viral meningitis
Consider always disease 
prevalence and incidence
Confirmation To look only for signs and 
symptoms that confirm 
your favorite hypothesis 
or to interpret clinical 
findings only to support 
such hypothesis, without 
looking for or even 
disregarding opposite 
evidences
The physician diagnosed a skin 
rash under the axilla of a diabetic 
patient as intertrigo missing a 
diagnose of erythema migrans 
due to Lyme disease
Utilize an objective tool, 
such as a differential 
diagnosis checklist, to 
verify if diagnosis 




To consider definite a 
diagnosis without 
evidence, but due to a 
label applied to the first 
contact and transmitted by 
all the people who took 
care of the patient
The physician attributed to 
alcohol withdrawal syndrome the 
psychomotor agitation of a patient 
with a sticky label of alcoholic, 
missing a life-threatening sepsis
Critically review 
diagnoses of others and 
look for evidence to 
support them
Framinga To decide on options 
based on whether the 
options are presented with 
positive or negative 
connotations or to be 
influenced by the context
The physician may decide to 
request a cranial CT scan in the 
same patient more often if it has 
been presented as associated with 
90% of true positives than 10% of 
false negatives
The physician may diagnose more 
easily a ruptured abdominal 
aneurysm in ER than in outpatient 
clinic
Change perspective
Gambler’s fallacy To believe a diagnosis less 
probable, if it occurred in 
several previous patients
The physician missed a diagnosis 
of pulmonary embolism as he 
diagnosed four cases of 
pulmonary embolism in the last 
week
Consider always pre-test 
probability
(continued)
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Table 17.5 (continued)
Bias Description Example Corrective strategy
Multiple alternative 
bias
To reduce differential 
diagnosis to few more 
familial hypotheses, when 
multiple options are 
available
The physician missed a rare 
diagnosis of familial 
Mediterranean fever and 
submitted the patient to surgery 
for appendicitis
Utilize an objective tool, 
such as a differential 
diagnosis checklist
Verify if diagnosis 
correlates with technical 
findingsOutcome bias To opt for the diagnosis 
associated with the best 
outcome, valuing more 
physician hope than 
clinical data
The physician interpreted as 
benign a lung nodule, instead to 
order further investigations
Frequency gambling 
bias and worst-case 
bias
In ambiguous clinical 
picture, to opt for a benign 
diagnosis, assuming 
benign diseases are more 
common.
It is opposite to the 
worst-case bias
The physician interpreted the 
poly-globulia as reactive rather 
than as a proliferative disorder in 
a heavy smoker
Broaden the history to 




To assume that a patient 
presenting with the same 
symptoms has always the 
same disease
The physician diagnosed heart 
failure instead of pulmonary 
embolism in a patient presenting 
with dyspnea and a repeated 
hospital admissions for heart 
failure
Use a differential 
diagnosis checklist and 
rule out worst-case 
scenario
Consider prevalence and 
incidence of any 
hypothesisSearch satisfying 
bias
In presence of a main 
diagnosis, to stop to look 
for secondary ones.
In this way, the physician 
will miss comorbidities, 
complications, and 
additional diagnoses
To attribute to hypertensive heart 
disease the atrial fibrillation 
occurred in a patient with 
essential hypertension, missing 
hyperthyroidism
Sunk cost biasa The tendency to pursue a 
course of action, even 
after it has proved to be 
suboptimal, because 
resources have been 
invested in that course of 
action
The physician continued to look 
for a cancer in a patient with 
fatigue, even if investigations are 
repeatedly negative
“Do not cling to a mistake just 
because you spent a lot of time in 
making it” Aubrey De Graf
Visceral bias To opt for a diagnosis 
being influenced by 
emotions
The physician attributed 
iron-deficiency anemia to 
hypermenorrhea in a patient her 
age without looking for bowel 
diseases
Commission bias Tendency to do something 
even if it is not supported 
by robust evidence and 
may in fact do harm
The physician complied with the 
request for lumbar puncture of the 
parents of an 18-year-old girl with 
fever and headache to rule out 
meningococcal meningitis 
although the neutrophil count was 
normal. The girl then developed a 
severe post-puncture headache 
and was admitted to hospital
Consider always evidence 
and balance benefits and 
risks
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erroneous consideration of tests value, poor 
supervision of N-AR [28]. At the end, also noisy 
environment, interruptions, high workload, 
fatigue, and time pressure can impair reasoning 
[27].
Health Research & Educational Trust (HRET), 
Hospital Improvement Innovation Network 
(HIIN) team, and Society to Improve Diagnosis 
in Medicine (SIDM) [29] published “Diagnostic 
error—Change Package,” a document including a 
menu of strategies and concepts that any hospital 
should implement (improving teamwork effec-
tiveness and diagnostic process reliability, engag-
ing patients and caregivers, reinforcing learning 
system, and optimizing cognitive performances 
of clinicians) [29]. For this last aim, several tools 
are available: (a) checklists for diagnostic pro-
cess such as CATCH (Comprehensive history 
and physical exam, Alternate explanations, Take 
a diagnostic timeout to be certain, Consider criti-
cal diagnoses not be missed, Help if needed) 
[30]; (b) mnemonic decision support tools like 
VITAMIN CC & D checklist (Vascular, Infection 
& Intoxication, Trauma & Toxins, Autoimmune, 
Metabolic, Idiopathic & Iatrogenic, Neoplastic, 
Congenital, Conversion, Degenerative); (c) lists 
of Red Flags; (d) electronic decision support sys-
tems like Isabel, associated with the highest 
accurate diagnosis retrieval rates [31]; (e) debias-
ing questions (Table  17.6) [32]; (f) reflective 
practice by the following options:
 – The crystal ball experience [29]: stop and ask: 
“if my diagnosis was wrong, which alterna-
tives should I consider?”
 – The ROWS (Rule Out Worst case Scenario) 
[29]: exclude first the most severe possible 
diagnoses.
 – The Blue and Red Team Challenge [33], bor-
rowed from military sector, is a safe method to 
improve clinical decision-making in complex 
clinical situations. Staff is divided into two 
teams: the Blue Team takes clinical history, 
makes the synthesis and generates diagnostic 
hypotheses; the Red Team acts as an indepen-
dent reviewer by thinking critically about the 
clinical picture and identifying alternative 
diagnoses to those presented.
 – Take 2—think, do [32] is designed to improve 
awareness and recognition of potential errors 
and reduce morbidity and mortality of wrong, 
missed, or delayed diagnosis. Literally, it 
means “Take 2 minutes to deliberate diagno-
sis” to verify if there are situations that need a 
closer look or diagnosis re-evaluation (Think 
moment) and act (Do moment). A closer look 
is necessary if physician is Hungry, Angry, 
Table 17.5 (continued)
Bias Description Example Corrective strategy
Premature closure To stop seeking other 
information after reaching 
a diagnostic conclusion
The radiologist did not see a 
second fracture, after the first has 
been identified
Review the case, seek 
other opinions (e.g., 
radiology backup), and 
consult objective 
resources (e.g., an 
orthopedic review that 
might include mention of 




To make a diagnosis 
considering only typical 
manifestations of a 
disease
The physician missed a diagnosis 
of myocardial infarction 





Extrapolation biasa To generalize experiences 
and clinical trial results to 
groups of patients in 
whom intended actions 
have not been properly 
evaluated
The physician ordered a CT scan 
to exclude an acute coronary 
syndrome in a patient with 
previous coronary artery bypass 
grafting (CABG)
Use tests for evidence- 
based indications
aThese biases can affect not only diagnostic process but also treatment decisions
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Late, or Tired (HALT), at risk of cognitive 
biases (e.g., context, framing bias) or in case of 
difficult patient engagement, knowledge defi-
cit, time pressure, high-risk presentations; 
diagnosis re-evaluation if things are not going 
as planned, patient is deteriorating, response to 
treatment is not as expected, at shift change or 
discharge or in case of patient’s/caregiver’s 
concern. Strategies to review and challenge the 
diagnosis are individual strategies, i.e., 
Diagnostic Timeout; Team-based strategies, 
e.g., Red Team Blue Team Challenge; second 
opinion from specialist services or senior med-
ical officer. Such approach helps to rule out the 
worst-case scenario, identify atypical or rare 
presentations, re-evaluate patients who do not 
improve, acknowledge patient and caregivers’ 
concerns, recognize high-risk patient groups, 
favor discussion or appropriate referral and 
escalation for diagnostic dilemmas, effective 
communication in case of care transfer.
At the end, appropriate and effective clinical 
reasoning should be trained. The “twelve tips for 
teaching avoidance of diagnostic errors” and “ten 
commandments to reduce cognitive errors" can 
be helpful to this scope [32].
17.2.3  Medication Errors
Medication errors (MEs) are unintended, pre-
ventable events that can cause or lead to inappro-
priate medication use or patient harm [34]. You 
make MEs if you give the right medication to a 
wrong patient or the wrong medication/dose to 
the right patient, if you prescribe a medication to 
the wrong patient or without indication or when 
you forget to give a medication that was due. 
MEs are one of the most common medical errors 
occurring in every setting: 41.7% happen in care 
homes, 38.3% in primary care, and 20% in sec-
ondary care settings. It has been estimated that 
less than 1% cause harm to patients [35]. 
Associated harm is moderate in 26% of cases and 
severe in 2% [35]. They are also costly in terms 
of lives and resources [36].
MEs fall in the broadest category of adverse 
drug events (ADEs) that represent 5% of all AEs 
in high-income countries and 2.9% in low- middle 
income ones, according to WHO estimation [37]. 
ADEs are untoward, preventable or not, out-
comes due to medications. If a patient has a skin 
rash due to an antibiotic, it is an ADE; if allergy 
was known, it is a preventable ADE. Preventable 
ADEs are formally MEs. Lastly, potential ADEs 
(pADEs) are MEs with the potential to cause an 
injury [38].
Given the well-known problem of under- 
reporting of ADEs, MEs affect about 4.8–5.3% 
of hospitalized patients with a significant vari-
ability by setting: intensive care is the most 
affected, whereas obstetrics the least as many 
drugs are prohibited [36, 39–41]. MEs may occur 
at any stage of medication process from ordering 
to transcription, dispensing, administering, and 
monitoring. About 80% happen during prescrib-
ing (39%) or nurse administration (38%), the 
Table 17.6 “Debiasing questions” to avoid cognitive 
errors in high-risk situations: what should I ask myself 
[33]
High-risk situations Questions
Handoff Is this patient handed off to 






Did the patient, a nurse, or 
another doctor suggest to me 




Did I choose the first 
diagnosis that came to my 
mind?




Do not I like that patient for 
some reason?
Do I have something in 
common with that patient?
Noisy and/or busy 
environment
Was there any interruption or 
distraction during the 
evaluation of that patient?
Personal fatigue Was I sleepy or tired during 
that patient evaluation?
Cognitive overload Am I overloaded or 
over- extended from a 
cognitive point of view?
Stereotyped situation Am I stereotyping that 
patient?
Time pressure, high 
workload
Am I neglecting some “must 
not miss” diagnosis?
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remaining 20% during transcription and verifica-
tion (12%) or pharmacy dispensing (11%) [42]. 
Any type of error can result from different proxi-
mal causes and a single proximal cause can lead 
to a variety of errors. For example, lack of drug 
knowledge can cause wrong choice, dose, fre-
quency, route, or technique of administration. 
Wrong dose can result from lack of drug or 
patient knowledge, slip or memory lapses, tran-
scription errors, and so on. Behind proximal 
causes there are latent causes or system failures. 
Leape et al. counted 16 different system failures, 
but the first seven have in common an impaired 
access to information and accounted for 78% of 
all MEs, whereas work and staff assignment have 
been associated to a broad range of errors such as 
slips, dose- and identity-checking, breakdown of 
allergy barriers [41].
Frequency of MEs/ADEs in IM has been 
poorly investigated. An 8-month prospective, 
cross-sectional study found that 89% of the 
patients experienced at least one ME during hos-
pitalization, with a mean of 2.6 errors per patient 
or 0.2 errors per ordered medication. More than 
70% of MEs happened during prescription. The 
most prevalent prescription MEs were inappro-
priate drug selection, prescription of unauthor-
ized drugs or for untreated indications. The most 
involved drugs were cardiovascular agents fol-
lowed by antibiotics, vitamins, minerals, and 
electrolytes [43].
MEs are more frequent and severe in the so- 
called high-risk situations due to high-risk 
patients and/or providers, medications, or set-
tings. High-risk patients are younger or older, 
multi-morbid or chronic patients (with liver and/
or renal impairment), on polypharmacy [44–47]. 
High-risk providers are younger or not expert 
providers [48, 49]. High-risk systems are hospi-
tals delivering acute care (e.g. error rates are 
likely higher for drugs administered intrave-
nously compared with other routes [50]) and 
high-risk medications are the so-called high-alert 
medications (HAMs) and look-alike, sound-alike 
medications (LASA). HAMs have a heightened 
risk of causing significant patient harm when 
used erroneously. They include drugs with a low 
therapeutic index and drugs at a high risk of harm 
when administered by the wrong route or at 
wrong dosage or when other system errors occur. 
The acronym A-PINCH serves as a reminder of 
them, it stays for Anti-infective, Potassium and 
other electrolytes, Insulin, Narcotics and other 
analgesics, Chemotherapeutic agents, Heparin 
and other anticoagulants. LASA are drugs with 
similar names or boxes [50].
Although there is no standard definition, poly-
pharmacy is generally defined as the concurrent 
use of five or more medications [51], over-the- 
counter and complementary medicines included. 
It increases MEs because it reduces compliance 
and favors timing and/or dosing errors, duplica-
tions, or omissions. Drug–drug and drug–disease 
interactions, instead, increase ADEs [51]. It is 
particularly risky in IM as it cares for poly- 
pathological patients, even if internists could be 
more aware and cautious, as supposed by a 
French study [52].
Care transition is a key moment of care for 
several reasons, medication safety included. It 
occurs when a patient moves to, or returns from, 
home, hospital, residential care setting or simply 
outpatient clinics, general practitioners’ office or 
consultation. In care transition unintentional 
(changes not supported by clinical reason) and/or 
undocumented (motivated but not documented 
changes) medication discrepancies can occur 
[53]. They are MEs that can lead to ADEs. A 
mean of 1.72 unintentional discrepancies per 
patient have been reported at hospital admission 
(0.16 per patient potentially harmful) and 2.05 
per patient (0.3 potentially harmful) at discharge 
from hospital [54].
Causes of MEs are numerous, so multiple 
simultaneous interventions are needed to reduce 
their rate and impact [36]. In recent years, infor-
mation technology has been established as a cor-
nerstone for MEs reduction. Recent meta-analysis 
highlighted that in hospital computerized physi-
cian’s order entry is associated with a greater than 
50% decline in pADEs [55], and the use of bar-
code assisted medication administration substan-
tially reduced the rate of MEs and pADEs [56].
Medication reconciliation (MR) is recom-
mended to avoid unintentional discrepancies 
between patients’ medications across transitions 
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in care. At a minimum, medication reconciliation 
refers to the completion of a “Best Possible 
Medication History” (BPMH) and the act of cor-
recting any unintended discrepancies between a 
patient’s previous medication regimen and the 
proposed medication orders at admission (from 
home or a healthcare facility, such as a nursing 
home), inpatient transfer (to or from other ser-
vices or units, such as the intensive care unit), or 
discharge (to home or a healthcare facility). More 
advanced medication reconciliation involves 
inter-professional collaboration (e.g. a physician 
and nurse or pharmacist conducting medication 
reconciliation as a team), integration into dis-
charge summaries and prescriptions, and provi-
sion of medication counseling to patients [23]. 
Medication reconciliation has also been bundled 
with other interventions to improve the quality of 
transitions in care, such as patient counseling 
about discharge care plans, coordination of fol-
low- up appointments, and post-discharge tele-
phone calls [24–26].
It refers to the completion of the BPMH and 
the correction of any unintended discrepancies 
between patient’s previous therapy and that pre-
scribed on admission to hospital or other health-
care facility, at discharge from them or in case or 
transfer to other wards or settings. More advanced 
system of MR include inter-professional collabo-
ration (physician, nurse, pharmacist as a team), 
integration of MR in discharge letters and pre-
scriptions, medication counseling to patients. It 
seems that MR alone cannot reduce post- 
discharge hospital utilization within 30 days, but 
it requires to be associated with other interven-
tions such as coordinated discharge plan, coun-
seling about discharge plan to patients, follow-up 
appointments and post-discharge phone calls. 
Evidence shows that pharmacist involvement 
increase intervention’s success [57]. Beyond that 
there are several strategies that any operator can 
use to prevent MEs (Table 17.7).
17.2.3.1  Special Focus: Oxygen 
and Noninvasive Ventilation
Oxygen is actually a drug and, moreover, the 
most prescribed drug in hospitals. Oxygen is 
indicated in many critical conditions and is a life- 
saving drug, as it prevents severe hypoxemia. 
However, it can potentially cause serious damage 
or even death if it is not properly administered 
and managed. The National Patient Safety 
Agency (NPSA) published in 2009 a report of 
281 incidents in which an inappropriate prescrip-
tion and management of oxygen caused 9 deaths 
and contributed to other 35 [58]. The analysis of 
these events highlighted various error modes: (1) 
failed or incorrect prescription; (2) oxygen 
administration without a written prescription; (3) 
failure to monitor or to act in the event of altered 
oxygen saturation levels; (4) confusion between 
oxygen and compressed air or other gases, erro-
neous flows, inadvertent disconnection of the 
flow; (5) empty cylinder equipment, missing 
equipment. Therefore, NPSA has issued a series 
of recommendations to improve the safety of 
oxygen therapy (Table 17.8).
Noninvasive mechanical ventilation, thanks to 
its potential for use outside intensive care, for 
example in IM, has been shown to significantly 
Table 17.7 Individual behavioral strategies to avoid 
medication errors
1. Write orders legibly
2.  Limit verbal orders, especially in case of high alert 
or look—alike, sound-alike medications
3.  Have always an independent double check for 
“high-alert drugs”
4.  Eliminate the need for calculations through use of 
tables
5. Use pumps if indicated and available
6.  Avoid dangerous abbreviations such as those in the 
ISMP list
7.  Avoid the “trailing zero” and put always a zero 
before decimals
8.  Take a complete medication review at any patient 
encounter
9.  Know any drug you prescribe, dispense, or 
administer
10. Adjust doses to liver and/or renal function
11.  Check allergies and interactions before 
prescription and/or administration
12.  Check patient identity, drug, dosage, dose, route, 
and rate before prescribe, dispense, or administer
13. Ask if you are in doubt or you do not know
14.  Explain the purpose of any medication 
introduction or withdrawal to patients, caregivers, 
and other team members
15.  Put safety ahead of timeliness and exercise caution 
when you are out of the normal safety zone of 
practice
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reduce mortality, the use of intubation and 
mechanical ventilation, especially in patients 
with COPD exacerbation.
A recent review [59] of AEs reported during 
noninvasive ventilation has shown some high- 
risk situations: (1) inadequate monitoring of 
patients unable to ask for help; (2) alarms deacti-
vated by the staff; (3) staff not familiar with the 
ventilators and their proper use (e.g. if they 
require a CO2 valve or not; when patients bring 
home appliances to the hospital); (4) implemen-
tation of a new ventilator or a new interface with-
out training. In Table  17.8, Joint Commission 
International [60]/British Thoracic Society/
Intensive Care Society [61] recommendations to 
improve the safety of noninvasive ventilation are 
listed.
17.2.4  Interventional Procedure- 
Related Errors
The National Institute for Health and Care 
Excellence (NICE) defines an “interventional 
procedure” as a procedure used for diagnosis 
and/or treatment that involves [62]:
• making a cut or a hole to gain access to the 
inside of a patient’s body—for example, when 
carrying out an operation or inserting a tube 
into a blood vessel
• gaining access to a body cavity (such as the 
digestive system, lungs, womb, or bladder) 
without cutting into the body — for example, 
examining or carrying out treatment on the 
inside of the stomach using an instrument 
inserted via the mouth
• using electromagnetic radiation (which 
includes X-rays, lasers, gamma-rays, and 
ultraviolet light) — for example, using a laser 
to treat eye problems.
Interventional procedures most frequently 
carried out autonomously by the internists at 
bedside are: thoracentesis, paracentesis, rachi-
centesis, osteo-medullary biopsy, central venous 
accesses, joint aspirations, but literature does 
not provide data on their frequency. Errors dur-
ing interventional procedures can cause various 
AEs of different severity, but apart from compli-
Table 17.8 Recommendations to improve safety in oxygen therapy and noninvasive ventilation [60–63]
Oxygen therapy Noninvasive ventilation
1.  Always ask yourself if the patient needs oxygen. Routine use of 
oxygen in patients with myocardial infarction, stroke, or dyspnea 
without respiratory failure is not supported by the evidence
2.  Prescribe oxygen indicating the target of peripheral saturation 
(SpO2) to be achieved: 94–98% for critically hypoxemic patients 
and 88–92% in patients at risk of hypercapnia (obese, 
kyphoscoliotic and affected by other restrictive syndromes, 
patients with neuromuscular diseases) or with manifest 
hypercapnic respiratory failure
3.  Use the appropriate device. Nasal cannulas are adequate for most 
patients; the mask with reservoir must be reserved to limited 
cases of critically ill patients. Use a 28% ventimask for high-risk 
patients with COPD or who require low-dose oxygen
4.  A correct oxygen prescription includes target, device, and dose 
(flow in l/min and fiO2%)
5.  Report in medical records the results when you check blood 
gases during oxygen therapy
5.  Before start oxygen, have blood gas analysis in all critical 
patients and, in particular, if you suspect acidosis or hypercapnia. 
Peripheral saturimetry does not provide information on pH and 
pCO2
6.  Monitor patients in oxygen therapy using systems for the early 
identification of clinical deterioration (e.g., NEWS)
7. I n an emergency, do not delay the administration of oxygen, to 
make the written prescription
8.  Educate patients, caregivers, and support staff (social and health 
workers) to correctly manage oxygen in hospital and at home
Organizational level
Short-term actions:
  1. Write down, share, and update a local 
policy
  2. Provide a checklist for each model of 
ventilator available in the department, in 
particular about circuit assembly, 
definition of controls and alarms)
  3. Perform and document staff training 
and periodic retraining
Long-term actions:
  1. Check staff competences annually
  2. Make available the material used for 
the training
  3. Create a multidisciplinary team with 
clear roles and criteria for intervention
Operational level
  1. Offer continuous monitoring of oxygen 
peripheral saturation to patients on 
noninvasive mechanical ventilation
  2. Perform intermittent controls of pH and 
pCO2 by blood gas analysis
  3. Provide continuous 
electrocardiographic monitoring in case 
of heart rate >120/min or arrhythmias or 
possible associated heart defects.
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cation rates there substantially no data about 
other quality measures. For example, we know 
that the most common AE of thoracentesis is 
pneumothorax occurring in up to 39% of 
patients [63] (10–50% of them requiring tube 
thoracostomy), but we know very few about 
success rate, adequacy of the diagnostic speci-
mens obtained, wait time, accuracy and com-
pleteness of clinical  documentation, and patient 
satisfaction of thoracentesis and other proce-
dures performed bedside on IM inpatients. On 
such premises, at General Hospital of Toronto 
an audit on procedural quality of interventional 
procedures was conducted in General Internal 
Medicine [64].
Over a 2-week period, 19 procedures (4 tho-
racenteses, 6 paracenteses, 8 lumbar punctures, 
and 1 arthrocentesis) were attempted, of which 
14 at the bedside and 5 by interventional radiol-
ogy. Only 7 (50%) of the bedside procedures 
were successful. The most common reason for 
failure was inability to aspirate fluid. Less than 
25% of bedside procedures were done on ultra-
sound guidance. The majority were carried out 
by students and residents, but only 7 (50%) were 
documented as supervised. None of the opera-
tors used procedural timeouts or checklists. Over 
50% of the bedside procedures were performed 
on evenings or weekends with less success (44% 
vs 60%), suggesting that procedures should be 
done during the daytime, when there is more 
availability of support and supervision. The 
quality of documentation was also suboptimal. 
Less than 50% of the procedures documented 
that the specific risks of the procedure were 
explained to the patient, how much local anes-
thetic was used, or what was the side (i.e., left or 
right). Communication with general practitioner 
was poor  as well: only 66% of the discharge 
summaries included the date of the procedure 
and only 75% the results of the procedure [64]. 
Another study on lumbar puncture investigating 
for headache on an acute medical admission unit 
reported that documentation of position and 
cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) opening pressure was 
poor (42% and 32%, respectively) even if essen-
tial, and only 32% had paired serum glucose 
measured [65].
Procedure-related errors are due to procedural 
and system factors [66], such as lack of clinician 
comfort with performing the procedure, inade-
quate supplies, insufficient time, or patient fac-
tors such as body habitus or characteristics of the 
fluid collection such as loculation. Once more, 
there is good evidence that clinicians are per-
forming fewer bedside procedures and are less 
confident in their bedside procedural skills [67, 
68]. So, interventions able to improve safety turn 
out to be: ultrasound guidance, use of a procedure- 
specific checklist, patient identification policy 
and pre-procedural briefing about patient charac-
teristics and risk factors, routine review of 
physician- specific procedural outcomes, periodic 
evaluation of operators’ competences, training 
through simulation, supervision until compe-
tence is consistently demonstrated and creation 
of dedicated teams [69–71], periodic assessment 
of procedural quality including informed consent 
obtained, waiting time, use of procedural timeout 
and sonography if needed, number of attempts, 
success and complication rate, diagnostic sam-
pling quality, completeness of diagnostic tests, 
avoidance of waste, documentation complete-
ness, legibility (for handwritten notes) and accu-
racy, wrong side errors, need for repeat procedure 
and patient satisfaction [64].
17.2.5  Communication Errors
Inter-professional communication in IM wards is 
complex, owing to the variety of patients’ popu-
lation with changing clinical conditions and con-
stant turnover, and multiple providers’ alternation 
[72]. A lot of information is exchanged every day 
among care providers in IM, through face-to-face 
(ward rounds, handover, briefing), synchronous 
(telephone or page), or asynchronous ways (clini-
cal chart, text messages, emails, written handoff). 
Anyway, there are only few empirical studies that 
explore inter-professional communication in IM 
[73], even if effective inter-professional commu-
nication in such information-intensive environ-
ment is critical to achieve a safe and timely care.
The most common communication strategies 
in IM include: handover, ward rounds, clinical 
M. L. Regina et al.
229
chart, briefing, and debriefing. In addition, there 
are other informal communication ways such as 
corridor conversation or chance hallway 
encounters.
17.2.5.1  Handoff
Up to 70% of sentinel events stem at least in part 
from miscommunications, often occurring during 
shift changes [74]. The transfer and acceptance 
of patient-care responsibility achieved through 
effective communication is technically called 
“handoff.” It is a real-time process of passing 
patient-specific information from one caregiver/
team to another for the purpose of ensuring con-
tinuity and safety of care [75]. US International 
Joint Commission recommendations for hando-
ver are reported in Table 17.9 [75]. The most rel-
evant is to refer to standardized handoff tools and 
methods (forms, templates, checklists, protocols, 
mnemonics, etc.). A recent review reported at 
least 24 different handoff mnemonics [76]. The 
minimum critical content to communicate to the 
receiver should include: (1) sender contact infor-
mation; (2) illness assessment, including sever-
ity; (3) patient summary, including events leading 
up to illness or admission, hospital course, ongo-
ing assessment, and plan of care; (4) to-do action 
list; (5) contingency plans; (6) allergy list; (7) 
code status; (8) medication list; (9) dated labora-
tory tests; (10) dated vital signs [75].
The most commonly used mnemonics are 
SBAR and its variants (I-SBARR, ISOBAR) and 
I-PASS.  The former, developed in military set-
ting to quickly pass information in command 
chain [77], has been adopted in healthcare with 
evidence for improved patient safety. Anyway, it 
is more suitable for emergency calls [77]. I-PASS 
Handoff Bundle was developed at the Boston 
Children Hospital and includes team training, 
verbal mnemonic, and structured printed tool. 
Medical errors fell by 40%—from 32% of admis-
sions at baseline to 19% of admissions 3 months 
during the pilot study [78]. Currently, the I-PASS 
Mentored Implementation Program is a collabo-
ration with the Society for Hospital Medicine 
funded by AHRQ, to facilitate implementation of 
the I-PASS Handoff Bundle in IM [79], as it is 
more suitable for complex patients.
17.2.5.2  Ward Round 
According to the Royal College of Physicians 
(RCP) and the Royal College of Nurses (RCN), 
ward round (WR) is “a complex clinical process 
during which the clinical care of inpatients is 
reviewed” [80]. It is also considered “a ritual of 
hospital life” [81] and “the cornerstone of hospi-
tal care” [82]. Undoubtedly, it is the main moment 
of information exchange in IM [83], critical to 
ensure high-quality, safe, and timely care. 
However, modern hospital organization is threat-
ening effective WR, in particular because of staff 
shortage. In order to “save the ward round,” RCP 
and RCN recently purposed to structure WR, as 
its standardization could warrant effectiveness 
and efficiency. A structured multidisciplinary 
WR includes four steps: (1) preparation; (2) pre- 
round briefing; (3) round; (4) post-round briefing. 
WR scheduling is not a negligible aspect to avoid 
overlapping with other activities (i.e. drug rounds, 
mealtimes, or visiting hours) or other team 
rounds in case of outliers. Inadequate scheduling 
can generate resources and efficiency issues but 
also safety problems, e.g. lack of the nurse 
responsible for the patient during WR and time 
wasted commuting to wards [80]. Preparation 
and pre-round briefing are critical to save time 
and resources for WR, post-round briefing to 
clearly delegate any task. A debrief should be 
conducted at the end of WR.  Briefing and de- 
briefing are practices borrowed from military 
world where they are used to assign mission tasks 
and verify them at the end. Briefing should be 
Table 17.9 Recommendations to increase handover 
safety [77]
Recommendations of International Joint Commission
1. Have a standardized approach to handoff 
communication
2. Prefer communications face to face, otherwise by 
telephone or video conference
3. Avoid only electronic or paper communications
4. Choose locations free from interruptions and noise
5. Include multidisciplinary team and also patient and 
family if appropriate
6. Do not rely on the patient and/or caregiver for the 
transfer of important information
7. Be traceable in case of need
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well-structured, concise, focused, shared, and 
reported in medical chart. For bedside round, 
RCP and RCN purpose a structure with precise 
roles and responsibilities for doctors, nurses, 
other professionals, and patients, listing the 
activities that should be carried out by any of 
them. In this way, everyone brings his/her com-
petencies and opinions, decisions are taken col-
legially, anyone is simultaneously informed, 
patients and/or caregiver actively participate and 
are timely informed about care plan [80]. That 
means no essential information is missed, break-
down in communication among team members 
and with patient or family is prevented, time and 
resources utilization is optimized, quality, and 
safety are warranted. Figure  17.2 includes a 
checklist for bedside round.
Other subsidiary rounds are board rounds 
(BRs) and intentional rounds (IRs). BRs are held 
away from bedside, next to a white board. They 
should be used to facilitate patient review but 






• leads the round and
 introduces the
 multidisciplinary
 team to patient
 and/or family
• provides the team
 with updated clinical
 history and
 examination, tests
 results, response to
 treatment, then
 collect information
 from patients and/or
 family, staff
• reviews drug chart
• summarizes team
 inputs
• defines daily plan and
 goals
• plans discharge
• discusses care plan
 with patient and/or
 family, checking their
 understanding.
• provides update of
 care provided,
 discharge and follow-
 up arrangements.
provides an update












express their feeling or concerns, ask questions about care plan or discharge and provide any additional information.
Fig. 17.2 Roles and responsibilities of the different health professionals during bedside round
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also for post-round briefing to summarize all 
issues, identify and prioritize tasks, and delegate 
responsibilities appropriately [80]. IRs are pro- 
active nurse rounds to check patients at set inter-
vals. During IRs, nurses assess patient’s 
experience and essential care needs (4 P: posi-
tioning, pain, personal needs, and placement). In 
terms of patient safety, positioning check helps to 
prevent pressure ulcers, personal needs (i.e., toi-
let) and placement of personal items checks 
reduce falls. Nevertheless, IRs facilitate team to 
organize workload [80].
17.2.5.3  Clinical Records 
Keeping clinical records (CRs) is an integral 
component in good professional practice and the 
delivery of high-quality care. Regardless of the 
type of documentation (electronic or paper), a 
good and updated CRs allow continuity and coor-
dination of care, aid informed decision-making, 
avoid repetition of tests or other investigations, 
improve communication between the various 
health professionals and improve time manage-
ment. Bad CRS misinform healthcare profession-
als and patients, prolong hospitalization, 
jeopardize patient care leads to serious incidents 
and increase medical-legal risk [84]. Figure 17.3 
summarizes what to do and not to do to keep 
good medical records.
17.3  Safety Practices 
and Implementation 
Strategy
According to the Agency for Healthcare Research 
and Quality and the National Quality Forum “a 
Patient Safety Practice is a type of process or 
structure whose application reduces the proba-
bility of adverse events resulting from exposure to 
the healthcare system across a range of diseases 
and procedures” [85].
In 2001 [86] and 2013 [85], an international 
panel conducted an evidence-based assessment 
of patient safety strategies (PSSs). The PSSs 
were categorized according to the following 
aspects: frequency and severity of the problem 
addressed, strength of evidence of the effective-
ness of the safety strategy, the evidence or poten-
tial harmful consequence of the safety strategy, 
an estimation of implementation difficulties and 
costs. It categorizes each PSS according to the 
following: the scope of the underlying problem 
that the PSS addresses (its frequency and sever-
ity); the strength of evidence about the effective-
ness of the safety strategy; the evidence or 
potential for harmful consequences of the strat-
egy; a rough estimate of the cost of implementing 
the strategy (low, medium, or high); and an 
assessment of the difficulty of implementing the 
strategy. As a result of this process, 10 PSSs were 
identified as “strongly encouraged” and other 12 
as “encouraged” for adoption [85].
Here, we report some safety practices relevant 
to IM, most of them included in the list of strongly 
encouraged or encouraged for adoption [87].
17.3.1  Prevention of Age and Frailty- 
Related Adverse Events
Falls. The rate of falls in acute care hospitals var-
ies from 1 to 9 per 1000 bed-days. The first effec-
tive strategy relies on the timely recognition of 
patients with risk factors for falls (Table 17.10) 
[88]. The National Institute for Health and Care 
Excellence (NICE) recommends to regard as the 
population at risk all inpatients older than 65 and 
those between 50 and 64 who are identified as 
being at high risk of falling [89]. Actually, some 
tools are available to discriminate between high- 
and low-risk patients, but they may show limita-
tions in specific populations. Morse Falls Score 
(MFS) and STRATIFY Score are the two most 
widely validated tools. However, they were not 
judged to be diffusely adopted and generate 
greater benefits than nursing staff clinical judg-
ment [90]. NICE guidelines do not recommend 
any predictive score [89]. Besides, various 
assessments and interventions should take place 
(Table  17.11): (1) all aspects of the inpatient 
environment  —including flooring, lighting, and 
furniture— must be identified and addressed; (2) 
high-risk patients should be considered for multi- 
factorial evaluation in order to timely identify 
cognitive impairment, incontinence, fall history, 
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Fig. 17.3 What 
healthcare operators 
have to do and not to do 
to keep good clinical 
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medications (Table  17.12) or health problems 
increasing the risk of falls, unsuitable footwear, 
and visual impairment. There is a high-quality 
evidence that multicomponent interventions can 
reduce risk for in-hospital falls by as much as 
30% [91]. The optimal bundle is not clearly 
defined but relevant components are: patients risk 
assessment, patient and staff education, bedside 
signs and wristband alerts, footwear advice, 
scheduled and supervised toileting, and medica-
tion review [91]. In particular, patients’ education 
should include exhaustive oral and written infor-
mation to patients/caregivers —taking into con-
sideration the patient’s ability to understand and 
retain this information— about (1) patient’s risk 
factors for falls; (2) how to call the nurse as well 
as when to ask for help before moving from or 
around the bed; (3) when and how to raise bed 
rails; (4) other interventions aimed at addressing 
individual risk factors.
Harms due to interventions have not been 
studied systematically, but they may include an 
increased use of restraints and sedatives and 
decreased patients’ mobilization [91].
Key factors for a successful implementation 
of such multicomponent interventions include: 
leadership support, engagement of frontline in 
the design of the intervention, multidisciplinary 
committee, pilot-testing the intervention, and 
changing nihilistic opinions about falls [91].
Wandering. It refers to two different, some-
times associated, behaviors: (1) the tendency of 
nursing home residents or hospital inpatients to 
persistently walk, spatial disorientation, or a 
combination of both [92]; (2) a situation in which 
a subject with dementia has become lost in the 
community. Although not all subjects with cogni-
tive impairment exhibit wandering behavior, all 
are at risk for wandering away from the care set-
ting and becoming lost [93].
The first measure to prevent wandering con-
sists of an accurate assessment of patient’s dis-
eases impairing cognition such as Alzheimer’s 
disease, fronto-temporal dementia, Lewy body 
disease, multi-infarct dementia, and delirium, on 
admission. In such cases, supervision is pivotal to 
reduce wandering-related problems [94] and 
should allow an immediate identification of 
patients at risk (e.g. through colored wristbands, 
armbands, or gowns), strategies providing an 
intensive surveillance (i.e. rooms close to the 
nursing station so that can be easily controlled by 
nurses and patients cannot go out without passing 
through it), and engagement of family members. 
This latter can play an important role during hos-
pitalization as a familiar voice or face can 
decrease fear and agitation of the patients, thus 
reducing the patient’s willing of wandering. 
Other strategies may include the avoidance of 
rooms near elevators, stairs, or exit doors as 
patients with cognitive impairment tend to 
respond to what they see around them. Placing 
clothes, shoes, and suitcases out of the patient’s 
view can help as well. Finally, electronic moni-
toring could represent a big help, installed in the 







New urinary incontinence or frequency
Adverse drug reactions (especially with psychotropic 
drugs)
Neurocardiovascular instability (usually orthostatic 
hypotension)
Table 17.11 External and internal factors associated 
with falls [182]
External factors Internal factors
Prior falls Physical restraint
Visual impairment Unsuitable footwear
Stroke Unsuitable ambulation 
aids
Joint diseases (i.e., 
arthritis/arthrosis)
Environmental factors 
(stairs, bathtub with no 
support, poor lighting, 
etc.)
Orthostatic hypotension





Drugs (impacting on 
blood pressure, glycemia, 
and gait)
17 Patient Safety in Internal Medicine
234
division of a hospital or a nursing home and 
potentially linked to local law enforcement 
agency, such as in the Project Lifesaver technol-
ogy (https://projectlifesaver.org/).
On the other end, inappropriate building orga-
nization, overworked and under-resourced sys-
tem, and limited staff knowledge of these 
problems may represent risk factors for patients’ 
wandering [95, 96].
Bed entrapment occurs when a patient is 
being caught, trapped, or entangled in the bed 
rails, mattress, or bed frame of a hospital bed 
[97]. Many health conditions can favor this event, 
such as cognitive and communication impair-
ments, frailty, agitation, uncontrolled pain, 
uncontrolled body movements, and bladder and/
or bowel dysfunction. Healthcare professionals 
should perform a patient’s evaluation to identify 
those at risk and monitor them by concentrating 
on the following elements: mental status, disease- 
related reasons for a reduced mobility capacity 
(obesity, neuromotor deficits), prior long bedrid-
den period, risk of fall and fall-related injuries, 
urine/fecal incontinence, and the paradox effect 
of certain drugs.
In order to prevent this event, it is very impor-
tant for all medical staff to familiarize with the 
areas of the bed where patients are most often 
entrapped (Fig. 17.4 and Table 17.13) [97]. These 
areas account for 80% of entrapment accidents 
occurring in the hospital. The US Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) provided some precise 
indications for the sizes of the different parts of 
the bed aimed at reducing as much as possible 
these accidents. For instance, in order to avoid 
trunk, head, and neck to be blocked in the bottom 
part of the bed, mattresses should cover com-
pletely this area and resist to patient’s movements 
and weight. Similarly, entrapment risks in the 
empty spaces between rails should be avoided. In 
Table 17.13, requirements for the size of the dif-
ferent bed areas are provided [98].
Aspiration pneumonia is considered as a 
continuum including community- and hospital- 
acquired pneumonias. However, data of in- 
hospital aspiration pneumonias are lacking as 
solid diagnostic criteria are not available [99, 
100].
An important step to face this dangerous com-
plication is represented by the recognition of risk 
factors (Table 17.14). Indeed, patients presenting 
with many risk factors have a 9- to 13-fold 
increased risk of death and adverse outcomes 
[101]. Compared to patients with community- 
acquired pneumonia, those at risk for aspiration 
experienced a 70% increased risk for 1-year mor-
tality, a 3-fold risk for recurrent pneumonia, and 
a 1.5-fold risk for re-hospitalization [101].
Since most of the elderly patients admitted to 
IM are assuming a long list of drugs, a great 
effort should be done to avoid sedatives, hypnot-
ics, antipsychotic agents, and anti-histamines, if 
possible [102]. Additionally, patients with dys-
phagia, especially those affected by a previous 
stroke or a neurodegenerative disease, can bene-
fit from speech and swallowing evaluation, 
before allowing feeding [103]. Oral feeding 
should always be preferred to enteral tube feed-
ing using a mechanical soft diet with thickened 
liquids, avoiding pureed food and thin liquids. 
Table 17.12 Drugs increasing the risk of falls [182]
Drugs with sedative effect on the CNS




Barbiturates Diuretics All types Sulfonylureas







CNS central nervous system, CV cardiovascular













Fig. 17.4 Areas where patients are most often entrapped. 
Zone 1: between the headboard or footboard and the mat-
tress; zone 2: under the rails; zone 3: between the rail and 
the mattress; zone 4: under the ends of the rail; zone 5: 
between the 2 bed rails; zone 6: between the end of the rail 
and the edge of the headboard or footboard; zone 7: within 
the rails [100]
Table 17.13 Areas of the bed at risk for entrapment and recommendations from the US Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) [99]
Zones Definition Recommendations
Zone 1 Any open space within the perimeter of the rail A loosened bar or rail can modify the size of the 
space.
The recommended space is <120 mm (i.e., head 
breadth)
Zone 2 The space under the rail between a mattress 
compressed by the weight of a patient’s head and 
the bottom edge of the rail at a location between 
the rail supports or next to a single rail support
Consider all factors modifying the mattress 
compressibility
The recommended space should be small enough to 
avoid head entrapment, i.e., <120 mm
Zone 3 The space between the inner surface of the rail 
and the mattress compressed by the weight of the 
patient’s head
This space should be small enough to avoid head 
entrapment considering the mattress 
compressibility and any lateral shift of the mattress 
or rail, i.e., recommended space <120 mm
Zone 4 The space growing between the mattress 
compressed by the patient and the lower part of 
the rail, at its end
Consider mattress compressibility, lateral shift of 
the mattress or rail, and degree of play from 
loosened rails to avoid entrapment of the patient’s 
neck, i.e., recommended space <60 mm
Zone 5 This area is occupied when partial length head 
and foot side rails are used on the same side of 
the bed
FDA recognizes these parts as at risk for 
entrapment encouraging manufacturers to report 
entrapment events at this area
Zone 6 The space between the end of the rail and the side 
edge of the headboard or footboard
However, when enteral feeding is unavoidable, 
patients should be positioned in a semi-recum-
bent and anti-Trendelenburg position to reduce 
the chance of gastric aspiration/regurgitation. In 
patients with dysphagia, it is helpful to consider 
a nutritional rehabilitation, during which swal-
lowing exercises and early mobilization may 
reduce risks of aspiration and/or recurrences 
[104, 105]. While the effectiveness of the naso-
gastric tube and the post-pyloric feeding is con-
troversial, the use of angiotensin-converting 
enzyme inhibitors (as anti-hypertensive drug) 
and cilostazol (as an anti-platelet drug) acting on 
substance P and bradykinin and improving cough 
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and swallowing reflexes showed more consisting 
results [106–108].
Oral hygiene may represent an important pre-
ventive action in non-ventilated patients: it has 
been demonstrated that chlorhexidine or mechan-
ical oral cleaning reduce up to 60% risk of aspira-
tion pneumonia [109]. However, it is important to 
remember that chlorhexidine can be toxic if aspi-
rated into the lungs, especially by ventilated 
patients. The association of oral care to supple-
mental nutrition also demonstrated to lower aspi-
ration pneumonia [110]. Anyway, a 
comprehensive oral care program (manual tooth, 
gum brushing, chlorhexidine mouthwashes, and 
upright positioning during feeding) evaluated in a 
cluster-randomized controlled trial conducted 
among nursing home residents showed a higher 
number of pneumonias/lower respiratory tract 
infections in the intervention group [111]. On the 
other hand, a short course (≤24 h) of prophylac-
tic β-lactam antibiotics was shown to reduce the 
risk of aspiration around the time of endotracheal 
intubation [112].
Delirium is a neuropsychiatric syndrome 
characterized by altered consciousness and atten-
tion with cognitive, emotional, and behavioral 
symptoms. It occurs among hospitalized 
patients—mainly in elderly frail people—at a 
rate from 14% to 56% and increases morbidity 
and mortality [113]. In this condition, multiple 
risk factors have been identified so that suggested 
intervention is obviously multicomponent. 
Evidence shows that they are effective in prevent-
ing delirium onset in at-risk patients in a hospital 
setting, without significant associated harms but 
it is insufficient to identify which multicompo-
nent interventions are the most beneficial, and 
which components within a program provide the 
most benefit [114, 115]. The aim of primary pre-
vention is to prevent physiological derangements 
by early mobilization, good hydration, sleep 
enhancement, family and caregiver involvement, 
in addition to physiotherapy and rehabilitation, as 
summarized in Table 17.15.
Since it is usually triggered by different fac-
tors, prevention strategies need to be reassessed 
during hospital stay [114].
Approaches including the education of nurs-
ing aides and caregivers, music therapy and psy-
chotherapy gave no definitive results [114].
The main recently published studies on phar-
macological approach are summarized in a 
review by Oh et  al. [114]. In general, antipsy-
chotic drugs did not demonstrate any clear bene-
fit in preventing delirium [116], similarly to 
cholinesterase inhibitors, ketamine, melatonin, 
and melatonin-receptor agonist (ramelteon) [117, 
118]. Hence, there is a lack of support in using 
drugs for prevention or treatment of delirium, 
especially when considered as a unique entity.
Table 17.14 Risk factors for aspiration pneumonia 
[103–105]
Impaired swallowing Esophageal disease, including 





Neurologic diseases, including 
seizures, multiple sclerosis, 
Parkinson’s disease and 
parkinsonism, stroke, 
dementia




Stroke or intracerebral 
hemorrhage
Cardiac arrest
Drug overdose and 
medications, such as narcotic 
agents, general anesthetic 
agents, and some 
antidepressant agents
Alcohol abuse
Increased amount of 
gastric content 
reaching the lungs
Percutaneous enteral tube 
feeding, especially when 
associated with gastric 
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At the end, if non-pharmacological strategies 
were proved to be effective on delirium onset, no 
convincing impact was provided for hospital 
mortality, 6-month mortality, or institutionaliza-
tion. As well, frailty, as a key predictor of out-
comes, was not taken into consideration [119].
17.3.2  Prevention of Healthcare- 
Associated Infections
Healthcare-associated infections (HAIs) repre-
sent a relevant problem for hospitalized patients 
all over the world. Some 3.2 million patients in 
Europe suffer every year from HAIs, of which 
nearly one third is considered preventable [120].
Many preventive strategies may help in reduc-
ing the spreading of HAIs [121]. For instance, 
patients coming from the intensive care unit to 
IM should be screened if they present with neu-
tropenia, diarrhea, skin rashes, known communi-
cable disease, or if they are known carriers of an 
epidemic bacterial strain. The recognition of risk 
factors, listed in Table 17.16 may help in reduc-
ing HAIs, too.
As hands are the most common vehicle for 
transmission of infections, hand hygiene is the 
single most effective measure to prevent the hori-
zontal transmission of infections among hospital-
ized patients and healthcare personnel. In 2003, 
World Health Organization promoted a world 
challenge on this topic, introducing the five 
moments for hand hygiene, two before and three 
after approaching the patient: (1) before touching 
the patient in order to protect him/her from germs 
carried on healthcare personnel’s hands; (2) 
before aseptic procedures to protect the patient 
against germs, including the patient’s own ones; 
Table 17.15 Multicomponent non-pharmacologic approaches to prevent delirium (adapted from [116])




• Provide adequate lighting, calendars, and clocks in order to help the patient orienting in the 
space
• The patient should be oriented in the space and in the role of the healthcare providers




• Patients should be encouraged to drink, eventually consider parenteral fluids




• Early postoperative mobilization should be encouraged as well as regular ambulation 
through specific programs
• Patients should be involved in active exercises based on their capacities
• Walking aids (canes, walkers) must be always nearby
Feeding 
assistance
• General nutrition guidelines should be followed. If needed, an advice from a dietician can 
be asked
• A proper fit of dentures must be provided
Vision and 
hearing
• Reversible cause of the impairment should be fixed
• Working hearing and visual aids must be available and used when needed
Sleep 
enhancement
• All medical or nursing procedures must be limited or avoided during sleep times
• Noise at night time must be avoided
Infection 
prevention
• Infections must be early recognized and treated
• Unnecessary catheterization must be avoided
• Infection-control procedures must be taken into consideration
Pain management • It is always important to assess the pain, especially among those patients with 
communication difficulties
• Pain must be monitored and managed in patients with known or suspected pain




• The list of medications, including class and number, must always be checked and modified, 
if needed
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(3) after body fluid exposure; (4) after touching 
the patient; and (5) after touching the patient’s 
surrounding (these three latter moments are 
intended to protect the personnel and the environ-
ment from the patient’s germs) and two methods, 
with water and soap or alcohol-based solutions 
[122].
In addition, standard precautions include pre-
ventive measures that should always be used, 
irrespective of a patient’s infection status. Sterile 
gloves should be worn after hand hygiene in case 
of sterile procedures or exposition to body fluids. 
It is important not to wear the same gloves when 
caring for more patients, remove them and wash 
hands after caring for a single patient. Wearing 
gown, mask, and eye protection/face shield is 
very important to avoid soiling clothing and skin 
during procedures potentially delivering body 
fluids [122].
In patients known or suspected to have air-
borne, contact or droplet infections (M. tubercu-
losis, H. influenzae, varicella zoster virus, herpes 
virus among others), additional precautions 
should be followed.
For airborne infections, isolation with 
negative- pressure ventilation is preferable. 
Additionally, all people entering the room, 
including visitors, must wear respiratory protec-
tions (such as the disposable N-95 respirator 
mask).
For contact infections, single use patient-care 
equipment is recommended. If unavoidable, ade-
quate cleaning and disinfection before using to 
another patient is mandatory. As well, the move-
ments of the patients across different wards 
should be limited.
In droplet infections, the patient should be iso-
lated and his/her movements limited, while 
 respiratory protections must be worn when enter-
ing the isolation room. Additional specific strate-
gies to prevent specific nosocomial infections 
have been reported by Mehta et al. [123].
Finally, environmental factors cannot be 
neglected. Adequate cleaning and disinfection 
are important, especially when considering the 
patient’s closest surfaces, such as bedrails, bed-
side tables, doorknobs, and equipment. The fre-
quency of cleaning should be as follows: surface 
cleaning twice weekly, floor cleaning 2–3 times/
day, and terminal cleaning after discharge or 
death. Central air-conditioning systems should 
ensure that air recirculates through appropriate 
filters (air should be filtered to 99% efficiency 
down to 5 μm). Isolation facility should include 
both negative- and positive-pressure ventilations. 
Alcohol gel dispensers should be positioned at 
the entry of every rooms and near entrance/exit 
for health operators, patients, and visitors.
17.3.3  Prevention of Venous 
Thromboembolism
The hospitalization for an acute condition is 
responsible for an eight-fold increase in the 
thrombotic risk and accounts for nearly 25% of all 
thromboembolic events [124]. However, risk 
stratification of patients admitted to IM is often 
complicated by their high heterogeneity [125, 
126]. For this purpose, the Padua Prediction Score 
has been implemented and validated by Prandoni 
et al. [126]. It includes 11 thrombotic risk factors 
and identifies patients at high or low risk for 
venous thromboembolism (VTE) (Table  17.17). 
Patients with a score  <4 (nearly 60% of the 
patients) are at low risk, while those with a risk 
score ≥4 (nearly 40%) have a high risk. Indeed, in 
the 3-month follow-up period, the incidence of 
VTE without any prophylaxis in the low-risk 
group was 0.3%, while the incidence in the high-
Table 17.16 Common risk factors increasing the risk of 
HAIs [122, 123]





Treatment-related Prior and/or prolonged antibiotic 
therapy
Mechanical ventilation





Prolonged intensive care unit stay 
(>3 days)
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risk group was 11% (hazard ratio HR 32.0, 95% 
confidence interval 4.1–251.0). Based on these 
findings, the Padua Prediction Score was recom-
mended as a tool for the identification of high-risk 
patients requiring thromboprophylaxis [125]. 
Anyway, the hemorrhagic risk should also be con-
sidered. In the study by Prandoni et al., major or 
clinically relevant bleeding complications were 
found in 1.6% of high-risk patients receiving 
pharmacological prophylaxis although all bleed-
ing complications were non-fatal [126]. In another 
study, active gastroduodenal ulcer, prior bleeding 
within 3 months, and low platelet count (<50,000/
mm3) were recognized as the strongest indepen-
dent risk factors for bleeding [127]. Other bleed-
ing risk factors included age >85 years, male sex, 
hepatic or renal failure, intensive care unit stay, 
central venous catheter, rheumatic disease, and 
cancer. All these factors have been integrated in a 
score for bleeding risk stratification (IMPROVE 
score), highlighting that more than a half of the 
major bleeding events were experienced by 
patients with a score ≥7 [127].
Combining thrombotic and hemorrhagic risk 
assessments, pharmacological and non- 
pharmacological measures can be adopted to 
safely reduce in-hospital VTE [128].
Current evidence is concordant in recogniz-
ing a similar efficacy of low-molecular-weight 
heparin (LMWH) and low-dose unfractionated 
heparin (LDUH) in patients hospitalized in the 
medical setting although LMWH is more likely 
to be associated with a lower risk of bleeding. 
Fondaparinux, the only selective inhibitor of 
factor Xa approved for the treatment and pre-
vention of thrombosis, showed a similar perfor-
mance compared to heparin both in terms of 
thromboprophylaxis and risk of bleeding [125]. 
For patients with an increased risk of bleeding, 
alternative treatments, such as graduated com-
pression stockings, intermittent pneumatic 
compression, and venous foot pumps, all aim-
ing at reducing venous stasis by inducing the 
movement of blood from superficial to deep 
veins through the perforator veins are recom-
mended [125].
Since IM usually receives a great number of 
patients often showing particular features 
(elderly, obese or underweight people, impaired 
kidney function, cancer), these specific popula-
tions need different managements [129].
Elderly patients present differences in terms 
of pharmacokinetics and an increased risk of 
bleeding, compared to the general population 
[130]. Further, older patients (>80 years) show a 
ten-fold risk increased risk for VTE compared to 
younger ones. Indeed, in the MEDENOX study, 
enoxaparin was greatly effective in reducing the 
risk of VTE in patients >80 years hospitalized in 
medical wards [131].
Obesity and overweight are recognized risk 
factors for VTE. The main concern is to modify 
or not the dosages to get the same efficacy in such 
conditions. A study conducted in a medical ward 
in the USA tested the 0.5 mg/kg/day enoxaparin 
dosage in obese patients showing its feasibility 
and efficacy and, at the same time, the absence of 
any bleeding event, symptomatic VTE, or dan-
gerous thrombocytopenia [132]. Some differ-
ences arose in a study among patients undergoing 
bariatric surgery [133] underlining potential dif-
ferences in terms of absorption among the differ-
ent formulations of LMWH. For this reason, for 
obese patients, dosages may need to be modified 
according to the drug used.
Table 17.17 The Padua Prediction Score [127]
Baseline characteristics Score
Active cancera 3




Already known thrombophilic conditionc 3
Recent (≤1 month) trauma and/or surgery 2
Elderly age (≥70 years) 1
Heart and/or respiratory failure 1
Acute myocardial infarction or ischemic stroke 1
Acute infection and/or rheumatologic disorder 1
Obesity (BMI ≥30) 1
Ongoing hormonal treatment 1
aPatients with local or distant metastases and/or in whom 
chemotherapy or radiotherapy had been performed in the 
previous 6 months
bBedrest with bathroom privileges (either due to patient’s 
limitations or on physicians order) for at least 3 days
cDefects of anti-thrombin, protein C or S, factor V Leiden, 
G20210A prothrombin mutation, and antiphospholipid 
syndrome
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In patients with kidney disease, LMWH and 
fondaparinux clearance is reduced and a modifi-
cation of the dosage is required. Usually, LMWH 
can be used at the dosage indicated for thrombo-
prophylaxis with a limited risk of bioaccumula-
tion in patients with kidney disease treated for a 
limited period of time [134]. LDUH can be a 
valid alternative in patients with advanced kidney 
disease. Prophylactic doses of fondaparinux must 
be reduced when kidney function is severely 
impaired: 1.5 mg/day when estimated glomerular 
filtration rate (eGFR) is 20–50 mL/min/1.73 m2. 
Fondaparinux is not recommended when eGFR 
is below 20 mL/min/1.73 m2 [135].
Patients with active cancer are known to be at 
increased risk of arterial embolism and VTE as 
well as bleeding events. Although treated for a 
long time with LMWH, recently direct oral anti-
coagulants have been found to be effective in 
reducing the risk of VTE and arterial embolism in 
many large randomized clinical trials. With this 
regard, an exhaustive report on these therapeutic 
strategies can be found in a recent review by 
Mosarla et al. [136]. Direct oral anticoagulants, 
however, are not yet approved for the prophylaxis 
of venous thromboembolism in these patients, 
but only in secondary prevention.
17.3.4  Prevention of Pressure Ulcers
Complications from hospital-acquired pressure 
ulcers cause about 60,000 deaths and relevant 
morbidity and resources consumption every year 
in the USA. Diabetes, obesity, and older age are 
known risk factors [137].
Moderate-strength evidence suggests that 
implementing multicomponent initiatives for 
pressure ulcer prevention in acute and long-term 
care settings can improve processes of care and 
reduce pressure ulcer rates [137].
Interventions usually address impaired mobil-
ity and/or nutrition and/or skin health. Using sup-
port surfaces, regularly repositioning the patient, 
optimizing nutritional status, and moisturizing 
sacral skin help to prevent pressure ulcers, along 
with initial and periodic risk stratification and 
personalized care for high-risk individuals. Many 
different pressure ulcer risk assessment tools are 
used in clinical practice (i.e. Braden, Norton, 
Exton-Smith, Waterlow, Knoll, …), but a recent 
Cochrane review was unable to suggest that the 
use of one tool over the others because of low or 
very low certainty of available evidence [138]. 
Multicomponent interventions typically include 
3–5 evidence-based practices that “when per-
formed collectively and reliably, have been 
proven to improve patient outcomes” [139]. 
Further, experts recommend to pay attention to 
organizational and care coordination components 
[140, 141]. Organizational components include 
selecting lead team membership, establishing 
policies and procedures, evaluating quality pro-
cesses, educating staff, using skin champions, 
and communicating written care plans. Care 
coordination components include creating a cul-
ture of change and establishing regular meetings 
to facilitate communication, collegiality, and 
learning [137].
Key components of successful implementa-
tion efforts include: simplification and standard-
ization of pressure ulcer-specific interventions 
and documentation, involvement of multidisci-
plinary teams and leadership, designated skin 
champions, ongoing staff education, and sus-
tained audit and feedback [137].
17.3.5  Clinical Monitoring by Early 
Warning Scores
Many hospitalized patients experience vital signs 
deterioration before cardiac arrest, unanticipated 
intensive care unit admission or unexpected death 
[142, 143]. Indeed, one or more aberrant vital 
signs can be detected by nurses or physicians in 
60% of cases before the adverse event [144]. A 
rapid recognition of these antecedents and an 
appropriate treatment can prevent further deterio-
ration so avoiding the development of the adverse 
outcomes. Several studies suggest that the triad of 
(1) early detection, (2) timeliness of response, and 
(3) competency of the response is crucial for 
patient’s outcomes [145–147]. According to these 
considerations, the use of the so-called early warn-
ing scores (EWS) has been widely implemented 
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by hospitals to efficiently identify and treat patients 
who present with or develop acute illness [147, 
148]. Although different and heterogeneous EWS 
exist, they are characterized by few key features. 
First, they require a systematic method to measure 
simple vital signs at the right intervals in all 
patients to recognize those with clinical deteriora-
tion. The assessment of vital signs need to be sim-
ple and usable by all healthcare professionals after 
an appropriate training. Second, clear definitions 
of the urgency and of the appropriate clinical 
response are necessary. The trigger for the clinical 
response should not be too sensitive in order to 
avoid alerts but it also should not be so insensitive 
that it never leads to system response activation 
[149]. In the EWS, the points for the final score are 
allocated for each physiologic parameter accord-
ing to how much it deviates from a predefined nor-
mal range, so that a higher score corresponds to 
greater patient’s deterioration. So, clinical response 
can be adapted in terms of urgency and provider’s 
level of expertise, ranging from the increase of 
vital signs monitoring to the activation of rapid 
response team. The vital signs considered in each 
EWS typically include pulse rate, breathing rate, 
blood pressure, level of consciousness and tem-
perature [150]. There is, however, variability in 
other parameters included (e.g. pain, level of respi-
ratory support, urine, age), in weights assigned, 
and in thresholds for triggering the response. In 
Table 17.18, the chart of National Early Warning 
Score (NEWS) used in the UK is reported, as an 
example [151]. Another important issue to con-
sider is the frequency of vital signs monitoring. 
Ideally, it should be done frequently enough to 
identify patient’s deterioration at a time that allows 
interventions to improve outcomes. There is no 
evidence that continuous surveillance has a posi-
tive effect on mortality [152, 153]. Moreover, 
although an increase in monitoring frequency 
leads to a higher detection of events, it is also asso-
ciated with a rise in expense and workload [149]. 
Thus, it is necessary to find a balance between 
patient’s safety and available resources. According 
to evidence, patients at low risk should be moni-
tored at least twice daily, whereas an increase in 
assessment frequency is required when EWS raise 
[154]. The appropriate responses to EWS can be 
described with an escalation protocol, in which at 
every threshold corresponds an action (see 
Table 17.19). Providers at every level of the chain 
have to operate according to their competences 
and skills. They have also to call medical emer-
gency team (MET) when it is indicated by the pro-
tocol. Several studies, however, reported omission 
to call MET in 25–42% of cases in which patients 
presented calling criteria [155, 156]. Reasons for 
non-adherence to protocol include negative atti-
tude toward MET, staffs’ confidence in their own 
ability, fear to appear incompetent or of criticism 
by the MET [155–158]. Ongoing education and 
training in the use of EWS is essential for all 
healthcare staff involved in the assessment and 
monitoring of acutely ill patients. A standardized 
system, jointly to a diffuse knowledge of it, is 
essential to achieve the aim of a rapid recognition 
of patient’s deterioration, an appropriate clinical 
response and a favorable outcome.
Table 17.18 National Early Warning Score (NEWS), adapted from [153]
Physiological 
parameters 3 2 1 0 1 2 3
Respiration rate ≤8 9–11 12–20 21–24 ≥25




Temperature ≤35.0 35.1–36.0 36.1–38.0 38.1–39.0 ≥39.1
Systolic blood 
pressure
≤90 91–100 101–110 111–219 ≥220
Heart rate ≤40 41–50 51–90 91–110 111–130 ≥131
Level of 
consciousness
A V, P or U
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17.3.6  Sepsis Bundles
The mortality rate for severe sepsis and septic 
shock remains a major concern in clinical prac-
tice [159]. The Surviving Sepsis Campaign (SSC) 
is a joint collaboration of the Society of Critical 
Care Medicine and the European Society of 
Intensive Care Medicine created in 2002 to 
increase sepsis awareness, improve early diagno-
sis, increase the use of appropriate timely care, 
develop guidelines and spread them, in order to 
reduce morbidity and mortality for sepsis. Sepsis 
bundles were presented for the first time in the 
SSC Guideline for the management of severe 
sepsis and septic shock in 2004 [160]. They were 
created to bring guidelines key elements to clini-
cians’ daily practice [161]. Indeed, a bundle is a 
small and straightforward set of evidence-based 
practices that, when performed altogether, have 
been proven to improve outcomes [162]. 
Hospitals that have successfully implemented 
sepsis bundles have consistently shown improved 
outcomes and reductions in healthcare spending 
[163]. Over the years, sepsis bundles have been 
revised according to most recent scientific evi-
dence [164, 165]. The most recent version is the 
hour-1 bundle, published in June 2018 [166]. 
Sepsis is a medical emergency. Early recognition 
and prompt management in the first hours after 
its development improve the survival [167]. 
Accordingly, the aim of hour-1 bundle is to begin 
sepsis management and resuscitation immedi-
ately although some of the actions require more 
than 1 h to be completed.
The hour-1 bundle includes five key steps:
 1. Measure lactate levels and re-measure if ini-
tial lactate is >2 mmol/L. Lactate is a surro-
gate for tissue perfusion measurement [168]. 
Lactate-guide resuscitation has been shown to 
reduce mortality in randomized control trials 
[169, 170]. So that, if initial lactate is elevated 
(>2 mmol/L), the measure should be repeated 
within 2–4  h and the treatment should be 
based on its values with the aim of normaliz-
ing lactate.
 2. Obtain blood cultures prior to antibiotics 
administration (at least two sets, aerobic and 
anaerobic). If obtaining blood cultures is dif-
ficult, however, do not delay antibiotic treat-
ment beginning. The identification of 
pathogens improve outcomes, but can be dif-
ficult to obtain after antimicrobial treatment 
for the rapid sterilization of cultures [171].
 3. Administer broad-spectrum antibiotics. The 
antimicrobial treatment should be started 
empirically with one or more intravenous 
broad-spectrum antibiotics. Therapy should 
be narrowed once pathogen is identified.
 4. Begin rapid administration of 30  mL/kg of 
crystalloid fluids in case of hypotension or 
lactate ≥4 mmol/L. Fluid resuscitation should 
be started immediately after the recognition of 
sepsis signs. The use of colloids did not show 
any clear benefit and it is, therefore, not rec-
ommended by guidelines.













Registered nurse to 
decide if increased 
frequency of monitoring 
and/or escalation of 
clinical care is required







• Registered nurse to 
urgently inform the 
medical team caring for 
the patient
• Urgent assessment 
by a clinician with core 
competencies to assess 
acutely ill patients







• Registered nurse to 
immediately inform the 
medical team caring for 
the patient
• Emergency 
assessment by a clinical 
team with critical care 
competencies, which 
also includes a 
practitioner/s with 
advanced airways skills
• Consider transfer to 
Intensive Unit Care
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 5. Administer vasopressor for hypotension dur-
ing or after fluid resuscitation, in order to 
achieve a mean arterial pressure ≥65 mmHg.
All these actions must be initiated within 1 h 
from “Time Zero,” defined as the time of triage in 
the Emergency Department or, in case of sepsis 
presenting in another care location, from the ear-
liest chart annotation consistent with elements of 
sepsis or septic shock.
A successful treatment of sepsis and septic 
shock require the collaboration of all healthcare 
professionals. The role of nurses is particularly 
important because they interact constantly with 
patients and they can provide early recognition of 
sepsis and implement a rapid clinical response 
[172]. Education programs on sepsis screening 
and hour-1 bundle should be strongly recom-
mended for the entire medical staff. The website 
survivingsepsis.org provides resources and tools 
to improve sepsis knowledge.
17.3.7  Safe Management of Outlier 
Patients
“Outlier” or “out-lying hospital in-patient” is a 
patient who, is admitted wherever an unoccupied 
bed is, because of unavailability of hospital beds 
in his/her clinically appropriate ward [173, 174]. 
In such case, clinical management is on charge of 
physicians of the clinically appropriate ward 
(generally IM ward), but care is delivered by 
nursing staff of the hosting ward (often a surgical 
ward). Outliers phenomenon involve commonly 
medical patients in countries with a public health 
system that faced hospital beds cuts, over the last 
decades. Outliers represent about 7–8% of all 
admissions every year [173]. They are the other 
neglected face of hospital overcrowding. From a 
patient safety point of view, they have been 
defined, according to Reason’s Swiss cheese 
model, “a latent condition which may underpin 
adverse events.” Identification errors, missed or 
delayed diagnosis and treatment, HAIs, delirium 
and falls could be amplified by outlier status, due 
to delay between admission and medical evalua-
tion, discontinuity of care, errors or delay in tests 
request/execution, inadequate communication 
between ward-teams, less familiarity with moni-
toring and treatment by hosting team [174]. 
Despite their compelling nature, they have been 
poorly studied. Available evidence shows a trend 
to increase in-hospital mortality and hospital 
readmission, but presents many serious limita-
tions [174]. Also evidence-based guidelines to 
safely manage outliers clinical risks are still lack-
ing. Only some bed management policies, formu-
lated mainly by NHS Trusts across the UK [175, 
176] contain some indications to ensure safety, 
dignity, and duty of care for both patients and 
staff involved in the care of outliers. As an exam-
ple, that from Portsmouth Hospitals NHS trust 
recognizes that the best choice is not to admit to 
off-service units, but when unavoidable, the risk 
for patients and staff  need to be minimized. It 
recommends not to admit to off-service units 
directly from emergency department or acute 
medicine, except  in rare cases. It prescribes to 
rate patients’ suitability to be moved to other 
units, with a score (RAG) based on clinical and 
mental health needs, level of acuity and depen-
dency and clinical capability of the receiving 
area. RAG must be assessed within 24  h from 
admission and reviewed every day. Further, outli-
ers must be placed in the same level of care and 
treatment that they would receive if cared in their 
appropriate unit. They must be reviewed by med-
ical and/or nursing teams from their clinically 
appropriate unit daily. Patient treatment plans 
must be updated including pending investigations 
and discharge plans carefully documented in the 
patient’s health records. The number of bed 
moves during each patient’s stay must be mini-
mized. Relatives must be informed of every 
movement and patients must be involved in deci-
sion by signing an informed consent [177].
17.4  Case Studies
17.4.1  Case Study 1
Female, 36 y-o, immigrant, unemployed, living 
with her husband and a 6 y-o daughter. Access to 
Emergency Room (ER) at 5.30 p.m. for left flank 
pain and hematuria. Previous history of kidney 
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stones. Giordano’s test positive. Her general 
practitioner suggests hospital admission for alco-
hol withdrawal. Blood tests reveal increased neu-
trophils, c-reactive protein and transaminases; 
abdominal US scan shows left hydro-nephrosis 
but not signs of liver damage. After 5 h, she is 
discharged with a diagnosis of hypertransamina-
semia in chronic alcohol abuse. Left renal colic. 
ER physician says she preferred go back home to 
fix her daughter tonight and will come back 
tomorrow. Twelve hours later, she is back to 
ER.  ER physicians writes: “the patient comes 
back for left flank pain”. Her general practitioner 
contacted social and psychiatric services. She 
remains in the ER until 5.00 p.m. without clinical 
nor laboratorial re-evaluation. Then she is admit-
ted to a medical ward for bilateral renal colic and 
alcohol abuse. At 9 p.m. onset of worsening psy-
chomotor agitation, treated by diazepam, gaba-
pentin, vitamin B6, and fluids. At 8 a.m., she 
receives the first dose of antibiotics (i.v. piper-
acillin/tazobactam). At 9 a.m., nurse reports 
hypotension (90/60 mmHg) and low peripheral 
oxygen saturation (92% room air); instead physi-
cian writes in medical record “inappropriate 
admission,” withdrawal syndrome in chronic 
alcohol abuse. At 2 p.m., morning shift physician 
hands off the patient saying she is going home 
because she rejects treatment. During the after-
noon, psychomotor agitation worsens so that the 
treatment with fluids and oxygen is compromised 
and relatives are asked to provide assistance to 
her. She receives multiple administration of i.v. 
midazolam. At 8 p.m., she has cardiorespiratory 
arrest. She is resuscitated and transferred to 
intensive care unit. A diagnosis of post-anoxic 
coma and septic shock by Escherichia coli is 
made and the patient dies after 20 days without 
ever regaining consciousness.
17.4.2  Case Study 2
A 78-year-old man, previous gastric ulcer and 
depression, affected by metastatic colon cancer 
in home palliative care, was admitted to IM ward 
on December 27th at 1.00  a.m., after rejecting 
hospice admission to die at home, just the day 
before. He was on transdermal and sublingual 
(breakthrough cancer pain) opioids, intravenous 
opioids, haloperidol, and hyoscine (elastomeric 
pump). He died about 20 h later. Ten days after, 
his wife and son made a claim for bad assistance. 
They complained that their relative was removed 
from sedation, so he was awake in the grip of its 
devastating pains; his pain was not asked or eval-
uated; no painkillers were given. They were told 
by the nurses: “We can’t do more than that. 
Sedation is a matter of anesthesia.” On the con-
trary, electronic medical record reported that 
patient was unresponsive to any stimulus since 
admission; sedation was not interrupted; intrave-
nous opioids dose was progressively increased; 
pain evaluation was frequent and pain control 
was achieved in few time. Health operators 
declared also that his relatives were allowed to 
stay with him until the end and any their desire 
such as music listening was satisfied. Why so dif-
ferent perceptions?
Despite of technical expertise and some 
human compassion, audit disclosed communica-
tion failure, and inappropriate setting (acute care 
ward). First of all, ward team missed medication 
and care plan recognition with palliative doctors, 
and, most of all, it did not effectively take care of 
family concerns and expectations. Health opera-
tors did not explore family feelings, did not pro-
vide frequent and punctual information about 
what was done and reassurance about their 
beloved clinical condition, in particular 
unconsciousness.
17.4.3  Epicrisis 
and Recommendations
17.4.3.1  Clinical Case 1
 1. Be aware of Medical mimics or secondary 
psychoses, medical conditions mimicking 
psychiatric disorders, especially in patients 
with previous psychiatric history.
 2. Remember that infections, trauma, autoim-
mune, metabolic, neurological diseases, and 
pharmacological withdrawal can present with 
psychiatric symptoms, from psychomotor agita-
tion to anxiety, depression, dementia, or apathy.
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 3. Think about medical mimics in case of: 
patient over 40 years and no previous psy-
chiatric history, no history of similar symp-
toms or worsening of previous symptoms, 
family concern, chronic comorbidities, his-
tory of head injury, change in headache pat-
tern, worsening after antipsychotics or 
anxiolytics, history of changing psychiatric 
diagnoses over time, difficult or unlikable 
patient, polypharmacy, abnormal autonomic 
signs, visual disturbance, visual, olfactory 
or tactile hallucinations, nystagmus, illu-
sions, speech deficit, abnormal body move-
ment [178].
 4. Have a complete medical and psychiatric 
history, an exhaustive review of systems to 
identify symptoms/signs suggestive of medi-
cal diseases, review of any drug prescription, 
over-the-counter and alternative medications 
included, a careful mental status examina-
tion, diagnostic tests for diseases known to 
mimic psychiatric disorders (look for head 
trauma, syphilis or hypothyroidism, glucose 
or electrolyte or blood gases alterations, sep-
sis, etc.)
 5. Avoid incorrect assumptions (patient triaged 
as psychiatric, is psychiatric; patient with psy-
chiatric history, has only psychiatric disease; 
young patients suffer from functional disor-
ders; abnormal vital signs are due to mental/
emotional state) and pitfalls (cursory history 
from limited sources, incomplete review of 
system, incomplete physical and neuropsy-
chiatric exam, failure to review medications) 
[179].
17.4.3.2  Clinical Case 2
• In end-of-life care, ensure skillful communi-
cation with patients and families.
• Define and share with patient and/or family 
realistic goals of care.
• Pay attention to understanding the patient’s 
and family’s concerns besides competent 
symptom management [180].
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This chapter aims to promote awareness by pro-
viding essential scientific elements about the 
risks associated with clinical oncology, with a 
particular focus on chemotherapy and 
radiotherapy.
Here as follows is the range of covered 
subjects:
• First, the epidemiologic and cultural context 
is addressed in order to understand the pecu-
liarity of oncology, a medical discipline in 
which the risk is directly related to the daily 
clinical practice, almost inseparable from the 
intervention that must be conducted, probably 
more than in any other branch of medicine.
• To increase specific knowledge, in a public 
health perspective, described herein is the 
epidemiology of the different adverse 
effects, listed according to their frequency of 
occurrence. The central topic of modern 
health organization in relation to the existing 
volume of activities, herein limited to sur-
gery, and the quality of health services, 
which can arouse debates of professional 
and organizational nature. Finally, safety 
practices, which were proven to be effective, 
and the strategies to implement them are 
also addressed.
18.1  Introduction
Developments in science and technology, 
together with the improved organization of health 
systems, have allowed remarkable progress in 
cancer diagnosis, care, and rehabilitation. In 
terms of assessment and management of the clin-
ical risk, however, considerable issues are raised 
by the continuously increasing frequency of the 
disease, the super specialization in care, the ele-
vated media attention, and the growing compe-
tence of patients and their associations.
Due to the complexity of their disease, cancer 
patients have access to different methodologies 
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and therapeutic strategies, all of which can be 




 – Hormonal therapy
 – Immunotherapy
 – Drug targeting
 – Gene therapy
 – Cell therapy
• Radiation therapy
 – External beam radiotherapy
 – Brachytherapy
 – IORT intraoperative radiotherapy
 – Radiometabolic therapy
Several therapeutic strategies can be adopted 
for treating oncology patients, including specific 
or combined/adjuvant approaches. Each strategy 
carries risks and adverse effects, which are not 
always acceptable, with the aim to achieve real 
benefits with the undertaken treatment.
The different, possible causes of these adverse 
events or errors, which can be frequent in certain 
situations, are discussed in this chapter.
Additionally, the chapter focuses on several 
strategies and organizational options aimed to 
minimize the risk and reduce therapeutic side 
effects, which can be negligible in some instances 
but very severe in others.
18.2  The Epidemiological Context
Tissue damage is unfortunately unavoidable dur-
ing radiation therapy and chemotherapy, as both 
approaches work by means of a mechanism of 
destruction of nucleic structures essential to can-
cer cells, in order to reduce cell multiplication. 
The setback is that most healthy cells are just as 
susceptible as cancer cells to the damaging 
effects of the treatments. Radiotherapy is based 
on ionizing radiations that must go through 
healthy tissues in order to reach the tumor. Even 
though new technologies are being developed, 
each more sophisticated and better able to pre-
cisely target the cancerous areas, the tissues sur-
rounding the tumor still tend to get damaged, but 
this is also due to the fact that the tissues sur-
rounding cancer cells are susceptible to micro-
scopic invasion by the malignant cells. 
Chemotherapy, as a pharmacological, systemic 
treatment, exerts its effects on the whole organ-
ism. Therefore, although in theory therapy could 
eliminate cancer cells, in practice it is often 
impossible as it becomes difficult to expose all 
cancer cells to adequate doses without damaging 
healthy tissues. Hence, the central issue of clini-
cal oncology consists in balancing cancer treat-
ment effects and the effects that therapies could 
have on the healthy tissues, reaching an equilib-
rium that, for a particular patient with a specific 
cancer type, the best possible therapeutic ratio 
could be obtained, meaning the best possible bal-
ance between the risk of damaging healthy cells 
versus killing cancer cells.
It is therefore accepted by the scientific com-
munity that collateral damage to healthy cells in 
oncology is often unavoidable. In other words, it 
has been accepted that during treatment with 
curative intent, adverse effects, including severe 
ones, can be expected to occur more than in other 
medical fields. Adverse events can occur during 
and after treatments with radiotherapy and with 
chemotherapy. Short-term or acute adverse 
effects occur during or shortly after treatment, 
and they usually last for a few days or up to 2 
weeks. Long-term or chronic adverse effects are 
more common in radiotherapy than in chemo-
therapy. They occur usually after treatment and 
sometimes even years later. These effects are 
usually irreversible and sometimes yield slowly 
progressive outcomes with severe consequences 
in terms of morbidity and, therefore, in terms of 
complaints and legal actions [1].
Approximately, one third of people may 
develop cancer during their lives. Today, about 
40% of cancer cases are curable. However, a 
number of patients can keep the disease under 
control for long periods of time though not 
achieving a complete recovery. As can be 
expected, at least half of them will die from their 
disease. The reason the numbers of simple com-
plaints and legal actions have dramatically 
increased in recent years lies in the high mortality 
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of the disease and the high toxicity rates of thera-
pies, on the one hand, and in the higher expecta-
tions of citizens regarding health services, on the 
other. This new perspective has been favored by 
higher cultural resources and by a higher aware-
ness of their own rights due to democratic 
progress.
The main areas of risk in clinical oncology 
include misdiagnosis (e.g., anticancer treatment 
delivered to patients without cancer, or to patients 
who had cancer in the past without disease recur-
rence, or for the wrong type of cancer), medica-
tion errors in preparation or administration, 
therapeutic toxicity, and negligence [1].
Two more categories can be added: delayed 
treatments, due to a delayed diagnosis, or delayed 
initiation or continuation of therapy, causing 
harm to the patient; over diagnosis risks in oncol-
ogy (e.g., PSA and TSH).
These are the most frequent categories of 
unfavorable outcomes afflicting patients. Some 
of the distinguishing characteristics of the spe-
cialty of oncology should be kept in mind. 
Oncology differs above all in the central role of 
the dedicated nurses and technicians who are 
specifically trained in the administration of 
sophisticated therapies. In radiotherapy in par-
ticular, a peculiar specificity exists, namely medi-
cal physicists who are called upon to run 
systematic quality checks of the linear accelera-
tors’ performance and to realize radiation treat-
ment plans. Furthermore, oncology has come to 
act according to multidisciplinary and multi- 
professional organizational models, following 
specific decisional protocols of clinical behavior.
18.3  Epidemiology of Adverse 
Effects
The most frequent adverse effects of cancer ther-
apies belong to the category of toxicity. In gen-
eral, radical treatments can result in very severe 
adverse effects in a small proportion of patients 
and in moderately severe adverse effects in a big-
ger proportion, even when conducted correctly 
and in accordance with to the appropriate clinical 
direction. The studies which have investigated 
the epidemiology of adverse effects mainly relate 
to chemotherapy.
In a cohort of 449 patients with cancer of the 
breast or lung or colon-rectum who underwent 
chemotherapy and followed up for a median time 
of 6 months, 86% reported at least one adverse 
effect during the study period and 27% an adverse 
effect of fourth degree, most often fatigue or dys-
pnea. Fatigue was the most frequent effect (85%), 
followed by diarrhea (74%), and constipation 
(74%). Prevalence and incidence rates of the 
adverse effects were similar among all types of 
cancer, and older age represented the only signifi-
cantly associated demographic factor [2].
In another cohort study, patients in treatment 
with antineoplastic drugs were followed up for 
2  years. Overall, 591 cases of adverse effects 
were reported, a 58.6% incidence rate. The prev-
alence of adverse effects was recorded among 
women (constituting 73% of the cohort). Of the 
patients with adverse effects, 50.2% requested a 
treatment, 12.9% were deemed severe cases, 
87% moderate, and 51% unpredictable [3].
An important further study was conducted on 
458 oncologic patients followed up for 8 months, 
investigating hospital stay. Among the unplanned 
hospital admissions, 13% were caused by a phar-
macological event, 13% by an adverse drug reac-
tion, and 2% by a major interaction between 
different drugs. In conclusion, one in 10 
unplanned hospital admissions of cancer patients 
was caused by a pharmacological effect [4].
It is estimated that between half and two thirds 
of new cancer cases receive treatment plans that 
include radiotherapy. Seventy-five percent of 
them are aimed to cure the patients. Radiotherapy- 
related adverse effects are the most frequent and 
they are described below.
Prevalence of depression among cancer 
patients is extremely variable, ranging from 0% 
to 60% in different case studies, according to 
study criteria, methodology, and populations. 
Depression is associated in particular with can-
cers of the oro-pharynx, lung, breast, brain, and 
pancreas, but rarely with gynecologic tumors and 
colorectal cancers. Since comorbidity and treat-
ment regimen are combined, in particular, with 
chemotherapy, it is often difficult to evaluate the 
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direct effect of radiotherapy on depression as 
well as on several other symptoms.
Patients often indicate fatigue as the most dis-
turbing adverse effect of radiotherapy, more than 
pain, nausea, and vomit. Fatigue correlated with 
radiotherapy occurs acutely in 80% of patients 
and chronically in 30% of patients. For this rea-
son, patients should be evaluated for this symp-
tom at regular intervals.
Dermatitis caused by radiation is a common 
adverse effect of radiotherapy, often complicat-
ing treatment of breast, prostate, perineum, and 
head and neck cancers. It is, however, difficult to 
evaluate the real burden of the phenomenon as 
clinical practice in this field is biased by unreli-
able and contradictory evidence. Early reactions 
include skin rash and dry and humid exfoliation, 
while delayed events include pigmentation 
changes, telangiectasias, hair loss, atrophy, and 
ulcerations.
Concerning vascular diseases due to radio-
therapy, a well-known adverse effect occurs 
mostly in Hodgkin lymphoma patients, and in 
lower numbers, in breast and lung cancer patients. 
It is estimated that the relative risk of cardiovas-
cular events after mediastinal radiation ranges 
from 2.2% to 7.2% for Hodgkin lymphoma cases 
and from 1% to 2.2% for cancer of the left breast.
Concerning lung effects, pneumonia due to 
radiation occurs in 5.15% of patients undergoing 
radiation for mediastinal cancers and breast and 
lung cancers. The risk is directly associated with 
the volume of the irradiated lung, intensity of 
radiation, and any concurrent chemotherapy. 
Toxicity of the digestive tract due to damage to 
the salivary glands is common in the radiation of 
the head and neck, especially in the case of con-
current chemotherapy. Esophagitis is also a com-
mon, early adverse effect whose frequency grows 
with the increasing of radioactive doses and in 
the presence of concurrent chemotherapy. Acute 
enteritis after radiotherapy is usually a self- 
limiting process by means of a correction to the 
diet and the administration of anti-diarrheal med-
ications. Usually, the symptoms start 3 months 
after the end of radiotherapy and can last indefi-
nitely. Another frequent symptom is the emesis 
induced by radiotherapy. The main risk factors 
include the completion of chemotherapy before 
radiation of the upper abdomen and the width of 
the irradiated areas. Patients who receive total- 
body radiations are at higher risk. Acute bladder 
infection, including the most severe hemorrhagic 
cystitis, is a less common effect of radiotherapy, 
and the risk is augmented by concurrent 
chemotherapy.
Sexual dysfunctions, including impotence, are 
common after radiotherapy for cancers of the 
prostate and, to a lesser extent, of the colon- 
rectum. They are primarily a concern for older 
patients, who show a higher frequency of prostate 
cancer diagnosis. Erection dysfunction is more 
common with brachytherapy and with external 
radiotherapy. Among women, sexual dysfunc-
tions are more common after radiotherapy for 
cervical and endometrial cancers. The adverse 
effects include a lower sex drive, vaginal dryness, 
and general sexual dissatisfaction.
18.4  Medication Errors 
in Oncology Practice
The publication of the report “To err is human” 
by the Institute of Medicine of Washington 
(IOM) in 1999 has led to a radical change in 
healthcare organizations with regard to the 
understanding of the phenomenon of medical 
error. In oncology, the current definition of med-
ication error, i.e., any “preventable event that 
may cause or lead to inappropriate medication 
use or patient harm while the medication is in 
the control of the healthcare professional, 
patient, or consumer,” is provided by the 
National Coordinating Council for Medical 
Error Reporting and Prevention.
A recent review of the literature from 1980 to 
2017 has shown that medical errors in chemo-
therapy occur at a frequency ranging from 1 to 4 
cases per 1000 prescriptions, concerning at least 
1–3% of patients and appearing in all phases of 
the cure process [5]. The definition of medication 
error applies to all areas of medicine but can have 
different implications depending on the complex-
ity of the discipline and the magnitude of the 
potential damage it can cause.
A. Marcolongo et al.
257
Cancer care is going through a revolutionary 
period both in the diagnostic and the therapeutic 
fields. At the same time, the substantial increase 
in scientific data is making the system increas-
ingly complex and constitutes a challenge for 
health professionals [6]. For example, the current 
rate of new therapeutic indications in hematology- 
oncology is about one per week, preventing the 
general medical oncologist from keeping up.
In oncology, several factors may expose 
patients to increased risk that can result in seri-
ous adverse effects (AEs) [5]. The greater vul-
nerability of cancer patients may be due to the 
fragility induced by the disease itself, to the nar-
row therapeutic index of many anticancer agents, 
or to the use of innovative therapies of which 
potential side effects and their management are 
not fully known. In addition, cancer care is often 
provided by inter-professional teams that need to 
be perfectly in tune when it comes to communi-
cation [7].
Quite surprisingly, although oncologists pay 
high attention to treatment-related toxicities of 
anticancer agents, oncology as a discipline lags 
behind other areas of medicine in focusing on 
understanding the nature of medication errors 
and the extent of their effects. Of note, only a few 
studies have analyzed the incidence and conse-
quences of medication errors in oncology [5, 8].
In December of 1994, a tragedy occurred that 
turned the spotlight on to the need to work sys-
tematically to ensure and strengthen safety mea-
sures in the administration of anticancer therapies. 
The incident occurred at the Dana-Farber Cancer 
Institute in Boston, a Harvard teaching hospital 
and a prestigious US institution, and caused the 
death of a young health journalist, Betsy 
A. Lehman, who died of a massive overdose of 
chemotherapy for breast cancer. A similar event 
occurred 2 days apart and caused permanent 
heart damage in a patient cared for by the same 
medical team. Both patients were treated with 
autologous stem-cell transplant, in the context of 
an experimental protocol that included high 
doses of cyclophosphamide. However, because 
of misinterpretation of the study protocol and 
subsequent miscalculated dosage, they received 
about four times the intended dose. The error was 
missed by other doctors, nurses, and pharmacists, 
including some senior members of the team.
Further attention was drawn to the importance 
of safe administration and management of che-
motherapy after another lethal event occurred in 
December of 2015, two decades after the death of 
Betsy Leman. The death of a 49-year-old man 
caused again by an unintended chemotherapy 
overdose catalyzed a call to action for healthcare 
systems to recognize and to implement safety 
principles and practices to prevent patient harm. 
Increased awareness and sensitivity regarding the 
risk of errors related to anti-tumor treatments 
and, in particular, to chemotherapy, has led the 
American Society of Clinical Oncology (ASCO) 
and the Oncology Nursing Society (ONS) to set 
standards to minimize treatment-related risks. 
The most updated version of the standards was 
published in 2016 and focused on four main 
points [9]:
• The environment and routine procedures
• Treatment planning and patient education 
before the start of treatment
• Specific standards for ordering, preparing 
(including labeling), and administering treat-
ment (chemotherapy)
• Monitoring adherence to, and toxicity from, 
chemotherapy to promote safety both while on 
treatment and subsequently
In particular, great attention is paid to the defi-
nition of the healthcare setting that includes the 
policy to ensure the relevant qualifications of the 
various professional figures involved in the 
order, preparation, and administration of the 
treatments.
Special emphasis is placed on training pro-
grams, on participation in basic life support 
courses by the clinical staff, and on information 
that must be reported in the medical record and 
verified before treatment (e.g., diagnosis, stage of 
illness, clinical history, physical examination, 
history of allergies, level of information shared 
with and understood by the patient and/or care-
givers, description of the treatment plan). In addi-
tion, the healthcare setting includes a policy on 
documents that standardizes the process for 
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obtaining treatment consent and valid proof of 
consent. Patients must be sufficiently informed 
about the treatment plan, the potential side 
effects, the management of adverse events, the 
handling of medicines at home, the follow-up 
visits, and the procedures they may be subjected 
to for monitoring during the therapy. Furthermore, 
patients must be provided with contact informa-
tion in case of need.
Regarding therapeutic orders, it is recom-
mended that they be signed by hand or electroni-
cally. Verbal orders are not allowed, with the 
exception of those for holding or stopping ther-
apy. New orders or changes to orders (e.g., dose 
adjustments) must be documented in the medical 
record. It is important that a chemotherapy order 
be extremely detailed and include the following 
information: the patient’s name, a second patient 
identifier, the date of the prescription order is 
written, the regimen or protocol identifier (name 
and number), the cycle number and day, all medi-
cations listed using full, generic names, the drug 
dose (to be written following the standards 
regarding abbreviations, trailing zeros, and lead-
ing zeros), the dose calculation, the date of 
administration, the route of administration, the 
presence of allergies, any supportive care treat-
ments appropriate for the regimens (e.g., premed-
ications, hydration, growth factors), parameters 
that would require holding or modifying the dose 
(e.g., laboratory tests, patient clinical status), the 
sequencing of drug administration, and the rate 
of drug administration. Special recommendations 
are given for prescriptions of oral chemotherapy.
The standards also include requirements for 
the preparation of chemotherapy which must be 
entrusted to licensed pharmacists, pharmacy 
technicians, physicians, or nurses with specific 
skills acquired as a result of specific education 
and training programs. Before preparation, a sec-
ond person has the task of independently verify-
ing the patient’s identifiers, the name of the drug, 
the dose, the route of administration, the rate of 
administration, the calculation of the dose, the 
treatment cycle, and the cycle day.
Upon preparation, one of the two operators 
must verify the drug vial(s), the concentration, 
the drug volume or weight, the diluent type and 
volume, and the administration fluid type, vol-
ume, and tubing.
Before each chemotherapy administration, at 
least two practitioners have to verify eight essen-
tial elements: the drug name, the drug dose, the 
infusion volume, the rate of administration, the 
route of administration, the expiration dates and/
or times, the physical integrity of the drugs, the 
rate set on the infusion pump.
Chemotherapy drugs—and ideally any drug 
used to treat cancer patients—must be labeled 
immediately upon preparation, including the fol-
lowing details [10]: patient’s name, a second 
patient identifier, full generic drug name, drug 
dose, drug administration route, total volume 
required to administer the drug, date the medica-
tion is to be administered, expiration dates and/or 
times, sequencing of drug administration and 
total number of products to be given when medi-
cation is provided in fractionated doses (e.g., one 
of five, two of two), and a warning about storage 
and handling.
Before the administration, the practitioner 
administering the treatment has to confirm it with 
the patient, reporting at least the following infor-
mation: drug name, infusion time, route of 
administration, and any infusion-related symp-
toms they should report. At least two individuals, 
in the presence of the patient, must verify the 
patient identification using at least two identifi-
ers. Documentation of chemotherapy administra-
tion must report the verification of the 
aforementioned eight elements that had to be 
checked before the administration (see above). 
Procedures to manage extravasation must be 
defined and must follow the most up-to-date 
guidelines. The antidote sets must be accessible 
within the appropriate timeframe. After the 
administration of the treatment, appropriate pro-
cedures must be adopted to monitor adherence, 
toxicity, and possible complications.
Some studies have analyzed the different 
clinical and management settings in which the 
medication errors were reported. Interestingly, 
most them were intercepted and corrected before 
they reached the patient [11–14]. Pharmacists or 
A. Marcolongo et al.
259
nurses usually detected order-writing errors and 
informed clinicians, thus preventing harm to the 
patient. Therefore, no harm occurred as a result 
of error, in part thanks to the diligence of the 
staff and the special alertness of the team in 
questioning any unclear or ambiguous orders. 
This proactive approach allows the team to fre-
quently intercept errors before they cause seri-
ous AEs. In addition, it produces cultural changes 
among health professionals, consequently 
improving medication prescription processes 
(e.g., development and adoption of specific com-
puterized and noncomputerized order tem-
plates). In contrast, behaviors such as the hiding 
of errors or the sanctioning attitudes are an 
obstacle to the creation of a culture of patient 
safety among health professionals. Of note, hos-
pital-based or center-based incident reporting 
systems have often performed better than nation-
wide systems, in which the problem of underre-
porting is more common [15, 16].
18.5  Safety Practices 
and Implementation 
Strategy in Clinical Oncology
Different strategies have been proposed in order 
to reduce the risk of medication errors during 
cancer care or to mitigate their effects or harm to 
the patient (Table  18.1). Therapeutic orders 
should be drawn up from standardized and con-
tinuously monitored dictionaries. By using com-
puter technology, errors stemming from a 
misunderstanding of handwriting can be avoided. 
In the literature, there are some recommendations 
that mainly concern the way in which to report 
orders related to the prescription of chemother-
apy. In particular, some information should 
always be present in each order report, including 
patient data such as name, height, weight, and 
body surface area, and treatment characteristics 
such as route of administration, timing, and dose. 
Furthermore, specific checklists that include 
Table 18.1 Strategic measures to improve safe management of anticancer medicationa
Strategic areas Examples of intervention measures
Training •  All health professionals involved in treating cancer patients (i.e., physicians, pharmacists, 
nurses, technicians) must have the necessary knowledge and skillset to perform their 
functions.
•  Continuous education programs must be aimed at all staff members.
•  Periodic audits must be implemented for accreditation by authorized independent 
organizations.
Resources • Staff and technological resources must be commensurate with the volume of work.
• High pressure placed upon care staff must be avoided.
•  Information and communication technology-based integrated system focused on the 
management of cancer patients has to be part of the hospital infrastructures.
Operating 
procedures
•  The healthcare setting must have in place standard operating procedures which include 
strategies for preventing errors.
•  The operating procedures must contain clear definitions of the processes for prescribing, 
pharmaceutical reviewing, preparing, dispensing, administering, and monitoring anticancer 
therapy.
• Responsibilities of each member of the staff must be clearly indicated in each process.
•  The Center Cancer must have up-to-date dictionaries with evidence-based treatment 
protocols, clearly and unambiguously written, and accessible to all health professionals 




The involvement of the patient and one or more caregivers is encouraged in order to facilitate the 





• Standardization of treatment orders.
•  The use of a computerized physician order entry (CPOE) system integrated into the medical 
records, equipped with a clinical decision support system (CDSS) that allows to minimize 
prescribing errors (e.g., dose calculation alerts, adjustments according to clinical situations, 
allergies, maximum doses).
(continued)
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safety parameters to be evaluated before the pre-
scription should always be available. Examples 
of such checklists are forms with information on 
white blood cell counts, creatinine clearance, 
liver function indices, and drug interactions, 
among others.
It should be acknowledged that computer 
technology does not eliminate the risk of errors. 
Although Computerized Physician Order Entry 
(CPOE) systems and Clinical Decision Support 
Systems (CDSS) may limit some specific errors 
linked to incorrect order entry, many order entry 
alerts can be ignored or manually bypassed by 
physicians.
Prescription errors can be sensibly reduced by 
55–80% by a CPOE system with the aid of a 
CDSS [17]. The introduction of computerized 
information systems in clinical practice and the 
use of medical records have been reported to 
have positive effects on the reduction of clinical 
risk, not only in relation to the cycle of medica-
tion (i.e., planning of treatment, prescription, 
preparation, administration, follow-up) but also 
for diagnostic and therapeutic evaluation in 
general.
The importance of documenting the occur-
rence of errors is independent of the extent of the 
damage caused to the patient or even whether any 
damage has been caused.
It is well known that underreporting of errors 
is widespread; errors that cause less serious dam-
age often go untracked. However, the importance 
of providing information on near-miss or lesser 
injury events is increasingly clear. Policies that 
start from metrics and reporting are essential for 
improvement and the appropriate use of data is 
extremely useful when implementing manage-
ment practices that target-specific risks.
Barriers to compliance with reporting include 
low staff awareness, cumbersome interfaces for 
documenting and sharing data among healthcare 
professionals, the perception of wasted time and 
uselessness, or fear of repercussions in the form 
of punitive measures.
On the other hand, strategies for improvement 
include simplification, standardization, and use 
of information technology.
Patient safety must not be limited hierarchies. 
Everyone must be involved in proactive error pre-
vention. The physician, nurse, and pharmacist 
should all double-check therapeutic prescriptions 
[5, 18]. Patients, in turn, must be fully informed 
about the characteristics of the therapy and its 
administration. Everyone must feel encouraged 
Table 18.1 (continued)





•  The staff of the pharmacy must follow standard guidelines or protocols related to the 
composition, reconstitution, dilution, stability, labeling of each drug used at the site.
•  Anticancer therapy must be prepared by the pharmacy staff in a safety cabinet, which can be 
automated or not, for one patient at a time, and each drug must be prepared individually.
•  Preparation of anticancer therapy should be completed by the pharmacy staff in such a way 
that no further preparation is required by the health professional responsible for administering 
the treatment (i.e., nurses).
•  A standardized labeling method must be used for ensuring easy identification of patient, 
medication, route, and dose. Labels must be printed (not handwritten).
•  The components of intravenous mixtures of cancer drugs must be verified using bar codes or a 
similar system. The preparation phase of cytotoxic drugs should be centrally managed within 




• Anticancer therapy must be administered by a qualified member of nursing staff.
•  Before each drug administration, patient ID must be verified by the nurse in the presence of 
the patient, using at least two identifiers.
•  In addition, an expert nurse must confirm the treatment with the patient. Drug name, infusion 
time, route of administration, and infusion-related symptoms must be reported, establishing 
any symptoms the patient must promptly report.
Monitoring 
process
After anticancer drug administration, patients must be monitored for adherence, toxicity, and 
complications.
aMany of these statements are also appropriate for radiation therapy.
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to express any doubts. Each must share their 
work with the others; this is the key to success in 
preventing a large proportion of potential errors.
18.6  Radiotherapy
Radiotherapy (RT) is one of the major treatment 
options in cancer management and “it is widely 
known to be one of the safest areas of modern 
medicine, yet, for some, this essential treatment 
can bring harm, personal tragedy and even death” 
(Sir Liam Donaldson).
It is estimated that between one half and two 
thirds of new cancer cases receive RT [19], which 
is used with curative intent in 75% of the cases 
that receive it. RT is a highly effective treatment 
option for palliation and symptom control; how-
ever, its adverse effects are quite common.
RT has distinctive risk features owing to the 
invasiveness of the irradiating techniques used 
and to the seriousness of neoplastic disease [20]. 
The RT process is complex and makes use of 
highly specialized technical equipment. The 
technical advancement has played a decisive role 
for precision in treatment delivery, creating 
highly conformal dose distribution with steep 
dose gradients [21]. Whatever the changes might 
have been, the objective remains the same: to 
eradicate tumors and to eliminate all cells in the 
regions at risk with minimized normal tissue tox-
icity [22]. The radiation treatment process is rep-
resented can be broken down into a sequence of 
steps. A high level of accuracy is needed at every 
step for maximum tumor control with minimal 
risk to normal tissue, defined as Organ at Risk 
(OAR) [23] (Fig. 18.1).
Over the last two decades, numerous studies 
have reported an association between dosimetric 
parameters and normal tissue outcomes. In 2007, 
a joint task force of physicists and physicians was 
formed with the support of the American Society 
for Therapeutic Radiology and Oncology 
(ASTRO) and the American Association of 
Physicists in Medicine (AAPM) to summarize in 
the QUANTEC the available data in a format use-
ful to clinicians and to update and refine the esti-
mates provided [24, 25]. Recently, PENTEC 
(Pediatric Normal Tissue Effects in the Clinic) 
has tried to explore and define normal tissue tol-
erance in developing children as a function of 
dose and volume of radiation, type and schedul-
ing of chemotherapy, and surgery. This informa-
tion can ideally be used to inform radiation 
oncologists, patients, and parents of the risks and 
benefits of multimodality therapy involving radi-
ation therapy, to define radiation dose constraints 
for treatment planning, and to propose new 
research directions [26].
In general, RT-related symptoms depend on 
the site, volume irradiated, technique, total dose, 
dose fractionation, age of patient, concurrent 
therapy, and biology of involved tissue. RT 
adverse effects are classically divided into acute 
adverse effects (i.e., arising during the treatment 
and lasting for about 3 months) and late ones 
(i.e., arising 6 months after treatment). RTOG/
EORTC hoped to standardize the way of report-
ing late effects on both sides of the Atlantic [27]. 
This has been succeeded by the CTCAE scale 
(Common Toxicity Criteria for Adverse Events), 
whose most prominent features are the merging 
of early and late effects criteria into a single uni-
form document and the development of criteria 
applicable to all treatment methods (e.g., chemo-
therapy, RT, surgery, new biotechnological 
drugs) [28]. RT-related symptoms can be divided 
into general symptoms associated with the pro-
cedure or disease and specific symptoms related 
to the site of irradiation. Among the former, 
patients often indicate fatigue as the most dis-
turbing adverse effect of radiotherapy, ahead of 
pain, nausea, and vomit. Fatigue correlated with 
radiotherapy occurs acutely in 80% of patients 
and chronically in 30% of patients. For this rea-
son, patients should be evaluated for this symp-
tom at regular intervals. The prevalence of 
depression among cancer patients is extremely 
variable, ranging from 0% to 60% in the differ-
ent case studies, depending on study criteria, 
methodology, and populations. Depression is 
associated particularly with cancers of the oro-
pharynx, lung, breast, brain, and pancreas, and 
rarely with gynecologic tumors and colorectal 
cancers. Since comorbidity and treatment regi-
mens are usually combined with chemotherapy, 
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it is often difficult to evaluate the direct effect of 
radiotherapy on depression as well as several 
other symptoms [29].
Specific symptoms relating to the irradiation 
of specific regions involve several organs. Here, 
we summarize only the main ones.
Acute and late effects of RT on the central ner-
vous system are common and represent a signifi-
cant source of morbidity. In particular, patients 
with tumor-related neurocognitive dysfunction 
may exhibit exacerbated deficits after RT [30].
Dermatitis caused by radiation is a common 
adverse effect of radiotherapy, often complicat-
ing treatment of breast, prostate, perineum, and 
head and neck cancers. It is, however, difficult to 
evaluate the real burden of the phenomenon as 
clinical practice in this field is biased by unreli-
able and contradictory evidence [31]. Early reac-
tions include skin rash, and dry and humid 
exfoliation, while delayed events include 
 pigmentation changes, telangiectasias, hair loss, 
atrophy, and ulcerations.
With regard to vascular diseases due to radio-
therapy, patients who received left-sided radio-
therapy as compared with those receiving 
right-sided radiotherapy experienced increased 
risks of developing coronary heart disease (RR 






























Fig. 18.1 Radiotherapy process of care from the first evaluation to follow-up. (Modified from WHO World Alliance 
for Patient Safety Radiotherapy Safety Expert Consensus Group)
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for breast cancer was associated with cardiac 
absolute risk increase of 76.4 cases of coronary 
heart disease and 125.5 cases of cardiac death per 
100,000 person per year [32].
With regard to effects on the lungs, pneumo-
nia due to radiation occurs in 5.15% of patients 
undergoing radiation for mediastinal cancers as 
well as breast and lung cancers. The risk is 
directly associated with the volume of the irradi-
ated lung, intensity of radiations, fractionation 
and concurrent chemotherapy [30].
Toxicity of the digestive tract deriving from 
damage to the salivary glands is common in the 
radiation of the head-neck area, especially in the 
case of concurrent chemotherapy [33]. 
Esophagitis is also a common, early adverse 
effect whose frequency grows with increasing 
radioactive doses and in the presence of concur-
rent chemotherapy [34]. Acute enteritis after 
radiotherapy is usually a self-limiting process, 
mitigated by correcting the diet and administer-
ing anti-diarrheal medications. The main risk fac-
tors include the completion of chemotherapy 
before the radiation of the upper abdomen and 
the width of the irradiated areas. Patients at 
higher risk are those who receive total-body radi-
ations [35].
Acute bladder infection, including the most 
severe hemorrhagic cystitis, is a less common 
effect of radiotherapy, and the risk is elevated by 
concurrent chemotherapy [36].
Sexual dysfunctions, including impotence, are 
common after radiotherapy for cancers of the 
prostate and, to a lesser extent, the colon-rectum. 
It mainly concerns older patients, who exhibit a 
higher frequency of prostate cancer diagnosis. 
Erection dysfunction is more common with 
brachytherapy and with external radiotherapy 
[37]. In women, sexual dysfunctions are more 
common after radiotherapy for cervical and 
endometrial cancers. The adverse effects include 
a lower sex drive, vaginal dryness, and an overall 
sexual dissatisfaction [38].
Of no less importance is the role of RT in the 
multimodal treatment for many childhood 
tumors, offering an important opportunity when 
the limits of surgical possibilities have been 
reached. Due to growing tissue, children are par-
ticularly sensitive to radiation-induced adverse 
effects and the induction of secondary malignan-
cies [39]. The significant developments in radia-
tion therapy techniques together with risk-adapted 
treatment strategies have proven to offer advan-
tages for the treatment of children in limiting 
dose exposure. The basic principle of pediatric 
radiotherapy is to tailor treatment intensity 
according to the individual risk profile (Fig. 18.2).
Quality Assurance (QA) programs improve 
the effectiveness of RT programs. Indeed, QA in 
RT involves all the procedures that ensure consis-
tency of the dose/volume prescription, together 
with minimal dose to normal tissue and minimal 
exposure of the health operators [40].
Clinical, biological, and technical characteris-
tics, dose delivery, organizational and training 
aspects can all have an impact on the efficacy, 
safety, and risk of the treatment [41].
The reference model in literature for clinical 
risk management is “clinical governance.” It 





























Fig. 18.2 Risk-adapted RT in pediatric cancer patients. 
The process should take in account the host characteristic 
(children/adolescent), the tumor site and volume, the 
treatment planned (photons, protons, multimodality treat-
ment, etc.), the specific risk of organ dysfunction and 
finally the risk of secondary malignant neoplasm (SMN)
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nies that are aimed at building relationships 
between different components with clinical and 
organizational responsibilities, based on quality, 
safety, and continuous improvement.
Typically, errors include unauthorized acts, 
operative errors, equipment failures, initiating 
events, accident precursors, near-misses, and 
other mishaps [42]. The event can occur any-
where in the entirety of the patient’s clinical care 
process. Most of the errors are discovered in 
setup/treatment and during follow-up. There are 
still errors that are not covered by regular QA 
checks so individual clinics should perform a risk 
analysis of their own practice, classifying and 
learning from mistakes, to determine appropriate 
testing frequencies that maximize physicist time 
efficiency and patient treatment quality and to 
improve existing processes or implement new 
workflows [43]. The detection of errors is essen-
tial in the RT process as it minimizes the risk of 
repetition, activates mechanisms of correction, 
and instills in the staff a drive to improve the 
quality of daily activities.
The potential for errors in radiotherapy is high 
as it involves a complete patient pathway with 
many links in the chain. The interaction of many 
healthcare workers collaborating on highly tech-
nical measurements and calculations can in itself 
present a risk of error.
The United States Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) maintains a large database 
of RT incidents and has estimated that about 60% 
or more of RT incidents are due to human error 
[44].
Beyond the rare cases in which there is inap-
propriate indication of treatment, there is still 
potential risk inherent to the treatment method. 
Three types of risk and consequent litigation 
exist: (1) correct RT treatment without the patient 
having given consent or being correctly informed 
of the risks and possible (potentially serious) side 
effects; (2) correct RT treatment not accompa-
nied by a satisfactory therapeutic response in 
terms of tumor control and OAR sparing; (3) 
incorrect RT treatment [20].
An example of the first type is the lack of ade-
quate explanation of fertility problems related to 
pelvic irradiation. Of the second type, possible, 
subjective biological factors or unrecognized 
variables can be considered; for example, the 
exclusive use of RT treatment instead of multi-
modality treatment is less justified in younger 
patients to limit and/or avoid serious, late side 
effects. The third case—incorrect RT treatment—
falls under malpractice due to inexperience, care-
lessness, or negligence. Such malpractice leads 
to civil and criminal liability where demonstrated 
and where there is definite cause of injury to the 
patient.
The WHO presents in “Radiotherapy Risk” a 
summary of all widely reported and major radio-
therapy incidents that led to significant adverse 
events for patients (such as radiation injury and 
death) and which have occurred in the last three 
decades (1976–2007) [41]. In total, 3125 patients 
were affected, of whom 38 patients (1.2%) were 
reported to have died due to radiation overdose 
toxicity. Overall, 55% of incidents occurred in 
the planning stage, while 45% occurred during 
the introduction of new systems and/or equip-
ment such as megavoltage machines.
The ROSIS database, a voluntary safety 
reporting system for Radiation Oncology for RT 
incidents in Europe [45] reports a total of 1074 
incidents between 2003 and 2008: 97.7% were 
related to external beam radiation treatment 
delivered with Linear Accelerator or Cobalt, and 
50% resulted in incorrect irradiation. Many inci-
dents arise during the pretreatment phase but 
only about 25% of the reported process-related 
incidents were detected prior to treatment. Of the 
cases in which an incident was not detected prior 
to treatment, an average of 22% of the prescribed 
treatment fractions were delivered incorrectly. 
The most commonly reported detection methods 
were “found at time of patient treatment” and 
during “chart-check.” The majority of the 
reported incidents (56%) were detected by 
 radiation therapists in the treatment unit. While 
the majority of incidents that are reported are of 
minor dosimetric consequence, on average they 
affect more than 20% of the patient’s treatment 
fractions.
Criteria for assessing treatment correctness are 
the following: (1) correspondence of the treatment 
schedule for administration of RT dose and techni-
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cal performance by the radiographer or portal 
images or CT on board (IGRT); (2) identification 
of the most restricted field of radiation possible, 
taking into account the assistance provided by 
modern diagnostic imaging devices in preparing 
the treatment plan and centering; (3) safety through 
quality control of the device and exactness of the 
dose delivered, which mainly falls under the com-
petence of the medical physicist.
The definition of organized protocols is funda-
mental; they should provide methods for the con-
stant monitoring of radiotherapy devices and 
identification of the person responsible for each 
process. To prevent any risk of incorrect calibra-
tion, devices should be submitted to quality con-
trol at the beginning of each new working cycle. 
Specific competence of the radiotherapist for the 
organ or system being treated has become 
accepted among the current criteria for treatment 
quality.
Due to rapidly increasing complexity during 
the last few years, comprehensive QA has become 
even more important for treatment planning soft-
ware, information handling, and treatment 
delivery.
The main health professionals involved in the 
delivery of RT are Radiotherapist Physicians, 
Radiation Therapists, and Medical Physicists, 
while the final guarantor of the process is the 
Radiotherapist Physician, who must acquire the 
patient’s informed consent, which is a process, 
not a form. The need to obtain informed consent 
for treatment is based on the patient’s right to 
self-determination and the fiduciary relationship 
between the patient and physician [46]. The 
Radiotherapist assumes responsibility for pro-
tecting the patient from errors and damage caused 
by the incorrect use of ionizing radiation (whether 
or not associated with drugs).
In the present era, RT is being enriched by big 
digital data and intensive technology. Modern 
radiotherapy departments transfer a great quan-
tity of data from diagnosis to planning and treat-
ment machines. The new technologies can help in 
reducing the risks but, when not used correctly or 
if the personnel is not adequately trained, can 
paradoxically act as a new source of error for 
manual procedures [47].
Multimodality image registration, intelligence- 
guided planning, real-time tracking, image- 
guided RT (IGRT), radiomics, and automatic 
follow-up surveys are the products of the digital 
era. Enormous amounts of digital data are created 
in the process of treatment, carrying both benefits 
and risks. Generally, decision-making in RT tries 
to balance these two aspects based on the archival 
and retrieving of data from various platforms.
Modern risk-based analyses show that many 
errors occurring in radiation oncology are due to 
failures in workflow [43, 48]. Medical imaging is 
crucial to RT; its application, referred to as IGRT, 
encompasses tumor diagnosis, staging, progno-
sis, treatment planning, radiation targeting, and 
follow-up care [49]. Setup errors, ranges of organ 
motion, and changes in tumor position and vol-
ume are most likely to be detected during an RT 
course with frequent imaging, which is becoming 
an essential requirement in order to attain the best 
local control of tumors and OAR sparing [50]. 
Various studies indicate that inconsistencies in 
anatomy contouring may be larger than errors in 
the other steps of the treatment planning and 
delivery process [51]. Some semiautomatic and 
automatic contouring methods have been pro-
posed, such as probabilistic atlases and machine- 
learning technologies, to minimize manual input 
and increase consistency in delineating clinical 
target volume (CTV) and planning target volume 
(PTV). Image guidance is suggested, allowing 
margin reduction to several millimeters and dose 
escalation while maintaining the sparing of the 
OAR. However, respiratory motion and artifacts 
may distort target volume. This can be compen-
sated for with the use of four-dimensional CT 
(4DCT) or instruments like “breath holding” that 
are able to facilitate the delivery of RT to a 
dynamic target rather than to a static volume. 
Tumor motion management has been a part of the 
IGRT effort and it markedly impacts radiation 
dose and volume of irradiated, normal tissue, as 
well as secondary cancer risk (SMN) [43].
The risks for RT-related SMN depend on the 
technique used (e.g., the risk for all tumors 
increases with the increase of number of fields, 
with higher energy, and with modulated/dynamic 
techniques) and vary in different organs and 
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tissues. Both size and shape of the PTV influence 
the risk of secondary malignancy. If we consider 
only SMN causing risk for life (e.g., sarcoma, 
carcinoma), they usually occur in healthy tissues 
near volumes irradiated with high-intermediate 
doses [52–55]. Of 30,000 adult patients treated 
between 1969 and 1989 with RT, 203 were re- 
admitted for RT due to an SMN. About 70% of 
SMNs occur in intermediate-high dose regions. 
The stomach, lungs, and colon are the most com-
mon sites for SMN after radiation exposure [54].
With the use of modern RT photon techniques 
such as intensity-modulated radiation therapy 
IMRT, the above-target, high dose volumes in 
healthy tissue have been drastically reduced com-
pared with conventional 2D- or 3D-RT.  One 
might expect a decrease in the number of sarco-
mas induced and (maybe with less certainty) a 
small decrease in the number of carcinomas. By 
contrast, the move from 3D-RT to IMRT involves 
more fields, and the dose–volume histograms 
show that as a consequence a larger volume of 
normal tissue is exposed to lower doses [56].
The greatest challenge in determining risk is 
that secondary cancers after RT have onset laten-
cies of 5–10  years for leukemia and about 
10–60  years for solid tumors after the initial 
treatment. Only longer term follow-up will allow 
a true assessment of the SMN risk. A risk-adapted 
strategy can be taken to optimize the routine fol-
low- up, the screening frequency, and the follow-
 up duration.
While IMRT marks the crowning achievement 
of photon-based external beam radiation therapy, 
the next step in improving physical-dose distribu-
tion naturally points to heavy-charged particle 
beams using the clinical application of Bragg 
peak. The recent introduction of particle therapy 
into clinical practice offers to minimize the radia-
tion dose to healthy tissues near cancer targets, 
offering significantly lower second cancer inci-
dence rates than photon-based therapy [53].
Problems related to the harmonious develop-
ment of RT in a growing multidisciplinary con-
text lie at the center of a growing interest to 
scientific groups. The scientific community of 
radiation oncologists is generally used to monitor 
the acute and late side effects related to treat-
ment, and consequently to adopt and to adapt 
methods from clinical Risk Management. The 
optimal use of preventative and integrated treat-
ment interventions based on a logical and sys-
tematic methodology is carried out through 
multiple, linked phases to improve the quality of 
health services and guarantee patient safety. Risk 
management is effective through the identifica-
tion, knowledge and analysis of risks and errors 
(via report systems, folder review, use of indica-
tors, etc.), identification and correction of causes 
(via Root Causes Analysis, Process Analysis, 
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis, etc.), monitor-
ing of preventive measures, and implementation 
and active support of proposed solutions.
Only integrated risk management can lead to 
changes in clinical practice and promote the 
growth of a healthcare culture that is more atten-
tive to patients and operators. It contributes indi-
rectly to the decrease in the cost of services and 
encourages the allocation of resources towards 
interventions aimed at developing safe and effi-
cient health organizations and structures.
18.7  Safety Practices 
and Implementation 
Strategy for Radiotherapy
Modern radiotherapy depends considerably on 
the transfer of patient data between different 
operative units, information systems, and staff of 
different disciplines.
The steps of the process are presented as fol-
lows in “Safety is No Accident—ASTRO” 
(American Society for Radiation Oncology, 
2019):
• Assessment of patient, or patient evaluation
• Radiation treatment preparation
• Clinical treatment planning
• Therapeutic simulation
• Dosimetric treatment planning
• Pretreatment quality assurance and plan 
verification
• Radiation treatment delivery
• Radiation treatment management
• Follow-up evaluation and care
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Care has to be taken at each step and general 
strategies are also needed to reach the theoretical 
goal of no accidents occurring.
One basic strategy for the improvement of 
safety in the radiotherapy process is the develop-
ment of a stable incident reporting and analysis 
structure. This could be designed in two steps. 
First, a systematic cross-check of the procedures 
should be established, at least at the end of the 
main subprocesses: clinical assessment and deci-
sion, target volume and organ at risk outlining, 
dosimetric treatment planning, and pretreatment 
checks. As a second step, it is important to instill 
in all operators the idea of error discovery and 
disclosure. This part of the process requires that 
all professionals (i.e., physicians, physicists, 
radiation therapists, etc.) are clearly informed 
about the potential advantages of a mandatory 
and tightened-up second check (i.e., a cross- 
check) of their actions, in order to create or main-
tain a no-blame culture within the department. To 
improve the global effectiveness of the check, 
every operator should be encouraged to record 
potential errors and report them within a well- 
structured reporting system or to dedicated 
professionals.
As stated by several authors, the quantitative 
and qualitative understanding of mistakes, gained 
by reporting, allows professionals to identify 
potential, necessary corrections to their organiza-
tion or its processes, or to the technology avail-
able, in order to prevent future incidents.
If no incidents are known, that is, if operators 
do not report problems, no improvement will be 
possible.
18.8  Volumes–Outcomes 
Relationship in Surgery
Patient safety in oncology should also be consid-
ered from the perspective of the outcomes associ-
ated with complex surgical activities or the 
procedures that comprise a broader therapeutic 
approach, in order to find a significant applica-
tion to solid tumors. The risk for cancer patients 
undergoing surgical procedures are linked, in the 
first place, to the generic risks that are typical of 
each surgical procedure, such as infection, selec-
tion of the wrong site, etc.; however, this section 
discusses only the risks associated with outcomes 
such as complications, hospitalization within 
30 days from surgery, or death for surgery per-
formed in specialized surgery centers, which dif-
fer by number of performed surgeries.
Since the earliest observations published 
about a century ago [57], a vast amount of studies 
have come to the conclusion that higher volume 
correlates to better outcomes in a number of med-
ical and surgical procedures, especially in high- 
risk surgery. The relation between workload and 
the latter was regarded as a key factor in the 
regionalization of healthcare providers, particu-
larly those offering surgery with a higher tech-
nology content [58]. For an overview of the 
medical and surgical specialties for which vol-
umes–outcomes relationship has been found, 
three recent works [59–61] are available in litera-
ture. The latest report [59] highlighted for surgi-
cal procedures in oncology a positive association 
of considered outcomes with a high hospital vol-
ume for 14 out of 18 studied conditions (i.e., can-
cers of the colon, colon-rectum, esophagus, 
breast, ovaries, pancreas, lung, prostate, kidney, 
bladder, and head and neck), while for other sur-
gical procedures no sufficient evidence was 
found to evaluate the association (i.e., for testis, 
brain, and pediatric cancers).
Workload volume thus acts as a proxy mea-
sure for various processes and provides charac-
teristics that in turn may directly influence 
outcomes. The causes of this association have 
been investigated since the first statistical evi-
dence of an association with mortality [62]. It has 
been hypothesized that for high-risk surgical 
 procedures with relatively short lengths of stay 
the relationship could be largely explained by 
surgeon volume. A systematic review recently 
investigated whether high-volume surgeons of 
various surgical specialties perform better surger-
ies, (i.e., the surgeon’s volume–outcome relation-
ship) [61]. A positive volume–outcome 
relationship is apparent for most procedures/con-
ditions (e.g., colorectal cancer, bariatric surgery, 
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and breast cancer) and can be related to the 
“learning curve” of a surgeon. The simple concept 
of “learning by doing” and the idea that “practice 
makes perfect” are often used to exemplify this 
notion. A drawback of this work is that these 
results are partly based on systematic reviews 
with methodological weaknesses, in particular 
the possible risk of bias in the primary studies. 
On the other hand, the hospital volume–outcome 
relationship has been investigated, as in one 
recent, German work [63]. Policy makers need 
good evidence for policy making around the stan-
dardization of surgical procedures. For proce-
dures requiring an extended length of stay, 
intensive care unit admission, and/or multidisci-
plinary inpatient or outpatient care (i.e., 
esophagectomy, pneumonectomy, hepatobiliary 
resection), the relationship can be largely 
explained by hospital volume, due to a large mul-
tidisciplinary team and many hospital processes 
of care required to achieve high-quality care.
Drawing parallels between the “experience 
curve” describing a decline in unit costs as func-
tion of cumulative production experience, a rela-
tion well documented in industrial economics, 
the Author underlines that a substantial number 
of deaths could be averted if all patients were 
treated in hospital having results similar to those 
of high-volume hospitals. Such consideration 
would represent a strong support in favor of 
regionalizing certain surgical procedures. To 
make a long story short: larger volumes lead to 
better outcomes. At a more fundamental level, 
one may ask whether a model focusing on vol-
umes may be appropriate. Many questions arise 
concerning the relationship between outcomes 
and experience accumulated over several years, 
the significance of the procedure alone compared 
with the more general set of procedures to which 
a specific procedure belongs to. Moreover, it 
should be clarified whether to regionalize opera-
tions into larger medical centers even when 
smaller hospitals with high volumes of specific 
procedures exists. This perspective raises some 
issues with medical students and young physi-
cians learning curve. In summary, volume alone 
probably does not automatically result in better 
performance, but acts as a proxy measure for 
various processes and provides characteristics 
that in turn may directly influence outcomes.
In a large national dataset of Medicare 
patients, it was found that, after more than three 
decades, both absolute and relative differences in 
adjusted mortality persist between hospitals with 
the lowest and highest volume [64]. Two recent 
overviews of systematic reviews [61, 63] found 
evidence synthesis based on systematic reviews 
instead of primary studies. This result supports a 
positive volume–outcome association for the sur-
geon/practitioner performing most procedures/
conditions. However, results are partly based on 
systematic reviews with methodological weak-
nesses, as to say the lack of consideration of the 
risk of bias in the primary studies [61]. The 
authors suggest that forthcoming reviews, to 
compare better findings across studies, should 
pay more attention to methodology specific to 
volume–outcome relationship.
A recent systematic review and meta-analysis 
on volume–outcome associations in head and 
neck oncology identified six studies that assessed 
long-term survival with conflicting results of lim-
ited external validity [65]. Of the studies ana-
lyzed, only one was able to assess both hospital 
and surgeon volume concurrently. This is a sig-
nificant limitation because it has been previously 
demonstrated that, depending on the procedure, 
either surgeon or hospital volume can explain 
most of the effect on outcome. Thus, these studies 
cannot delineate between the relative importance 
of hospital- and surgeon-volume effects [65].
Considering head and neck cancer patients, 
the same authors took into account data coming 
from a single payer national healthcare system. 
The results of the meta-analysis were consistent 
with the hypothesis: for head and neck cancer 
resections that often require an extended hospital 
stay and inpatient and outpatient multidisci-
plinary care delivered by a large team, the rela-
tionship appears to be explained not only by 
surgeon volume but more strongly by hospital 
volume [66].
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18.9  Case History
 1. A 55-year-old woman with a recent diagnosis 
of early-stage triple negative breast cancer 
was admitted to the breast unit of a National 
Cancer Center to receive the second cycle of a 
regimen with epirubicin and cyclophospha-
mide. Although an apparently correct order 
was written by the physician, and the pharma-
cist entered the right dose of both drugs 
through the computerized provider order entry 
system, 7 days after the treatment administra-
tion the patient experienced a severe toxicity 
(i.e., febrile neutropenia and G3 stomatitis). 
Therefore, a deep verification process was 
started in order to exclude potential medica-
tion errors responsible for the observed side 
effects. In particular, a rigorous examination 
of the medical record together with the analy-
sis of the various steps of the therapeutic 
course were performed. Notably, the second 
pharmacist, who was charged with indepen-
dently verify the computerized order, signed 
the drug preparation as correct. In turn, before 
treatment administration, two nurses were 
charged to appropriately check for the phar-
macists’ signatures, and to independently 
compare the dose on the medication to the 
written physician order. Both nurses con-
firmed the correctness of the process, and the 
drug administration was initiated. 
Subsequently, before all of the medication had 
infused and according on standard proce-
dures, the dose on the medication bag was 
compared to the written order, but no errors 
were found. Appropriately, every step about 
treatment prescription, preparation, and 
administration were adequately reported on 
the medical chart. This approach allowed us to 
recapitulate the whole event and to identify 
the error that had consisted into a wrong pro-
gramming of the interval between the two 
cycles of therapy, administered at a distance 
of 2 weeks instead of 3. Therefore, the patient 
received an unintentional dose-dense regimen 
without support of pegfilgrastim. The physi-
cian was misled by the normal values of the 
blood count before starting the second cycle 
of chemotherapy. This is a clear example of an 
error due to a failure of a CPOE system to pro-
vide a proper alert about the wrong interval 
between two cycles of treatment, and it under-
lines the importance of a correct set of proto-
cols with each distinct variable unequivocally 
detailed.
 2. Patient undergoing two subsequent treatments 
with tomotherapy on two different areas of the 
same anatomical site. For the two treatments, 
two different immobilization and positioning 
masks were made with different positioning 
points. The IGRT (Image-Guided Radiation 
Therapy) procedure, mandatory before each 
treatment, requires the acquisition of images 
with the patient wearing the mask, positioned 
on the treatment bed, and a comparison of the 
acquired images with the simulation images, 
on which the dosimetry plan was conducted. 
For this patient, the IGRT procedure indicated 
an anomaly of a few centimeters along the 
cranial-caudal direction and a different rota-
tion of the patient body on the transversal 
plan. The repositioning needed to return to the 
correct anatomical reference point was inter-
preted as a positioning error of the LASER 
during the planning phase. In addition, no 
investigation was conducted on the different 
rotation of the patient’s body on the transver-
sal plan. The repositioning according to the 
IGRT procedure movements was conducted 
and the patient received therapy in three ses-
sions. After the third session, an evaluation of 
the images revealed that the positioning pre- 
IGRT did not coincide with that of the simula-
tion and that the repositioning post-IGRT did 
not guarantee the precision required in these 
cases. The treatment was suspended, and an 
investigation indicated that the immobiliza-
tion and positioning mask of the first treat-
ment had not been destroyed as by requirement, 
and that at the first three sessions of the sec-
ond treatment, the patient had been immobi-
lized and positioned using the same mask of 
the first treatment. The second treatment was 
modified, in consideration of what had 
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happened during the first three sessions, and 
the patient continued therapy with the new 
treatment and the correct mask for the subse-
quent sessions without adverse effects.
18.10  Final Recommendations
Implementation of best practices in clinical 
oncology, to reduce the risk of error and pre-
venting harm to the patient, must be seen as a 
priority among professionals and health organi-
zations. The growing complexities of modern 
medicine require continuous updates and 
adjustments to meet new necessities. The safest 
possible administration of chemotherapy drugs 
requires a continuous surveillance of the meth-
ods through which the drugs are administered. 
The implementation of an orderly method of 
administration of the drugs is, today, a manda-
tory process of revision, if we want to obtain a 
significant reduction in the risk of error that can 
result in harm to the patient. The preparation of 
cytotoxic drugs can often lead to error. 
Therefore, it should be centrally managed in 
the hospitals and possibly guaranteed by dedi-
cated technicians and pharmacists. The proce-
dures not only must be kept in writing and 
shared with the team, but they also need to be 
monitored and revised in order to avoid the 
introduction of new types of errors. They can 
take advantage of integrated electronic systems, 
such as Computerized Provider Order Entry 
(CPOE) and Clinical Decision Support System 
(CDSS). Each hospital where oncology prac-
tices are provided must have a pharmacy staff 
trained to guarantee the appropriate preparation 
of drugs, which can also benefit from new tech-
nologies that include always improving moni-
toring systems and bar coding. The organization 
must enforce a safety culture among the hospi-
tal staff members, so that they can feel compe-
tent and involved in the processes of improving 
quality of services and preventing pharmaco-
logical errors. Patients should be encouraged to 
contribute to their own care through patient 
education programs with focus on self-evalua-
tion and on monitoring the effect of their treat-
ments. Efforts must be made with the aim of 
improving systems to report and analyze errors. 
Coherently, strong strategies must be intro-
duced to promote inter- professional and 
patient–provider communication.
Concerning radiotherapy, it is necessary: to 
document in detail the different phases of the 
process; to be able to rely on adequate informa-
tion systems; to work in team; to support and 
implement a culture of safety training; to incre-
ment a system of error reporting and near-misses; 
to start methods of error analysis; to support con-
tinuous education and training, especially in case 
of introduction of new technologies.
In conclusion, there should be an open com-
munication among the different professionals 
involved in management of treatment with the 
aim to take inspiration from the best practices, 
which must be defined on the basis of scientific 
evidence. Moreover, the Hospital Organization 
must ensure a peaceful environment and a serene 
atmosphere, warranting necessary organizational 
conditions.
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Surgical specialties have a higher risk of errors 
and adverse events as represented in literature 
[1]. Orthopedics is one such specialty in which 
the clinical risk is more conspicuous and, conse-
quently, it has a high exposure to medical-legal 
disputes [2, 3]. The aim of this work is to analyze 
the clinical risk and alleged malpractice in medi-
cal practice, in order to map professional risk and 
identify recurrent pitfalls.
19.1  Introduction
Orthopedics and traumatology are particularly 
risky specialties for various reasons:
• The very high volume of surgery.
• The reliance on extremely varied skills 
depending on the nature of treatments (casting 
and splinting immobilization, open and closed 
surgery, arthroscopy, etc.), the anatomical 
sites (hand surgery, shoulder surgery, spine 
surgery, etc.), and the age of patients (pediat-
ric and geriatric orthopedics), a fact which 
renders impossible the acquisition of high lev-
els of reliability in all disciplines.
• A progressive increase in surgical indications 
for traumatic pathologies and/or lesions that, 
in the past, were generally treated conserva-
tively with casts. Today, patients no longer 
accept treatments that require long periods of 
immobilization. The evolution of surgical 
techniques offers tantalizing alternatives that 
allow a faster recovery, but involve greater 
risk related to surgery.
• The ever-increasing complexity of interven-
tions. Within just a few years, orthopedics has 
grown from a limited number of relatively 
simple interventions to an enormous range of 
surgical possibilities, often highly technical 
(e.g., intraoperative computerized navigation). 
Where the complexity is high, there is a 
greater risk of making mistakes.
• Two distinct flavors of specialization: ortho-
pedics and traumatology. The latter is charac-
terized by a clinical path that begins suddenly, 
due to time-sensitive diagnostic and therapeu-
tic choices conditioned by the time factor, 
often offering no opportunity for proper plan-
ning. The acceleration of any diagnostic- 
therapeutic procedure generates a greater risk 
of error, adverse events, or harm.
• The fact that any damage caused produces 
unavoidable functional repercussions that lead 
to obvious clinical consequences.
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• The growing attention to repercussions on 
physical appearance, in addition to those on 
functioning. Many surgical procedures 
attempt to correct deformities and any failures 
cause obvious aesthetic damage.
For these reasons, orthopedics is among the 
medical specialties most prone to clinical risk, 
together with oncology, obstetrics/gynecology, 
and general surgery; “clinical risk” refers to the 
probability that a patient is a victim of an adverse 
event and, consequently, suffers any damage that 
is attributable (even if unintentionally) to medical 
care.
The damage may consist of a worsening of 
health conditions, but also of an increase in the 
duration of treatment and/or higher care expenses. 
It may be due to an error which in turn can be 
defined as the failure to complete a planned 
action, or the adoption of procedures not suitable 
for the intended purpose; in this case, the damage 
can be preventable and the underlying error cor-
rectable. The damage may also be due to an acci-
dent (due to a cause that is independent of a real 
error) and, consequently, not always preventable; 
this is an adverse event in the strictest sense.
An error is often the result of various compo-
nents: human, technological, organizational, pro-
cedural, and cultural. Adverse events are difficult 
to assess, due to their complexity, and require 
careful investigation in order to implement pri-
mary prevention measures, whenever possible. In 
Sweden, the analysis of adverse events in the 
orthopedic branch showed that errors in this spe-
cific discipline have a high degree of predictabil-
ity [4]. This type of error deserves the highest 
dedication of attention and resources.
Of the errors which can be classified through a 
Root Cause Analysis [5], the main types are (1) 
diagnostic errors, (2) treatment errors, (3) com-
munication errors, (4) evaluation errors, and (5) 
environmental or system-related problems. In the 
context of diagnostic errors, further categories 
can be distinguished, among which the most 
important are delayed diagnosis, missed diagno-
sis (unidentified pathology or lesion) or wrong 
diagnosis (different pathology diagnosis), failure 
to prescribe diagnostic tests, and incorrect inter-
pretation of diagnostic tests. Treatment errors 
include treatment delay, incorrect surgical tech-
nique, treatment failure, unnecessary treatment, 
and improper surgical wound care. 
Communication errors are divided into verbal 
and written communication mistakes. Evaluation 
errors include misevaluation of indications for 
surgery, non-fulfillment of protocols, and inade-
quate planning. Finally, various organizational 
aspects are considered with regard to problems 
inherent to the system, ranging from poor envi-
ronmental safety to inadequate resources.
19.2  Epidemiology of Adverse 
Advent
The highest number of clinical negligence claims 
comes from surgical specialties, orthopedic sur-
gery being the worst offender, responsible for 
29.8% of all cases [1]. Casali et al. [6] carried out 
a retrospective study on orthopedic claims based 
on an archival data analysis from one of the larg-
est medical malpractice insurance brokers in 
Italy. Their analysis indicates that orthopedics is 
the specialty with the highest risk of malpractice 
claims. Most of the claims studied originated in 
civil litigation and malpractice was mainly sus-
pected in perioperative and operative cases aris-
ing in general hospitals. The anatomical sites 
most commonly invoked in claims were the hip 
and the knees (constituting 40% of all claims), 
and sciatic nerve lesions were the main contribu-
tor. Malpractice was ascertained in about half of 
the analyzed claims, typically cases of elective 
surgery that resulted in the permanent impair-
ment of a patient. On the other hand, death result-
ing from orthopedic malpractice was rare.
19.3  Most Frequent Errors
In orthopedics, risk is mainly related to two types 
of procedures: diagnostic and therapeutic [6–8]. 
Therefore, subsequent discussion will be concen-
trated on these two types. However, it is neces-
sary to remember that a strict classification of 
risk is not possible, since the categories of adverse 
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events are numerous and since a causal chain can 
combine various causes from within each cate-
gory. For example, the most classic typology in 
the category of treatment errors, that of surgery 
performed on the wrong limb, often sees a com-
munication error as the main causal element.
Hospitals are the main sites of error in ortho-
pedics and traumatology. In the patient’s clinical 
route, there are three main phases: intake, hospi-
talization, and discharge. Intake usually happens 
through an outpatient appointment, an emergency 
room visit, or a transfer from another department. 
Patient intake is the phase in which diagnostic 
errors mainly occur. These errors have a high 
incidence in orthopedics and traumatology, com-
parable to that of therapeutic errors [9], even 
though diagnostic errors have been the subject of 
fewer studies. Although the causes of diagnostic 
error are numerous, the main mistakes are the 
insufficient collection of anamnestic data and 
clinical examination results, a failure to check 
previous health records (laboratory tests, reports 
of previous hospital admissions, etc.), insuffi-
cient knowledge of diseases compatible with the 
clinical presentation, a failure to generate diag-
nostic hypotheses or the formulation of incorrect 
diagnostic hypotheses (a differential diagnosis 
focused on the most striking or the most recently 
encountered diseases rather than the most statisti-
cally probable hypothesis), a lack of consider-
ation of diseases or associated therapies that 
modify the diagnostic approach, a lack of time or 
an overload of work, the lack of knowledge or a 
failure to assess the accuracy limits of tests, 
among others.
Intake from the emergency department runs a 
higher risk of error than intake from an outpatient 
clinic. The importance of a diagnostic error dur-
ing an intake from the emergency department is 
very variable. It can be relatively negligible, such 
as the failure to highlight a fracture of a distal 
phalanx of a finger, or it can have devastating 
consequences, such as neurological damage 
caused by a vertebral fracture that goes unrecog-
nized and, consequently, not adequately immobi-
lized. A lack of an initial diagnosis most often 
delays the start of therapy, possibly leading to a 
worse outcome or a more difficult treatment; fur-
thermore, in all cases of delayed injury identifica-
tion, the prolongation of pain until a definitive 
diagnosis represents a significant source of dis-
comfort. Finally, even if the physical conse-
quences are minimal, there is always the concern 
of psychological stress trauma, deterioration of 
the doctor-patient relationship, or a loss of confi-
dence in doctors or the hospital.
Traumatologic emergency care has been 
described as “the perfect storm” for a traumatolo-
gist (or radiologist) [10, 11], as the following 
conditions can occur simultaneously: an unstable 
patient, a difficulty to collect a complete anamne-
sis, a need to make important decisions quickly, a 
confluence of different specialist skills, a need 
for different treatments at once, overcrowding, 
and working with young or trainee health staff.
The polytrauma patient has the highest con-
centration of risk factors. In these circumstances, 
some orthopedic lesions often go initially unno-
ticed, both because of the need to focus clinical 
and instrumental diagnostics on conditions that 
endanger the patient’s life and because of the 
multiplicity of lesions, some of which distract 
from fractures that are more difficult to identify 
through clinical examination (such as vertebral 
fractures). The initial evaluation is not always 
reliable; for example, it may happen that atten-
tion is initially drawn to more striking injuries 
that actually have lower priority: a severe facial 
trauma evokes a visceral response but, if the air-
ways are clear, rarely constitutes a serious threat 
to the patient’s life, while it can divert attention 
away from an unstable cervical spinal cord lesion 
of critical importance.
The most frequently misunderstood lesions 
are fractures, followed far behind by ligament 
injuries, dislocations, and tendon injuries. 
Vascular-nerve lesions are even less frequent but 
they are of high importance due to the risk of irre-
versible damage. The need for an accurate neuro-
vascular evaluation of the limbs of the 
trauma-orthopedic patient is certainly well- 
recognized, but often overlooked: an interesting 
study published in 2012 in the American Journal 
of Medical Quality [12] highlights the existence 
of a statistically significant association between 
the increased experience of the examiner and the 
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reduced or inadequate documentation of the neu-
rovascular status of extremities.
A fracture may go unrecognized for many rea-
sons; the following main groups can be distin-
guished: the absence of targeted instrumental 
examinations, the failure to observe the fracture 
even with a targeted instrumental examination, 
the incorrect interpretation of an examination, 
and the effective absence of radiographic 
evidence.
The failure to prescribe a radiographic exam is 
the second most frequent cause of diagnostic 
error, preceded only by the failure to observe a 
fracture in correctly performed radiographs [13]. 
Prescription error can be caused by various fac-
tors. First, it must be recognized that, however 
simple it may be to perform a targeted X-ray 
examination on a conscious patient who can pin-
point the origin of pain to the site of a fracture, 
the examination becomes extremely challenging 
when performed on a patient who is unconscious 
or in an altered sensory state. Furthermore, even 
in lucid patients, pain may not always be present; 
this may be especially true for elderly patients, in 
whom the frequent occurrence of bone fragility 
may cause the severity of trauma to be 
underestimated.
Failure to observe the fracture even through a 
targeted instrumental examination occurs rela-
tively frequently in some anatomical regions that 
do not appear in standard projections. For exam-
ple, fractures in the lower cervical/upper thoracic 
spine are often invisible due to the overlapping of 
the shoulders in a lateral projection; therefore, if 
the clinical presentation or the dynamics of the 
accident cannot exclude the presence of such 
lesions, an in-depth diagnostic analysis with CT 
is necessary.
The misinterpretation of the results of a cor-
rectly performed exam is primarily due to error in 
diagnostic imaging [13], while the actual absence 
of radiological signs, even in the presence of a 
lesion (a true false negative), is a rare but possible 
event (Fig.  19.1). These errors are mainly rele-
vant to the radiological specialty, for which refer-
ence should be made to the respective literature 
[14, 15].
The most frequent locations of unrecognized 
fractures are hand, wrist, and foot and ankle; each 
anatomical site has a characteristically prevalent 
type of unrecognized lesion, posing very differ-
ent degrees of danger: in the wrist, the most fre-
quently unrecognized fracture occurs at the distal 
end of the radius (more so than all greenstick 
a b
Fig. 19.1 (a) CT scan normal, performed on the day of the accident; (b) cervical radiograph performed 2 months later 
demonstrating C4–C5 subluxation
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fractures in growing subjects); however, the 
scaphoid fracture, often completely invisible in 
initial radiograms, is the most important for its 
clinical consequences. In the elbow, fractures of 
the radial head are the most often ignored; in the 
hip, fractures of the branches are the least identi-
fied lesions, even though the consequences are 
definitely more serious in the less frequently 
undetected fractures of the femur neck. In the 
knee, the diagnosis of intercondylar eminence 
fracture is not frequently made, but the rarest 
joint fractures of the tibial plateau produce the 
most serious consequences. At the level of the 
ankle and foot, fractures of the external malleolus 
and calcaneal apophyses are those that most often 
escape the initial diagnosis, but more care must 
be taken when excluding thalamic calcaneal frac-
tures, fractures of the talar neck, and the rarer 
fracture-dislocation of Lisfranc, which are deter-
mining factors in the severity of aftereffects when 
not promptly treated.
Regarding the spine, most of the missed diag-
noses entail substantial risks: at the cervical level, 
fractures of the atlas and axis (and in particular of 
the odontoid process) can cause serious if not 
fatal neurological damage or pseudoarthrosis. At 
the level of the thoracic spine, compression frac-
tures of the first vertebrae are frequently over-
looked, since, as with lower cervical vertebrae, 
they are not visible on standard radiographs. The 
most frequently underestimated fractures are 
those of the thoracolumbar passage in elderly 
subjects or those with bone fragility. Even though 
these vertebrae are often the site of compression 
fractures (as well as low-energy trauma), the area 
is not sufficiently investigated either because the 
trauma is considered an insufficient cause for 
concern, or because the examination is incor-
rectly centered around the lumbosacral rachis 
(the site of radiating pain).
On the other hand, diagnostic errors may also 
be contrary to those previously described. They 
may consist of an unindicated radiographic 
examination or a radiographic diagnosis of frac-
ture where it is absent (i.e., radiographic false 
positives, for overlapping artifacts or anatomical 
variants). In the former case, this leads to poten-
tially damaging ionizing radiation exposure and, 
in the latter case, to the unnecessary prescription 
of treatments (usually orthosis). The percentage 
of radiographic false positives in the radiology of 
the skeletal system in an emergency department 
can even reach 18% of cases if the radiologist has 
not yet gained sufficient competence [16].
Not all diagnostic errors result in therapeutic 
errors. Even if in orthopedic traumatology small 
fractures may go unnoticed relatively frequently 
and consequently be misdiagnosed as bruises or 
distortions, treatment (e.g., immobilization, rest, 
or weight-bearing restrictions) is often compati-
ble with a favorable final result.
Hospitalization in the orthopedic- 
traumatological ward occurs by various means 
and, given the nature of the specialty, the purpose 
of hospitalization is typically surgery. Considering 
that surgical errors are the most frequent among 
the therapeutic errors, studies in literature have 
focused more on these than on others. In a work 
published in the Archives of Surgery of 2009 
[17], all incorrect surgical and/or invasive proce-
dures due to errors made in or outside the operat-
ing room were analyzed; data collected from the 
Veterans Health Administration (VHA) Medical 
Centers from 2001 to 2006 were analyzed and it 
was found that about 50% of the adverse events 
had occurred in operating rooms, and the rest 
outside. Orthopedic surgery was ranked among 
the first places for adverse events occurring in the 
operating room, while interventional radiology 
set the record for errors outside the surgical the-
ater. Across the board, the most common cause of 
error was a lack of communication.
Incorrect surgical and/or invasive procedures 
represent a challenge both in and out of the oper-
ating room. Surgical errors can be classified in 
the following main groups: patient identification, 
surgical technique, and postoperative surgical 
complications.
Patient identification errors can be further sub-
divided into three subgroups: wrong patient, 
wrong anatomical site, and wrong procedure [18, 
19]. Anatomical site errors have two peculiar 
characteristics that make them particularly of 
note in the context of clinical risk management: 
the first is that the consequences are particularly 
serious in terms of damage to the patient; the 
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second is the high level of preventability, which 
renders viable their complete elimination and 
transformation into never events.
This type of error is not so rare: it has been 
calculated that the risk of making an anatomical 
site error within 35 years of an orthopedist’s pro-
fessional career is about 25%, particularly in 
arthroscopies for side errors and in vertebral sur-
gery for level errors [20].
Anatomical site errors can be prevented by 
implementing various types of procedures: (1) 
preoperative checks, with clinical/instrumental 
exams and the use of specific items of the preop-
erative checklist. The identification of the patient, 
the side to be operated on, and the type of inter-
vention should always take place in all phases, 
starting from the addition to the waiting list to the 
admittance into the operating room, always 
actively involving the patient, if their state of 
consciousness and the level of vigilance has not 
been compromised by concomitant pathologies; 
(2) marking the site with ink resistant to aseptic 
procedures. The mark must be visible even after 
the preparation of the sterile field. If it is possible 
to make an error even when the side is correct 
(for example, in the case of the various fingers of 
the hand), the mark must be specifically located 
on the anatomical part to be operated on, possibly 
precisely tracing the incision. In any case, the 
mark must not be ambiguous: it must be made by 
the first operator and known to the whole team; 
furthermore, there must be no other marks on the 
body. In spinal surgery, the use of specific radio-
logical techniques may be necessary in order to 
identify the cutaneous region corresponding with 
the surgical level or the single vertebra; (3) “time- 
out,” the last check performed by team members 
immediately before the surgical incision. Each 
activity must be suspended for a moment and the 
correctness of the site must be checked once 
again, verifying that the marked site agrees with 
the checklist.
Despite the implementation of protocols, 
reports of site errors are constantly increasing 
[2], probably in part thanks to improved transpar-
ency. Consequently, the risk of making mistakes 
in this sector is not negligible, above all because 
site errors tend to be underestimated by the ortho-
pedist who, often due to an excess of confidence, 
does not consider it as a possibility.
Surgical technique errors are extremely vari-
able and a detailed discussion is outside the scope 
of this chapter. Spinal surgery is the most fre-
quently involved [21] (e.g., neurological dam-
age) together with prosthetic hip and knee surgery 
[22, 23] (e.g., mobilization of prosthetic compo-
nents). Infectious complications, which were 
included in the next group, also weigh heavily in 
this context.
Most failures in orthopedic surgery are related 
to postoperative surgical complications, often 
arising from a failure to take adequate preventa-
tive measures. In traumatic and orthopedic 
pathology, surgical complications can be classi-
fied as local or general. The main local complica-
tions are related to infections, which occur in 
surgery at a constantly increasing rate despite 
improvements in aseptic procedures. This 
increase is probably due to the continuous evolu-
tion of implants and osteosynthesis systems, 
which require increasingly complex and pro-
longed interventions, on top of fears of new, 
resistant bacterial strains. The risk of infection 
cannot be completely eliminated; nevertheless, it 
is essential to reduce the risk as much as possible 
through the most accurate execution of each sani-
tary procedure according to the rules of asepsis, 
both in the ward before and after surgery, and in 
the operating room during the surgical phase. The 
key to preventing infections is sterility in the 
operating room and the management of surgical 
wounds in the ward.
General complications are extremely variable 
but thromboembolism is the most widely involved 
in orthopedic risk management. Anti- 
thromboembolic (ATE) prophylaxis and therapy, 
when needed, are a highly debated and controver-
sial topic. There are various guidelines drawn up 
by the leading experts in the field, which are con-
tinuously reviewed and updated. The assessment 
of a patient’s overall thromboembolic risk is tai-
lored to the various departments in which this 
complication is more prevalent (with orthopedics 
at the top of the list). Adequate anti- 
thromboembolic prophylaxis must always be 
established while taking into account its counter-
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part: the risk of bleeding. In the context of gen-
eral complications in orthopedic departments, the 
mortality rate is widely used as a safety indicator. 
Panesar et al. [24] analyzed deaths in the orthope-
dic environment using a qualitative approach to 
identify causative factors: the conclusions were 
that most deaths were due to avoidable or treat-
able complications.
Even patient discharge is a critical moment 
along the clinical route. It is essential to give the 
patient clear and detailed information  highlighting 
all the possible risks (e.g., risks relating to an 
incorrectly performed thromboembolic prophy-
laxis or antibiotic therapy).
The medication reconciliation and handover 
[25] represent crucial moments for the care of a 
patient at home and for communication between 
the hospital doctor and the general practitioner. 
Communication in the discharge phase is very 
important; it must be certain that all information 
is understood by the patient and that they are 
invited to re-read the prescriptions of drugs or 
repeat the recommendations made.
Furthermore, it is appropriate to consider the 
socio-cultural background and the personality of 
the patient, in order to be sure that the indications 
are well understood and do not cause problems 
for their family.
During the discharge phase, checklists are 
useful to remind the doctor of all the necessary 
checks to be made before discharging the patient, 
including the removal of any devices and report-
ing to the general practitioner in particularly 
complex cases.
19.4  Safety Practices 
and Implementation 
Strategy
In absolute terms, the number of orthopedic 
patients suffering preventable adverse events is 
high. Critical phases of the clinical route are usu-
ally divided into tasks by organization, technol-
ogy, and professional skill. Diagnosis errors are 
mainly linked to a lack of professional skill and 
organizational problems. In the case of profes-
sional skill, the specific training of health person-
nel must be improved. Various therapeutic 
protocols cover the most important steps in cases 
of polytrauma, especially those needed to rule 
out vertebral lesions. Providing information 
about the most easily misunderstood injuries, 
especially potentially serious ones, draws and 
maintains a high level of attention towards spe-
cific anatomical sites. For example, in the case of 
wrist trauma, tenderness of the snuffbox could 
indicate a possible compound fracture despite the 
absence of clear lesions of the scaphoid upon 
radiographic examination; it may therefore be 
appropriate to immobilize the wrist along with 
the first finger and re-evaluate the patient clini-
cally and radiographically after a period of 
7–10  days, when a possible compound fracture 
would be more evident after the initial bone 
resorption. In the case of cervical whiplash, there 
are specific protocols that determine if a radio-
graphic examination is required. Finally, a frac-
ture of the thoracolumbar passage in an 
osteoporotic subject with low back pain will not 
go unnoticed if guidelines are provided for acute 
low back pain and the epidemiology of fractures, 
such as the recommendations that patients over 
the age of 55 receive radiographic control of the 
spine and that X-ray control must be extended to 
the L1–T12 vertebrae which are the most fre-
quent fracture sites.
With regard to organizational problems, indi-
vidual phases of the diagnostic-therapeutic path 
must be distinguished. In urgent care and in 
emergency facilities, it is essential to regulate the 
access to prevent overcrowding.
In the orthopedics and traumatology depart-
ments, the main critical points are patient and 
surgical site identification, proper ward manage-
ment including the compilation of the medical 
record and therapy, peripheral vascular-nervous 
status assessment, prevention of venous throm-
boembolism and infections, control of pre- and 
postoperative bleeding, and correct indications in 
the postoperative period as well as at discharge. 
Some of these problems are common to every 
other department while others are more specific. 
An inadequately completed medical record, 
besides representing a serious danger for the 
patient, is also an act of negligence. Without a 
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precise clinical diary, it will be difficult, or even 
impossible, to clearly reconstruct the diagnostic- 
therapeutic course of that patient, which is essen-
tial to understand the context of an adverse event 
if one should occur.
The main critical tasks for the prevention of 
surgical error are also organizational and profes-
sional. From an organizational point of view, the 
surgical checklist is the most fundamental tool; it 
must be concise, complete, intuitive, and easily 
understandable to all the personnel involved, 
both in the operating theater and in the ward. A 
checklist is useless if its compilation, involving 
each actor, is not complete across every sector 
and within the pre-established timetable. 
Subsequent contributions by a single operator are 
useless and harmful. Consequently, efforts must 
be directed towards two main areas to ensure the 
quality of care and of future investigations: those 
in which the error has a higher incidence rate 
(e.g., communication, instrumentation), and 
those in which the error, even if less frequent, 
represents a serious risk for the patient (e.g., 
management of drugs/medications, surgical site 
errors) [2].
Taking into account the professional criticali-
ties, it is possible to limit surgical technique 
errors by improving the training of personnel, 
even in simulated settings. It is desirable, espe-
cially in large hospitals, to promote super- 
specialized disciplines through the creation of 
subsets of surgeons dedicated to specific sectors, 
such as hand and spine surgery.
Most complications in orthopedics and trau-
matology can be treated or prevented thanks to 
the knowledge and the implementation of strate-
gies for clinical risk management. It is more cor-
rect to say “risk management” than “risk 
elimination,” because risk cannot be realistically 
eliminated. Risk is an ever-present condition and 
our aim must be the identification, understand-
ing, management, and finally reduction of 
adverse events. The main purpose of clinical risk 
management is primary prevention, which 
includes continuous updating and professional 
training, aimed at improving health care; in addi-
tion, communication skills and the prevention of 
surgical errors must be improved, with the help 
of protocols and checklists already widely dis-
tributed and available.
We must learn from our mistakes. Hence the 
importance of clinical audits and Mortality and 
Morbidity meetings. Adverse events and errors 
must be contextualized; the risks and criticalities 
present in context must be identified in order to 
introduce control and prevention measures. This 
is possible when there is adequate communica-
tion, consultation, control, and review of cases 
and, above all, when a health organization 
believes in safety management.
A modern approach to clinical risk manage-
ment is represented by the Failure Mode and 
Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA), a tech-
nique that allows to identify defects or errors of 
the system in a simulated way. Data relating to 
this interesting procedure, also tested in orthope-
dic departments [6], are still preliminary but defi-
nitely useful in the context of clinical risk 
management.
19.5  Clinical Cases
19.5.1  Case 1
A 68-year-old man was injured in a car accident. 
The first treatment was performed in a local hos-
pital. The physical examination revealed a head 
injury and cervical pain. The cranial CT scan was 
normal. The lateral X-ray cervical view was nor-
mal until the level C6. The injury mechanism 
involved high energy and a cervical CT scan was 
performed. The cervical CT scan was also nor-
mal (Fig. 19.1). Two months later, the patient vis-
ited due to a persistence of the cervical pain. The 
clinical examination revealed pain and a defi-
ciency in the range of cervical spine motion, 
without neurological impairment. No radiologic 
examination was ordered and the patient was pre-
scribed analgesics and physiotherapy. After a 
month, the persistence of pain led to a second 
assessment: a cervical radiograph was ordered 
and demonstrated C4–C5 subluxation. There are 
only a few cases of neglected cervical spine dis-
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locations reported in the literature and no clear 
guidelines regarding the management of such 
injuries. Therefore the treatment of delayed pre-
sentations of such cases is very difficult and the 
patient now needs a risky and complex surgical 
intervention. The diagnosis of cervical spine 
injuries remains a significant problem for many 
blunt trauma patients. Correct and early diagno-
sis of these injuries is imperative, as delayed or 
missed diagnoses result in increased morbidity 
and mortality.
The first error of diagnosis was radiologic: the 
sensitivity of the CT scan to cervical trauma is 
98% but may fail to identify ligamentous injuries. 
Only an MRI can detect this type of lesion before 
the subluxation.
This case report underscores the importance 
of integrating all aspects of patient history, pre-
cise physical examination, diagnostic imaging, 
and clinical judgment. Re-evaluation is necessary 
when the CT scan does not correlate with physi-
cal examination. The diligent integration of both 
physical examination and the review of images 
obtained will undoubtedly lead to a decrease in 
claims of medical malpractice.
19.5.2  Case 2
The patient is a 16-year-old girl with no known 
family history of neurofibromatosis. She had 
noticed some deformity in her spine when she 
was 8 years old, and was diagnosed with neurofi-
bromatosis type I (NF-1) and followed up by a 
neurologist. She had a scoliotic deformity of the 
spine, more pronounced during a forward Adam’s 
test. During the neurologist’s initial follow-up, 
serial plain radiographs that had been performed 
every 2 years revealed progression of the scolio-
sis. Then, 5  years ago, when she was 11  years 
old, the patient was treated with a brace. However, 
the curve rapidly progressed as she entered the 
adolescent growth spurt, with scoliosis measur-
ing 50° Cobb, kyphosis 56°, and Risser 1 
(Fig. 19.2). Even so, the brace treatment was con-
tinued. When the patient presented herself at our 
hospital, she was Risser 5 and the radiological 
imaging showed a classic dystrophic kyphosco-
liosis with Cobb angles measuring 88° scoliosis 
(T5–T8) and 85° kyphosis (T2–T101) (Fig. 19.3).
Neurofibromatosis is an autosomal, dominant 
chromosomal disorder and scoliosis is the most 
common skeletal presentation, with incidence 
ranging from 10% to 60%. Our patient had a 
kyphoscoliotic curve of the proximal thoracic 
spine, with severe apical rotation from T5 to T8. 
The clinical presentation and radiological imag-
ing in this patient were very suggestive of dystro-
phic features and included: (a) short segment and 
acute angular deformity; (b) early occurrence at 
the young age of 8 years old; (c) sagittal plane 
kyphoscoliosis; (c) pencilling of the ribs; and (d) 
defective pedicles. Early surgical stabilization 
was indicated in this patient at an early age of 
onset because of the risk of substantial progres-
sion of the curve. However, the doctor had opted 
for nonsurgical treatment in the initial stages, 
using a brace: this is an error of treatment and it 
was not surprising that bracing had failed nor that 
the curve had rapidly progressed. Now the patient 
needs multiple, complex, and risky surgical 
interventions.
19.6  Recommendations
To conclude, two important elements must be 
mentioned in orthopedic risk management. The 
first is that the biggest danger comes not from the 
risk itself but from ignorance, as many orthope-
dists do not fully appreciate the level of risk and 
so do not feel the need for more scrutiny.
The second is that a good doctor-patient rela-
tionship is as essential as both professional com-
petence and compliance with protocols and 
guidelines. When approaching clinical practice, 
the principles of classical medicine, from the 
Hippocratic oath onwards, must always be kept 
in mind. According to Nebel [26], the best pre-
vention against both adverse events and their 
legal implications can be summed up by the 
ancient precept “love thy patient.”
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Fig. 19.2 Standing whole spine radiographs in NF1 patient 12 years old, showing sharp angular right-sided kyphosco-
liosis: dystrophic curves have always surgical indication and the conservative treatment is contraindicated
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This chapter will review the most common 
adverse events that happen in a psychiatric unit 
and the safety measures that are needed to 
decrease the risk of errors and adverse events. 
The adverse events and errors that may happen in 
a psychiatric unit are unique and will be exam-
ined in detail. This section will also highlight the 
role of staff members and patients in preventing 
or causing the error.
A section of this chapter will describe the 
unique structural requirements that a psychiatric 
unit needs for optimal patient safety. The role of 
the doctors, nurses and staff to ensure safety will 
be discussed in detail.
20.1  Introduction
‘Patient safety’ refers to the prevention of harm, 
errors and adverse events to patients receiving 
healthcare. Despite the growing interest in patient 
safety, its application to mental health context is 
still largely unexplored [1]. Indeed, mental health 
hospitals or units face unique patient safety 
issues, such as those related to self-harm, suicide 
and use of restraints/seclusion [1, 2].
The Institute of Medicine (US) categorizes 
patient safety events as either adverse events or 
medical errors [3]. An adverse event consists of 
an incident that causes harm to the patient and 
negatively affects the patient’s health and quality 
of life, causing illness, injury, disability, suffering 
or death, and negatively affecting his or her 
social, physical or psychological structure [4]. A 
medical error is basically consisting of any mis-
take which is made during the diagnosis and 
treatment process [5].
The terms medical errors and adverse events 
are often used interchangeably. Medical errors 
can happen regardless of whether they lead to 
adverse events or cause no harm to the patient. 
Adverse events can be a consequence of a medi-
cal error but may well be also a result of appro-
priate care. For example, an event in which a 
patient, who has been appropriately assessed for 
not being at risk of a fall, accidentally trips and 
falls resulting in a fractured hip would be consid-
ered an adverse event. On the contrary, when a 
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person who has been assessed to be at risk of a 
fall does not receive the prerequisite fall preven-
tion implements, and then the person falls, the 
event is to be considered as a medical error even 
if the individual does not experience any injury 
[3].
20.2  Epidemiology of Adverse 
Events in Patients Receiving 
Mental Healthcare
Adverse events resulting from psychiatric condi-
tions are influenced by various clinical, social 
and patient factors [3]. As for other disciplines, 
adverse events during mental healthcare may be 
described as unintended injuries caused by men-
tal health management, resulting in an increased 
hospital stay or diminished function/disability at 
the time of discharge. Severe adverse events 
include those that result in the death of patients or 
permanent disability [6]. A system for categoriz-
ing events is needed to understand the multitude 
of factors leading to it [4]. Marcus et al. classified 
adverse events into nondrug-related events and 
medication-related events [3].
Nondrug adverse events include falls, assault, 
sexual contact, self-harm and other injuries [3].
20.2.1  Nondrug-Related Adverse 
Events
20.2.1.1  Falls
Falls in hospitals are common and can result 
in conditions ranging from prolonged hospi-
talization to death [7]. Falls in psychiatric 
units are more common than observed in many 
other medico- surgical units [8], and falls in 
geropsychiatric patients result in more severe 
outcomes [9].
According to the National Database of 
Nursing Quality Indicators, the rate of patient 
falls in psychiatric units is in the range of 13–25 
per 1000 patient days, compared with 4 per 1000 
patient days in medico-surgical areas [8]. The 
higher rate of falls in psychiatric inpatients is 
likely influenced by side effects of psychotropic 
medications, such as sedation, orthostatic hyper-
tension [10] and medication-induced parkinson-
ism [9]. Lavsa et al. reported that the significant 
predictor of falls in the psychiatric population 
includes Alzheimer’s disease, dementia, use of 
drugs like alpha-blockers, non-benzodiazepines 
sleep aids, benzodiazepines, H2 blockers, lithium, 
atypical and conventional antipsychotics, anti-
convulsants and mood stabilizers, laxatives, and 
stool softeners [7]. Chan et al. found that adjust-
ment or change in psychotropic drugs is also one 
of the major factors for falls in psychiatric units 
[9]. Other risk factors include orthostasis, gait 
instability, fluctuations in blood pressure and 
physical limitations [10]. All patients undergoing 
electroconvulsive therapy are assumed to be at a 
higher fall risk thereafter [11].
20.2.1.2  Assault
Assault refers to forcible physical contact and 
may include slapping, kicking, biting, punching 
and pulling hair. The assault need not result in an 
injury to be considered an adverse event. The 
exception is when a patient assaults a staff mem-
ber, which is considered as an adverse event only 
if the staff member sustains an injury. No assaul-
tive violence like the destruction of hospital 
property is usually not regarded as a patient 
safety event [3].
Studies have found that assaults, aggression or 
violence from a patient to staff members is more 
common than the same events directed towards 
another patient. Staggs found that higher levels of 
staffing by non-registered nurses resulted in 
higher rates of injurious assaults, regardless of 
who the victim (hospital personnel/other patients) 
was. Higher levels of staffing by registered nurses 
were associated with lower rates of injurious 
assaults against patients and higher rates of inju-
rious assaults against hospital personnel [12]. A 
research conducted in a Norwegian psychiatric 
hospital showed that 100% of nurses had experi-
enced a violent assault during their career [13].
Violence may cause an emotional effect like 
fear, anger, depression and sleeplessness on other 
inpatients. It can also result in increased absen-
teeism of staff members and high staff turnover 
[14]. Several negative variables that increase the 
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risk for violence in mental hospitals have been 
identified in the interaction between inpatients 
and hospital staff [15] and multiple studies have 
identified variables such as extended hospital 
stay, previous episodes of aggression, and sub-
stance abuse, among the most significant predic-
tors of violence in mental health units [4, 15].
20.2.1.3  Sexual Contact
Sexual contact is always considered as a patient 
safety adverse event when it is not voluntary. 
However, even voluntary sexual intercourses 
may be adverse events, given that patients admit-
ted to an inpatient unit are often cognitively 
impaired and unable to give full consent. Also, 
risks may arise from the possibility of getting/
transmitting a sexually transmitted disease and/or 
of starting an unwanted pregnancy [3]. Sexual 
contact includes touching directly or indirectly, 
through the clothing, of the anus, breasts, genita-
lia, groin, buttocks and inner thigh. Sexual con-
tact does not include non-physical contact such 
as sexual talk or non-sexual physical contact such 
as a pat on the back, hugging or kissing on the 
cheek greetings between a patient and a visitor, 
and where a staff member was an unwanted 
recipient of sexual contact from a patient [16]. 
Lawn and colleagues summarized a series of 
studies reporting that a high percentage of 
females experienced molestation or unwanted 
sexual comments during their stay in a psychiat-
ric inpatient unit and that up to 56% of women 
reported having been troubled by men, with 8% 
stating that they had participated in sexual acts 
against their will. The authors note that consent-
ing sexual activity on inpatient wards is a contro-
versial issue but point to the fact that it is relatively 
common that inpatients have sexual intercourse. 
As an example, they report that in a study at 
Imperial College, 30% of the patients had 
engaged in some form of sexual intercourse, a 
percentage that was similar to the one (38%) that 
was found in a survey of chronic patients in a 
facility of British Columbia, Canada [17].
20.2.1.4  Self-Harm
Psychiatric illnesses such as anxiety, depression 
and alcohol use disorders are well-known fac-
tors for self-harm [18]. Self-harm has been 
described in many terms, including self-injury, 
deliberate self-harm, self-mutilation, attempted 
suicide or parasuicide [19]. People who self-
injure may be at an increased risk of suicide 
[18]. Exceptions include suicidal ideations that 
are not followed by actions to self-harm and 
minor injuries without any bruises, swelling or 
need for treatment [16].
A study conducted among acute inpatients 
found that the most common method of self-harm 
is ripping of the skin. The study also reported that 
men would more likely use outwardly aggressive 
methods to self-harm. Another study found out 
that among the inpatients who engage in self- 
harm episodes, women with no suicidal risk com-
prised the largest group. The chances of the 
patient trying to re-engage in self-harm are high-
est in the first 2  years after the first episode of 
self-harm, but the risk may persist over the next 
few years [19].
Patients who self-harm often describe feelings 
of upset, anger, loneliness, periods of inner ten-
sion, or feeling unreal, numbness or emptiness 
inside. James et al. cited psychological distress as 
the most common reason for self-harm. Studies 
found that environmental restriction increased 
the risk of self-harm. Other reasons for self-harm 
include refusal of a request by staff, feeling of 
being controlled by the staff, conflict with other 
patients and disappointment with the doctor [20].
20.2.1.5  Other Nondrug Adverse 
Events
These adverse events are usually caused by medi-
cal examination or treatment other than medica-
tions, such as electroconvulsive therapy [3]. The 
events may include difficulty in breathing or 
walking, seeing, hearing, or standing [16] and 
often result in stopping the treatment and causing 
functional impairments.
20.2.2  Drug Adverse Events
Adverse drug reaction (ADR) refers to the 
response of a drug that results in unintended and 
harmful consequences when the medication is 
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given at doses that are typically used in humans 
for diagnosis, prevention or modification of 
physiological functions. These reactions result in 
increased mortality, morbidity, cost of treatment 
and non-adherence to treatment [21]. ADRs pose 
a significant problem in the treatment of patients 
with mental illness because these patients often 
lack adequate insight into their condition and 
treatment, and the ADR further complicates the 
situation [23]. Weight gain, constipation and 
tremors are among the most common ADRs that 
have been reported [21].
ADRs in psychiatry units are common and 
somewhat preventable. Rothschild et al. reported 
that 13% of all ADRs were preventable and atypi-
cal antipsychotics accounted for 37% of reported 
ADRs [22]. A study on the referrals of psychiat-
ric inpatients to general hospitals found out that 
76% of transfers were because of neurological 
reactions and 32% of transfers were because of 
the use of more than one psychotropic drug [23].
Studies conducted in New England and 
Kolkata, India, found that atypical antipsychotics 
were responsible for the majority of the ADRs 
reported in psychiatry units [21]. Thomas et al. 
conducted a study that involved the analysis and 
evaluation of ADRs reported in a psychiatric hos-
pital for 3 years. The study found that the most 
frequent drugs associated with ADRs were anti-
epileptics, cardiovascular agents and second- 
generation antipsychotics. The study also found a 
20.4% ADR preventability rate in the mental care 
units, which is lower than the preventability rates 
found in general inpatients and long-term facili-
ties [24].
20.3  Medical Errors 
in Psychiatric Care
As in the general medical setting, medical errors 
in psychiatric care lead to significant injuries, up 
to death, as well as to an increase in the health-
care system costs.
Medical errors are classified into diagnostic 
errors, preventive errors, treatment errors and 
‘other errors’. Diagnostic failure includes failure 
to diagnose, including failure to order a diagnos-
tic test. Preventive errors include failure in pre-
venting disease or in monitoring the disease 
processes. Treatment errors include failure in 
providing medical interventions. Other errors 
include system error caused by a failure in the 
operating system or defective medical 
equipment.
The chain of events that leads to medical error 
is complex, but factors that lead to errors can be 
broadly classified as patient factors, provider fac-
tors and system factors.
 (a) Patient Factors
Acute psychiatric symptoms such as 
impulsive, homicidal, suicidal and poor- 
judgement behaviour could result in either 
mistakes or slips. Mistakes include inaccu-
rate treatment plans, whereas slips result 
from the deviation from the action plan. 
Psychiatric patients may not be able to accu-
rately report their symptoms to the physician, 
which may delay treatment and complicate 
the differential diagnosis of diseases. Violent 
patients may induce distress and interfere 
with the decision-making process. For 
instance, even providers who are well knowl-
edgeable of the dosing guidelines may end 
up administering excessive doses to these 
patients [25].
 (b) Provider Factors
Mental healthcare providers have a con-
siderable effect on patient safety [4]. 
Workplace stress and mental workload of the 
staff may impact on patients’ safety and 
treatment. Communication deficiency is a 
commonly observed contributor to errors in 
psychiatry units [26]. Factors that may affect 
communication include fatigue, high staff 
turnover, lack of experience and interper-
sonal conflict [4]. Decreased length of stay 
by medical personnel in psychiatry units 
could raise the chances of missing out on 
crucial clinical information, such as medical 
comorbidities, medication allergies or medi-
cation dosing errors. The fear of aggression 
may result in an increased use of seclusion or 
restraint, as well as in insufficient therapeutic 
engagement [27].
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 (c) System Factors
Non-clinical systems such as training pro-
grammes, human resources, manualized 
admission and discharge processes are 
beyond the individual control of care provid-
ers but are relevant to patient safety [4]. 
Various factors pertaining to the general 
organization of  mental healthcare delivery 
may have a significant effect on patient safety 
or lack thereof [4]. Institutional structures, 
operations and processes may be strained 
and vulnerable to errors [25].
Individuals with mental disorders are suscep-
tible to the same type of errors that are seen in the 
general medical hospitals, such as diagnostic 
error, preventive error, treatment error and other 
errors.
 (a) Diagnostic Errors
No biomarkers are available for the diag-
nosis of specific psychiatric conditions; 
therefore, the practitioner has to rely on sub-
jective clinical assessment, to establish the 
diagnosis of the illness [28]. Establishing a 
diagnosis when adequate information about 
the patient’s history is not available, espe-
cially of patients admitted on an emergency 
basis, is challenging and poses several risks. 
For instance, a missed diagnosis of bipolar 
disorder may lead to prescribing treatment 
with an antidepressant in mono therapy and 
result in agitation, impulse dyscontrol or 
manic switch.
 (b) Preventive Errors
This type of error includes inadequate 
monitoring of patients and failure to provide 
prophylactic treatment. Inpatient psychiatric 
settings with inadequate protection systems 
such as locked wards and with a lack of ‘no- 
sharps’ policies result in patient self-harm. 
Failure to monitor patients with suicidal risk 
may place patients in danger.
 (c) Treatment Errors
Treatment errors include errors in admin-
istering treatment and medications, improper 
care and avoidable delays in initiating treat-
ment. Another error in treatment is over 
sedation by handlers when the patient 
becomes aggressive or violent. Improper use 
of tranquillizers may over sedate patients 
which may result in severe patient falls.
 (d) Other Errors
Other frequent errors include poor com-
munication between patients, staff members 
and physicians. Effective communication 
between patients and service providers in 
psychiatric units is essential to understand 
patient history, conduct assessments and pro-
vide proper care [25].
20.3.1  Common Errors 
and Dangerous Outcomes
A summary of the most common errors associ-
ated with treatment in a mental health setting, as 
well as a review of their most dangerous out-
comes, is provided below, with special reference 
to the errors that are associated with medication 
treatment, restraint, seclusion, and suicide.
20.3.1.1  Medication Errors
Medication errors are associated with an increase 
in morbidity and healthcare costs [29]. Medication 
administration error (MAE) may be the most 
commonly cited medication error in psychiatric 
hospitals. MAEs refers to a deviation from the 
instructions given by the psychiatrist, manufac-
turer and relevant institutional policies [26]. 
MAEs may occur due to failure in any of the five 
rights (right patient, dose, route, time and medi-
cation). These errors may arise both from mis-
takes committed by the provider and from system 
failures such as understaffing or inadequate pre-
scribing or administration procedures [30].
20.3.1.2  Restraint and Seclusion
Restraint and seclusion, ordered to prevent aggres-
sive patients from harming themselves, staff mem-
bers and other patients, are controversial practices 
[4, 25]. They are perceived by some as an infringe-
ment of human rights and by others as unavoidable 
last resource to maintain patient safety.
Restraint is categorized into environmental 
constraint, physical/mechanical constraint and 
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chemical constraint. Environmental restraint 
(seclusion) refers to limiting the mobility of 
patients to a specifically designed and securely 
locked room. Physical/mechanical restraint refers 
to the use of any technique to manually restrict 
the free body movement of a person or any part 
of the body. Mechanical restraint refers to the use 
of appliances and devices like body vests, 
multiple- point ligatures, blankets and bedside 
rails to immobilize the patient. Chemical restraint 
refers to the use of drugs to rapidly tranquillize or 
sedate the patient. The drugs that are commonly 
used for this practice include benzodiazepines 
and antipsychotics [4].
Errors relating to restraint and seclusion pri-
marily result from the misuse of restraints or 
holding techniques. Errors also result from fail-
ure in monitoring the patients from using sharp 
objects or cigarette lighter to relieve themselves 
from the restraint. Also, patients with comorbid 
illnesses like asthma, cocaine intoxication, car-
diomyopathy, pulmonary hypertension or coro-
nary artery disease are at an increased risk of 
sudden death by restraint devices. Failure in doc-
umenting and assessing these risk factors may 
affect patient safety [25].
20.3.1.3  Suicide
Suicide is described as deliberate physical self- 
harm leading to death [4]. Suicide attempts tend 
to peak during early admission to psychiatric 
institutes and soon after discharge [31]. As com-
pared to the genera; population, the risk of dying 
by suicide while being admitted to a psychiatric 
unit is much higher. An English study reported 
that among the patients who died by suicide, 39% 
were on agreed leave, 29% were absconding and 
32% died in the ward [32]. Researchers have 
demonstrated that despite using sophisticated 
methods, it is impossible to predict suicide even 
in high-risk patients completely [11].
The most common predictors of inpatient sui-
cide include a history of deliberate self-harm, 
depressive symptoms upon admission, and a 
diagnosis of schizophrenia [32]. The suicide inci-
dences in patients who are suffering from schizo-
phrenia are 10–13% [33]. The method of suicide 
largely depends on the means that are available in 
the wards and includes hanging, strangulation, 
asphyxiation and cutting; among absconders the 
methods include drowning, jumping from a 
height, jumping in front of a vehicle and overdos-
ing [31]. A large-scale study reported no differ-
ence in the risk of suicide in patients admitted to 
wards with and without doors [32]. However, the 
variables involved in suicide risk are multiple and 
there are situations in which an inpatient unit 
with closed doors is safer than a unit with open 
doors. Also, a closed unit avoids the need for 
nurses to spend time watching the door as 
opposed to talking and interacting with patients. 
However, there are situations in which a closed 
unit increases anxiety and agitation, over the 
feeling of being trapped, which might increase 
suicide risk. What is clear is that a poor assess-
ment of suicide risk level and inadequate moni-
toring of patients at risk of suicide invariably 
leads to decreased safety [25].
20.3.2  Nondrug Medical Error
These include omitted, incorrect or delayed tests 
or procedures. They also include issues such as 
excessively low level of monitoring or observa-
tion, communication errors and failure to elimi-
nate environmental dangers [16]. The three main 
categories of nondrug medical errors are errors 
proximal to the elopement, errors proximal to 
contraband and other errors [3].
20.3.2.1  Errors Contributing 
to Elopement
Elopement is the unauthorized absence of a 
patient from the psychiatric unit. Common rea-
sons for elopement include the feeling of being 
trapped/confined, desire to use drugs or alcohol, 
feeling to be cut off from family and friends, 
boredom, being afraid of the other patients, 
objection over taking medications and stigma 
about being in a psychiatric unit. Involuntarily 
admitted patients have a higher chance of eloping 
from the psychiatric unit [34]. Elopement by 
itself is not an error, but the use of unguarded 
doors or windows may be considered as an error 
which allows the patient to flee from the unit [3].
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20.3.2.2  Errors Contributing 
to Contraband
Contrabands are potentially hazardous items pro-
hibited in the psychiatry unit. These include 
rope-like items such as shoelaces, headphone 
wires and belts; sharp objects such as scissors 
and razors; matches and lighters, illegal drugs 
and alcohol; plastic bags and balloons [16]. 
Detection of contraband is not an error, but a par-
tial search of the body and belongings of the 
patients and visitors in the psychiatric unit is an 
error [3].
20.3.2.3  Other Errors
These include any other error that occurs during 
the hospitalization. Examples include performing 
a wrong or undue test or procedure, not perform-
ing test or procedures that were ordered, or issues 
such as administering food to a patient known to 
be allergic to that specific food [3].
20.4  Safety Practices 
and Implementation 
Strategies
Inpatient psychiatric care is often necessary to 
administer medications and procedures that can-
not be administered on an outpatient basis. 
However, admission to an inpatient unit may also 
be due to the need for other reasons, such as the 
need to protect a patient from dangerous behav-
iours [16].
The most common strategies to reduce medi-
cal errors and adverse events and to provide a 
safe and therapeutic environment for inpatient 
psychiatric care are reported below.
20.4.1  Role of the Hospital 
Environment in Patient Safety
The unique structure of psychiatric ward plays a 
vital role in patient safety. Replacing the hazard-
ous things in the psychiatric ward with non- 
hazardous materials may help in preventing the 
harm caused by the patient to self or others [35]. 
Avoiding anchors for ligatures and materials used 
for ligatures during construction or renovation of 
a psychiatric unit may help to prevent many 
adverse events [11]. Ligature anchor points are 
protrusions capable of supporting body weight 
for patients who hang themselves [31].
The most common ligature points are hooks 
or handles, doors, curtain rods, closet clothing 
rods, towel rods and sprinkler heads [31, 36]. 
The facility should be regularly inspected, given 
that the bathroom, closet, bedroom, and a hidden 
area of a unit are places where patients can self-
harm [11]. Doors should be removed from places 
where not required. It has been reported that the 
number of suicides following absconding from a 
locked door was the same as those that occurred 
in open wards [31]. Door hinges should be in the 
continuous piano style from the top to the bot-
tom of the door, in an unbroken manner, to avoid 
that patients to tie the cord to the hinge [36]. 
Wardrobe cabinets should not have doors, and 
hangers and rods should be replaced with 
shelves.
Exposed utility pipes should be covered. Fire 
safety sprinklers and showerheads should have a 
flush-mounted design. Shower curtain rods 
should be removed or designed such that they 
break away even when a least-heavy patient tries 
to commit suicide. Shower controls, sink faucets 
and handles should be such that they will not sup-
port a cord. A rounded design can be incorpo-
rated. Plastic or unbreakable windows and 
mirrors should be used throughout the unit. 
Dining utensils should not be able to cause self- 
injury or to others. The dishes should also be 
unbreakable.
Patients can also use structures close to the 
floor for asphyxiation. Fixtures close to the floor 
should have a design such that they do not sup-
port a strangulation device. Items that can be 
used by patients for strangulation or hanging 
should be avoided inside the unit. These items 
include handkerchiefs, ties, belts, drawstring 
belts and shoelaces. Because patients can also 
use straps associated with bras for strangulation, 
it is necessary to assess women patients who are 
at a high risk of suicide and consideration should 
be made whether such women should be allowed 
to wear a bra [36].
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The use of latest technology for safety, secu-
rity and medicine administration helps in the 
safety of patients. The use of security system 
helps the patients feel well protected and protects 
them from unwanted visitors, robbery and access 
to alcohol and drugs [35].
20.4.2  Role of Organizational 
Management in Patient Safety
Organizational management plays a major role 
in patient safety [37]. The time spent by hospi-
tal managers and board of directors to visit 
and inspect the inpatients units positively 
influence safety performance [38]. Leadership 
comprises three areas: availability, experience 
and understanding patient safety plan. The 
role of leadership is to enhance learning, team-
work, feedback and improvement in individual 
worker’s safety behaviour. They provide sup-
port for the staff and help in creating a good 
working environment. Also, if any adverse 
event occurs, they act as a support system for 
the staff [37].
20.4.3  Role of Staff in Patient Safety
Nurses play an important role in patient safety, 
especially in inpatient psychiatric wards [37]. 
According to a study conducted by Ajalli et al., 
the role of nurses is defined in two terms, ‘close 
observing’ and ‘vigilant care’ [39]. The head 
nurse plays an important role in encouraging 
patient safety culture among other nursing staff. 
The head nurse should do the following: commu-
nicate effectively, contribute to leadership, main-
tain a positive culture and provide patient-centred 
care. The presence of nurses with experience in 
dealing with psychiatric patients is strongly con-
nected to the high quality of patient care and to 
better outcomes [35].
The staff members should possess skills to 
help with the disorders that are being treated in 
the unit, and skills to help patients with self-care. 
They should be able to provide reassurance, and 
basic information and knowledge about the ill-
ness, the treatment and its administration proce-
dures. Also, they should be able to identify and 
address trauma-related needs [37].
Staff load is also a concern in patient safety. 
The number of patients is assigned to each nurse 
and staff member depending up on many factors 
which include the experience and qualification of 
the staff and patient’s condition. Nurses who lack 
experience in dealing with patients with mental 
illnesses negatively impact the quality of care 
provided and this should be accounted for when 
the number of persons allocated to a shift is 
decided. Also, patients that are better stabilized 
should preferably be assigned to the nurses with 
less experience [35].
Staff safety, health and well-being are impor-
tant in dealing with psychiatric patients [35, 37]. 
Hospital administration should take care that 
staff do not suffer from stress, fatigue or distrac-
tion from work. Staff members should have a 
healthy state of mind to be able to help patients 
experiencing an acute mental disease.
Staff members need to have good communica-
tion skills (written and verbal) to understand the 
patient’s condition and minimize errors. Failure 
in communication is a known source for adverse 
events. Appropriate communication is also 
important during the transfer of a patient as an 
error in transferring the medical and psychiatric 
history may lead to serious adverse events. 
Communication also helps patients to seek help 
and safety when they feel a threat [37].
20.4.4  Role of the Patient in Patient 
Safety Practices
Involving patients in safety issues is key to reduc-
ing risks and preventing errors [37]. Establishing 
a safe nurse–patient environment is important for 
effective patient care, and helps to better under-
stand the patient’s needs [35, 37]. Whenever pos-
sible, patient’s preference should be considered 
so that the decision made aligns with the patient’s 
values. Patient’s health condition and personality 
also play an important role because it influences 
communication and interest to become involved 
in the care [37].
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Research has found that inpatients are active 
in making their environment safer for themselves 
by avoiding excessive interactions with risky 
individuals or situations, by contributing to de- 
escalating potential risky situations, and seeking 
surveillance or other safety interventions from 
staff. These findings underline the importance of 
fully involving patients in safety initiatives [4].
20.5  Conclusion
Several adverse events and medical errors are 
unique to inpatient psychiatric care. Several 
safety measures are able to decrease the risk of 
errors and adverse events. The most important 
strategies to improve safety in mental health 
facilities include an appropriate consideration of 
the structural requirements that a psychiatric unit 
needs to have in place to ensure the optimal 
patient safety. Also, administrators, doctors, 
nurses and staff play a proactive role to ensure 
safety. Whenever possible, patients themselves 
should be involved in procedures able to increase 
their safety.
20.6  Case Studies
The case examples below are fictitious and for 
didactic purposes only
20.6.1  Case Example 1
Mr. Mario, a 40-year-old man, was admitted to 
the emergency room, accompanied by his par-
ents, for his ‘strange and anomalous’ behaviour 
in the last days. He lived with his parents and is 
their only child. He unemployed and had no sen-
timental ties.
Family members traced the onset of his symp-
toms when he was approximately 20 years old. 
At the time, Mario was a university student and 
began to manifest the bizarre symptoms and 
behaviours. He reduced the time spent in class 
and the relationships with his peers. He spent 
most of his time isolated in his room. He slept 
through the entire day and stayed awake at night. 
After a few months, the situation worsened, and 
he stopped communicating with everyone, 
including his parents, appeared confused, 
anguished and disturbed. He neglected basic 
needs such as personal hygiene and eating. One 
day he barricaded himself in his room, refusing 
to leave because he was convinced that the mafia 
had spies and cameras all over his life. His par-
ents took him to a hospital, where an antipsy-
chotic drug therapy was started, and a diagnosis 
of paranoid schizophrenia was made at discharge 
after a few days in the inpatient unit. Over the 
years, he was relatively stable, but his insight 
remained limited and his parents had to con-
stantly convince him taking the prescribed 
treatment.
Six months ago, Mario’s mother was diag-
nosed with breast cancer. She was initially hospi-
talized to undergo mastectomy and later received 
chemotherapy. This situation resulted in the 
reduced presence of parents at home and 
decreased her support in Mario’s everyday life. 
Mario stopped his medication without informing 
neither the parents nor the reference psychiatrist. 
Persecutory delusions reappeared; he spent all 
his time locked in his room, had no relationship 
with anyone, remained naked in the dark and 
neglected his basic needs.
Mario was admitted to inpatient care and re- 
started being treated with an antipsychotic. In the 
following days, he improved and went gradually 
towards remission. His parents visited and spend 
time with him every day. After 5 days, however, 
the mother was hospitalized because of a severe 
infection and could no longer visit her son. Mario 
did not verbalize his concern for his mother’s 
health but refused to talk and was apathetic. He 
was no longer a participant in the activities of the 
psychiatry unit and began to show indifference to 
everything and everyone, including his father 
who visited him regularly.
One night, when the health workers were busy 
to admit two new patients in the psychiatry 
department, Mario managed to steal the belt of a 
newly arrived patient and tried to hang himself in 
the shower of his room. Fortunately, the patient 
with whom he shared the room noticed what was 
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happening and promptly warned the nurses who 
intervened and saved Mario’s life.
20.6.1.1  Discussion
This case outlines that the level of stability and 
the required level of care may quickly change 
during the periods of inpatient admission. It is a 
reminder for the need to talk to the patients, 
check their suicidal ideation and constantly mon-
itor their level of stability. Also, it reminds us 
about the need to not decrease the level of atten-
tion on the other patients when new patients are 
admitted to the inpatient unit. Finally, it reminds 
us of the key role of other patients in increasing 
their and other patients’ level of safety.
20.6.2  Case Example 2
Ms. Alice was a patient admitted to the geriatric 
psychiatric unit because of a severe major depres-
sive episode.
She is 78  years old. Her married daughter 
lived in another city. She suffered from arterial 
hypertension that was being treated pharmaco-
logically with ACE inhibitor (ramipril 5 mg/day). 
She was also taking an oral opioid analgesic (tra-
madol 200  mg/day), for the past 2  months, to 
cope with severe pain and functional limitation of 
the right knee associated with medial femoral- 
tibial gonarthrosis. After her husband passed 
away 3 months ago, Ms. Alice did not sleep well 
at night and did not eat much. She preferred stay-
ing in bed most of the day and no longer seemed 
interested in any of her usual daily activities. Two 
weeks earlier, a general practitioner prescribed 
her antidepressant therapy with sertraline, which 
was started at 50 mg/day but did not lead to any 
improvement in her symptoms.
Upon admission, her sertraline was increased 
to 100 mg/day.
Five days after, she started to present with 
tremors, increased sweating, confusion, hyperpy-
rexia (39  °C), tachycardia, arterial pressure of 
170/80  mmHg and respiratory rate of 30 acts/
min. She also presented with chills, diarrhoea, 
vomiting, mydriasis and marked neuromuscular 
hyperactivity (more prominent in the lower 
extremities) with tremor plus hyperreflexia, 
hypertonia and muscle stiffness, myoclonus, 
spontaneous clonus and plantar extensor 
responses.
Based on history taking, laboratory and physi-
cal examination, Alice was diagnosed with sero-
tonin syndrome. Treatment with tramadol and 
sertraline were stopped, and the patient was 
hydrated with intravenous fluids. The mental 
state of the patient improved within 24 h.
The hospital regime diagnostic-instrumental 
investigations excluded the presence of other 
organic pathologies of a neurological, infective 
or metabolic nature.
Upon discussion of the case, it turned out that 
the staff members had noticed—since her first 
day of admission—that she had sweating, hyper-
tonia and tremors while drying her off after the 
daily shower. However, they did not report this 
finding to the attending nurses and physician.
20.6.2.1  Discussion
It is imperative to pay attention when a patient is 
taking a selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors 
(SSRIs), tramadol, in addition to a CYP2D6 
inhibitor. These isoenzymes are involved in 
extensive metabolism of SSRIs in the liver. The 
CYP2D6 system, one of the key enzymes 
involved in adverse drug reactions, has a high 
degree of genetic polymorphism. Studies cite that 
7% of white patients lack the capacity to metabo-
lize drugs by CYP2D6 enzyme. Consequently, 
the serum levels of tramadol would be higher; 
and such patients would be at an increased risk 
for serotonin syndrome if a second serotonergic 
agent is added to the pharmacological protocol. 
The attending physician who admitted the patient 
likely made an error in continuing the medica-
tions that the patient was taking at home. The 
attending physician in the unit likely made an 
error in increasing the dose of sertraline, without 
considering the interaction with tramadol and 
without carefully examining the patient for 
symptoms of the serotonin syndrome. The staff 
members that noticed her tremor, sweating and 
hypertonia likely made an error in not communi-
cating the above to the nurses and psychiatrists. A 
careful evaluation of the interactions of the medi-
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cations that are prescribed in combination, a thor-
ough physical exam conducted before and after 
raising the dose of sertraline, and a more appro-
priate communication to the nurses and physician 
of the observations from staff members could 
have prevented the onset of a potentially fatal 
event.
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Patient Safety in Pediatrics
Sara Albolino, Marco De Luca, 
and Antonino Morabito
Learning Objectives/Questions Covered in 
the Chapter
• What are the most common adverse events in 
pediatrics?
• Which are the approach and solutions to pre-
vent harm?
• What are the most critical issues for quality 
and safety in the process of care of children?
• Which are the most effective practices and 
strategies for implementing them?
21.1  Epidemiology of Adverse 
Events in Pediatrics: Some 
Numbers and Some 
Reflections
Since the publication of the 1999 IOM report “To 
Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System,” 
much has been learned about pediatric patient 
safety. However, adverse events still affect one- 
third of all hospitalized children [1]. The main 
areas of adverse events are hospital-acquired 
infections, intravenous line complications, surgi-
cal complications, and medication errors [2].
The area of medication errors that has been 
considered the major priority by WHO through 
the campaign “medication without harm” [3] for 
children is even more critical because of child-
hood development, demographics, dependency 
on parents and other care providers, and the dif-
ferent epidemiology of medical conditions [4].
In a study conducted in 2 pediatric hospitals, 
on 1120 admission, including more than 10,000 
orders, there were 616 medication errors (5.7%) 
[5]. In recent years the transition to digital health-
care has been identified as a significant element 
that concur to medication errors, in fact the elec-
tronic clinical records can affect the safety of pre-
scription until they are modified with customized 
decision support, such as weight-based and body 
surface area-based dosing [2].
Concerning the most critical settings for qual-
ity and safety, a study published in 2012, con-
ducted in Canada in 8 teaching hospitals and 14 
local healthcare agencies underlined that the 79% 
of adverse events in children happened in inten-
sive care unit, of which more than 40% are pre-
ventable and the incidence on admissions is of 
6.5% [6]. These results are similar to the studies 
conducted in the adult population.
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Other studies show other types of errors with 
total rates as high as 40 harms per 100 patients. 
Events reported include accidental extubation, 
pressure ulcers, patient misidentification, 
delays in diagnosis, intravenous infiltrates, and 
other adverse events attributed to systemic 
causes like communication, training, and sys-
tems failures [7].
Concerning the ambulatory setting, a recent 
study [8] revealed that the largest group of errors 
was attributed to medical treatment (37%). Other 
errors included patient identification (22%), pre-
ventive care (15%), diagnostic testing (13%), and 
patient communication (8%).
In a meta-analysis conducted in 2018, with the 
analysis of 388 primary studies related to inter-
ventions to improve patient safety, the most com-
mon critical issues to address were medication 
(189 studies, 48.7%) and general medical (81 
studies, 20.9% errors) whereas the 53.1% (206 
studies) addressed healthcare systems and tech-
nologies [9].
From these and other evidences, we can affirm 
that over the last 20  years many efforts and 
advancements have been done to improve patient 
safety, even in pediatrics, but the trend doesn’t 
seem to have changed, as the complexity of the 
healthcare systems and their dynamicity is a big 
challenge for improving quality and safety of 
care. Also the centrality of the human being, the 
continuous interaction of clinicians and patients 
with the other components of the system, makes 
risks and errors in healthcare an unavoidable fact.
Error is part of normal human behavior as 
highlighted by James Reason “Human error is 
both universal and inevitable—human fallibility 
can be moderated but it can never be eliminated 
[10]. However, when errors have significant con-
sequences or occur in high-risk industries, they 
become of paramount importance (ibidem)”. 
Reason wrote that “Errors are consequences not 
causes, they have a history” and that only by 
understanding the history of the circumstances 
can there be progress to limit the chances of a 
recurrence (ibidem).
As a result of high-profile errors which have 
caused many deaths, industries like aviation, 
space travel, military, nuclear, and oil rigs have 
spent the last decades investing in the under-
standing, identification, and error prevention 
training in their respective industries [11].
In order to understand and prevent that errors 
result in adverse events, it is important to adopt a 
patient safety approach with some key elements: 
awareness of the epidemiology of adverse events 
and establishment of methods for risk identifica-
tion; integration of improvement science princi-
ples and techniques into daily work; and creation, 
customization, and application of evidence- and 
context-based patient- safety solutions. Each of 
these key elements can be incorporated into pedi-
atric patient safety risk assessment and solution 
development [12].
Some of the most common and severe types of 
adverse events, also in pediatrics, are the ones 
that happen in surgery. All surgery involves risk 
and potential complications—both known and 
unexpected. Medical errors may be decreased if 
there are clear standards of care described and 
adhered to; however it is clear that no two surger-
ies are identical; therefore every surgical error 
(and the underlying cause of the error) has the 
potential to be unique [13].
In high-reliability organizations variability is 
a constant and the focus is on minimizing that 
variability and its effects, this strategy in high- 
hazard industries have contributed in a significant 
decrease of severe adverse events. But in the spe-
cific setting of healthcare, with the high complex-
ity of medical care there are usually more 
difficulties in creating a culture of safety. In this 
case, as underlined by Pascale Carayon in her 
SEIPS model [14], the science of human factors 
(the focus on how people interact with each other 
and their environment) provides healthcare pro-
fessionals with an important view that can give 
them the resilience to avoid adverse events. An 
optimal culture of safety focuses on human falli-
bility by concentrating on the conditions under 
which people work and on building defenses to 
prevent adverse events or mitigate their effects.
Going back to the surgical adverse events in 
pediatrics, not all surgical errors constitute medi-
cal malpractice and not all errors lead to adverse 
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events. Studies indicate that nearly 75% of surgi-
cal errors occur during surgery, with the remain-
ing occurring either during pre- or postoperative 
care. There are well-recognized factors for surgi-
cal errors [15–18]:
• Environment—Factors in the organizational 
and management structure/culture may impact 
on the individual surgeon performance from 
lack of a safety culture, lack of effective 
 leadership and workplace communication 
procedures.
• Lack of Surgical Competency—be that lack of 
the appropriate individual technical skills or 
technique, poor decision-making, poor 
teamwork.
• Insufficient Preoperative Planning—It is criti-
cal that a surgeon be well prepared for surgery 
with a full knowledge of the individual patient 
to be operated on the intended techniques. The 
preparation of the patient is also important 
including a robust preoperative workup and 
multidisciplinary discussions if necessary of 
any known or anticipated issues/complica-
tions. Preoperatively the surgeon should try 
and forward plan and anticipate complications 
that have a potential to occur. The wider the-
ater team needs to also have had the opportu-
nity for forward planning, ensuring the correct 
skill mix is present, the correct equipment 
available with personnel familiar with the 
operative procedures to be undertaken and 
equipment to be used.
• Inappropriate workplace conduct—Either 
professionally by utilizing improper surgical 
techniques and employing improper surgical 
haste or “shortcuts” or personal by, e.g., dis-
ruptive behavior and poor leadership.
• Poor Communication—This can be as an indi-
vidual or within the team. Poor communica-
tion can occur prior to the operation, e.g., 
marking the wrong site for surgery, miscom-
munication of the procedure to occur, and lack 
of forward communication about surgical 
equipment required. To improve communica-
tion prior to the start of the theater list Team 
Briefing is now employed.
• Fatigue, personal stresses, drugs, and alcohol 
can all impair decision-making and technical 
performance.
• Patient factors may make the surgery more 
complex such as the ASA grade, age, BMI, 
and surgical pathology (e.g., previous surgery) 
and these can all influence performance and 
postoperative recovery.
Surgical competency involves a combination 
of good decision-making (preoperatively, opera-
tively and postoperatively), team performance 
and communication with all colleagues and the 
appropriate technical skills. These skills coupled 
with a high patient volume operating rate tend to 
achieve a reduced patient mortality and morbid-
ity [19, 20]. There are three important “red flag” 
times to check the correct patients/procedures/
skill and equipment mix—before induction of 
anesthesia, before skin incision, and before the 
patient leaves the theater suite. During the proce-
dure the lead surgeon should be constantly re- 
evaluating the ongoing surgical progress with 
salient communications; they should be re- 
appraising the clinical and theater setting, and 
constantly re-evaluating the patient’s care and the 
conduct of the operation. Protocols have been 
introduced to reduce surgical error (e.g., safer 
surgery checklists) [21]. However, the occur-
rence of surgical error is part of a multifaceted 
phenomenon and protocol use is only part of the 
overall solution. A cascade of errors from varying 
aetiologies, with different controlling factors, 
can/may culminate into a catastrophe or adverse 
event [22].
Practicing surgery and medicine in the twenty- 
first century will embrace new medications, tech-
nologies, equipment, operations, etc. which aim 
to improve the treatment and care of patients. 
However the focus must also remain on evaluat-
ing and minimizing the impact of adverse events 
in the healthcare environment to provide a sus-
tained, high level of surgical care.
Pediatric healthcare providers in all practice 
environments can benefit from having awareness 
of the need for understanding patient safety start-
ing from a systemic and human factor approach. 
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Knowing the patient safety concepts and language 
can help pediatricians to adopt the best practices 
and attend risks that are unique to children, and 
leading efforts to reduce avoidable harm for their 
patients [2].





Epidemiological data and evidences from the lit-
erature are few for patient safety in pediatrics and 
there is a need for comparing experiences and 
applied solutions in different contexts. At the 
European level some recommendations have 
been defined and the need for applying specific 
solutions and patient safety practices has been 
underlined. We have now a list of evidence-based 
patient safety practices at the international level. 
These practices need to be adapted by trials in 
order to be useful also for the pediatric settings. 
The patient safety manifesto by the American 
Academy of Pediatrics whose last version was 
published in 2019 underlines the importance to 
evaluate the patient’s specific characteristics 
every time that a safety intervention for children 
is planned [2].
In fact the analysis of patient safety practices 
in pediatrics literature underlines that there is no 
list of interventions strongly recommended [23], 
in contrast with the adult context where some pri-
ority interventions have been identified [24], 
while there are several groups of practices that 
can be adopted according to the specificity of the 
pediatric setting and issue you have to address. 
The concern with a compiled unique list, say the 
authors, is to give priority to practices which are 
less expensive or more adapted to the hospital 
setting. Especially in pediatrics it is instead 
important to consider the complexity of the care, 
the inestimable value of saving a life and the fra-
gility of the patients. Besides that, it is important 
to consider that in general there is a need for 
moving from simple to complex interventions 
which include not just the application of single 
actions but the identification of more advanced 
model for evaluating complexity and promote a 
system change.




One of the most effective methodologies for 
evaluating the complexity, developing technical 
and nontechnical skills, and testing a system 
change is simulation. Pediatrics is among the 
disciplines that benefits most from the introduc-
tion of simulation, the health personnel who take 
care of the health of children have the possibility 
of exercising and improving their skills, without 
risk and without the emotional stress of damag-
ing their little patients [25]. This is an extraordi-
nary context to experiment new solutions for 
safer care.
The pediatric patient has unique characteris-
tics, both from a physiopathological and psycho- 
behavioral point of view. “The child is not a small 
adult” and this assumption also applies to simula-
tion. The pathology of the critically ill pediatric 
patient is often a rare but high-risk pathology. 
This involves the use of medical devices and sup-
plies specific for the child, with calibers and dos-
ages that vary with the weight and age of the 
patient. All this adds complexity and risks to an 
already complex situation.
However, the simulation is an added value not 
only for training on technical skills. It is now 
clear that many errors in the medical field are 
consequent to problems related to the organiza-
tion and not to the inexperience of the profession-
als or to negligence or incorrect individual 
conduct. Research has also shown that through 
the development of a process-centered model in 
the health system, it is possible to reduce adverse 
events and improve the quality and safety of care. 
Since 2000, the Institute of Medicine [26] men-
tions simulation as a key strategy for improving 
patient safety.
It is also important to mention that in order to 
apply solutions for improving quality and safety 
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of health in an effective way, the simulation is a 
key element. Especially simulation on site had a 
significant diffusion in relation to this purpose. In 
fact simulation on site is less expensive and can 
be performed in the everday working environ-
ment, so that a major number of healthcare oper-
ators can participate and experience the advantage 
of testing a solution. With the application of a 
structured debriefing, it is possible to evaluate the 
positive and negative aspects of the designed 
solution and tailor it for a better compliance to 
the specific setting.
The use of simulation offers undoubtable 
advantages, among the most relevant are:
• Eliminates all the problems related to fear, 
embarrassment, possible legal implications 
that can arise during a real event.
• Allows, once the causes of an adverse event or 
near-miss has been identified, to define cor-
rective measures which, if applied in a subse-
quent planned simulation, offer the possibility 
of verifying their feasibility and effectiveness 
in the field.
• Allows to evaluate the clinical risk of pro-
cesses that in reality are only exceptionally 
implemented, but which can be tested several 
times as part of a simulation project.
• In addition to the ethical and moral implica-
tions of providing the highest quality in care, 
there are important financial reasons for intro-
ducing simulation more frequently within 
health systems. Whereas it is now clear that 
adverse events significantly increase the cost 
of treatments. It is likely that decision makers 
will be more receptive in incorporating the 
simulation within healthcare organizations, if 
the value of this training, also in terms of 
return on investments, can be demonstrated 
tangibly.
In the next paragraph we present a clinical 
case, based on a true reported event, that is also 
used, in a large network of healthcare trusts for 
training by simulation pediatricians in the emer-
gency area (Simpnet—Tuscany regional network 
for pediatric simulation).
21.2.2  Clinical Case: Safe Care 
in Pediatric Emergency
21.2.2.1  9.15 pm
Anna arrives in PS, transported by an ambulance 
with a doctor on board, Anna is a 3-year-old 
patient with perinatal suffering quadriparesis. 
Anna has been suffering from high fever gastro-
enteritis for the last 2 days. In the past 12 h, she 
has had numerous episodes of vomiting and diar-
rhea. For the last 4 h, she has been more sleepy 
and less interactive with her mother, who worried 
and called the emergency service, when after the 
last episode of vomiting, the daughter did not 
respond to verbal stimuli.
These are the vital signs recorded during 
ambulance transportation:
• RF 36/min





When the ambulance arrives at the ER, Anna 
is transferred directly to the red code room 
(resuscitation room). Giulia, the triage nurse, 
asks the mother to stay at the triage with her for 
collecting the personal and clinical data of the 
patient. The door of the red code room closes 
and Anna’s mom will never enter that room dur-
ing the resuscitation phases. She will wait sitting 
on a chair just outside the door of the red code 
room.
Critical Issues
International literature and guidelines agree in 
making the family members of pediatric patients 
to assist to the resuscitation phases, if they wish, 
and in any case to encourage their presence. This 
presence should not be perceived as invasive for 
the resuscitation team. Evidences show that the 
parents’ presence benefits the child and allows 
the family members to have a realistic view of the 
resuscitation attempts and of the expertise of the 
operators. In addition, it helps the parents in 
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developing greater adaptability if the patient dies 
and in experiencing a better mourning process.
21.2.2.2  9.18 pm
In the room there are:
• Mario—Pediatrician with 6-year experience 
in the ER
• Sara—Pediatrician with a temporary contract 
for 3 months in the ER
• Lucia—Expert nurse in the ER
• Claudio—nurse transferred to the ER for 
6 months from a geriatric ward
• Paolo—doctor working at the emergency ter-
ritorial service
• Cesare—volunteer of the emergency territo-
rial service
Mario asks Sara to get Anna’s vital signs and 
talks to Paolo, (a doctor from the emergency ter-
ritorial service), about the patient and her 
assessments. Paolo reports that he was unable to 
take any vascular access. He admits that he has 
no experience with pediatric patients and that in 
any case the patient was very vasoconstricted 
with cold ends and that was the reason why they 
were unable to achieve O2 saturation and that 
the HR was elevated 150 min despite a feverish 
temperature of 37.6 °C. Paolo repeatedly apolo-
gizes for not having taken venous access, Mario 
listens absently to Paolo’s indications on the 
patient and to his apologies, he is distracted by 
the appearance of the parameters on the monitor 
and by the difficulty in finding a saturation 
value.
Paolo knows he often faces difficulties with 
pediatric patients and this leads to further stress 
in their management.
Critical Issues
In this unstructured handover, Paolo forgets to 
report that he had performed a glycemic stick 
(42  mg/dl) which is also reported on the form 
filled up in the ambulance and left at the access to 
ER. At the triage, Giulia has inserted the patient 
into the waiting list through the ER software and 
she doesn’t notice the filled format on the coun-
ter. A structured handover, even in an emergency 
situation, can make a difference, especially in 
those situations where the team is aware of con-
ditions that can generate stress, as in the case of 
Paolo that is unfamiliar with pediatric patients. 
The fact that Mario is distracted by the work of 
nurses in taking the parameters does not facili-
tate communication in such an important 
situation.
21.2.2.3  9.20 pm
The nurse Claudio began to place the electrodes 
on Anna’s chest, and the oximeter probe on the 
index finger of the right hand.
• HR is 78 min down
• RR 16 min with gasping
• satO2 not detectable due to the presence of 
peripheral vasoconstriction
• T 37.4 °C
• BP 52–31 after some measurement attempts
Mario asked Sara to begin clinical evaluations 
and Lucia to take venous access.
21.2.2.4  9.24 pm
Paolo and Cesare have left the room and are pre-
paring to go to the ambulance for another territo-
rial service.
Anna does not even respond by now to the 
painful stimulus of venous access attempts.
In fact, in the meantime, Lucia has not been 
able to take the venous access, she has already 
been trying for 4 min, on the patient’s skin there 
are already signs of Paolo’s ambulance attempts. 
Lucia knows she is very good at finding venous 
access in critically ill pediatric patients and does 
not accept failing in this case. She has lost track 
of time.
Sara has difficulty finding a peripheral pulse 
and assessing the patient’s breathing. Mario sees 
Lucia’s difficulties and begins to seek access to 
the veins of the hand.
The Claudio went to get a new oximeter probe.
HR has fallen below 60 min, a frequency that 
is now insufficient to maintain an effective car-
diac output.
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Critical Issues
Anna’s conditions because quickly compromised, 
but at the moment there is no real leadership, 
there is not an Event Manager who manages the 
situation. There is no explicit distribution of roles. 
Everyone is engaged in specific activities and 
even Mario, who initially seemed to assign the 
tasks, is busy with venous access. All the team is 
victim of an error of fixation: Mario and Lucia on 
the venous access, Claudio on the oximeter probe 
that seems not to work for evaluating the periph-
eral vasoconstriction, Sara in the search for the 
pulse and evaluation of the breathing in a clinical 
situation of imminent cardiac arrest. The percep-
tion of time and the possibility of a plan B regard-
ing venous access are also lacking. International 
guidelines show that in the critical child, if it is 
not possible to find venous access within 1 min, it 
is a priority to insert an intraosseous device.
21.2.2.5  9.27 pm
• HR is 38 min down
• RR 6 min with gasping
• satO2 undetectable
• BP undetectable
Claudio in attempts to have a parameter of 
saturation is repeatedly looking at the monitor and 
he noticed that the HR has dropped to 44 min and 
communicates it to the team in a generic way:
 – “The heart rate is 44 min.” Mario and Lucia 
are concentrated on the vascular access 
attempts and do not notice the communica-
tion, which is received by Sara. Sara, however, 
cannot understand if Mario’s lack of response 
to this critical information is because he is dis-
tracted, but she does not stress the message 
because at that moment he has managed to 
cannulate a peripheral vein and they can start 
with taking the exams and starting a bolus of 
physiological solution at 20 ml/kg. They don’t 
know the weight, Claudio looks out of the 
door to ask the mother.
“11 kg, but how’s Anna doing? What’s up?”—
but the door has already closed the door.
Sara finally manages to attract Mario’s atten-
tion with this sentence:
 – “I don’t feel the pulse, the heart rate is 34 on 
the monitor, she has gasping, we start cardio-
pulmonary resuscitation and we are calling 
the anesthesiologists to help us and intubate 
the patient.”
21.2.2.6  9.32 pm
Beginning of CPR and contact the 
anesthesiologists.
As there is no real leadership, or an Event 
Manager who manages the patient with a 360° 
view, communication skills has not been effec-
tive. The message is not addressed to a specific 
person. There was no feedback, no closing of the 
circle. Claudio’s message on bradycardia did not 
reach Mario, the expert doctor and Sara, who got 
the message, does not want to interrupt Mario 
who is managing to cannulate a peripheral vein. 
Only later she kept Mario’s attention by summa-
rizing the clinical situation and proposing funda-
mental actions.
21.2.2.7  9:34 pm
CPR was on for 2 min when Martina, the anes-
thesiologist, and Giorgio, the nurse, arrive from 
the Intensive care.
She is informed that the patient is under car-
diac arrest and that they have been massaging and 
ventilating her for about 2 min.
Martina wants them to stop for 10  s to do a 
reassessment.
HR is 12 min electric activity without a pulse.
RR, satO2, PA not detectable.
Martina decides to intubate the patient and 
gets help from Giorgio and asks Claudio.
“Meanwhile, get ready the adrenaline, 1 mg.”
Claudio has some doubts about this drug, but 
prepares a 2.5 cc syringe with 1 ml of undiluted 
Adrenaline 1:1000, as he used to do in the geriat-
ric ward, where he previously worked. Martina is 
on the third unsuccessful intubation attempt, and 
when she sees the syringe with undiluted adrena-
line she is upset lashing out her frustration for the 
failed intubation on Claudio.
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“it is not possible! In pediatric arrest you 
always have to dilute 1 to 10,000, always!!!” She 
takes the syringe and throws it in a corner of the 
room.
Critical Issues
Martina’s request for adrenaline dosage is incor-
rect. Under the pressure of the moment she got 
confused between mg and ml, asking a dose ten 
times higher than that required by guidelines. 
Besides the exchange related to the dosage, the 
rest of the communication on adrenaline was also 
incorrect, the dilution, the preparation method 
and Claudio’s failure to explain the preparation 
explicitly led to a further waste of time. This tech-
nical error is frequent in pediatrics and numerous 
studies show that patients in this age group are 
exposed three times more than adults to poten-
tially harmful therapeutic errors. In infants or 
low-weight patients, for example, there is a high 
risk of error: a minimal difference in the dosage of 
an additional drug can produce lethal effects 
since the low body mass and the immaturity of the 
organs cannot buffer the overdose. Martina’s irri-
tation related to the difficulties of intubation and 
the altered tone towards Claudio, definitively 
compromised a good team collaboration.
Luisa re-prepares the diluted adrenaline, but 
realizes that at the site of the cannulation of the 
vein there was an extravasation of Synovial Fluid 
and the vein is irrecoverable. She tells Mario that 
is massaging the patient, he tries to see if the 
Synovial rilli sis really leaking, but this worsens 
the quality of the massage.
Martina listens to the conversation and decides 
for an intraosseous access and sends Giorgio to 
take the drill in the intensive care unit. The same 
intraosseous is present in the ER, but at this point 
Sara and Claudio, who know about that, don’t 
want to contradict Martina. Mario thinks that in 
the intensive care unit there could be a more 
advanced technological device to do this proce-
dure, but does not have the courage to ask for it.
Critical Issues
The tense atmosphere within the team again 
leads to unshared choices, and the lack of infor-
mation (the presence of the ER intraosseous drill) 
with the consequent further loss of time and 
resources (Giorgio leaves the room to go to inten-
sive care unit). ER and intensive care unit teams 
were taking care of the same patient without 
speaking enough and without sharing priorities.
Anna is in asystole.
After about 40 minutes CPR without ever 
resuming a pulse compatible rhythm, Martina 
declares Anna’s death. And now someone has to 
open that door to communicate it to the mother.
21.2.2.8  Final Considerations
Pediatrics is one of the most challenging areas in 
patient safety. There is a need for basic and 
advanced research and for a rigorous application 
of the evidence-based solutions already tested and 
validated in pediatric settings. The application of 
these solutions remains a challenging issue. The 
clinical case we presented and the previous evi-
dences discussed in the chapter underlines the 
importance of understanding the context as a key 
factor for safety, and especially for safety in pedi-
atrics. The importance of understanding context 
has been highlighted by research underlining that 
proven safety solutions can be less effective in 
settings different from the ones they were devel-
oped and firstly applied in [27]. This opens a large 
debate about the effectiveness of the proposed 
interventions but also on the capability of the new 
contexts, in terms of organizational, cultural, and 
economic resources, to apply that solution [ibi-
dem]. In this scenario we believe that quality 
improvement methodology together with the 
human factor approach can provide fundamental 
insight for the transferability and success of the 
application of the patient safety solutions in dif-
ferent contexts and especially in pediatrics. 
Among the key elements responsible for the com-
prehension and the enabling of the context are:
• Patient and family engagement, which has 
been identified as a priority in the WHO 
patient safety Declaration during WHA 2019 
[28] and is one of the most important elements 
for setting up agendas at all levels for promot-
ing patient safety.
• Leadership and culture which are the engines 
for fostering patient safety as a strategic asset 
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of healthcare organizations, usually more 
developed and advanced in pediatrics.
• Governance, which is the basic framework in 
which developing patient safety actions.
• Teamwork and education, which are the infra-
structure for creating new generations of clini-
cians able to provide care having in mind 
safety as a priority for our kids.
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• Recognize the importance of multidimen-
sional patient safety issues in radiology.
• Discuss the level of awareness of radiation 
protection in the different categories of health 
care workers and among patients.
• Explain MRI hazards and identify their pre-
ventive approaches.
• Analyse the clinical use and adverse effects of 
contrast media and the management of con-
trast agent-related risks.
22.1  Introduction
Medical imaging (in short radiology) includes 
diagnostic and interventional procedures and has 
an essential role in the diagnosis and treatment of 
diseases. The objective in this field of medicine is 
focused on providing diagnostic and therapeutic 
benefit to the patients along with protecting them 
from the possible hazards associated with the 
procedures. By continuously upgrading imaging 
technologies and improving imaging modalities, 
such as  ultrasonography, X-ray-based imaging 
(radiography, fluoroscopy, and computed tomog-
raphy), magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), and 
interventional radiology, safety has become more 
and more crucial. The potential hazards in radiol-
ogy for the patients and the staff are 
multidimensional:
• some possible errors could take place during 
handling the patients, acquisition of imaging, 
or image reporting that could be harmful to 
the patients. The examples of these errors 
include the wrong patient, site, or side during 
image acquisition, diagnostic errors of percep-
tion or interpretation of imaging, and tran-
scription errors in radiology reports [1, 2]
• the potential hazards and side effects of unique 
aspects of medical imaging such as ionizing 
radiation, the strong magnetic field of MRI, 
and the contrast agents are critical issues in 
radiology safety.
• considering the ubiquitary diffusion of infor-
mation technology in medical imaging, cyber-
security strategies are becoming necessary to 
avoid incidents  that could threaten patient 
safety [3].
In radiology, like the other medical fields, new 
approaches to patient safety are needed: a patient- 
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centered approach and a high-tolerance system vis-
a-vis the errors rather than eliminating them by 
individual blaming [1]. Team working and continu-
ous training about radiology hazards and their pre-
vention are essential for all radiology professionals, 
to improve the system quality and to provide radi-
ology safety for the patients and the staff [4].
In this chapter, we will discuss the main radi-
ology safety aspects: radiation protection, MRI 
hazards, and contrast agent-related risks.
22.2  Radiation Protection
“Radiation protection” includes all measures use-
ful to ensure the protection of man and the envi-
ronment against the hazards of ionizing radiation. 
In medical imaging, X-ray-based modalities, 
especially computed tomography (CT), are the 
main area of concern for radiation exposure and 
its biological effects [5]. Indeed,  radiation from 
imaging procedures comprises a significant 
amount of exposure to the general population.
Radiation effects can be classified as follows: 
(1) somatic effect (appears in the person exposed) 
and genetic effect (emerges in the offspring); (2) 
deterministic effect (with a radiation threshold 
level, such as burning) and stochastic effect 
(without a radiation threshold level). Stochastic 
effects are the most significant matter of concern 
of radiation exposure  in radiology [5]. These 
effects can arise from exposure to low-level ion-
izing radiation which is responsible for long-term 
disease induction (both cancer and non- 
oncological diseases). The linear no-threshold 
model states that any exposure to ionizing radia-
tion, however small, has the potential to cause 
harm [6].
Several papers have shown a small but signifi-
cant increase of cancer risk in children and young 
patients with previous exposure to CT scans [7] 
paralleled by a measurable increase in radiation- 
induced DNA damage following several radio-
logic examinations [8].
The European Commission issued guidelines 
on radiation protection education and training of 
medical professionals in the European Union that 
recommend [9]:
• a course on radiation protection should be 
included in the basic curriculum of medical 
and dental schools
• continuing education and training after quali-
fication should be provided, and, in the special 
case of the clinical use of new techniques, 
training should be provided on these tech-
niques and the relevant radiation protection 
requirements
• knowledge of the advantages and disadvan-
tages of the use of ionising radiation in medi-
cine, including basic information about 
radioactive waste and its safe management, 
should be part of radiation protection educa-
tion and training for medical students. 
However, several studies have reported an 
alarming lack of knowledge among health pro-
fessionals about radiation protection issues and 
radiation doses of commonly performed imaging 
procedures [10–12]. For example, the overall 
radiation doses associated with various imaging 
modalities are underestimated by  a substantial 
number of professionals, and in some cases, pro-
fessionals are unable to correctly differentiate 
between ionizing and nonionizing radiation- 
based imaging techniques [13]. Furthermore, 
patients’ knowledge of the risk associated with 
radiation exposure is generally low. They should 
be better informed concerning the dose and the 
potential risk of medical radiation [14]. The 
referring physicians, as well as radiologists, have 
the responsibility to communicate dose informa-
tion to patients in an easily understandable and 
useful way.
The European Directive BSS 59/13 is an 
essential document in this field, which has force-
fully restated the importance that all stakeholders 
are informed and committed to the reduction of 
unnecessary exposure of patients during imaging 
procedures [15]. Article 57, which deals with the 
responsibilities, explains the requirements to 
optimize the radiation dose and to provide infor-
mation to patients. It is emphasized that the pro-
fessionals have to provide adequate information 
to the patient or his/her representative, and have 
to ensure that he/she is aware of the benefit and 
the risk of radiation based procedures [15].
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The radiographers play a vital role as the last 
gatekeeper in the radiation protection chain. To 
do so radiographers should [13, 15]:
• be provided with intensive education pro-
grams on typical doses for each type of exami-
nation, risk/benefit analysis and biological 
effects of radiation
• attend obligatory radiation safety courses dur-
ing their undergraduate studies, as well as 
postgraduate radiation protection and radia-
tion safety training
• attend updating courses about new technolo-
gies and devices which can limit radiation dose 
without compromising image quality
• be familiar with software which allows radia-
tion dose monitoring of the procedures carried 
out in the  daily  activity  (DMS: Dose 
Management System)
• participate in projects of radiological proce-
dures benchmarking
• be included in multidisciplinary teams to set 
up and periodically review diagnostic refer-
ence levels both for adult and paediatric 
patients.
A poorly informed radiographer can put the 
patient at a higher risk by not optimizing the per-
tinent imaging parameters. For instance, during 
CT imaging, it is crucial to select the correct tube 
voltage and current rotation time, depending on 
patient age and diagnostic query. Further to this, 
the use of automated tube current modulation and 
correct patient centering on the CT table have 
proved useful in lowering radiation dose while 
preserving diagnostic image quality. The localizer 
radiograph shows a significant influence on radia-
tion exposure but with different outcomes depend-
ing on the manufacturer of the CT scanner [16].
Radiologists and radiographers should have a 
thorough understanding of these differences to 
assure patients the best examination in terms of a 
correct trade-off between radiation dose and 
image quality. Moreover, particular attention 
should be given to ensure that radiation dose vari-
ability is minimized in patients undergoing repeat 
CT examination [17]. Because of the strict cor-
relation between image noise and radiation expo-
sure, the iterative reconstruction approach has the 
potential to be employed with data acquired at 
lower radiation doses while preserving clinical 
information [18].
All this highlights the importance of educa-
tion and awareness of the operators. The lack of 
awareness represents a small risk for individual 
patients; however, the danger becomes signifi-
cant when considered at a population level. 
Un-awareness may depend on [13, 19]:
• lack of proper preparation during university 
courses
• inadequate training for staff already in 
employment, and lack of interest, especially of 
the senior staff
• growth of technological complexity, which 
requires a continuous update of the  knowl-
edge of the radiological staff
• lack of accountability, i.e. dose performances 
are seldom evaluated.
Comprehensive and well-coordinated actions 
must be set up to increase awareness of radiation 
risks and to promote education and knowledge in 
radiation protection. This is why information 
campaigns such as Image Gently®, Image 
Wisely®, and the more recent Eurosafe Imaging 
campaign have paid specific attention to the fun-
damental role of staff training in radiation protec-
tion, emphasizing the role of effective 
multi-professional cooperation [20].
22.3  Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging (MRI) Hazards
Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), as a nonion-
izing radiation modality, poses unique hazards to 
the patients and the staff. These hazards are 
mainly related to the static magnetic field (SMF), 
the gradient magnetic field (GMF), and the radio-
frequency (RF) field. The interaction between 
these three components and human body tissues, 
as well as ferromagnetic objects/devices, pres-
ents the more relevant  safety concerns. Other 
MRI safety issues include:  gadolinium- based 
contrast media, cryogen- related issues, 
22 Patient Safety in Radiology
312
metallic implants, pregnancy, and paediatric 
examinations.
The following paragraphs will briefly explain 
the hazards and safety issues of MRI in further 
detail.
22.3.1  Static Magnetic Fields (SMF)
Biological effects on the human body: The 
SMF strength used in clinical applications is typ-
ically between 0.2 and 3.0 T; however, the clini-
cal utilization of 7 T MRI is increasing. Magnet 
strengths as high as 17.5  T are currently being 
used in research [21]. There is no evidence indic-
ative of significant or permanent biological 
effects of the SMF on the human body [22]. 
However, patients within a strong magnetic field 
(7 T or above) can undergo transient symptoms 
including nausea, vertigo, tinnitus, hearing loss, 
nystagmus, motion disturbances, dizziness, and a 
metallic taste [23]. For certain occupations, such 
as a surgeon, during an operation within an open 
MRI device, the occurrence of these acute symp-
toms may present a safety threat for patients [24]. 
Simultaneous exposure to SMF and low- 
frequency movement-induced time-varying mag-
netic fields from a 7  T MRI can result in 
neurocognitive effects such as reduced verbal 
memory and visual acuity [25]. There is no con-
sensus in the scientific literature regarding the 
ability of SMF to damage DNA, to be carcino-
genic, or to have other biological effects [21, 26].
Translational force and torque on ferro-
magnetic objects: Torque (twisting force) and 
translational magnetic force (the force that causes 
a magnetic object to move toward a magnet) are 
the results of the interaction between the SMF 
and ferromagnetic objects, which are propor-
tional to the strength and spatial gradient of the 
magnetic field (MF), respectively [22]. Objects 
which may be affected by these forces include 
implanted medical devices—such as surgical 
sutures, stents, clips, prostheses, and cardiac 
pacemakers—and unintended metallic foreign 
bodies. These forces can dislodge the objects 
resulting in injury to the patient or may even be 
fatal if located in dangerous anatomic zones such 
as aneurysm clips [21, 27]. The compatibility of 
MRI with any implant and medical devices has to 
be evaluated before entering into the MRI envi-
ronment. Therefore, it is necessary to perform 
accurate and thorough screening procedures for 
patients and other individuals to avoid all the MR 
non-safe objects entering the MR environment 
(see Sect. 22.3.4 below).
All patients who are suspected of having fer-
romagnetic foreign objects within their bodies 
must undergo further investigation. For example, 
in patients with a history of orbital trauma, orbital 
radiography is recommended to exclude possible 
intraocular metallic foreign body before MR 
examination [23, 28].
Projectile injury: The projectile or missile 
effect is a dangerous event caused by the attrac-
tion of ferromagnetic objects (external to the 
patient) by the SMF. Accelerated movements of 
medical support equipment such as oxygen 
tanks, cylinders filled with anesthetic gas, intra-
venous stands, beds, and chairs towards the 
magnetic bore can cause patient injury and dam-
age to the hardware [22, 27]. To prevent projec-
tile injuries, all patients and non-MR personnel 
must pass device and object screening before 
entering the MR environment [28]. There should 
be restrictions into the MR zone in order to pre-
serve a safe environment. Hence, the accessibil-
ity of the MR site is classified into four zones 
according to the potential risk of danger: zone I 
(freely accessible to the public), zone II (the 
interface between zone I and the strictly con-
trolled zones), zone III (in which free access by 
unscreened non- MR personnel or ferromagnetic 
objects can result in serious injury), and zone IV 
(MR unit magnet room: the presence of the indi-
viduals in this zone is subject to direct visual 
observation of MR imaging personnel) [28].
22.3.2  Gradient Magnetic Fields 
(GMF)
Nerve and muscle stimulation: The fast- 
switching gradient magnetic coils used within 
the MR unit produce spatial information [21]. 
The time-varying (gradient) magnetic field 
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induces tiny currents in the peripheral nerve 
cells and muscle fibers resulting in a sensation 
of tingling or pain. The U.S.  Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) does not provide a spe-
cific number for dB/dt to avoid peripheral 
neurostimulation and only requires  to  operate 
below levels that may  result in adverse effects 
[27]. Another potential side effect of GMF is 
magneto-phosphenes, the perceived flashing 
sensation in the eye, due to stimulation of the 
retina/optic nerve. Current MR systems operate 
below  the  threshold for cardiac stimulation or 
ventricular fibrillation [22]. GMF may also 
induce electronic currents in conductive materi-
als which may be hazardous for patients with 
electronically active devices like cardiac 
pacemakers or neurostimulators that can 
undergo  temporary or permanent malfunction-
ing [29].
Acoustic noise: Due to the rapidly switching 
currents in the coils, another effect of GMF is the 
production of acoustic noise. Hearing protection 
devices should be provided for all patients during 
MR examinations with noise pressure exceeding 
99 dB to avoid acoustic injuries [28].
22.3.3  Radiofrequency (RF) Magnetic 
Field
Thermal injury and burns: The RF coil pro-
duces the RF magnetic field (in the order of μT), 
which excites nuclear magnetization inside the 
body and receives nuclear MR signal which is 
used to form the images [21]. The absorbed RF 
energy by the human body may result in whole- 
body or localized tissue heating. Heat stress and 
heat exhaustion might be produced due to exces-
sive body heating, and in certain conditions, 
localized RF burns may occur because of intense 
heat transmission. The level of RF energy depos-
ited into body tissues can be quantified by the 
Specific Absorption Rate (SAR, W/kg) and 
Specific Energy Dose (SAD, J/kg). SAD can be 
calculated by multiplying the SAR with the dura-
tion of exposure to the RF power [23]. Patients 
who have the highest risk of experiencing dan-
gerous levels of whole-body heating include 
those with thermoregulatory dysfunctions such 
as obesity, diabetes, old age, and those unable to 
sense or communicate an increase in temperature 
[21, 23]. Therefore, it is essential to maintain the 
core body temperature below 40°C, and it must 
not increase more than 1°C to ensure patient 
safety [30]. The FDA recommends that the maxi-
mum level of SAR for individuals with normal 
thermoregulatory function should be: 4 W/kg for 
the whole body over 15 min, 3 W/kg to the head, 
and 8 W/kg for any 1 cm3 of tissue (e.g., in the 
extremities) over 5  min [22]. Recent data pro-
posed that the SAD should be below 4 kJ/kg to 
prevent an excessive core temperature rise of 
1.3°C, which is the updated threshold limit [30]. 
The other safety points are to keep the tempera-
ture in the MRI system below 22°C, to avoid the 
use of blankets, to consider active cooling, and to 
provide rest (cooling-off) periods for patients in 
the case of higher SAD or prolonged MR exami-
nations [23, 30].
The RF magnetic field induces the current in 
conducting objects, primarily those with an elon-
gated shape or those with a loop of a specific 
diameter. This interaction between the RF field 
and conducting objects can produce excessive 
heat, which may lead to thermal injuries or burns 
of adjacent tissue [30]. Hence, conductive objects 
such as  implants, medical devices, wires, leads, 
sensors, and jewelry, can be problematic. Another 
important recommendation is to remove all cloth-
ing of the patients and to use MR-safe clothing 
during the MR examination [23]. Moreover, it is 
recommended to use cold compresses or ice 
packs in areas at high risk of burning, for exam-
ple, where leads are placed on the skin or exten-
sively tattooed areas [28]. Localized burns can 
also potentially be caused by conductive loops 
resulting in excessive energy deposition due to 
skin-to-skin contact, for example, thigh-to-thigh 
contact. In order to prevent these kinds of inju-
ries, thermal insulation should be placed in areas 
with risk of skin-to-skin contact. Finally, it is 
mandatory to use insulation pads between the 
patient and the RF coils to reduce the risk of 
burns [27].
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22.3.4  Implants and Devices 
 Potentially relevant MR safety hazards can occur 
as the result of magnetic field-induced movement 
and dislodgment of ferromagnetic objects, induc-
tion of electrical currents, excessive heat produc-
tion, and misinterpretation due to imaging artifact 
[30]. Moreover, the MR electromagnetic field 
may interfere with the regular operation of elec-
tronically active devices such as cardiac pace-
makers, implantable cardioverter- defibrillators, 
neurostimulators, implanted medication pumps, 
and cochlear implants. Non-clinical testing is 
required for all medical implants and devices to 
determine their safety in the MR environment 
[30]. Three types of labeling—typically provided 
by the device manufacturer—apply for the 
implants/devices according to either the scientifi-
cally based rationale or device testing data: MR 
safe (no known hazards), MR non-safe, and MR 
conditional [31]. MR conditional devices are 
objects that are tested and considered safe only 
under specific MR conditions. Information on 
these conditions, including maximum SMF, max-
imum spatial magnetic field gradient (dB/dx), 
and the maximum whole-body averaged SAR, 
are provided by the device manufacturer [30, 32].
Effective screening to identify possible 
implants/devices within the patients is necessary 
before the MR examination to preserve a safe 
MR environment. In the patient with implants/
devices, it is essential to obtain the MR safety 
information of the implant/devices to document 
its compatibility with the MR environment [29].
With the development of new technologies 
and devices, adherence to continuously updated 
guidelines is crucial. Fortunately, large databases 
exist that provide updated safety ratings and rec-
ommendations for medical devices, and manu-
facturers publish MR safety information on their 
websites [33, 34].
22.4  Contrast Agent-Related 
Risks
Contrast agents (CA) are frequently employed to 
improve radiology diagnostic capacity in certain 
indications. Although these agents generally con-
sidered safe, they can cause some adverse effects 
ranging from minor reactions to severe life- 
threatening events [35]. These agents include:
• Iodinated contrast agents for X-ray-based 
studies (radiography, fluoroscopy, CT).
• Gadolinium-based contrast agents (GBCA) 
for MRI.
• Microbubbles for ultrasonography.
The side effects of CA consist of  acute 
adverse events, injection site problems such as 
CA extravasation, or the adverse effects related 
to a specific group of CA such as nephrotoxic-
ity, thyrotoxicity, and systemic nephrogenic 
fibrosis. The general considerations and precau-
tions related to the contrast-enhanced examina-
tions to provide patient safety are summarized 
as follows.
22.4.1  Patient Selection
The best prevention of CA adverse effects is to 
avoid applying them. The referring physicians 
and the radiologists should always consider the 
risk-to-benefit of applying CA for the patients, 
assure about the real indication, and consider the 
possible better alternative diagnostic imaging 
without CA [35].
22.4.2  Identify the Risk Factors 
and Contraindications
It is necessary to obtain the medical and drug 
history of the patients before performing a 
contrast- enhanced examination. One example is 
the history of prior allergic-like reactions to CA, 
asthma, or allergies that could increase the risk 
of allergic-like contrast reactions and if neces-
sary premedication should be prescribed with 
corticosteroids or changing the CA within the 
same CA group. Another example is the history 
of renal diseases: in these patients creatinine 
level should be obtained before administration 
of iodinated CA or GBCA. Drug history of using 
metformin (hypoglycemic agent) should be con-
sidered before the administration of iodinated 
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CA and in case of reduction of renal function 
temporary discontinuation of metformin is 
recommended.
22.4.3  Safe Injection of Contrast 
Agents
The injection of CA either by hand or by power 
injector can cause complications following con-
trast extravasation or air embolism. The health 
care professional performing the injection has to 
evaluate intravenous access, verify the catheter 
size, monitor the flow rate of injection, and adjust 
the power injector carefully for preventing the 
potential adverse events [35, 36].
22.4.4  Allergy-Like and Chemotoxic 
Reactions
These adverse reactions can occur following 
intravascular administration of any group of CA, 
specially iodinated CA and GBCA [35]. Most of 
these reactions are acute and occur in the first 
hour after contrast administration (many in the 
first 5 min), but in rare cases, there are delayed 
reactions after injection of iodinated CA [36].
The acute adverse events can be chemotoxic 
or allergy-like (idiosyncratic) reactions. They are 
classified into three severity categories: mild, 
moderate, and severe. Most of the acute adverse 
reactions are mild, but severe life-threatening 
reactions can rarely occur. Chemotoxic reactions 
are related to molecular and chemical character-
istics and are frequently dose and concentration 
related. Vasovagal reactions and cardiovascular 
effects (especially in patients with underlying 
cardiac disease) and symptoms of warmth, metal-
lic taste, and nausea/vomiting are examples of 
chemotoxic reactions [36]. Allergy-like reactions 
are independent of dose. The symptoms can 
include  urticaria, pruritus, cutaneous edema, or 
rare anaphylactic reaction. The most important 
risk factor for an acute adverse reaction to CA is 
a previous reaction, and a prophylactic cortico-
steroid injection is indicated. A history of asthma 
and atopy can result in a mildly increased risk of 
acute adverse reactions [35]. The other risk fac-
tors include more massive doses, increased rate 
of administration, the use of higher osmolar non-
ionic CA, and intra-arterial (vs. intravenous) 
administration [37]. The properties of GBCA that 
increase the risk of acute allergic reactions are 
ionicity, protein binding, and having a macrocy-
clic structure [38].
The considerations required for ensuring the 
minimal contrast-related acute adverse events 
and their proper management are:
• providing enough education and training of 
the health professionals involved in CA side 
effects, their risk factors, and treatment
• screening the patients for detecting possible 
risk factors
• using nonionic CA whenever possible
• considering premedication in high-risk 
patients
• ensuring the availability of emergency and 
resuscitation equipment
• monitoring the patients and providing acces-
sible communication between them and the 
radiology staff  before, during, and 
after the injection [37, 39].
22.4.5  Adverse Events Related 
to Iodinated Contrast Agents
Nephrotoxicity: Iodinated contrast agents (ICA) 
can cause acute kidney injury or worsen  pre- 
existing chronic kidney disease [40]. This effect 
is known as contrast-induced nephropathy (CIN). 
However, post-contrast acute kidney injury 
(PC-AKI) is a general term and describes any 
sudden deterioration in renal function within 48 h 
following the intravascular administration of 
iodinated contrast, regardless of the cause [35]. 
The pathophysiology of CIN is not precisely 
understood [40].
The critical risk factor is pre-existing severe 
renal insufficiency (eGFR <30 ml/min for intra-
venous, eGFR <30–45  ml/min for intra-arterial 
injection). Other risk factors include age 
>70 years, dehydration, diabetes mellitus, hyper-
tension requiring medical therapy, nephrotoxic 
medication, and metformin or metformin- 
containing drug combinations [39, 40]. ICA with 
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high osmolality, high viscosity, large doses, and 
multiple contrast injections within 48–72  h 
entail further risk [40].
• Follow the recommendations to prevent ICA- 
related nephrotoxicity [35, 39, 40].
• A baseline serum creatinine should be avail-
able or obtained before the injection of con-
trast medium in all patients considered at risk 
for CIN.
• Alternative imaging without using ICA (if 
possible) should be applied in high-risk 
patients.
• Volume, osmolality, and viscosity of the ICM 
should be as low as possible if the injection of 
ICA is necessary.
• Nephrotoxic treatments should be 
discontinued.
• Hydration before the injection of ICA in high- 
risk patients is extremely important.
• The use of antioxidants, such as statins or 
N-acetylcysteine, may be useful.
Thyrotoxicity: ICA can develop thyrotoxico-
sis in patients with a history of hyperthyroidism 
[35].
22.4.6  Adverse Events Related 
to Gadolinium-Based Contrast 
Agents (GBCA)
GBCA are MR contrast media. Different kinds of 
GBCA are available, with different chelate chem-
istry, viscosity, and osmolality. According to 
these properties, GBCA can be macrocyclic, lin-
ear, ionic, or nonionic [38]. In the following para-
graphs, two main side effects of GBCA will be 
presented.
Nephrogenic systemic fibrosis (NSF): NSF is 
a rare and serious disease, related to the exposure 
of GBCA in patients with impaired renal func-
tion. It primarily involves the dermal/sub- dermal 
tissues but can also involve other organs such as 
lungs, heart, skeletal muscles, and esophagus. 
Most cases of NFS are reported in patients with 
severe chronic kidney disease (CKD4, eGFR 
15–29  ml/min/1.73  m2) and end- stage CKD 
(CKD5, eGFR <15 ml/min/1.73 m2). Risk factors 
for developing NSF, include renal failure (acute or 
chronic), the pre-existing pro- inflammatory state 
of these patients, and type, dosage, and frequency 
of GCBA administration [41, 42]. The higher the 
dose of GBCA, either administered in a single 
dose or cumulative dose of multiple administra-
tions, the higher is the risk of NFS [41]. 
The formulation of GBCA is an essential fac-
tor in developing NFS.  Most reported cases of 
NFS are due to exposure to gadodiamide, gado-
pentetate dimeglumine, and gadoversetamide. 
The American College of Radiology Committee 
on drugs and contrast media, the European 
Medicines Agency, and the U.S. FDA have clas-
sified GBCA groups based on their risk for devel-
oping NFS [35, 42].
Therefore, low-risk GBCA and the lowest pos-
sible dose should be used in patients with renal 
insufficiency to prevent the development of 
NFS.  For dialysis-dependent patients, a full 4-h 
dialysis session should be considered [35, 41, 42].
Tissue deposition of GBCA: GBCA can be 
deposited in some tissues, i.e., the brain, in 
patients with multiple exposures to GBCA. Linear 
GBCA are responsible for most reported cases of 
brain GBCA deposition, which can be seen as 
high T1 signal intensity in the dentate nucleus 
and globus pallidus. Although no neurological 
adverse effects of GBCA deposition have been 
reported, further evidence is needed before 
excluding any harmful consequence of such 
deposition [43].
22.5  Conclusion
Other aspects of patient safety in medical imag-
ing, such as cybersecurity, radiology safety in 
children or pregnant women, and safety in inter-
ventional procedures  are not addressed in this 
chapter. The aim of the chapter is to provide a 
basic coverage  of the main  safety concerns 
related to medical imaging that may be useful for 
further improving radiology as an enabling medi-
cal specialty [44]. 
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Organ Donor Risk Stratification 
in Italy
Adriano Peris, Jessica Bronzoni, Sonia Meli, 
Juri Ducci, Erjon Rreka, Davide Ghinolfi, 
Emanuele Balzano, Fabio Melandro,  
and Paolo De Simone
23.1  Background
23.1.1  The Donor Risk
Assessment of suitability of organ and tissue 
donors is aimed at the best donor-to-recipient 
matching and minimization of the risk of disease 
transmission. Basically, there are two types of 
communicable disease: infectious and neoplastic. 
In addition, some toxic agents (i.e., acute poison-
ing of the organ donor) can inadvertently be 
transmitted to graft recipients. In the setting of 
organ transplantation, disease transmission may 
be intentional (i.e., deliberate, anticipated) or 
inadvertent (Table 23.1).
For instance, use of hepatitis C positive (HCV) 
liver grafts may be contemplated for HCV- positive 
liver recipients due to recent availability of 
pangenotypic, direct acting antivirals (DAA). In 
such cases, the risk of viral transmission is con-
sidered minimal with respect to the anticipated 
benefit for the transplant recipient. The higher the 
need of transplantation for a given patient, the 
greater is the risk that can potentially be taken: 
i.e., risk assessment requires evaluation of both 
donors and recipients. The organ donor evaluation 
process entails collection of available informa-
tion, laboratory investigations, clinical examina-
tions, and surgical exploration findings. It is 
intrinsically multidisciplinary and multiphase, 
and its span ranges from donor referral to long-
term survival of organ recipients. Transmissible 
disease is any condition for which available scien-
tific evidence or clinical reports confirm the risk 
of transmission. In clinical practice, however, 
communicable disease is the one that is consid-
ered such by clinical experts or whose risk of 
transmission cannot entirely be excluded.
In Italy, the donor risk assessment process is 
based on guidelines provided to all transplant 
network professionals by the national agency for 
transplantation (Centro Nazionale Trapianti, 
CNT). Due to complexity of clinical practice, 
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however, consultation with national experts in 
infectious disease, pathology, hematology, and 
legal issues has been provided on a routine basis 
since 2004 to assist transplant professionals.
23.1.2  The Principles of Donor Risk 
Evaluation
There are three basic tenets in the donor evalua-
tion process (Table 23.2). Firstly, in the absence 
of formal contraindications to donation (i.e., 
active systemic infections from multidrug- 
resistant bacteria or invasive malignancies with 
metastatic dissemination), the risk of disease 
transmission must be assessed against the poten-
tial benefit for the transplant recipient. Apart 
from a limited number of clinical conditions unfit 
to donation (unacceptable risk), no donor can be 
excluded from evaluation and their organs might 
benefit potential candidates. Secondly, patients 
awaiting organ transplantation must be informed 
that the risk of disease transmission is small but 
finite (standard risk). Finally, risk evaluation is an 
ongoing process based on information collected 
longitudinally after transplantation. To this 
regard, CNT is committed to updating of current 
guidelines based on clinical data derived from 
clinicians and on evaluation of posttransplant 
graft and patient survival rates.
23.1.3  The Risk Evaluation Process
The donor risk evaluation process is multi-
phase and multidisciplinary and involves all 
healthcare professionals along the entire con-
tinuum of the donation-transplantation jour-
ney. Risk assessment is based on the following 
(Table 23.3).
23.1.3.1  Organ Procurement
 (a) Donor’s clinical history, with special focus 
on infectious diseases and malignancies. 
This entails use of all available sources of 
information (attending physicians; family 
members; healthcare staff, etc.), and atten-
tion should be paid to (1) sexual habits; (2) 
use of drugs; (3) travels to areas with endemic 
infectious disease (i.e., malaria; West Nile 
virus; trypanosomiasis); (4) bite-marks 
(dogs; bats; hamsters, etc.), and (5) previous 
or current disease of infectious, neoplastic or 
autoimmune etiology.
 (b) Donor’s physical examination: This should 
focus on the presence of scars (i.e., previous 
surgeries), skin or mucous lesions with spe-
cial attention to: (1) tattoos; (2) jaundice; (3) 
rashes (especially in infants and children); 
(4) lymph node enlargement; and (5) signs of 
active drug use (venipuncture). Exploration 
of thyroid, breast, testes, superficial lymph 
Table 23.1 Categories of donor-derived disease transmission in organ transplantation
Category Definition Instances
Inadvertent Unintentional transmission of infections, 
malignancies or toxic agents from organ donors to 
recipients
•  Transmission of unknown donor 
hepatocellular carcinoma or HIV infection
Intentional Anticipated transmission based on possibility of 
treatment and/or benefit for the recipient
•  ver transplantation from HBsAg, anti-HBc 
or anti-HCV-positive donors
•  Transplantation from donors with low-grade 
malignancies (i.e., skin, kidney, prostate)
Table 23.2 The basic principles of the donor risk evalu-
ation process
# Definition
1 No donor can be excluded from evaluation unless 
there is any clinical condition contraindicating 
donation (i.e., metastatic malignancy)
2 The risk is never zero
3 Risk evaluation is an ongoing process based on 
available clinical information
Table 23.3 The donor risk evaluation algorithm
Phase # Definition
Pretransplant 1 Clinical history
2 Physical exam
3 Laboratory and imaging
4 Surgery
Posttransplant 5 Ongoing clinical evaluation 
and prompt reporting of 
adverse events
A. Peris et al.
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nodes and rectal examination is strongly rec-
ommended if the donor is >50 years.
 (c) Laboratory and imaging: There is great 
variability in number and type of investiga-
tions as per local clinical practice, but the 
basic set should include blood count; kidney 
and liver function tests; and HBV, HCV, HIV 
serology. Additional tests may be contem-
plated, based on local practice or individual 
donor’s clinical conditions. In the presence 
of massive blood and fluid administration 
(i.e., traumas), all viral serology should be 
interpreted with care. Current European 
Union directives recommend long-term stor-
age of a whole blood or buffy coat sample of 
both donor and recipient for longitudinal risk 
assessment.
 (d) Donor surgery: Irrespective of number and 
type of procured organs, surgeons are requested 
to explore thoracic and abdominal organs, 
including kidneys in case of anticipated lack of 
allocation. Exploration should be combined 
with sampling and biopsies when needed.
23.1.3.2  Posttransplant Course
Continued monitoring of transplant recipients and 
prompt reporting of donation-related and unre-
lated adverse events is crucial to collection of evi-
dence and updating of current recommendations.
23.1.4  The Donor Risk Categories
Based on procurement data and information, any 
referred donor can be further categorized in one 
of the following (Table 23.4):
 1. Standard-risk donor: this group includes 
any organ donor with no particular disease 
transmission risk. The probability of disease 
transmission is extremely low, but not zero.
 2. Nonstandard-risk donor: This group is fur-
ther divided into:
 (a) Donor with a negligible risk profile: This 
category includes donors with disease 
that either will not affect the posttrans-
plant graft and patient outcome or do not 
require special treatment versus standard- 
risk donors.
 (b) Donor with an acceptable risk profile: In 
these cases, use of organs is based on 
availability of treatment (i.e., anti- 
hepatitis B virus (HBV) prophylaxis for 
recipients of HBsAg and/or anti-HBc 
donor organs) or benefit to recipients 
(i.e., risk of dropout from the waiting list 
due to native disease progression). In 
both cases, recipients shall be informed 
at the time of wait listing and transplanta-
tion and informed consent is to be docu-
Table 23.4 The donor risk categories according to the Italian Center for Transplantation (CNT)
Risk category Definition Organ allocation
Standard No risk factors have been detected during donor 
referral evaluation and procurement
No restriction
Nonstandard Negligible
Presence of disease that will not affect transplant 
outcome or require treatment (i.e., skin basalioma, 




Presence of disease that might affect transplant 
outcome if untreated (i.e., transplantation from 
HBsAg and/or anti-HBc and/or anti-HCV-positive 
donors)
Selection of appropriate transplant 
recipients is required (i.e., anti-HCV- 
positive recipients for anti-HCV-positive 
donors)
Posttransplant treatment should be 
implemented
Informed consent required
Acceptable for patients in relative clinical urgency
Presence of disease that might affect transplant 
outcome
Allocation directed to recipients at risk 
of disease progression and waitlist 
dropout
Informed consent required
Unacceptable Presence of risk factors of communicable, ominous 
disease (i.e., metastatic malignancy)
Avoid transplantation
23 Organ Donor Risk Stratification in Italy
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mented in their clinical records. The 
category of acceptable risk profile also 
includes transplantation for patients in 
relative clinical urgency, i.e., those with 
severe clinical status, impending disease 
progression, and consequent risk of drop-
out from the waiting list (e.g., advanced 
hepatocellular carcinoma, high model for 
end-stage disease (MELD) liver trans-
plant candidates or long-standing kidney 
transplant patients with pretransplant 
sensitization).
 3. Unacceptable-risk donor: This group 
includes donors with overt risk factors for dis-
ease transmission, with special regard to 
active infectious disease from multidrug- 
resistant bacteria and metastatic malignan-
cies. In such cases we assume that the risk of 
transplantation greatly exceeds the benefits of 
dying on the transplant waiting list.
23.2  Discussion
Organ transplantation carries a small but finite 
risk of disease transmission [1, 2]. The risk of 
transmission of malignancies in organ transplan-
tation is currently estimated between 0.01% and 
0.05% [1, 2] when strict criteria for donor selec-
tion and evaluation are implemented. In such 
series [3, 4], only one case of melanoma is 
reported, thus underscoring the benefit of trans-
plantation as compared to a 2% mortality risk for 
kidney and up to 17% for liver waitlist candidates 
in the same study period. On the opposite, lack of 
guidelines and inaccurate medical histories are at 
the basis of case reports of donor-to-recipient 
transmission of malignancies [5–19].
Due to stagnant donation rates, donor selec-
tion criteria have been expanded and use of non-
standard risk donors has been introduced in many 
countries [20]. This clearly poses considerable 
ethical issues that should be analyzed and taken 
into consideration by the competent authorities 
and institutions. In Italy, introduction of donor 
risk categories in 2004 has allowed safe use of 
organs from donors with malignancies, HBsAg 
and/or anti-HBc donors and, recently, from anti- 
HCV- positive and HCV RNA-positive donors in 
negative recipients in light of the availability of 
DAAs for hepatitis C treatment with no negative 
impact on the overall graft and patients survival 
rates [20].
Implementation of national guidelines and 
risk stratification has been crucial to achievement 
of favorable results. This underlies the important 
role of regional and national authorities/agencies 
and of multidisciplinary integration of all health-
care professionals along the entire continuum of 
the donation-transplantation process. Retrieval of 
clinical information can be challenging in the set-
ting of donation after brain death (DBD) and 
even more in the setting of uncontrolled donation 
after cardiocirculatory death (uDCD), when time 
pressure urges professionals to achieve results 
(i.e., organ procurement) as quickly as possible. 
To this regard, active participation of donor fami-
lies, general practitioners, and healthcare institu-
tions to the donation process is pivotal to an 
efficient algorithm and reduction of the uncer-
tainty margin to the lowest level (standard risk). 
Organ donation is truly an instance of social 
enterprise, and relies on efficient integration of 
all levels of care (primary, secondary, and ter-
tiary). Risk control strategies can be effective 
only if based on comprehensive policies encom-
passing the entire spectrum of the donation- 
transplantation process.
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The notion of patient safety in laboratory medi-
cine can be loosely interpreted as the assurance 
that harm to patients is prevented, safe care out-
comes are enhanced through error prevention, 
and the system is continuously improved. 
However, this somewhat simplistic interpretation 
hides the concept’s true complexity. A clear defi-
nition of the laboratory professional’s role and 
competencies in the diagnostic process is there-
fore required, as is the use of suitable quality 
assurance tools.
The concept of a “brain-to-brain loop” of lab-
oratory testing encompasses the different steps 
involved, starting with appropriate test request-
ing and concluding with the appropriate use of 
laboratory information (Fig. 24.1). Moreover, it 
highlights the importance of integrating labora-
tory information in the care pathways, calling for 
system quality and patient safety, and also eluci-
dates the value of laboratory medicine.
In the last few decades, changes in the nature 
of laboratory services have underscored a para-
digmatic transformation of the laboratory sce-
nario [1] thanks to technological innovation, the 
introduction of ever more complex tests in emerg-
ing diagnostic fields, more advanced diagnostics, 
and other internal and external drivers. The trans-
formation will become even more marked in the 
future. In the ten points identified in the “Manifesto 
for the future of Laboratory Medicine profession-
als” (Table 24.1), great emphasis is placed on the 
importance of cooperation in reducing the risk of 
diagnostic errors, the implementation of reliable 
laboratory medicine stewardship, the involvement 
of laboratory medicine professionals in interdisci-
plinary teams, and the promotion of professional 
expertise. A large body of evidence demonstrates 
that this integration is crucial to the rational utili-
zation of laboratory information [2].
The issue of patient safety, which impacts 
every diagnosis, involves numerous stakeholders. 
No single intervention to prevent errors is avail-
able, and there is a pressing need for the rigorous 
evaluation of possible solutions that will be ben-
eficial, will obviate unintended consequences, 
and, above all, will safeguard patients.
In the healthcare setting, medical laboratories 
should always be a driver in ensuring patient 
safety through:
• The integration of laboratory professionals 
with new competencies and skills in 
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 multidisciplinary teams, in which all stake-
holders are involved.
• Awareness of the impact of laboratory errors 
in patient management.
• The implementation of effective quality assur-
ance tools to identify and prevent potential 
laboratory errors.
24.1  Epidemiology of Adverse 
Events
24.1.1  Laboratory Medicine 
as a Driver in Ensuring Patient 
Safety
The phrase “clinical laboratory stewardship” 
















Fig. 24.1 The 
brain-to-brain-loop: 
description of the total 
testing process (from 
reference 8 modified)
Table 24.1 Manifesto for the future of laboratory medi-
cine professionals [1]
1. Convert results in clinical information
2.  Cooperate in reducing the risk of diagnostic 
errors
3.  Implement a reliable laboratory medicine 
stewardship
4.  Combine data of all laboratories subspecialties and 
diagnostic imaging in the same report
5.  Establish reliable reference ranges and decision 
limits
6.  Facilitate more effective teamwork and be actively 
involved in interdisciplinary teams
7.  Promote the shift from volume based 
reimbursement models to clinical values
8.  Improve and update the way laboratory medicine is 
taught
9.  Do not neglect administrative competence and 
duties
10. Promote the value of the profession
M. Plebani et al.
327
laboratory medicine in healthcare and points to 
the need to promote a new vision for the disci-
pline in which some novel ideas must be stressed 
and focused on. Diagnostic and therapeutic net-
works must be promoted in order to improve 
patient- centered and end-to-end support in clin-
ical pathways and to transform laboratory data 
into effective information. Studies in literature 
highlight the urgent need for clinicians to make 
better use of diagnostic testing and to be confi-
dent that laboratory information issued to them 
is accurate. Important issues must be shared in 
order to achieve compliance with the above 
needs. In order to reduce errors and improve 
quality of care, laboratory professionals must be 
made aware of the impact laboratory results 
have on the patient and, on the other hand, clini-
cians must have a thorough understanding of the 
tools implemented and used in the laboratory 
[3–5].
In the healthcare system, Laboratory Medicine 
is still considered a low-risk speciality with 
respect to other specialities such as emergency 
and intensive care medicine [6]. This is because 
the main activities in laboratory medicine are 
accurately defined [7, 8] and are more easily con-
trolled than procedures in an emergency depart-
ment, where they are strictly dependent on the 
healthcare professionals. However, laboratory 
errors tend to be more insidious and difficult to 
immediately identify because they involve sev-
eral steps, numerous providers, and a greater time 
lapse between testing, physician action, and 
patient outcome [9].
During the healthcare process, failures occur-
ring in a phase nearest to patient intervention are 
more likely to result in patient harm due to the 
presence of active and defensive barriers designed 
to identify the event before it impacts patient out-
come. However, despite the common belief that 
errors in laboratory testing have less of an impact 
on patient safety than those occurring in the oper-
ating or resuscitation rooms, several examples in 
literature demonstrate that errors in the testing 
process can result in a negative patient outcome. 
In a survey, anatomic pathologists and medical 
laboratory directors were asked questions on 
error rates, on barriers to error disclosure, and on 
their experience with pathology and laboratory 
error disclosure. Of the 95.2% of respondents 
who reported having experienced an error, 43.6% 
reported involvement with a serious error, 69.1% 
a minor error, and 77.6% a near miss [10]. 
Himmel et  al. described a case of unnecessary 
hemodialysis being performed in a healthy 
patient due to an erroneously transcribed metha-
nol result (6  mmol/L instead of 0.06  mmol/L) 
[11]. In 2007 in Italy, a transcription error in an 
HIV result led to the death of three transplant 
recipients [12]. Adverse events have been also 
associated with false glucose readings when 
using glucose dehydrogenase pyrroloquinoline 
quinone (GPD-PQQ) test strips: out of 82 errone-
ous reports, 16 (20%) led to death, 46 (56%) 
severe hypo-glycemia, and 12 (15%) minor 
hypo-glycemia [13]. Other authors have reported 
that about 30% of cases of error in total labora-
tory testing translate into a patient care problem 
(e.g., inappropriate admission to critical care 
units, inappropriate transfusions, modifications 
in heparin and digoxin therapies) [14–16].
These data demonstrate the importance of 
laboratory information in clinical decision- 
making since it can significantly affect the diag-
nosis and subsequent patient management [17]. 
The reliability of laboratory information is there-
fore the prerequisite for assuring a quality health-
care process and reducing the risk of harm to 
patients.
Although it is acknowledged worldwide that 
the fundamental role of laboratory medicine is to 
ensure patient safety, more could be done to high-
light this role in order to make the laboratory’s 
work visible to the patient.
24.1.2  From Laboratory-Related 
Errors to Diagnostic Errors
The understanding of errors in terms of type, fre-
quency, causes, and impact on patients is crucial 
to identifying and implementing control mea-
sures to prevent failures and reduce risk. In the 
laboratory field, the meaning of “error” has 
changed over time, in parallel with the transfor-
mation of the organizational methods of the med-
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ical laboratory and the definition of the laboratory 
testing process itself.
In the late 1990s, the promotion of patient- 
centered care prompted laboratory professionals 
to investigate any defects in the TTP that could 
negatively impact the patient. A series of papers 
published between 1989 and 2007 documented a 
high error rate in the pre- and post-analytical steps, 
thus demonstrating the high vulnerability of these 
phases [15, 16, 18, 19]. Accordingly, the accepted 
definition of laboratory error became “a defect 
occurring at any part of the laboratory cycle, from 
ordering tests to reporting results and appropri-
ately interpreting and reacting on these,” which 
was also incorporated into the ISO Technical 
Report 22367:2008 “Medical laboratories—
Reduction of error through risk management and 
continual improvement—Complementary ele-
ments” [20].
In 2011, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) 
included the service of laboratory medicine 
among the ten categories of essential services in 
the United States health system, marking a new 
era for the medical laboratory. As the medical 
laboratory becomes an integral part of the health-
care system, laboratory-related error becomes 
part of a much wider issue, known as “diagnostic 
error” [21, 22]. Diagnostic errors have been 
defined as failures to provide an accurate and 
timely explanation of the patient’s health prob-
lems and/or communicate that explanation to the 
patient. Diagnostic errors are typically subdi-
vided into errors in which diagnosis has been (a) 
delayed, despite sufficient available information, 
(b) wrong, because a diagnosis was made before 
the correct one was determined, or (c) missed, 
when no diagnosis was made [23]. The concept 
of “diagnostic errors” definitively links 
laboratory- associated errors to patient safety 
problems. The fundamental role of the medical 
laboratory in the diagnostic process was high-
lighted by a survey administered to clinicians to 
assess type and causes of missed and delayed 
diagnoses. The results showed that errors 
occurred most frequently in the testing phase 
(i.e., failure to order, report, and follow-up labo-
ratory results) (44%), followed by errors in clini-
cian assessment (overruling or failing to consider 
a competing diagnosis) (32%), history taking 
(10%), physical examination (10%), and referral 
or consultation errors and delays (3%) [24].
Failure to order appropriate diagnostic tests, 
including laboratory tests, has also been linked to 
missed and delayed diagnoses in the ambulatory 
setting (55%) [25], and in emergency depart-
ments (58%). Likewise, failure to note abnormal 
test results (7%) has been related to delay in diag-
nosing cancer. The incorrect interpretation of 
laboratory tests, resulting in diagnostic errors, 
has also been documented in the primary care 
setting (37%), internal medicine (38%), and 
emergency departments (37%) [25, 26].
Current research into laboratory-related diag-
nostic errors highlights the following.
• Pre- and post-analytical phases are more vul-
nerable to errors, accounting for 46–68% and 
19–47% of errors, respectively. The manage-
ment of the interface between the clinical set-
ting and laboratory remains a challenge for 
healthcare professionals [27].
• Analytical quality is a persistent issue. Initial 
studies on laboratory-related errors focused 
on the analytical phase, the only phase com-
pletely performed within the laboratory walls 
and under direct laboratory control. 
Furthermore, only errors in the measurement 
of clinical chemistry analytes were consid-
ered. Despite their limited design, these stud-
ies offered a wide range of strategies to 
improve analytical performance and provide 
clinicians with timely and reliable results. The 
strategies adopted (e.g., the development of 
external quality assurance (EQA) programs, 
the improvement of internal quality control 
(IQC), regulation and standardization of ana-
lytical techniques and reagents, automation 
and computerization of laboratory processes) 
led to a dramatic decrease in analytical error 
rates and to a significant increase in test 
demand and utilization.
• Analytical interferences must be focused on. 
Despite the optimism of clinical pathologists, 
analytical interferences still affect many tests, 
such as glucose, bilirubin, C-reactive protein, 
creatinine, and albumin [28]. These errors, 
also known as irregular errors, represent one 
of the greatest challenges for laboratory pro-
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fessionals because they are not detectable by 
quality control procedures, are reproducible 
within the test system, and may be clinically 
plausible. Furthermore, their frequency is 
variable and probably underreported [29]. 
Immunoassays are the most affected tests, 
with an analytical error rate of 0.4–4%, con-
siderably higher than those for other routine 
tests and in some cases associated with an 
adverse clinical outcome (e.g., unnecessary 
hysterectomy and chemotherapy in a 22-year-
old woman due to false-positive hCG results 
caused by heterophilic antibodies) [30]. The 
issue of irregular analytical errors presents an 
opportunity to reframe the mission of labora-
tory medicine as the provision of key informa-
tion for effective clinical decision-making and 
optimal patient outcome [31].
• Errors do not only concern clinical chemistry 
tests. New pathophysiological knowledge and 
technologies have led to the introduction of 
novel, ever more sophisticated tests into clini-
cal practice, calling for further efforts to 
ensure competency of laboratory staff as well 
as other healthcare professionals [1]. Although 
the test cycle is the same across laboratory 
medicine tests and disciplines, this cannot be 
said for the distribution of the errors within the 
test cycle. In molecular-genetic testing or 
mass spectrometry, many steps of the analyti-
cal process are not yet automated and are 
closely linked to the inherent judgment of the 
laboratory professional, thus making the 
results more subjective than those of other 
clinical laboratory tests. In molecular-genetic 
testing for example, it has been demonstrated 
that 60% of errors occur in the pre-analytical 
phase, 32% in the analytical phase, and 8% in 
the post-analytical phase [32].
24.2  Safety Practices 
and Implementation 
Strategy
In recent years, the evolution of the role of labo-
ratory medicine in patient management and the 
growing attention to cost containment have 
underscored an evaluation of the service provided 
by the medical laboratory based on efficacy crite-
ria. In this context, improvement has been 
observed in quality control techniques, from 
improvements in the analytical phase to the pro-
motion and development of quality assurance 
systems for the entire analysis process; several 
quality improvement initiatives have been under-
taken to support sustainable outcomes based on 
systematic and organizational criteria.
A body of scientific evidence shows that it is 
now essential to identify opportunities for 
improvement while considering all TTP activi-
ties, especially those in the pre- and post- 
analytical phases. Systems for the identification 
and monitoring of errors are important quality 
assurance tools, as are proactive and reactive 
analysis methods that focus not only on the pro-
cesses themselves but also, and above all, on any 
risk to the patient.
Of the procedures to be implemented in medi-
cal laboratories, the identification and monitoring 
of errors is paramount to ensure proper perfor-
mance because it calls for continuous data analy-
sis and the implementation of preventive, 
corrective, and ameliorative actions whenever 
necessary. The monitoring of result accuracy, a 
traditional laboratory process, is conducted using 
IQC procedures and through participation in 
EQA programs. In the last few decades, the 
responsibility of laboratory professionals has 
widened thanks to awareness of the brain-to- 
brain loop (Fig. 24.1) [33]. The systematic use of 
approved quality indicators (QIs) to control criti-
cal TTP activities over time has expanded to the 
monitoring of the extra-analytical phases and the 
description of the efficiency and effectiveness of 
performance.
Moreover, a robust, well-structured, and well- 
managed quality management system can pro-
vide a wide variety of information generated by 
both symptomatic events (e.g., incident report-
ing) and asymptomatic events (e.g., analysis of 
strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats) 
for measuring and monitoring different aspects 
of the process and its outcomes.
Examples of information sources are:
• Reports on participation in EQA programs.
• Quality indicator data.
24 Patient Safety in Laboratory Medicine
330
• Findings of external accreditation and/or cer-
tification audits.
• Records of non-conformities (e.g., errors, 
complaints, adverse events, non-compliance).
• Findings of surveys investigating user satis-
faction, where the user is understood to be one 
who utilizes the service (e.g., citizen, patient, 
clinician, doctor) or one who works within the 
process as a user of one sub-process and a sup-
plier of another.
• Assessments of staff competency.
The analysis of all data collected contributes 
to the definition of organizational and quality 
objectives and of intervention priorities. However, 
the effectiveness of the information for improve-
ment purposes is influenced by the criteria and 
methods with which the information is collected 
and subsequently managed.
Only a small proportion of laboratory errors 
give rise to actual patient harm and adverse 
events, thanks to several checks and defensive 
layers implemented to guarantee the reliable 
release of laboratory information; however, each 
and every error that does occur must serve as an 
important learning opportunity [34].
24.2.1  ISO 15189 Accreditation
The reliability of laboratory tests has increased 
dramatically in line with technological progress 
and the refinement of techniques, methods, and 
professional skills. For a medical laboratory to 
reliably deliver routine services at high volumes 
continuously and broadly, it must emphasize the 
importance of drawing maximum attention to the 
quality of its processes, starting with the biologi-
cal sample quality (i.e., collection, handling, and 
transport), followed by analytical accuracy, and 
then the quality of report communication (e.g., 
timeliness, appropriateness of reference inter-
vals/decision levels, controls in place to ensure 
the correct communication is received by 
clinicians).
Although a robust quality management sys-
tem is crucial for the correct management and 
traceability of all processes, it is now more 
important than ever to understand how to opti-
mize efficiency and effectiveness while overcom-
ing the mentality of blind compliance with 
requirements. The definition and application of 
criteria, procedures, and quality assurance tools 
must be driven by laboratory professionals on the 
basis of practice and data analysis, rather than by 
requirements defined outside the laboratory.
Improvement action plans for laboratory 
activities are multiple and varied due to the com-
plexity of the relationships and interactions 
between the different processes and activities. 
Success depends on:
• The commitment of leadership to improving 
quality as a modus operandi.
• An organization-wide culture that recognizes 
the need for and calls for the involvement of 
all personnel in improvement activities.
• Integrated and defined processes and proce-
dures describing the ways in which improve-
ment can be implemented and responsibilities 
articulated.
• The application by management and all staff 
members of knowledge and skills relevant to 
the continuous improvement of concepts, 
models, and tools [35].
Laboratory medicine is increasingly recog-
nized as a fundamental component of patient care 
and therefore laboratory professionals are 
requested to improve not only analytical but also 
clinical competence. Great efforts have been 
made by laboratory professionals to supplant the 
belief that the recognition of performance quality 
might be assured with the granting of ISO 9001 
certification, highlighting instead the suitability 
of the ISO 15189 accreditation process.
Accreditation in compliance with ISO 15189 
(Medical laboratories—Requirements for quality 
and competence) is designed to demonstrate the 
reliability of laboratory performances to patients 
and users, and general stakeholders [36]. This 
assurance is based on the implementation of an 
adequate quality management system and, above 
all, on the availability of qualified staff with the 
technical competence needed to carry out spe-
cific examinations.
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The ISO 15189 is a worldwide International 
Standard, specifically designed for the accredita-
tion of medical laboratories. The ISO 15189 
accreditation is issued by the national accredita-
tion body, a unique body recognized by the 
national government for the issuing of accredita-
tion. Obligatory in some countries and voluntary 
in others, accreditation is based on comparative 
logics between homogeneous organizations, typ-
ical of benchmark systems. Its purpose is not to 
satisfy a fixed target but goals that vary continu-
ously over time and space and hinge upon quality 
of professional performance (best practice). 
Since best practice is affected by contextual 
change, technological evolution, scientific 
advancements, and so forth, the aim of accredita-
tion is to help the laboratory achieve continued 
improvement and compare its performance with 
the best possible performance, as determined by 
the state-of-the-art and/or the reference model. 
The maintenance of accreditation, a dynamic 
process, calls for continuous evaluation of excel-
lence in the respective discipline.
24.2.2  Quality Indicators
Despite the availability of laboratory accredita-
tion and compliance with mandatory and/or vol-
untary standards calling for the application of the 
best available criteria and procedures, and the 
harmonization of staff behavior, its effectiveness 
is closely related to continuous monitoring of all 
TTP steps and outcomes.
In recent years, laboratory professionals have 
developed and implemented a number of QIs 
focusing on the main critical TTP steps that are to 
be included in a coherent and well-integrated 
quality improvement system [36–41]. This has 
come about because of the need to reduce error 
rates, the difficulty in recognizing and isolating 
undesired events, and a willingness to meet ISO 
15189 accreditation requirements.
An internal evaluation process and participa-
tion in an inter-laboratory comparison must be 
implemented in order to guarantee the effective-
ness of QIs.
The internal evaluation process includes the 
definition of:
• A list of QIs focused on the critical activities.
• A document for each indicator describing its 
specifications (e.g., what must be measured, 
how to collect data, measurement limitations, 
acceptability limits of results, areas of appli-
cation, responsibilities).
• A standard operating procedure describing all 
steps to be followed in order to guarantee 
effective use of QIs.
Moreover, participation in inter-laboratory 
comparison aims to evaluate the quality level 
achieved in comparison with other national or 
international laboratories. This calls for the use 
of common QIs and of criteria and procedures for 
data collection. A coordinator center is needed to 
perform data processing that complies with 
approved quality specifications and to provide 
each laboratory with a report describing the 
resulting performance evaluation pertaining to 
each QI.
The Working Group on “Laboratory Errors 
and Patient Safety” (WG-LEPS) of the 
International Federation of Clinical Chemistry 
and Laboratory Medicine (IFCC) has put in 
motion a project for the definition of a Model of 
Quality Indicators (MQI) along with data col-
lection specifications, to be used in all laborato-
ries regardless of logistics, technological level, 
and complexity. In two Consensus Conferences 
held in 2013 and 2016, experts on this topic dis-
cussed and ultimately approved the list of QIs, 
the  procedure for data collection, the criteria 
for performance evaluation, and the informa-
tion to be included in a periodic report concern-
ing the analysis of data for participating 
laboratories. The progress of the project and its 
findings are reported in literature as well as 
through a dedicated website that is www.ifcc-
mqi.com.
Currently the MQI includes 53 measurements 
to evaluate 26 indicators concerning key pro-
cesses, support processes, and outcome mea-
sures. To facilitate implementation, a priority 
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index has been assigned to each QI (from 1 to 4, 
with 1 being the highest and 4 the lowest) based 
on the importance of the QI and the difficulty of 
data collection (Figs. 24.2 and 24.3).
However, sufficient effectiveness of the sys-
tem cannot be achieved without the correct iden-
tification and analysis of the causes for error as 
well as the implementation of adequate correc-
tive actions. In order to reduce error rates and 
improve laboratory performance, it is extremely 
important for laboratory professionals to periodi-
cally analyze the QI data and:
• Highlight declines in performance in compari-
son with previous data and with the state-of- 
the-art (i.e., other laboratories).
• Identify any error-related causes of undesir-
able performance as well as any room for 
improvement.
• Implement preventative and/or corrective and/
or improvement actions.
• Evaluate any risk to patient safety.
QI data are an effective starting point for eval-
uating error probability in risk management pro-
IFCC Working Group “Laboratory Errors and Patient Safety”
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cedures. Some authors have reported on their 
experience applying Failure Mode and Effect 
Analysis (FMEA) to critical activities using QI 
data. The reported findings demonstrate that the 
use of QIs to monitor errors and implement risk 
management procedures reduces the error rate, 
maximizes performance quality, and improves 
patient safety and health system outcomes [42]. 
The promotion of continued improvement cen-
ters about the commitment of laboratory profes-
sionals to the management of QIs. The last few 
years have confirmed that the utility of QIs is 
closely linked to the recognition by all personnel 
involved of their importance and of the need to 
guarantee appropriate data collection as well as 
effective data analysis. To raise awareness in pro-
fessionals, there has been a diffusion of consen-
sually approved MQI and results that highlight 
achieved improvement, and professionals have 
been encouraged to assume responsibility. The 
continuous exchange of experiences among labo-
ratory professional aim therefore to improve both 
the quality of the project and of laboratory ser-
vices [41].
24.2.3  Professional Competence: 
Education and Skill
In order to make the role of laboratory medicine 
in the context of patient care more visible, labora-
tory professionals must accept that they are mem-
bers of a multidisciplinary team. Greater visibility 
in the form of rounds, committees, consultation, 
demonstration of knowledge, and self-promotion 
will be judged chiefly in relation to the clinical 
value they bring. Laboratory professionals must 
develop new competencies to highlight the con-
tribution of laboratory information to patient 
management. Even knowledge of less traditional 
areas is required; this will bring new insights and 
approaches from other disciplines. Moreover, 
laboratory professionals must realize that the 
level of recognition achieved will be profoundly 
affected by continuous advancements in areas 
such as computerization, technology, clinical 
decision tools, informative media, and artificial 
neural networks. Laboratory medicine is a con-
tinuously evolving clinical discipline and emerg-
ing challenges require a revision and improvement 
of operational flows to enhance quality and safety 
in patients care. Laboratory professionals must 
maintain a high level of skills for achieving effi-
ciency and effectiveness when delivering labora-
tory services [43]. To reduce diagnostic errors, 
the first-line intervention consists of education 
and training designed to improve knowledge and 
skills to guarantee relevant competency [23]. 
Given the data reported above, it might be neces-
sary to act on graduate education and training by 
rescheduling national programs, enhancing the 
duration and contents of courses given in labora-
tory medicine. Currently, however, only post-
graduate initiatives are underway. The EFLM 
published the fifth edition of a syllabus for labo-
ratory medicine outlining requirements for the 
postgraduate skills, knowledge, and competency 
needed to direct laboratory medicine services. 
The syllabus would not replace existing post-
graduate programs, the aim being to harmonize 
the common principles of education and training 
of professionals working Europe in order to guar-
antee high standards of quality and safety. This 
initiative paves the way for the free migration of 
professionals and patients across EU national 
borders. While the fourth version of the syllabus 
was built with the specialist’s generic skills, 
knowledge, and competencies in mind, the fifth 
version details individual discipline requirements 
(such as those in clinical chemistry, immunology, 
hematology, blood transfusion, microbiology/
virology, genetics, and in vitro fertilization) and 
includes new analytical techniques and statistics. 
Laboratory organization, quality, safety, and clin-
ical governance have also been included as fun-
damental aspects of training, thus enabling the 
specialist in Laboratory Medicine to operate as a 
clinical leader who can support and transform 
healthcare services [44]. Given the recent changes 
in the nature of laboratory service and its role in 
the healthcare process, the new generation of 
laboratory professionals and leaders are then 
called upon to incorporate specific technical 
skills into a broader vision of healthcare and of 
patients’ needs. As shown in Table  24.1, the 
recently published “Manifesto for the future of 
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laboratory medicine professionals” specifies the 
tasks of laboratory professionals in ten specific 
points. Clinical laboratory stewardship appears to 
be the new, shared strategy for guaranteeing 
patient safety while simultaneously maximizing 
efficacy and efficiency [1]. With this approach, 
quality and safety are held to be just as essential 
in daily laboratory practice as they are in clinical 
practice; yet, neither topic appears in national 
education and training programs.
The World Health Organization (WHO) has 
developed initiatives for professionals training in 
the field of patient safety, beginning with the pub-
lication of a “Multi-professional’s patient safety 
curriculum guide” to provide assistance in the 
teaching of patient safety in universities and 
schools. This manual, originally published in 
2011, has been translated into many different lan-
guages (i.e., Chinese, Czech, English, French, 
German, Indonesian, Italian, Japanese, Polish, 
and Spanish) [45]. In 2018, WHO organized the 
first international meeting on safety in healthcare 
addressed to students and residents in the medi-
cal field. More than 200 residents of different 
specialities and coming from 30 nations were 
divided into 18 working groups and enhanced the 
new clinical generation’s perspective on health-
care safety through their participation. The sur-
vey administered at the end of the sessions 
highlighted that for 90% of respondents this was 
the first time attending an international meeting 
on patient safety, that 80% of residents had not 
been aware of the existence of the “WHO Multi- 
professional Patient Safety Curriculum Guide” 
prior to attending, and that only 40% of the par-
ticipants had already received training in the field 
of patient safety and clinical risk.
The above percentages show that in the areas 
of quality, safety, and risk management the 
training of young laboratory and clinical profes-
sionals is still linked to the sensitivity of leader-
ship towards these issues. However, 
professionals cannot overlook this issue: they 
must all be aware that many laboratory errors 
stem from personnel- related factors, and that 
other factors can positively or negatively affect 
laboratory activities, factors such as the social 
environment, developments in technology, eco-
nomic parameters, rules and regulations, and 
safety precautions [46–48].
24.2.4  Risk Management Procedures
Risk management, the systemic process designed 
to identify and manage the actual and potential 
risks associated with laboratory testing, is becom-
ing an integral part of quality management sys-
tems and plays an important role in providing 
quality services [49].
Although ISO 15189 [36] and ISO 9001 [50] 
include risk management requirements, they do 
not specify the means to this end. Laboratory 
professionals generally choose risk assessment 
techniques recommended by ISO/TS 22367 [20] 
or suggested by CLSI EP18-A2 [51] while using 
differing approaches to define goals and identify 
risks.
Available reviews of risk management proce-
dures in literature focus on different steps and 
activities. Some authors use FMEA and the 
Failure Reporting, Analysis and Corrective 
Action System (FRACAS) to estimate, respec-
tively, potential and actual risks associated with 
operational (i.e., pre-analytical, analytical, and 
post-analytical) and strategic and support pro-
cesses [52]. Other authors use the FMEA tech-
nique for specific examination procedures to 
reduce the occurrence of multiple failures 
recorded throughout the entire testing process, in 
particular risks concerning Factor V Leiden 
mutation or parathyroid and adrenocorticotropic 
hormones [53, 54], or risks pertaining to the pre- 
analytical phase using QI data [42].
The use of QI data in risk management 
procedures is a valid mean for evaluating the 
probability of error occurrence. The Australasian 
QI program, Key Incident Monitoring and 
Management System (KIMMS), provides partic-
ipants with the KIMMS risk matrix among other 
statistical tools in order to encourage laboratories 
to examine high-risk steps and analyze causes of 
error. For each QI, the system automatically 
multiplies together the frequency imputed by lab 
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participants, the harm as defined in advance by a 
consensus of lab professionals, and the ability to 
detect errors [55]. Flegar-Meštrić et al. [42] also 
retrospectively studied data collected from 22 
harmonized QIs of MQI launched by the IFCC 
WG-LEPS for risk analysis and error reduction 
in pre-analytical steps in an emergency depart-
ment with a higher error rate [33].
24.3  Clinical Cases
In our laboratory, the IFCC-MQI reports pro-
vided by WG-LEPS—including the mean and 
sigma value of laboratory performances for each 
quality indicator—are analyzed annually to iden-
tify high-risk processes. In 2018, the most fre-
quent errors were related to sample unsuitability 
(e.g., hemolyzed, clotted, or insufficient samples, 
and samples with inappropriate sample- 
anticoagulant volume ratio of 0.262%); as a 
result, the blood collection phase was analyzed to 
identify the high-risk steps and procedures. 
Errors in blood collection can generate incorrect 
results, delays in the release of results, delays in 
diagnosis and treatment, the release of incom-
plete testing panels, and repeated blood collec-
tion resulting in a negative final outcome for the 
patient. Checks already in place to prevent proce-
dural errors included standard operating proce-
dures and a training course for blood collection, 
as well as a checklist serving as an auxiliary tool 
to guide phlebotomists. All procedural errors can 
be detected in the laboratory by means of serum 
indices. To analyze the blood collection phase 
and identify causes of errors, a selection was 
made of five wards (i.e., neonatal pathology, clin-
ical medicine, hematology, clinical immunology 
and day-hospital, and general medicine) with dif-
ferent organizational structure and patient char-
acteristics. The blood collection phase was 
mapped out in each ward and the risk index (RI) 
estimated. The highest risk index was found for 
neonatal pathology (RI  =  226), followed by 
hematology (RI  =  165), clinical medicine 
(RI  =  138), clinical immunology day-hospital 
(RI = 107), and general medicine (RI = 63). The 
risk analysis demonstrated that the major causes 
of error were partial knowledge of the standard 
operating procedures relating to blood sampling 
and the storage and sending of the sample (for 
example, due to insufficient user credentials to 
access an internal website containing standard 
operating procedures), insufficient and/or inade-
quate staff training, partial use of the blood col-
lection checklist, incorrect storage of the sample, 
human factors (e.g., stress, fatigue, lack of sleep), 
and the patient’s condition (e.g., fragile veins). In 
order to reduce the error rate during blood collec-
tion and minimize risk to patients, several correc-
tive actions were implemented: divulgation of the 
existing standard operating procedures on blood 
collection and on sample storage and transporta-
tion to the laboratory; request-based authoriza-
tion to access the documentation found in the 
internal website; a training course on blood col-
lection addressed to all phlebotomists; and 
encouraging use of the checklist. Six months 
after the implementation of the corrective actions, 
the risk index was re-evaluated to verify effec-
tiveness. We found risk had been reduced in all 
the studied wards, in particular hematology (58% 
risk minimization; RI = 69), followed by neona-
tal pathology (32%; RI = 153), clinical medicine 
(30%; RI  =  98), clinical immunology day- 
hospital (28%; RI  =  77), and general medicine 
(19%; RI = 51).
The detection, identification, and monitoring 
of errors through a set of harmonized, evidence- 
based, and patient-centered QIs have allowed a 
better understanding and management of the 
more critical stages of the processes. QIs incor-
porated in the laboratory quality management 
system proved to be effective tools for risk assess-
ment and minimized the possibility of errors 
occurring, consequently guaranteeing patient 
safety.
24.4  Recommendations
The prevention of errors in healthcare is still a 
worldwide priority for ensuring patient safety. 
Data reported by the World Health Organization 
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(WHO) website on the incidence and magnitude 
of errors in healthcare are discouraging: it has 
been estimated that approximately 43 million 
patient safety incidences occur every year, and as 
many as one in ten patients are harmed while 
receiving healthcare. Medical record reviews 
have demonstrated that 6–17% of all adverse 
events in hospital are due to diagnostic errors, 
which have therefore been listed among the ten 
factors affecting patient safety [56].
The IOM defined patient safety as “the pre-
vention of harm to patients,” considering it 
“indistinguishable from the delivery of quality 
healthcare,” and defined quality of care as “the 
degree to which healthcare services for individu-
als and populations increase the likelihood of 
desired health outcomes and are consistent with 
current professional practices” [46, 57]. It is clear 
from these definitions that safety is an essential 
building block for high-quality performance and 
that it is strictly connected to the other dimen-
sions of quality of care, such as patient- 
centeredness, effectiveness, timeliness, 
efficiency, and equity [58].
Quality assurance tools in laboratory medi-
cine must be integrated within the everyday work 
of all laboratory professionals, who must shift 
from focusing on individual human errors to 
adopting a systematic approach.
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Patient Safety in Ophthalmology
Myrta Lippera, Jacques Bijon, Chiara Eandi, 
and Gianni Virgili
Learning Objects and Questions Covered in 
the Chapter
• Patient safety in the field of surgical ophthal-
mic care.
• Intraoperative and postoperative adverse 
events of cataract surgery and intravitreal 
injection therapy, possible prevention strate-
gies, and management of the complications.
• Patient care and assessment prior, during, and 
after ophthalmic surgery.
• How to improve the surgical training process.
• Introduction to ophthalmic surgical errors and 
implications for the patient and the surgeon, 
with special focus on cataract and intravitreal 
injection therapy.
• How medical errors occur: the Swiss Cheese 
model of system accident.
• Causes and risk factors of wrong site surgery 
and preventing strategies.
• How to avert medication-related errors.
25.1  Introduction
In the “Guidance on Patient Safety in 
Ophthalmology,” the Royal College of 
Ophthalmologists (RCO) defines patient safety 
as “the process by which an organization makes 
patient care safer. This should involve the follow-
ing: risk assessment; the identification and man-
agement of patient-related risks; the reporting 
and analysis of incidents; and the capacity to 
learn from and follow-up on incidents and imple-
ment solutions to minimize the risk of them recur-
ring” [1].
Patient safety is particularly relevant in oph-
thalmology and regards the surgical part more 
than the clinical one. In particular, the Veteran 
Health Administration (VHA) reported in 2009 
and 2011 that ophthalmology was the specialty 
with the highest number of incorrect surgical pro-
cedures [2]. However, Mayo Clinic defines oph-
thalmic surgery, and in particular cataract surgery, 
as safe for patients. This apparent contradiction is 
due to the fact that cataract surgery is a very com-
mon operation, and thus even rare adverse out-
comes are frequent in absolute terms.
According to the World Health Organization 
(WHO), cataract causes 51% of world blindness. 
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In 2010 this condition represented about 20 mil-
lion people. In fact, in many countries barriers 
exist that prevent patients to access surgery. 
Nonetheless, worldwide approximately ten mil-
lion surgeries are performed each year. In eco-
nomically well-developed countries, cataract 
surgeries were performed at a rate of 4000–6000 
per million population annually in 2000 [3]. In 
2011, in the United States of America (USA), the 
rate reached 1100 per 100,000 residents and the 
number of people who undergo cataract surgery 
seems to grow steadily [4].
In the same way, the amount of intravitreal 
injections continues to increase year by year [5]. 
Between 2010 and 2015 it was registered in 
England a 215% rise of anti-VEGF injections 
and 388,031 procedures were registered between 
2014 and 2015 [6]. In 2016 it was reported that 
5.9 million injections were administered only in 
the USA [5].
Since the two mentioned procedures are the 
most common and consequently the ones that 
contribute the most to adverse events and errors 
in the ophthalmic practice, they will be the focus 
of the chapter.
25.2  Epidemiology of Adverse 
Events: Safety Practices 
and Implementation 
Strategy
25.2.1  Cataract Surgery
Greenberg et al. reported the prevalence of ocular 
complications associated with cataract surgery in 
45,082 United States veterans. The study showed 
that 3.8% patients had intraoperative ocular com-
plications and 9.8% patients had postoperative 
ocular complications within 90  days from sur-
gery. The most common intraoperative ocular 
complications were posterior capsular tear and 
vitreous loss, sometimes both (3.5%). The most 
common 90-day postoperative ocular complica-
tion was posterior capsular opacification (4.2%). 
Cystic macular edema (3.3%) and retained lens 
fragments (1.7%) followed [7].
Ophthalmology trainees execute 21–39% of 
all the cataract surgeries performed in developed 
countries [8, 9]. It is interesting to notice that, 
with proper supervision and patients’ selection, 
cataract surgery performed by residents have a 
similar risk of complications to cataract surgery 
performed by attending staff. In detail, Rutar 
et  al. reported a major intraoperative complica-
tion rate of 4.7% in cataract surgery performed 
by residents in the USA, the rate included 3.1% 
cases of vitreous loss [10]. The USA Accreditation 
Council for Graduate Medical Education 
(ACGME) assessed at 86 the required minimum 
number of procedures as primary surgeon for 
graduating residents in ophthalmology [11].
Similarly, a study conducted in Australia 
found no difference in the rate of posterior cap-
sule tear, vitreous loss, or dropped lens rates 
between trainees and consultants. However, an 
increased rate of wound burns when trainees 
were operating was registered (2.2% versus 
0.4%) [12].
The same trend was confirmed by a Canadian 
study [13]. Unfortunately, further recent studies 
regarding the complication rate of cataract sur-
gery performed by residents are missing in other 
countries, for instance Europe.
Therefore, the reported data might not reflect 
the standards worldwide. Nevertheless, it can be 
said that residents can always add a positive value 
to the quality of patient’s care. As a matter of fact, 
trainees often spend additional time with patients 
and create a supportive relationship with them. 
This attitude improves patient experience before 
surgery, with a more attentive preoperative 
assessment for risk factors. In addition, there are 
also benefits after surgery, with increased vigi-
lance for postoperative complications [14].
25.2.1.1  Intraoperative Adverse 
Events
• Local anesthesia is nowadays the technique 
most frequently used. In specific it is per-
formed in 95.5% of cataract surgeries. In par-
ticular, topical and sub-Tenon anesthesia are 
considered effective and safe procedures [15]. 
In fact, sub-Tenon anesthesia consists in the 
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insertion of a blunt cannula in the episcleral 
space in order to release the anesthetic.  Topical 
anesthesia consists in administration of anes-
thetic eye drops.
On the contrary, retro-bulbar and peri-bul-
bar anesthesia imply the use of a sharp needle 
to inject the anesthetic [16]. This action can 
lead to sporadic but serious adverse events 
like retrobulbar hemorrhage (0.03%), globe 
injury (0.01%), and, more rarely, optic nerve 
atrophy, muscular palsy, and brain-steam 
anesthesia [17].
The main adverse event of topical and sub- 
Tenon anesthesia is patient discomfort or ocu-
lar pain during and after the procedure. A 
Cochrane review established that topical anes-
thesia showed intensification of intraoperative 
pain and decrease of postoperative pain at 
24 h, when compared to sub-Tenon’s anesthe-
sia. Since there was not enough evidence to 
declare which of the two techniques was asso-
ciated with less intraoperative complications, 
both types of anesthesia can be considered 
adequate for cataract surgery [16].
• Posterior capsule rupture (PCR) incidence 
rate has recently decreased due to the intro-
duction of advanced techniques, newer instru-
mentation and technology. It is the most 
common intraoperative complication and in 
uncomplicated cases of cataract surgery can 
range from 1.9% [18] to 3.5% of [7]. It can 
lead to consequences such as vitreous loss 
(1–5%), drop of lens fragments or nucleus in 
the vitreous, placement of the intraocular lens 
in the ciliary sulcus or anterior chamber, and 
occasionally the need for additional surgical 
interventions [19].
Intraocular risk factors for PCR include: 
pseudoexfoliation syndrome; small pupils and 
reduced working place; excessive anterior 
chamber depth, which can occur in high myo-
pic eyes or after pars plana vitrectomy; certain 
types of cataract, as posterior polar ones; 
dense asteroid hyalosis; etc. [20].
The American Academy of Ophthalmology 
(AAO) described cardinal signs that can help a 
non-expert surgeon in recognizing PCR: sud-
den deepening of the anterior chamber, 
momentary pupillary dilatation, excessive 
movement of the nucleus that do not come 
toward the phaco tip, or vision of a focal sharp 
red reflex.
Recommendations in order to prevent PCR 
include considering intracameral phenyleph-
rine in floppy iris syndrome; small capsu-
lorhexis enlargement before hydrodissection; 
application of one of the existing different 
techniques in case of rhexis tears [20]; and use 
of capsular tension rings whenever the capsu-
lar bag is unstable or in case of zonular dehis-
cence [21]. Moreover, a thorough knowledge 
of phacoemulsification machine and its 
parameters is essential both to prevent and 
manage unexpected events while operating 
[20].
In the eventual case of PCR, the National 
Institute for Health and Care Excellence 
(NICE) suggests following a protocol. The 
protocol should include: removing vitreous 
from the wound and anterior chamber; mini-
mizing traction on the retina; removing lens 
fragments in the posterior chamber or vitreous 
cavity when possible; removing soft lens mat-
ter; and proceeding to intraocular lens (IOL) 
insertion when possible [21].
In conclusion, identifying the presence of 
predisposing factors, early recognition, and 
appropriate modification of the surgical plan 
can decrease the overall incidence of PCR.
25.2.1.2  Postoperative Adverse 
Events
• Posterior capsular opacification (PCO) rate 
varies in literature from 3% [22] to 47% [23, 
24]. PCO is caused by migration toward the 
posterior capsule, proliferation, and differen-
tiation of the residual lens epithelial cells on 
the anterior capsule [25]. Young age is a sig-
nificant risk factor for PCO [26]. Surgery- 
related factors that can be modified in order to 
prevent PCO are: achieving good hydrodis-
section and cortical cleanup, implanting both 
haptics in the capsular bag, performing a con-
tinuous curvilinear capsulorhexis diameter 
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which should be slightly smaller than the IOL 
optic diameter [22].
The treatment is provided by YAG capsu-
lotomy, a noninvasive, quick, and effective 
technique. However, it should be remembered 
that YAG capsulotomy can cause rare but pos-
sible risks, including retinal detachment, dam-
age to the IOL, cystoid macular edema, 
increase in intraocular pressure, iris hemor-
rhage, corneal edema, IOL subluxation, and 
exacerbation of localized endophthalmitis 
[27]. A follow-up after YAG capsulotomy is 
therefore recommended.
• Retinal detachment (RD) rate is described 
being between 0.26% at 1 year [28] and 1.79% 
at 20 years from cataract surgery [29].
It was hypothesized to be caused by post-
surgical anatomical and biochemical altera-
tions in the vitreous [30]. Specifically, the 
smaller volume of IOL, compared to the vol-
ume of the cataractous lens, increases the total 
vitreous volume and consequently mobility of 
the vitreous [31]. Moreover, biochemical 
changes and alterations in the protein compo-
sition of the vitreous fluid after phacoemulsifi-
cation contribute to the development of retinal 
disease [32].
Predisposing factors are young age, male 
gender, long axial length, and intraoperative 
complications, like capsular tear with vitreous 
loss [33]. Pars plana vitrectomy for removal of 
posteriorly dislocated lens fragments was 
additionally associated with a significantly 
shorter time interval between cataract surgery 
and retinal detachment (3.9 versus 
15.7 months) [34].
Whenever this complication occurs, the 
patient should be immediately referred to a 
vitreoretinal surgeon. Haddad et  al. showed 
achievement, after retinal reattachment, of 
20/60 best-corrected visual acuity (BCVA) or 
better in only 50% of cases [34].
• Cystoid macular edema (CME) is a fre-
quent cause of decreased BCVA after uncom-
plicated cataract surgery [35]. The incidence 
of CME in patients without risk factors was 
1–2% [36]. However, its incidence has been 
reported to be between 1% and 30%, due to 
the heterogeneity of diagnostic criteria. In 
addition, its rate can be increased whenever 
other ocular comorbidities are present, like 
diabetes, previous CME, previous retinal vein 
occlusion, epiretinal membrane or by prosta-
glandin use [37].
CME is normally a self-limiting condition: 
95% of CME due to Irvine-Gass, or post- 
cataract CME, has been shown to resolve 
within 6  months without additional therapy. 
Some cases, however, can determine long- 
term visual impairment [37]. The NICE rec-
ommends the use of topical steroids in 
combination with non-steroidal anti- 
inflammatory drugs (NSAIDs) in order to 
manage CME. Moreover, NICE recommends 
their use after cataract surgery for people at 
increased risk of cystoid macular edema, for 
example, people with diabetes or uveitis [21].
In 2015, Kim et  al. reported that topic 
NSAIDs hasten the speed of short-term visual 
recovery after cataract surgery when com-
pared with placebo or corticosteroid eye drop 
with limited intraocular penetration. However, 
at 3 months or more, prophylactic use of 
NSAIDs showed lack of evidence in reducing 
CME- related vision loss [38]. A 2016 
Cochrane review concluded that topical 
NSAIDs can be useful in preventing CME, but 
possible effects on postoperative BVCA are 
uncertain [39]. In 2018 the European Society 
of Cataract & Refractive Surgeons (ESCRS) 
PREMED Study I reported that use of topical 
bromfenac 0.09%, compared with topical 
dexamethasone 0.1%, can lower macular 
thickness and total volume after uneventful 
cataract surgery in patients with no risk fac-
tors for CME.  However, a reduced risk of 
developing clinical significant macular edema 
was shown in eyes treated with combination 
of the two drugs, compared with patients 
treated with a single drug [40, 41].
• Suprachoroidal Hemorrhage (SCH) is a 
sight-threatening complication where blood 
accumulates between the choroid and the 
sclera. The etiopathogenesis is long or short 
posterior ciliary arteries rupture [19, 42]. It is 
defined as a hemorrhage that can cause extru-
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sion from the eye of the intraocular contents, 
or that can force the inner retinal surfaces into 
or near apposition [42]. The incidence varies 
from 0.03% to 0.28%, in the case of 
 extracapsular cataract extraction [42, 43]. 
Risk factors include myopia, glaucoma, dia-
betes, atherosclerotic vascular diseases, and 
hypertension [42].
Clinical signs of an intraoperative choroi-
dal hemorrhage include shallowing of the 
anterior chamber, iris prolapse, expulsion of 
the lens and vitreous outside the eye, and dark 
retinal and choroidal detachment with loss of 
the red reflex [44]. Whenever it occurs, the 
surgical wound should be immediately closed 
with sustainable sutures [42]. As systemic 
hypertension is also a risk factor, intravenous 
administration of hypotensive agents might 
help in patients with high blood pressure.
In case of massive SCH, with BVCA of 
light perception, surgical interventions such as 
transcleral drainage, vitrectomy, and silicone 
oil tamponade are valuable options to improve 
the poor prognosis [45].
Consideration of all risk factors and avoid-
ance of predisposing events are a priority in 
order to prevent SCH.
• Endophthalmitis is a severe infective inflam-
mation of intraocular fluids. It is frequently a 
postoperative complication but can also occur 
after traumas. Rarely it can be sterile or with 
an endogenous etiology, arising from systemic 
infections or inflammatory disorders [46].
The epidemiology of post-cataract endo-
phthalmitis varies in the literature. A system-
atic review conducted by Taban et al. reports 
an overall endophthalmitis rate of 0.128% 
between the years 1963 and 2003. Specifically, 
a 0.327% rate occurred in the 1970s, 0.158% 
in the 1980s, 0.087% in the 1990s. It is inter-
esting to notice that a 0.265% rate was regis-
tered between 2000 and 2003 [47]. On the 
contrary, the ESCRS endophthalmitis study 
group reported a decrease of postoperative 
endophthalmitis from rates near 0.3–1.2% to 
0.014–0.08% after the institution of intracam-
eral cefuroxime [48].
The main finding is a red eye with blurred 
vision. Although an aching eye is often pres-
ent, 25% of the patients do not complain of 
pain. Signs include hypopyon (85% of cases) 
and hazy media (80% of cases) [49].
The mainstay treatment is with antibiotic 
intravitreal injections; vancomycin and ceftazi-
dime are the first choice. The Endophthalmitis 
Vitrectomy Study (EVS) showed no benefits in 
systemic intravenous antibiotics administra-
tion [49]. On the contrary, in case of severe 
purulent infections the ESCRS Guidelines for 
Prevention and Treatment of Endophthalmitis 
encourage the prescription of a systemic anti-
biotic therapy, not necessarily intravenous. For 
those cases, the same drug class from the one 
contained in the intravitreal therapy should be 
administered [50].
BCVA was a discriminant factor for endo-
phthalmitis management. In 1995 the EVS 
reported that only patients presenting with a 
visual acuity of light-perception showed ben-
efit from immediate core vitrectomy. However, 
more recently Kuhr suggested offering a com-
plete vitrectomy whenever those clinical signs 
were present: poor red reflex or no detection 
of retinal details, no improvement after 24 h 
from intravitreal injection [51, 52]. The study 
is, however, conducted on a limited number of 
patients and it is not randomized.





NICE guidelines recommend using optical biom-
etry for axial length measurements [21]. In facts, 
this technique is easy and quick to perform. It is 
automated, user-independent, and precise, since 
the patient is fixating on a target while the mea-
surement is taken [53, 54]. However, its limita-
tion is due to the fact that the machine uses an 
average velocity to determine the eye axial 
length, which is extrapolated from the time 
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needed by the pulse waveform to cover the 
cornea- retina distance. Due to this, in an eye lon-
ger than 26  mm the real axial length could be 
overestimated, and the opposite could occur in an 
eye shorter than 22 mm. In those cases, special 
formulas are required to balance the final 
calculation.
Ultrasound biometry is nowadays necessary 
when optical biometry pulse waveform does not 
manage to measure the axial length, for example, 
in case of very dense cataracts or vitreous hemor-
rhage; or whenever the optical biometry results 
cannot be considerate precise, as it can occur in 
case of macular retinal detachment.
Corneal topography should be used whenever 
any abnormality of the cornea surface is present 
or suspected: high or low K-values, high astigma-
tism, keratoconus, etc. In particular, topography 
should be performed in case of a precedent 
refractive surgery correction. Since the relation-
ship between the anterior and posterior curvature 
is iatrogenic modified in those eyes, additional 
calculations and sometimes more than one inter-
vention can be necessary to achieve the desired 
refractive target [21].
Supplemental Evaluation
Patient comorbidities can worsen and cause sys-
temic adverse events during or after cataract 
surgery. Cavallini et al. registered those compli-
cations to occur in 0.63% of cataract cases, in 
particular arterial hypertension showed to com-
plicate the 0.31% of the surgeries [55]. Systemic 
adverse events are a matter of concern, in terms 
of absolute numbers, due to the large number of 
elderly who undergo cataract surgery with car-
diac or pulmonary diseases [56]. In the past 
decade, the request of blood test results and of an 
electrocardiogram prior to surgery was common. 
Nowadays, different geographical areas have var-
ious approaches.
The AAO Preferred Practice Pattern, as well 
as the RCO Guidelines and the National Health 
Service (NHS), discourages asking for routine 
exams before cataract surgery [21, 53, 57]. But, 
in case of serious comorbidities, the AAO advises 
requiring supplemental testing and a systemic 
visit [53].
On the other hand, in 2019 a Cochrane review 
certified that routine preoperative testing does not 
increase the safety of cataract surgery in terms of 
total medical adverse events, total hospitaliza-
tion, total deaths, cancellation of cataract surgery, 
and total ocular adverse events. As an alternative, 
questionnaires about general health can be 
administered and completed by the patient or the 
primary care physician. Doing so, a better identi-
fication of patients at risk of systemic adverse 
events is possible [56].
Risk Stratification
NICE Guidelines suggest relying on a validated 
risk stratification system in the preoperative 
assessment. If a high surgical risk is identified, its 
implications and the new risk-benefit ratio for 
surgery should be discussed with the patient. 
Whenever an unsuccessful surgery could have a 
severe impact on life, as it might be for instance 
in monocular vision, surgical risks should be 
attenuated and a close supervision is necessary if 
a trainee is performing the surgery [21].
Muhtaseb et al. developed a risk stratification 
system by reviewing different risk factors for 
cataract surgery from the literature and associat-
ing a value to each of them. According to the total 
sum of the points related to single risk factors, 
each patient was categorized into a risk group 
predictive of intraoperative complications: group 
1 with no added risk; group 2 with low risk; 
group 3 with moderate risk; and group 4 with 
high risk. In addition to individualized counsel-
ing, risk stratification can be useful to select cases 
that could be operated by nonexpert surgeons and 
to standardize patients in groups for scientific 
studies [9].
Butler et  al. described a similar system with 
weighted scores based on the severity of risk fac-
tors reported by Narendran et al [58, 59]. Scores 
less than 3 are appropriate for junior trainees; 
cases scoring from 3 to 5 are appropriate for more 
senior trainees; and cases scoring higher than 5 
for consultants [58]. Although this system was 
meant to predict intraoperative complications, a 
correlation was also observed between the score 
and postoperative complications, as well as post-
operative corrected-distance visual acuity out-
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comes [60]. Other risk stratification systems 
exist, like the New Zealand Cataract Risk 
Stratification or the Najjar-Awwad cataract sur-




The Joint Guidelines from the RCO and the 
Royal College of Anesthetists declared that it is 
not mandatory for patients to be fasted the day of 
the surgery in case of topical anesthesia without 
sedation. As a matter of fact, no aspiration event 
was ever described. In detail, a special attention 
is required for diabetic patients in therapy with 
insulin. For them, local protocols should be 
developed in order to avoid hypoglycemia, con-
sidering also catering whenever the surgery is 
going to be performed late in the day [63].
The RCO also suggests to tell patients to take 
their normal medication on the day of the surgery 
[57, 63]. In particular, a review conducted in 
2015 showed how continuation of anticoagulant 
and antiplatelet therapy before and during an 
uncomplicated cataract surgery is safe. However, 
in case of small pupils, floppy iris syndrome, iris 
neovascularization, significant pseudoexfolia-
tion, or phacodonesis, discontinuation of the 
therapy can be discussed with an internist or car-
diologist [64]. Indeed, Warfarin increases the risk 
of orbital hemorrhage from 0.2% to 1.0% [57]. It 
might also increase other hemorrhagic complica-
tion risk, like hyphema, dot retinal or retrobulbar 
and choroidal hemorrhages [64]. In addition, 
anticoagulant exposure worsen the severity of an 
already onset bleeding [65]. Nevertheless, it was 
demonstrated that warfarin reduces life- 
threatening thrombotic events and decreases the 
risk for stroke to 1 in 100 [57]. Therefore, when 
older oral anticoagulants are used, the 
International Normalized Ratio (INR), when pos-
sible, should remain in the desired therapeutic 
range [57].
Prophylaxis of Infections and Sterility
Endophthalmitis prevention is crucial. The 
ESCRS Endophthalmitis Study Group demon-
strated that the risk for contracting postoperative 
endophthalmitis was reduced by an intracameral 
injection of 1  mg cefuroxime at the end of the 
surgery. The lowest incidence rate of endophthal-
mitis was observed in the group who received, in 
addition to intracameral cefuroxime, an intensive 
pulsed dose regimen of three drops levofloxacin, 
each drop separated by 5 min, also given at the 
close of surgery, along with two drops given pre-
operatively, 30  min apart [50, 66]. A Cochrane 
review confirmed, with high-certainty evidence, 
the role of intracameral cefuroxime for preven-
tion of intraocular infections. On the other hand, 
the perioperative use of antibiotic eye drops, 
levofloxacin or chloramphenicol, showed to 
lower the possibility of endophthalmitis only 
with moderate certainty evidence [46].
Since the patient’s own ocular surface flora 
contains also pathogenic microorganisms that 
can infect the eye during surgery, preoperative 
antisepsis is an important point in prophylaxis 
[67]. Prior to the start of operation, the surgeon 
must irrigate the cornea, conjunctival sac and 
periocular skin with povidone-iodine 5% oph-
thalmic solution, or chlorhexidine 0.05% in case 
of allergy [50]. In this way, the microorganisms 
of patient ocular flora are reduced up to 90%. The 
application of the antiseptic for at least 3  min 
before surgery showed to decrease the postopera-
tive endophthalmitis rate [50, 68].
A systematic review demonstrated that, 
excluded patient ocular flora, another cause of 
postoperative endophthalmitis is contamination 
from the surgical environment. In particular, it 
occurs from solutions, phacoemulsification 
machines, ventilation systems, and defective ster-
ilization of ocular surgical instruments [69]. 
Consequentially, endophthalmitis prevention 
includes standardized quality control systems, sur-
veillance, and infection control measures in the 
operating theater. Regular maintenance of proper 
filters in the airflow systems is mandatory. In the 
same way, maintenance of closed doors during 
surgery is recommended and a constant positive 
pressure in the room should always be present. 
Bacterial filters on bottles of solutions are neces-
sary since wet areas are easily contaminated with 
Pseudomonas aeruginosa, which leads to a par-
ticularly severe form of endophthalmitis [50]. All 
instruments must be limited to single use and 
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washed properly prior to sterilization. More rec-
ommendations regarding intraocular surgical 
instruments cleaning and sterilization can be found 
in the article written by Hellinger et al. [70].
C. Postoperative Care
After surgery, teaching the patient which symp-
toms might be an early sign of a possible compli-
cation is crucial for fast access to emergency 
care. In particular, it should be remarked that sig-
nificant reduction in vision, increasing pain, pro-
gressive redness, or periocular swelling could 
indicate a possible intraocular infection [53].
Since it was demonstrated that, in case of an 
uncomplicated operation, a visit within 24 h from 
surgery did not reduce the rate of severe adverse 
events, a first postoperative visit postponed at 
2 weeks did not seem to increase the postopera-
tive risk [71, 72]. However, a 24-h check is still 
recommended in patients who underwent intra-
operative complications, have high postoperative 
risk, or have monocular vision [53].
Moreover, during the postoperative visits, a 
dilated fundus examination is not mandatory since 
the incidence of peripheral retinal findings at 1 
month after cataract surgery was demonstrated to 
be low [53, 73]. However, it should be performed 
whenever a posterior segment complication is sus-
pected or in patients with high risk of peripheral 
retinal pathologies like diabetic retinopathy, reti-
nal vein occlusions, or high myopia [74].
According to the AAO, “the surgeon’s obliga-
tion to the patient is not discharged with the con-
clusion of a successful operation. Unless 
terminated by the parties, his relationship to the 
patient continues until ended by the cessation of 
the necessity which gave rise to the relation.” 
Therefore, the same ophthalmologist who per-
formed the surgery should provide postoperative 
eye care. Whenever this is not possible, the 
patient can be referred to another ophthalmolo-
gist only with agreement between the three fig-
ures involved: the patient and the two 
ophthalmologists [75].
D. Training
The ACGME states that trainees approaching the 
end of their ophthalmic residency should be able 
to perform the diagnostic, medical, and surgical 
procedures expected for an ophthalmologist 
entering a comprehensive ophthalmic practice 
[76]. This goal has to be achieved always provid-
ing high-quality patient care.
The ACGME also exhorts University Hospitals 
to build their own Ophthalmic Educational 
Programs. Each program should include goals for 
the trainee. The aims cannot be standardized 
since they depend on the needs of the community 
where the hospital works, on the hospital work-
ing team propensity toward specific ophthalmic 
fields, as well as on the resident talent or inclina-
tion. Because of this, the Program may be more 
focused on research, leadership, public health, 
etc. Nevertheless, faculty members should 
approve it and review it regularly [76].
The “Guide for delivery of Ophthalmic 
Specialist Training (OST)” of the RCO recom-
mends protected time for education. Lessons 
should be organized, and residents should be able 
to attend at least one session per week of a regional 
teaching program. In addition, at least one fully 
protected research session a week is expected [77].
The International Council of Ophthalmology 
(ICO) Residency Curriculum, available online, 
offers an international perspective on what should 
be taught during residency [78].
Methods to teach and learn surgical proce-
dures are not standardized worldwide. Moreover, 
the surgical skills and possibility to learn for resi-
dents vary widely among the residency training 
programs and even within the same program. For 
instance, in the USA the average number of 
phacoemulsification performed during residency 
is about 113, but it might vary from 80 to 140 
cases, and 25% of residents perform fewer than 
80 cases; United Kingdom (UK) registered a 
number of 500–600 cases per resident [79], and 
Canada a number of 200–400 [79, 80]. However, 
in other countries less than 50 phacoemulsifica-
tion are performed at the end of residency.
Implementation strategies to improve the pro-
cess of training, while reducing risk for the 
patient, have been proposed [79].
Enhancement made by hospital and program 
administration might regard expansion of clinic 
and operating theater where residents work. In 
addition, teaching should be encouraged, also 
with incentives.
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Regarding trainers, the RCO strongly exhorts 
them to regularly attend a course that learns how 
to teach. Whenever possible, part of the operating 
lists should be specifically reserved for training, 
and specific time in the surgery room should be 
dedicated for junior doctors [81].
Lastly, residents should study and be famil-
iar with the surgical procedures and possible 
complications [79]. Indeed, they should also 
actively participate to the pre- and postopera-
tive care [79]. In facts, good data collection 
with continuous monitoring of complication 
rates for each individual resident is important, 
as well as successive audit about the cataract 
outcomes [81].
Wet labs and surgical simulators should be 
included in residents’ experience in order to 
improve the trainee learning curve and increase 
patient safety [82]. In fact, a significant decrease 
of cataract intraoperative complications was 
shown in junior surgeons who trained with addi-
tional surgical simulator [83].
25.2.2  Intravitreal Injection Therapy
Intravitreal injection therapy (IVT) is the treat-
ment of choice for many retinal diseases. This is 
used mainly in case of choroidal neovasculariza-
tion in macular degeneration or in case of macu-
lar edema, which can be present in diabetic 
retinopathy or retinal vein occlusion.
Types of drug released mainly belong to the 
anti-VEGF family, which blocks the vascular 
endothelial growth factor in order to obtain 
regression of abnormal vessels, or corticoste-
roids, which act as a nonspecific anti- 
inflammatory agent, but also showed a role in 
VEGF downregulation [84].
25.2.2.1  Adverse Events, Safety 
Practices, and Implementation 
Strategy
• Ocular hemorrhage is the most frequent 
adverse event. In fact, subconjunctival hemor-
rhages can occur in 10% of intravitreal injec-
tions, especially if the patient is under 
antiaggregant medications [85]. Massive sub-
retinal and choroidal hemorrhages are rare but 
present in the literature as possible complica-
tions [86, 87]. It is important though not to 
interrupt antiaggregant, neither anticoagula-
tion drugs prior to IVT. In fact, the risk of seri-
ous ocular hemorrhage is low. On the contrary, 
in case of discontinuation the risk of severe 
thromboembolic events is high [88].
• Endophthalmitis is the most severe of IVT 
adverse events. The frequency of this compli-
cation ranges from 0.02% to 1.6% [89, 90].
Streptococcus species showed to be the 
causative pathogen approximately three times 
more frequently when compared with intraoc-
ular surgery. The bacteria can be isolated in the 
salivary flora, indeed aerosolization or droplet 
spread can be the source of operative field con-
tamination. For this reason, talking, sneezing, 
and coughing should be avoided while per-
forming IVT and a surgical mask should be 
worn during the whole procedure [89].
Streptococcus mitis or oralis were also 
found in unused syringes of Bevacizumab. 
Bevacizumab is an anti-VEGF approved by the 
Food and Drug Administration for colon-rectal 
cancer metastasis. Nevertheless, this drug 
showed good results also in case of neovascu-
lar macular degeneration, for which it might be 
used off-label [91]. On one hand, Bevacizumab 
use reduces public health care costs due to its 
price 4–40 times lower than the on-label drugs. 
On the other hand, in order to reduce the costs, 
the drug needs to be repackaged for intravitreal 
injections by the local pharmacy. This action 
increases the risks of contamination, and there-
fore protocols and guidelines which stress the 
need of asepsis during syringe preparation 
have been made available [92].
Other strategies to reduce the rate of postin-
jection endophthalmitis are treatment of 
patient’s external infections like conjunctivitis 
or blepharitis, use of 5% povidone–iodine, 
and avoidance of needle contact with eyelids 
or lashes by the use of a blepharostat [93].
A systematic review conducted in 2018 
showed that topical antibiotic prophylaxis 
prior to IVI injections does not reduce the rate 
of risk for endophthalmitis [94].
• Sterile intraocular inflammation frequency 
ranges from 1.4% to 2.9% [95]. It is an acute 
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ocular reaction without infection; conse-
quently it can be treated with topical steroids 
and showed good visual outcomes at resolu-
tion [96]. This condition goes in differential 
diagnosis with endophthalmitis, although it is 
more frequent. Signs that might help a correct 
diagnosis include:
 – Time of presentation: 2.55 days (between 1 
and 6  days) for endophthalmitis versus 1 
day or less in ocular inflammation.
 – Symptoms: decreased vision and severe 
pain are more frequently associated with 
endophthalmitis.
 – Severity of anterior chamber reaction and 
vitreitis.
However, it is recommended to adminis-
ter early intravitreal antibiotic injections 
whenever a high infection suspicion is pres-
ent [97].
• Rhegmatogenous retinal detachment 
(RRD) incidence was around 0.013% as 
reported by Meyer et  al. [98]. The hypothe-
sized cause is the vitreous detachment due to 
an incorrect injection technique. For this rea-
son, particular attention to the site of injection 
and use of small needles are required [93].
• Intraocular pressure (IOP) acute and transi-
tory elevation, lasting maximum some hours 
and with individual variations, is caused by 
the injection of fluid in the eye [99]. However, 
cases of sustained IOP elevation following 
anti-VEGF have been described, although 
they are rare [100]. On the contrary, intravit-
real injections of corticosteroids, and in par-
ticular of Dexamethasone, showed to cause 
chronic ocular hypertension in almost one out 
of three patients [101]. Risk factors are a fam-
ily history for glaucoma or previous glaucoma 
diagnosis. Regular check of IOP after intravit-
real injection is recommended. Fifty percent 
of all cases with chronic IOP elevation did not 
require any treatment, while topical hypoten-
sive drugs were needed in most of the other 
cases and a glaucoma surgery was rarely per-
formed [101].
• Posterior subscapular cataract is known 
to be correlated with corticosteroid use 
[102]. Dexamethasone intravitreal implant 
showed a role in cataract development and 
was confirmed by a meta-analysis con-
ducted in 2018 [103].
The setting of care for IVT is not necessarily 
an operating theater. The procedure can also be 
safely performed in a suitable sterile room with 
adequate ventilation system. More information 
about sterility requirements, patient information 
and consent, pre-injection checks and prepara-
tion, as well as post-injection care can be found 
in the Ophthalmic Service Guidance for 
Intravitreal Injection Therapy [104].




Since humans are fallible, patient safety cannot 
only rely on the ophthalmologist experience or 
proficiency. Reliable systems must be put in 
place to reduce human errors, considered as 
events that should never occur (i.e., “never 
event”). For instance, invasive procedure on the 
wrong eye, as published in the “Never Events List 
2018” by the NHS, is not acceptable [105]. 
Moreover, the occurrence of even a single “never 
event” constitutes a red flag.
Thereby, despite being in training, a young 
ophthalmologist must become aware of this fun-
damental issue: preventable medical errors are 
not tolerated, especially in the eye of the patient’s 
opinion [106]. This topic is further significant for 
a specialty that trains not only physicians but also 
future eye surgeons.
For instance, as previously said, cataract sur-
gery constitutes one of the most common proce-
dures performed, making it a top priority for 
error avoidance [4, 107, 108]. Indeed, Neily et al. 
found 342 reported incorrect surgical procedures 
from VHA Medical Centers from 2001 to 2006. 
Ophthalmology was the specialty with the most 
reported errors, representing 1.8 surgical confu-
sions for every 10,000 cases: wrong IOL implan-
tation occupied the highest percentage [109]. 
This observation was also reported by Simon 
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et  al. where 67% of surgical confusion cases 
(67/106) were accountable to wrong IOL implan-
tation [106]. Their findings emphasize the impor-
tance of awareness among young trainees 
attending ophthalmological surgery.
In a retrospective analysis of medical profes-
sional liability (MPL) claims in the US from 
2006 to 2015, 2.6% out of the 90,743 closed mal-
practice claims were filed against ophthalmolo-
gists, with 50% being accountable to cataract and 
corneal surgery [110]. Even though this study 
concluded that compared with other specialties, 
ophthalmology had a relative low number of mal-
practice claims (ranked 12th out of 29 specialties 
in a 10-year period), it should be reminded that 
study results on this topic probably represent the 
tip of the iceberg as many medical errors might 
be unreported [106, 111, 112]. Furthermore, Ali 
et al. analyzed a decade of claims due to clinical 
negligence on the NHS Litigation Authority data-
base for ophthalmology (from 1995 to 2006) 
[113]: their results estimated that an ophthalmol-
ogist of any grade had a 30% chance to be con-
fronted to a claim in a 10-year period, representing 
one medical claim due to malpractice in a 30-year 
career. An even higher risk was predicted for con-
sultants, with 90% chance of being faced to a 
claim in a 10-year period.
25.3.1  The Most Common Medical 
Errors and Preventive 
Strategies in Ophthalmology
To be successful at preventing a medical error, 
knowledge of how it occurs is fundamental. The 
Swiss Cheese model of system accident, pro-
posed by Reason et al., allows to understand how 
an incident could happen despite defense mecha-
nisms in place [114]. This model represents a 
“cumulative act effect” phenomenon. For exam-
ple, in an elaborate medical system, a series of 
barriers (metaphorically considered as a slice of 
cheese) are built to prevent a mishap to occur. 
However, each barrier has its own dynamic weak-
ness (i.e., holes in a Swiss cheese). Taken indi-
vidually, they do not create an adverse event for 
the patient but when the holes of the slices are 
aligned, there is the opportunity for a given haz-
ard to reach the patient [115]. Those weaknesses 
come from the combination of two main reasons 
[114]: active failures and latent conditions. James 
Reason defines active failures as “the unsafe acts 
committed by people who are in direct contact 
with the patient or system,” while latent condi-
tion “arise from decisions made by designers, 
builders, procedure writers, and top-level 
management.”
In summary, young trainees could hardly be 
entirely responsible for an error but can partici-
pate in the occurrence of such, especially within 
a system where many latent conditions lie dor-
mant. It takes minor mistakes from multiple 
aspects of the management of a patient to pro-
voke a preventable error: thus, every medical 
action has its importance.
It is important for trainees to be aware of the 
causes and consequences of possible medical 
errors (including surgical confusions) in ophthal-
mology. It would allow implementing strategies 
from the beginning to prevent such mistakes and 
thus improve patient safety. The list of medical 
errors and strategies is non-exhaustive; therefore 
acknowledging their existence is the very first 
step toward avoiding malpractice. When properly 
considered, medical errors are an opportunity to 
learn. Indeed, this allows for actions to be taken 
in response to such unfortunate and evitable 
events. Consequently, this will lead to risk reduc-
tion for recurrence.
25.3.1.1  Wrong-Site Eye Surgery
Introduction
Wrong-site surgery is defined as “surgery on the 
wrong site or the wrong side, the wrong proce-
dure, the wrong implant, or the wrong patient” 
[116]. In a large systematic review of surgical 
never events published in 2015, the median inci-
dence of wrong-site surgery in ophthalmology 
ranged from 0.5 to 4 events per 10,000  procedures 
[116]. In comparison, the median incidence for 
general surgical procedures across seven 
American studies was 0.09 events per 10,000 
procedures with, however, a wide variation in 
the results. Parikh et  al. recently conducted a 
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large retrospective cohort study of errors in oph-
thalmological surgical procedure between 2006 
and 2017 [117]: they intended to characterize the 
incidence, causes and consequences of ophthal-
mological surgical confusions on patients and 
specialists. Out of the 143 cases of surgical con-
fusions reported, cataract-related errors occu-
pied the first position. Incorrect eye blocks were 
the second most common surgical confusions, 
representing 14.0% of cases. Incorrect eye pro-
cedure was in third position, with incorrect 
patients or operation (3.5%) being the fifth. 
Similarly, these results are consistent with a pre-
vious retrospective series of 106 cases investi-
gated by Simon et al. more than 10 years earlier 
[106]. Indeed, 15 cases had surgery on the wrong 
eye. Wrong eye block was performed in 14 
cases. In another 8 cases, either the operation 
occurred on the wrong patient or the wrong pro-
cedure was performed.
Causes and Risk Factors
Some examples of common root causes and risk 
factors for the occurrence of surgical confusion 
identified among the different studies mentioned 
include [106, 116, 117]:
• Inadequate time-out: it represented the main 
cause of surgical confusion according to 
Parikh et al.
• Inadequate site markings: absent, washed off 
during preparation, poorly visualized, hidden 
under surgical capes or drapes.
• Inadequate communication: breakdown of 
communication between the patient and the 
surgeon, inadequate communication among 
staff (e.g., OR schedule changes not ade-
quately communicated to all staff members).
Preventive Strategies
The following are the main prevention strategies 
of wrong-site surgery proposed across the 
studies:
A. The Universal Protocol
This protocol was introduced by the Joint 
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare 
Organizations in 2004 and is aimed to prevent 
confusions in all surgical procedures. For 
instance, Parikh et  al. concluded that 64.3% of 
ophthalmological cases would have been pre-
ventable by using the universal protocol [117]. 
The same conclusion was initially made by 
Simon et al. where, conscientiously applied, 85% 
of the ophthalmological surgical confusions in 
their retrospective series of 106 cases could have 
been prevented [106].
The protocol focuses on three complementary 
steps [118]: (1) Preoperative verification, (2) site 
marking, and (3) time-out before starting the sur-
gery [106].
However, the universal protocol does not 
cover steps prior the surgery day where a lot of 
negligence can be the cause of medical errors 
occurring in the OR.
The AAO Wrong-site Task Force has managed 
to fill this gap by bringing specific recommenda-
tions tailored to ophthalmological surgery [119]. 
Their guidelines are divided into three stages:
 1. Steps taken prior to surgery day.
 2. Steps taken on the day of surgery.
 3. Procedures dependent upon preoperative 
calculations.
Interestingly, communication is central. 
Indeed, the first step emphasizes on medical 
records of the patient with proper surgical data 
available. It outlines the importance of passing 
the information adequately between ward or 
clinic and operative room. Other examples 
include the active participation of the patient and 
all staff members especially on the day of sur-
gery. Moreover, adherence to the steps and com-
munication would be facilitated by the use of 
checklists, further reducing the incidence of 
wrong-site surgery [118].
Nonetheless, certain issues are yet not covered 
by these strategies. For instance, Simon et  al. 
suggested that patient confusion could ultimately 
lead to failure of the protocol’s efficacy [106]. 
Furthermore, if staff members do not take 
 seriously into consideration the time-out, which 
represents the final step of the universal protocol, 
it would be ineffective. Thus, prevention strate-
gies are only tools to help reduce risks, but even-
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tually it is the duty of the surgeon to make sure 
these tools are thoroughly followed.
These basic rules must be learned from the 
beginning of training in order to ensure their effi-
cient application. For example, the inconsistent 
engagement of staff members in the WHO surgi-
cal safety checklist is thought to contribute to 
persistence of surgical errors in the 
NHS. Experience of the surgical safety checklist 
training was therefore investigated through a sur-
vey among UK medical and nursing undergradu-
ates by Kilduff et al. [120]. Students that received 
teaching about the checklist or that were included 
in the time-out before the beginning of the proce-
dure had a significant better understanding of the 
checklist’s purpose. Their results, however, high-
lighted the suboptimal teaching of surgical 
checklists among undergraduates: they did not 
meet the WHO minimum standards. They postu-
lated that teaching about perioperative patient 
safety systems and continuous participation in 
safety protocols were important skills to be 
taught early in training. Interestingly, they rec-
ommended principles and educational interven-
tions in order to guide such endeavor (introductory 
lectures, surgical rotations, clinical skills, surgi-
cal safety checklist assessment through examina-
tion questions and clinical evaluation, etc.). The 
need for formal assessment in the prevention of 
surgical errors was already suggested through 
results from a survey mailed to U.S. ophthalmol-
ogy residents [121]. Most residents responded 
that their program provided training in prevent-
ing surgical errors, mostly through observation 
and participation to OR protocols. Hands-on 
experience was found to be the most effective 
method. However, a gap still remained in for-
mally assessing residents’ knowledge about this 
subject.
B. Consent Form
This is entirely a part of the universal protocol as 
mentioned in the WHO guidelines [118]. Full 
consent from the patient is mandatory for any 
procedure. The patient must be awake, alert, and 
have a full capacity of discernment in order to 
understand the details and potential complica-
tions of the surgery that will be performed. This 
includes therefore a proper explanation from the 
physician and an active participation of the 
patient or representative. Consequently, the site 
of the surgery and the laterality must be clearly 
stated and written on the form. Finally, once 
agreement between the surgeon and the patient 
has been achieved, the latter must sign the con-
sent form to confirm its approval.
25.3.1.2  Cataract Surgery-Related 
Errors
Introduction
Cataract surgery occupies a central part in under-
standing and preventing medical and surgical 
errors in ophthalmology. Studies treating about 
the incidence of surgical confusions in ophthal-
mology unequivocally agreed that the top surgi-
cal error is related to IOL implants. Indeed, the 
use of incorrect IOL represented 66.4% of surgi-
cal confusion cases in Parikh et al. series [117]; 
48.9% of adverse events in Neily et al. descrip-
tive study [109], and 63% in the retrospective 
series of Simon et al. [106]. Interestingly, these 
results match the number of claims reported in 
the literature among ophthalmological proce-
dures. For example, two different studies made 
across the UK showed that one third of malprac-
tice claims filed against ophthalmologists were 
accountable to cataract surgeons [113, 122]. 
Moreover, socioeconomic consequences of cata-
ract malpractice are considerable [110]. 
Therefore, young ophthalmologists must be well 
prepared regarding legal aspect when starting 
their surgical training especially in cataract 
surgery.
Causes and Risk Factors
In the “Cataract Surgery Guidelines” released by 
the RCO in 2010 [57], they presented a list of risk 
factors for unsafe cataract surgery for surgeons to 
be attentive to. Here are some examples that 
could lead to medical errors especially for 
residents:
• Clinical staff not following guidelines or not 
relying on evidence-based medicine.
• Lack of team working or team training.
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• Lack of appropriate skills.
• Distractions or interruptions during 
intervention.
• Rushing during surgery with inappropriate 
focusing on personal performance rather than 
patient safety and quality of care.
• Lack of patient involvement.
• Poor communication (e.g., of information 
within the medical file or between the surgeon 
and the patient…).
Interestingly, such factors have been linked to 
the occurrence of surgical claims. Ali et al. sepa-
rated predisposing factors (communication 
errors, inattention…) from precipitating factors 
(lack of adequate care, mistakes, system errors…) 
for litigation [111]. They suggested that in the 
absence of predisposing factors, precipitating 
factors are unlikely to lead to litigation in clinical 
practice. Furthermore, studies have shown that a 
breakdown in communication is the root cause of 
up to 70% of claims [123]. Thus, knowing these 
causational risk factors for young trainees would 
reasonably improve patient care by reducing the 
risk of medical errors occurrence.
There are different stages of the patient care in 
cataract surgery: (1) identification of refractive 
goals, (2) biometry measurement, (3) IOL selec-
tion, and (4) implantation. These sequential steps 
involve various staff members in different times. 
Often, communication is crucial to allow a proper 
transmission of data. Thus, this complicated pro-
cess carries out an increased risk for error occur-
rence. In the following are examples of specific 
preventable human errors (i.e., never events) that 
were identified for leading to IOL-related inci-
dent [57, 124]:
 1. IOL measurement (biometry, formula)
 (a) Inaccurate biometry
 (b) Wrong formula
 (c) Failure of routine bilateral biometry 
measurement
 (d) Failure of re-measurement of axial length 
asymmetry
 2. IOL selection
 (a) Confusion in postoperative refractive 
goals (e.g., the patient agreed for postop-
erative myopia and the surgeon aimed for 
emmetropia during surgery)
 (b) Wrong-patient biometric data used for 
surgery
 (c) Wrong-eye biometric data used for 
surgery
 (d) Wrong type of IOL data selected (e.g., 
confusion between anterior chamber and 
posterior chamber IOL data)
 (e) Failure to adequately communicate the 
selected IOL type and power due to tran-
scription errors
 3. IOL preoperative preparation
 (a) Failure to check availability of the IOL 
before starting the surgery
 (b) Failure to adequately label the IOL box 
with the correct patient
 4. IOL surgical implantation
 (a) Failure to bring the correct IOL in the 
OR
 (b) IOL confusion due to a second IOL (not 
belonging to the patient) already present 
in the OR
 (c) Failure to check the IOL characteristics 
before implantation [106]
 (d) Failure to correctly place a toric IOL in 
the right meridian
Finally, improper use of the universal protocol 
is also among the errors identified for incorrect 
IOL placement.
Preventive Strategies
Examples of preventive strategies could be 
divided into two definite periods according to the 
NICE guideline for cataract management in 
adults (for details, refer to paragraph 1.5, 
“Preventing wrong lens implant errors”) [21]:
 1. The day before the surgery
 (a) Confirm the patient’s correct medical 
notes.
 (b) Biometry assessment: confirm that the 
results belong to the proper patient; use 
electronic data and transfer the biometry 
results to the patient’s medical record; 
print the results and fix them appropri-
ately into patient’s medical notes.
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 (c) Communication with the patient: explain 
the different types of IOL and their refrac-
tive implications; discuss the refractive 
target; record the IOL chosen by the 
patient and any specificities mentioned 
during the discussion.
 2. The day of the surgery
 (a) Have the patient’s note, especially biom-
etry results available in the OR.
 (b) Use the modified WHO Surgical 
Checklist: confirm the patient’s identity 
and match the information with the con-
sent form, the biometry results and the 
medical notes; check and mark the eye to 
be operated; have only the selected IOL in 
the OR with one another identical IOL in 
stock and an alternative type of IOL ready 
if complications occur. Some of these 
steps are repeated before anesthesia and 
one last time before starting the procedure 
by the surgeon.
 (c) Confirmation by two distinct staff mem-
bers that the IOL formulas, calculations, 
and constants are appropriate.
Moreover, in attempt to learn from any wrong 
IOL implantation and establish further preventive 
strategies, the NICE guidelines advocate for mul-
tidisciplinary analysis of actual incidents.
Interestingly, these guidelines are, for instance, 
based on the IOL safety protocol for routine cata-
ract surgery that is merged with the WHO 
Surgical Checklist as introduced by the Royal 
Victorian Eye and Ear Hospital in Australia 
[124]. Similar strategies were described in the 
third section of the recommendations proposed 
by the AAO wrong-site task force, regarding the 
procedures that are dependent upon preoperative 
calculations [119].
25.3.1.3  Intravitreal Therapy-Related 
Errors
Introduction
Despite IVT being more frequently performed 
than cataract surgery, studies have shown that 
there is less surgical confusion occurring during 
intravitreal injection [117]. Parikh et  al. only 
found one case of an incorrect eye intravitreal 
injection. An under-report of errors could justify 
this paradigm. As suggested, the latter could be 
explained by the procedure being mainly per-
formed by single ophthalmologists in 
nonhospital- based clinics, a substantial number 
of patients having bilateral conditions which 
would therefore minimize the consequence of 
wrong-side intervention, the procedure itself 
being of low-risk for complications, and sub-
stances used to be similar in action with few 
adverse effects [117].
Preventive Strategies
In a retrospective review of anti-VEGF-related 
incidents from 2003 to 2010 in NHS care, a sub-
stantial number of patient safety incidents were 
accountable to medical and surgical confusions 
[1]. Some suggestions by the authors to reduce 
these incidents included electronic patient 
records or prescriptions, audit tools, or the use of 
checklists with an appropriate time-out before 
injection. Therefore, most of medical and surgi-
cal confusions related to intravitreal injections 
belong to the category of “wrong-site surgery” 
and its preventive strategies.
25.3.1.4  Medication-Related Errors 
in Ophthalmology
Introduction
The National Coordinating Council for 
Medication Error Reporting and Prevention 
defines medication errors as “any preventable 
event that may cause or lead to inappropriate 
medication use or patient harm while the medi-
cation is in the control of the health care profes-
sional, patient, or consumers (…).” They propose 
this standard definition to be used by researchers 
and institutions to better identify errors [125]. 
Medication errors constitute a common cause for 
malpractice in medicine. Ophthalmology is thus 
not spared, especially due to the high volume of 
prescriptions in this specialty. Indeed, in a large 
data report collected in the United States in 1995 
and 1996 from the National Ambulatory Medical 
Care Survey, half of ophthalmological consulta-
tions in the office resulted in a medication pre-
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scription [126]. Furthermore, a prospective study 
over a 4-week period that recorded the number of 
prescription errors at an ophthalmic hospital in 
the UK found that 8% of prescription sheets had 
errors (144/1952) [127]. Therefore, drug pre-
scription is a sensible step in a patient care, espe-
cially after a surgical intervention, and identifying 
the causes and strategies to prevent errors are 
critical to ensure patient safety.
Causes and Risk Factors
In the following are highlighted common contrib-
uting factors that lead to medication errors as 
listed in the Communication about Drug Orders 
released by the AAO in 2015 [128]:
• Lack of information about the patient (e.g., 
allergies, contraindication) and the drug (e.g., 
interactions).
• Failure in adequate communication of drug 
orders (e.g., illegible prescription, improper 
use of decimal points and zeros, confusion 
with abbreviations).
• Environmental stress (e.g., fatigue, distrac-
tions affecting performance during prescrip-
tion writing).
Additionally, young ophthalmologists are 
more likely to commit medication errors than the 
senior physicians, as suggested by the results of 
the prospective study conducted by Utman et al. 
[129]. This finding emphasizes the importance of 
training and prevention among residents in this 
topic.
The causes of medication errors could be 
divided into two categories, prescription errors 
and drug-related errors [127, 129]:
 1. Prescription errors
 (a) Erroneous patient information
 (b) Erroneous format
 (c) Unreadable prescription
 (d) Unclear instructions
 (e) Failure to note allergy status
 2. Drug-related errors.
 (a) Erroneous dosage
 (b) Erroneous frequency
 (c) Erroneous route of administration
Preventive Strategies
In the following are some strategies regarding 
writing of prescription to improve patient safety 
[128]:
• Include: date, patient name, drug name, dos-
age, route of administration, frequency, pre-
scriber name and signature.
• Use capital letters.
• Avoid abbreviations (e.g., q.h.s., t.i.d., …): 
instead transcribe in full (every night at bed-
time, three times a day).
• Use the metric system.
• Use leading zero (0.1 instead of .1) and avoid 
trailing zero (2 instead of 2.0).
• If available, prefer computer-based prescrib-
ing systems (participates in decreasing the 
incidence of prescription errors [129–132]).
Finally, other types of error and their corre-
sponding strategy are proposed by the AAO 
Quality of Care Secretariat. For example, regard-
ing drugs with similar names, they propose to 
communicate the generic and brand name to mini-
mize confusions. Other suggestions include limit-
ing verbal orders to urgent situations when other 
ways of prescription orders are not available [128].
25.4  Clinical Case
We report the clinical case of a 45-year-old man 
who attended left eye (LE) cataract surgery in 
September 2019. The patient was allergic to 
Novocaine. The patient worked for a sewer and 
drain cleaning service. He was known for cardio-
vascular risk factors under treatment, with his-
tory of myocardial infarction and transitory 
ischemic attack a year prior to the event. He was 
pseudophakic in his right eye (RE).
The surgeon prescribed a preoperative therapy 
with eyelid cleansing pads and Bromfenac eye 
drops 0.9 mg/ml, twice per day, 2 days before sur-
gery. The day of the surgery, topical  anesthesia 
without sedation and preoperative antisepsis were 
administered in the left eye. The surgeon performed 
small incisions, capsulorhexis, hydrodissection, 
and hydrodelineation. During phacoemulsification, 
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wound burn of the tunnel occurred. During the 
whole procedure the patient was irritated and com-
plained intraoperative pain. The tunnel where the 
wound burn occurred was sutured and the IOL was 
implanted. Due to the constant eye squeezing and 
scarce patient compliance, the surgeon decided not 
to inject intracameral cefuroxime, which was how-
ever used to irrigate the cornea. A contact lens was 
applied on the left eye.
Postoperative therapy included antibiotic and 
corticosteroid drops, four times per day each, and 
topical NSAIDs twice per day. The day after the 
operation corneal edema was present, and corti-
costeroids were increased to six times per day. 
No signs of anterior chamber inflammation were 
detected. A new visit was programmed in 7 days.
Three days after surgery, the patient came to the 
emergency room with left eye pain. The patient 
reported that he went back to work the day before. 
Visual acuity was light perception and the ocular 
examination detected a 4 mm hypopyon. The IOP 
was within normal limits. The eye fundus was not 
explorable. Endophthalmitis was diagnosed and 
the patient underwent a pars plana vitrectomy. 
During the surgery, corneal melting with perfora-
tion on the sutured wound burn was detected. The 
corneal suture was removed; vitreous and aqueous 
humor taps were collected and sent to the microbi-
ology. The surgeon performed then a complete vit-
rectomy and Oxane was left as tamponade. 
Intravitreal injections of vancomycin and ceftazi-
dime were performed. An amniotic membrane was 
sutured on the cornea. Postoperative therapy con-
sisted in ciprofloxacin 500 mg twice a day for 6 
days, luxazone eye drops one drop four times a 
day for 15 days, fortified vancomycin 25 mg/ml 
eye drop one drop every 2 h and fortified tobramy-
cin 14 mg/ml one drop every 2 h.
At the 15-day visit visual acuity was still light 
perception, the amniotic membrane was correctly 
positioned and did not allow vision of the under-
lying structures. The therapy was changed based 
on the antibiogram sent by the microbiology that 
detected a Staphylococcus aureus infection. The 
surgeon prescribed tobramycin 0.3%/dexametha-
sone 0.1% one drop four times a day and cipro-
floxacin drops 0.3% one drop four times a day.
An audit on the clinical case was successively 
discussed.
25.4.1  Clinical Case 
Recommendations
 1. A good pre-anesthesia assessment of the 
patient is important. In fact, topical anesthesia 
without sedation is not always the appropriate 
technique for cataract surgery. A good anam-
nesis and examination are necessary to rule 
out the type of anesthesia that better suits the 
patient and ophthalmologist needs.
 2. Whenever there are no contraindications, 
always inject 1 mg cefuroxime in the anterior 
chamber since it contributes to prevent ocular 
infections.
 3. Avoid premature return to the patient’s work, 
especially if this condition exposes the oper-
ated eye to a high bacterial load.
 4. Close follow-up is necessary for a high-risk 
patient.
 5. Wound burns might complicate cataract sur-
gery. They are a risk factor for endophthalmi-
tis because of the continuing leakage, anterior 
chamber shallowing, corneo-scleral melting, 
and the possible presence of a corneal fistula. 
Performance of larger corneal incisions and 
adjustment of phacoemulsification settings 
can prevent this complication.
25.5  Recommendations
High-quality care and safety are important issues 
in ophthalmology. Prevention is crucial.
Knowledge of ophthalmic surgical complica-
tions and their management is fundamental, espe-
cially whenever a non-expert surgeon is 
operating.
Young ophthalmologists should consider the 
possibility of making medical errors in order to 
be cautious during daily practice.
Attention to guidelines and the use of a surgi-
cal checklist can help in reducing both adverse 
events and medical errors. Periodical check of the 
Ophthalmic Safety Alert website page from the 
Quality and Safe group is recommended to keep 
updated.
The educational process should involve differ-
ent figures: the resident, who actively take part in 
the patient care; the trainers, who dedicate their 
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time and knowledge to young doctors; and the 
hospital administration. In particular, wet labs 
and surgical simulators should be introduced in 
resident training. A proactive behavior is impor-
tant to be adopted while on training.
Each program should have a structure that 
promotes safe, interprofessional, and team-based 
care [133]. Therefore, this is the duty of each 
resident and young trainee to know the different 
rules that apply for each individual program.
It is expected from residents to pay particular 
attention to patient safety. In facts, residents’ per-
ceptions of perioperative safety were defined as 
suboptimal in different scientific papers [120, 
134, 135]. Establishing a culture of safety in oph-
thalmology and training young doctors in this 
field is important in order to improve patient care 
standards.
25.6  Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to sensitize 
young trainees to some of the most common 
adverse events and medical errors in ophthalmol-
ogy with a special focus on surgery, and the tools 
to overcome such burden by presenting existing 
safety practices and strategies. We did not intend 
to be exhaustive, but we aimed to raise curiosity 
and self-awareness about this topic. Indeed, the 
occurrence of such events could have unaccept-
able consequences for the patient and severely 
impact young ophthalmologists that are building 
their career. We thus believe that the sooner we 
modify our behavior, the higher the impact on 
patient safety and on each individual future 
profession.
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WHO defined primary care “as socially appropri-
ate, universally accessible, scientifically sound 
first level care provided by a suitably trained 
workforce supported by integrated referral sys-
tems and in a way that gives priority to those 
most needed, maximizes community and indi-
vidual self-reliance and participation and involves 
collaboration with other sectors, including health 
promotion, illness prevention, care of the sick, 
advocacy and community development” [1].
Therefore, primary care services are at the 
integrated people-centered healthcare in many 
countries where they provide an entry point into 
the health system and have directly impact on 
people’s well-being and their use of other health 
and care resources. Unsafe or ineffective primary 
care may increase morbidity and preventable 
mortality, and may lead to the unnecessary hospi-
talization and specialist resource and, in some 
cases, disability and even death [2].
Patient safety is the absence of preventable 
harm to a patient during the process of healthcare 
and reduction of risk of unnecessary harm associ-
ated with healthcare to an acceptable minimum. 
An acceptable minimum refers to the collective 
notions of given current knowledge, resources 
available and the context in which care was deliv-
ered weighed against the risk of non-treatment or 
other treatment [2]. Therefore, it is the minimum 
prerequisite for high-quality care.
Studies on patient safety have traditionally 
focused on hospital care. The reason for this is 
that it reflects the dominance of hospital-based 
care in many health systems and is the result of a 
perception that this is where most serious inci-
dents occur.
Primary care has been perceived for many 
years as a low technology environment where 
safety would not be a problem. However, in 
England, 90% of contacts with the National 
Health Service take place in primary care, and 
more than 750,000 patients consult their GP 
each day. In many countries, it is estimated that 
85% of all healthcare contacts occur in primary 
care [1].
European data show that the issue of patient 
safety is ongoing and that, for example, in the 
United Kingdom between 5 and 80 safety inci-
dents occur per 100,000 primary care consulta-
tions, which translates to between 370 and 600 
incidents per day [3].
For this reason, patient safety and preventable 
harm to patients in primary care is becoming a 
rising issue because it represents the largest vol-
ume of healthcare encounters.
Attention towards patient safety was renewed 
in 2016 by the World Health Organisation (WHO) 
with its “Technical Series on Safer Primary Care” 
aiming at raising awareness about the underlying 
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causes of safety incidents and consequences of 
unsafe primary care [2].
There is lack of a formal reporting mechanism 
for medical errors in primary care. Incident 
reporting is practiced as a self-reporting process 
and the magnitude of errors could have been 
underestimated. Among existing strategies to 
help improve clinical effectiveness and enhance 
patient safety there are the Quality and Outcomes 
Framework (QOF), appraisal, revalidation, sig-
nificant event analysis (SEA), and critical inci-
dent reporting systems (CIRS) One of the first 
comprehensive and coordinated attempts to 
improve patient safety in primary care is the 
Scottish Patient Safety Program in Primary Care 
(SPSP-PC), established in March 2013.
Recent years have seen more researches 
located in primary care settings which have dif-
ferent features compared to secondary care. 
Attempts to classify medical errors and prevent-
able adverse events in primary care have proved 
challenging due to the lack of an evidence base 
and are yet to be reliably quantified. Data on the 
most frequent misdiagnosed conditions are 
scarce, and little is known about which diagnos-
tic processes are most vulnerable to breakdown. 
Most of them are derived from studies of mal-
practice claims or self-report surveys. These 
methods introduce significant biases that limit 
the generalizability of findings to routine clinical 
practice [4].
Many countries have implemented strategies 
to reduce avoidable harm or “never event” defined 
as “a serious, largely preventable patient safety 
incident that should not occur if the available pre-
ventable measures were implemented by health-
care workers.” In 2014, De Wet published a never 
event list based on general practice identified 
eight items (Mistaken patient identity, Acts of 
omission, Investigations, Medication, Medico- 
legal and ethical incidents, Clinical management 
Practice systems, Teamwork and communica-
tion) and, if there is some evidence of reduction 
of patient safety incidents in some item of never 
event list, it is unclear whether all of the never 
events in the list are truly preventable, or which 
of the available interventions will be acceptable 
or effective [5, 6].
The difficulties in identifying and monitoring 
the never event list is due to the specific context 
of General Practice.
“Marshall Marinker has characterised the role of 
the GP as being to ‘marginalise danger’, contrast-
ing this with the specialist, whose diagnostic role is 
to ‘marginalise uncertainty’. In other words GPs 
have the often difficult task of identifying the 
minority of patients whose presenting symptoms 
represent serious illness from the majority who do 
not have something seriously wrong” [7].
Patients in primary care setting can have many 
health problems (multimorbidity), complex 
needs (both social and medical), and frequent 
interactions with healthcare staff in a number of 
different clinical contexts. There is a range of 
challenges for GPs, due to the specific primary 
care setting based on deliver optimal disease 
management and patient-centered care in a time- 
limited consultation. The many and varied dis-
eases encountered in primary care make 
comprehensive measurement of guideline adher-
ence difficult (especially for guidelines that 
change frequently). Decision-making in primary 
care often relies on complicated care algorithms 
specific to numerous diseases. The complexity 
and inadequacy of single disease guidelines, 
evidence- based medicine and barriers to shared 
decision-making were managed through the use 
of relational continuity of care.
This peculiar care relationship involves a 
many patient factors, including sex, age, the 
nature of the illness, earlier experiences and per-
ceived control on the illness, education, financial 
considerations, personal values, and cultures and 
traditions [8].
Studies suggests inappropriate care with 
patients presenting the same conditions, as a 
result of gender, ethnicity, or socioeconomic dis-
parities and some vulnerable social groups are 
more likely to experience adverse patient safety 
events. A recent research confirms that, in pri-
mary care, women and black patients are more 
likely to receive inappropriate diagnosis, treat-
ment, or referrals compared to men and Whites, 
respectively. However, our findings interestingly 
suggest that social disparities in patient safety 
vary among social groups depending on the type 
of disease, treatment, or health service [9].
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High-quality and safe care should be equally 
achievable for all patients and we need further 
studies to matching data on patient’s gender, edu-
cational, ethnic, and socioeconomical status with 
the data of critical incident registers.
26.1  Epidemiology of Adverse 
Event
Most published literature originated from the 
USA and the UK within the last 10 years.
The most common approaches for measuring 
harm in primary care include self-reporting by 
staff, analysis of existing databases, reviewing 
patient records manually or using automation, 
and asking professionals or patients to recall 
errors.
Most of these methods suffer from potential 
bias. Staff incident reports and patient and staff 
surveys are all affected by recall bias and poten-
tial social desirability bias.
Trigger tools are commonly used to identify 
events in hospital care but only a few studies have 
tested this approach in primary care [10, 11].
Furthermore, the majority of the studies pub-
lished on medical errors in primary care show 
different error reporting methods and several 
definitions and classifications of types of medical 
errors (rate severity or preventability, etc.) and 
sources (estimated, legal reported or hospital 
referrals, etc.).
International reviews suggests that 1–2% of 
general practice consultations may result in 
adverse events, potentially preventable in 
45–76% of cases, with estimated serious harm in 
4–7% of all adverse event (resulted in permanent 
harm such as disability, death or long-lasting 
physical or mental consequences). Other authors 
report the occurrence of incidents to be between 
5 and 80 times per 100,000 [3, 12–14].
In many studies, safety incidents are identified 
in three categories: administrative and communi-
cation incidents; diagnostic incidents; and pre-
scribing and medication management incidents.
Some studies estimated that administration 
incidents occurred in at least 6% of patient con-
tacts. Most of these incidents related to issues 
such as incomplete, unavailable, unclear, or 
incorrect documentation (coding/record keep-
ing); inappropriate monitoring of laboratory tests 
(e.g., repeat blood tests for patients with repeat 
prescription or not checking results); or insuffi-
cient communication between professionals and 
patients (e.g. referral pathway for chronic dis-
eases). Documentation errors are in high rate in 
undeveloped countries because of the lack of 
electronic records, while in developed countries 
they are less reported.
Diagnostic incidents are responsible for 
4–45% of all patient safety related incidents. 
Common diagnostic incidents related to misdiag-
nosis or missed diagnoses and their effect can 
take months to years to manifest. Examining 
faulty clinical decision-making, shortcuts in rea-
soning (heuristics) emerges as an important 
entity. Misattributing presenting symptoms and 
signs to an obvious or readily available diagnosis 
may be a key issue, known as availability heuris-
tics, or even anchoring heuristics, which occurs 
when doctors tend to maintain initial impressions 
once they are solidly formed. Any previous diag-
nostic label can reduce the clinician’s ability to 
reconsider an appropriate differential diagnosis 
list.
Researchers estimate an overall prescribing 
error rate from 3% to 65%, potentially occurred 
in any step of the medication process such as pre-
scribing, transcribing, dispensing, administra-
tion, and monitoring (e.g., drug error, information 
error, or administrative error). Older persons are 
at higher risk than the general population for 
these adverse events and this probability increases 
to 75% in older people with four or more medica-
tions (polypharmacy) especially those residing in 
nursing homes. The reason of such high rate is 
probably related to elderly physiologic changes, 
frequent low health literacy, and drugs misuse for 
cognitive dysfunction.
26.2  Most Frequent Errors
The international medical community identifies 
three classes of factors as source of harm in pri-
mary care:
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• Human factors such as teamwork, communi-
cation, stress, and burnout.
• Structural factors such as reporting systems, 
processes, and the environment.
• Clinical factors such as medication.
The classification proposed here of the error 
areas is a function of the moment of citizen- 
professional meeting for simplicity here called 
“clinical moment” [15].
26.2.1  Preclinical Errors
Preclinical errors are due to the organizational 
activities of primary care professionals. In the 
preclinical setting, we can make further dimen-
sional distinctions based on the specific compe-
tencies involved. We can thus distinguish access 
management errors of spontaneous citizens’ pre-
sentations (accesses postponed to days away for 
time-dependent pathologies with diagnostic and 
therapeutic delay; immediate accesses for self- 
resolving conditions with the risk of overmedi-
calization and overdiagnosis), administrative 
errors (errors of compilation and use of personal 
data sheets, error in the management and storage 
of sensitive data), reception problems (lack of or 
confusing reception and orientation to services 
both at the front office level and at the level of 
web information; lack or defect of architectural 
elements aimed at to accommodate the inconve-
nience of mobilization such as elevators, chairs, 
comfortable environments, absence of reception 
for people with audio-visual-linguistic barriers 
on a cultural or disability basis), problems linked 
to the physical achievement of primary care facil-
ities (reachability by public transport or private, 
usability during day or night hours), problems 
related to the communication methods with the 
structure and the professionals (availability of 
telephone or web contacts, receipt of communi-
cations in the appropriate channels and quality of 
their management).
These dimensions at the risk of generating 
errors can variably cause damage in the short to 
medium or long term.
A citizen who fails to reach or communicate 
with the primary care facility may suffer a diag-
nostic or therapeutic delay, or turn to an 
improper setting with avoidable risks and 
improper use of resources to the detriment of 
other citizens.
A citizen who is not welcomed and oriented 
may delay the spontaneous presentation of the 
problem he perceives, may manifest anxiety or 
violent attitudes, or he can decide to postpone it 
and present it later with the risk of developing 
more demanding conditions.
This also has ethical, equity, and right to 
healthcare implications.
An incorrect management of personal data 
files, sensitive data, and poor care of electronic 
medical records can expose the patient to prob-
lems and damages even without a concurrent 
consultation with a professional. The risk of 
using erroneous or missing data can occur for 
exchanges in personal or administrative data or 
different clinical history used in subsequent 
meetings with professionals.
26.2.2  Clinical Errors
Clinical errors are those that are classically iden-
tified as a central element of safety problems, 
both among professionals and in the public. The 
authors agree that this type of error is an impor-
tant part of the possible errors but not the most 
relevant.
Usually clinical errors in primary care have 
less impact than clinical errors in high-intensity 
settings; at the same time, the outcomes of these 
errors can reverberate at a distance.
A first group of errors concerns the prescrip-
tive error of pharmacotherapy. LASA drugs 
(looks alike sounds alike) prescriptions are 
always possible and often avoided thanks to the 
electronic health record (EHR) software with its 
numerous checks necessary for the issue of the 
prescription and a last check at the time of deliv-
ery of the drugs in pharmacy. These errors often 
occur due to fatigue or distraction, rarely due to 
incompetence. To this end, EHR software, 
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through its own alerts and security systems, can 
greatly limit errors with drugs and their dosages.
A second group of errors is the doctor’s diag-
nostic process. The errors of this group are in the 
scarce technical-medical competences during the 
medical examination and the anamnesis, the 
errors on the relationship and communication 
plan, the difficult management and communica-
tion of the diagnostic uncertainty, the erroneous 
prescription of lab tests and imaging tests. The 
latter represents a particular subgroup worthy of 
interest that calls for quaternary prevention. In 
the event that the primary care physician ask for 
a consultation to another doctor or prescribes fur-
ther tests, this determines a certain risk of sub-
jecting the patient to useless and sometimes 
harmful medical practices: unnecessary examina-
tions, increased costs and time, over-use of 
resources of the health system and patient, sensi-
tive iatrogenic risk investigations such as those 
with ionizing radiation, and accesses in special-
ized healthcare settings.
A third group of errors is the malfunctioning 
of the team or its ineffective use and its lack. It is 
internationally shared options that primary care 
established in multidisciplinary teams where 
more skills can be present at the patient’s closest 
level may be able to respond to health needs. 
Malfunctioning teams with staff shortages or 
lack of leadership can generate clinical errors: 
lack of sharing and planning of care plans, failure 
to share information, non-assignment and recog-
nition of professional responsibilities.
A fourth group of errors consists of delayed 
diagnoses. As said for the second group the diag-
nosis is a social fact, an error placed in its social 
determinants will produce a clinical error. An 
example is precisely delayed diagnosis or delayed 
prevention. Both underlie the presence of a lack 
of clinical and organizational competence. By 
way of example, the diagnosis of advanced dia-
betic foot lesions can be characterized by a diag-
nostic delay in initial lesions or even by a failure 
to prevent the diabetic foot (an activity that must 
be organized) if not precisely by the failure to 
prevent diabetes. It appears obvious here that the 
question of error goes beyond the ideal boundar-
ies of primary care as the near or distant respon-
sibilities lie in individual behavior and in the 
social determinants of disease, but it is equally 
evident that the problem emerges in the clinical 
setting of primary care among physicians and 
patient.
A fifth group of errors is in the promotion- 
preventive sector. The banal absence of preven-
tive and health-promoting activities is notorious 
that involves development of disease and repre-
sents a mistake. This type of error is intertwined 
in preventive skills and competences and in orga-
nizational skills. This is a very important point 
because in the medicine of the twenty-first cen-
tury the attention and resources to prevention 
must grow in order to pass effectively from an 
acute organization to an organization for com-
plex problems and chronic cases.
26.3  Clinical Cases
26.3.1  Clinical Case: Being Alert
The wife of a 68-year-old patient calls the switch-
board of the group medicine because her husband 
has been suffering from dyspnea for a few days 
and is worried, he calls at 4.00 pm and the doctor 
invites him to present himself the same evening, 
having time to dedicate to him. The patient 
arrives after about an hour, on foot (his house is 
about 1500  m away) accompanied by his wife 
and daughter. It appears dyspnoic. The patient is 
known to the doctor, has a low socioeconomic 
condition. As a chronic diseases, he has type 2 
diabetes mellitus in oral antidiabetic therapy, 
COPD 2b in inhalation with LABA and LAMA, 
he has an essential tremor on propranolol ther-
apy. The doctor investigates any concurrent 
events, the patient denies fever denies trauma and 
denies coughing. He denies chest pain. The vital 
parameters are good (PA 130/70 FC 75r Sat 97% 
T 36.3). Being a patient with an elevated 
cardiovascular risk (previous tobacco smoker, 
diabetic) the doctor proceeds with the execution 
of an ECG in the office. The ECG demonstrates 
an elevation of V1, V2, V3, and V4 and suspect-
ing an acute coronary syndrome alerting the ter-
ritorial emergency- urgency service for rapid 
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access to the Emergency Room. Furtherly the 
doctor will be informed by the children about the 
diagnostic confirmation, which will be followed 
by an urgent coronary angiography with medi-
cated DES and then the setting up of an antiplate-
let therapy and cardiological rehabilitation.
Compared to the safety practices adopted we 
can identify some hidden but absolutely impor-
tant elements.
The availability for urgent visits is the essen-
tial element that allows citizens to be able to have 
a confrontation with the doctor for situations that 
alarm them but that do not lead them to indepen-
dently access emergency services. This availabil-
ity cannot be causal but is the result of an 
organization, and therefore of an organizational, 
multidisciplinary competence that involves phy-
sician and ancillary staff (front office). The pos-
sibility of receiving phone calls during daytime 
means setting up a service capable not only of 
receiving phone calls during daylight hours but 
also of making the doctor interact with these 
requests for attention. This service is substanti-
ated with the presence of dedicated staff and doc-
tors available during the daytime hours. A triage, 
run by medical or nursing professionals, can be 
added to this organization, which could signifi-
cantly increase the quality of the management of 
urgent requests, but today there is little literature 
on the subject and in any case does not fit into the 
clinical case scenario.
The presence of time and space is an element 
of safety. The organization of primary care must 
foresee the unforeseen and equip itself with 
effective response capacities: it is necessary that 
unpredictable visits can take place in times and 
places consistent with the need for each single 
clinical case.
On the instrumental level we can see how a 
doctor experienced in the diagnostic use of medi-
cal equipment represents a critical element. For 
the patient’s condition, probably the doctor 
would still have had to send it to the emergency 
service as it would have been considered neces-
sary the troponin curve not feasible in another 
setting. But the early diagnostic suspicion made 
it possible to activate the further medical service 
in order to optimize the management with times 
and strategies typical for a life-threatening condi-
tion. This technical element, of medical compe-
tence, conceals the element of safety that 
concerns the continuity of care in setting transi-
tions which also represents a competence, though 
not merely clinical.
26.3.2  Clinical Case: A Foreseeable 
Error
In the hottest days of summer, Aldo, a diabetic 
83-year-old man, is recovering from a weekend 
gastroenteritis with 2 days of vomiting and diar-
rhea. He is not worried because his nephew had a 
similar condition few days before and told him 
what to do. In a certain way, he hopes to lose 
weight faster and reduce his high glycemic level. 
He didn’t take all medications in the last days, 
except those for blood pressure and diabetes 
(ACE-I and metformin). He tried to call his doc-
tor, but the line was always busy and the secretary 
told him that first office appointment available 
would have been the next week, so he decided to 
postpone the consultation, also because he is 
tired and his back pain has increased in the past 
few days. Before going to bed, he takes three pills 
of an over-the-counter painkiller (NSAID) to 
reduce back pain. Two days after, his fatigue has 
increased and he urinates very little, almost noth-
ing from midnight, even if he has doubled the 
dose of diuretic. His worried nephew tells him 
call the doctor but Aldo decides to wait until the 
afternoon, when the doctor is in office, but he is a 
little confused and go to bed and he sleeps all 
evening waking up only for dinner. Aldo is very 
tired and little inclined to speak and also he 
doesn’t trust the young doctors on call. When he 
calls, he only talks about his tiredness The doctor 
who answers doesn’t investigate about his comor-
bidities or medication and reassures him saying 
that this is the normal course of acute viral 
gastroenteritis.
During the night, Aldo is not doing well, he is 
confused, extremely tired, sick, and when dys-
pnea occurs, he decide to call the Emergency 
Department. Admitted in the Emergency Room, 
his diagnosis is acute kidney injury.
E. Alti and A. Mereu
371
Acute kidney injury (AKI) is a sudden episode 
of kidney failure or kidney damage that happens 
within a few hours or a few days. AKI occurs in 
approximately 10–15% of patients admitted to 
hospital. It is a serious condition with fourfold 
increased hospital mortality. It is defined by a 
rapid increase in serum creatinine, decrease in 
urine output, or both. Comorbid conditions 
including CKD, diabetes, hypertension, coronary 
artery disease, heart failure, liver disease, and 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease are risk 
factors for AKI as well as age (over 65  years), 
nephrotoxic exposures (iodine products and 
drugs as NSAIDs, ACE-I, diuretics, etc.) major 
surgery, sepsis, fluid resuscitation, and volume 
status (dehydration by Inadequate fluid intake, 
excessive vomiting, diarrhea, and fever).
In this clinical case, Aldo had not been suffi-
ciently informed of the side effects of the medi-
cines he was taking or of the measures to be taken 
in the event of a fever or vomiting or diarrhea. 
Prescribing a medicine, with reviewing side 
effects, contraindications, and drugs interactions, 
is an essential part of the primary care visit. 
Using a tool to monitor that step during the visit 
would be useful to avoid medication incident. 
Another communicative incident is also the dif-
ficulty of accessing a medical consultation with 
his primary doctor, both by phone and by visit. 
The lack of confidence in the unknown doctor 
leads him to silence parts of his condition and the 
doctor on call does not sufficiently investigate 
patient’s condition (age, comorbidities, etc.). 
This diagnostic error is due to both clinical and 
organizational competence. The incomplete 
anamnestic review leads to superficial diagnosis 
and underestimated severity with potential seri-
ous harm (from intensive care to dialysis or 
death). A more organized primary care team 
would have shared medical records, avoiding 
misunderstanding.
A further element of safety that those scenario 
predicts, but does not described, is the possibility 
of a review of the case through the SEA model 
(significant event analysis). The diagnosis, dur-
ing the acute phase, of a life-threatening disease 
is a significant event in primary care. This phe-
nomenon represents an excellent opportunity for 
the multidisciplinary team to review its skills and 
competences and understand if mistakes have 
been made, regardless of the positive outcome of 
the specific case.
26.4  Safety Procedures
Safety is a major concern in four main areas: 
diagnosis, prescribing, communication, and 
organizational change [16].
26.4.1  Diagnosis
Diagnosis in primary care is by its very nature 
uncertain and uses a hypothetic-deductive 
approach. A general practitioners deals with a 
very broad range of symptoms and signs with no 
clear diagnosis in most cases and his longitudinal 
care leads to practice related to individualized 
needs, preferences, and values. Therefore, the use 
of guidelines and protocols is likely to have some, 
but limited, success in improving safety. Some 
procedures are known to be safer than others, and 
those could be the best practices to improve in 
primary care. Decision support tools and (elec-
tronic) information systems can be hypotheti-
cally useful, but this has not yet been proved 
empirically. But, many safety problems can be 
overcome by design, for example, the use in spe-
cific circumstances of reminders such as message 
alerts on screen or insertion of checks or forcing 
steps instead of relying on memory and 
observance.
26.4.2  Prescribing
Prescribing is the most analyzed area. Hospital- 
based studies have shown that use of a computer 
system for prescribing is likely to improve accu-
racy. In many computer medical records, there is 
the opportunity to highlight possible drug-drug 
interactions, individual known drug hypersensi-
tivities, and relative and absolute contraindica-
tions related to clinical conditions. But, many 
computer systems currently use alerts so often 
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that many doctors simply choose to ignore them 
(the “cry wolf” phenomenon) and the increasing 
use of complementary treatments including 
herbal remedies is often not reported by patient 
because they are not considered medicine.
26.4.3  Communication
Communication is a common cause of harm to 
patients, but it is probably a symptom of organi-
zational problem rather than a cause. Medical 
errors can occur due to a lack of communication 
both between colleagues and between doctor and 
patient.
Electronic communication can reduce prob-
lems in sharing clinical information or therapies 
or allergies among clinicians. The “patient held 
record” (better if held on the internet) would 
ensure that clinicians have immediate access to 
all relevant clinical information and assure con-
sistency across primary and secondary care.
A poor doctor–patient relationship can have 
negative outcomes for patient satisfaction, treat-
ment compliance, and even the health status of 
the patient (missed or inadequate diagnosis, for 
example). Agreed methods of communicating 
would be developed and established at the first 
visit, well known by team members and secre-
tarial staff. Each therapy should be reviewed 
and re-explained at each visit in writing form. 
While respecting patient privacy, all clinical 
information should be known to the primary 
care team.
26.4.4  Organizational Change
The reporting of incidents can help healthcare 
professionals learn from mistakes. Leaders 
within the system should reward and encourage 
doctors to report problems in order to take spe-
cific action to prevent the problem occurring 
again. The understanding how system fails, 
reporting and analysis of the medical errors, the 
use of technology, and the continuous attention to 
the safety culture can lead to a quick improve-
ment of the primary care. Where primary care 
is organized in teamwork, it has the ability of 
sharing and analyzing medical errors, actual or 
perceived, and implements those organizational 
changes necessary for a better development of 
the safety culture [17].
26.5  Recommendations
Patient safety incidents (PSIs) in primary care are 
perceived as a relatively lower-risk endeavor, but 
about 4–7% of the errors have the potential to 
cause serious harm, either in the short or long 
term. Most of them are preventable. In secondary 
care settings, targeted strategies have been imple-
mented and reported but in primary care we have 
limited data and the World Health Organization 
has noted the pressing need to study and address 
patient safety in this setting.
As Dr. De Wet pointed out, improving patient 
safety in general practice requires “action on at 
least three fronts: greater evidence-based knowl-
edge of patient safety, time and space to conduct 
the required, appropriate reflection and a strong 
safety culture within practices, characterised by 
excellent leadership, effective communication, 
and team members who support each other and 
learn together” [14].
The importance of “human factors” and the 
complexity of doctor–patient interactions in pri-
mary care can influence any health system and 
need to be investigated to better understanding 
their role in causing patient safety incidents.
To reduce harm and improve patient safety is 
essential to overcome the diversity in the reported 
frequency and nature of errors and to develop an 
understanding of both the causation and preven-
tion of error in primary care. Actually, we have an 
opportunistic incident reporting rather than a sys-
tematic and proactive approach and we need a 
more specific intervention in the definition of 
“error” in primary care, a common rate for sever-
ity and preventability and in collecting data.
In 2019, González-Formoso shows that edu-
cation is a key pillar of quality improvement and 
is considered the most important factor in 
improving patient safety, especially in primary 
care where the effectiveness of the educational 
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intervention given to residents and their tutors in 
family medicine teaching units was measured by 
the number of events reported [18]. Training in 
patient safety improves knowledge and the pro-
cess of care. The effectiveness of specific inter-
ventions to reliably reduce harm in general 
practice remains unknown. Further studies are 
needed to examine whether and how the profes-
sionals participating in the educational interven-
tion have modified their behavior with respect to 
patient safety and whether patients’ outcomes did 
improve.
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Learning Objectives and Questions Covered 
in the Chapter
• How does a linear view of improvement con-
trast with a complexity science approach?
• The complexity frame makes it harder to man-
age and deliver high quality and safer care—
does it therefore need to be rejected in favour 
of simpler improvement models?
• What examples can be brought to bear to show 
how studies in the complexity frame can lead 
to good outcomes and positive change?
27.1  The Complexities 
of Healthcare
Over the past two decades, prominent researchers 
such as Greenhalgh [1], Plsek [2], Leykum [3], 
Lanham [4], Petticrew [5] and Hawe [6, 7] and 
their colleagues and teams have promoted using 
complexity theory to describe and analyse the 
various dimensions of healthcare organisation 
[8–12]. Internationally, in parallel, governments 
have recognised the need to ‘think differently’ 
about healthcare policy and service delivery, but 
without much traction on how that might be done 
and what it might mean. Nevertheless, it has now 
become more common—but by no means univer-
sal—to apply a complexity lens to understanding 
healthcare services and to improving them. This 
involves greater appreciation of elaborate, intri-
cate, multi-faceted care networks, healthcare 
ecosystems, layered parts in composite settings, 
contextual differences across care settings, clini-
cal cultures, multi-agent environments, and the 
convoluted, challenging, wicked problems [13] 
these systems throw up. However, with some 
relatively limited exceptions, the quality and 
safety fields’ interest in complexity has, to date, 
been largely superficial, both theoretically and 
empirically [1].
Although it is seen as an emerging field, com-
plexity science is not new; it sprang from knowl-
edge and studies accumulating in disciplines 
such as sociology, ecology, and evolutionary 
biology in the 1940s, and with antecedents even 
earlier in what is broadly called ‘systems think-
ing’. Taking a systems view, healthcare is not just 
complicated, or layered, or socially dense, or var-
ied, although it is certainly all of these things. 
Rather, the systems view is based on several fun-
damental ideas: essentially, that all systems are 
composed of a set of seemingly discrete but actu-
ally interdependent components, defined not just 
by their inter-relations but by the permeable and 
shifting boundaries between them. The 
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components (people, technology, artefacts, 
equipment, departments, professions) are com-
bined sometimes in organised and expected ways, 
and sometimes opportunistically and in unex-
pected ways. The components are constantly 
changing, and aggregate such that their collective 
behaviour is more than the sum of their parts. 
Complex systems are multidimensional, and 
characterised by eddying, recurring patterns of 
behaviour [14]. Complexity has been described 
as ‘a dynamic and constantly emerging set of 
processes and objects that not only interact with 
each other, but come to be defined by those inter-
actions’ [15].
Healthcare and care delivery systems are pow-
erful examples of a complex adaptive system 
(CAS) [8, 14]. A healthcare CAS consists of 
dynamic interactions between different individu-
als and groups (agents of different types such as 
bureaucrats, clinicians and patients), as well as 
their affordances (buildings and artefacts, rang-
ing from stethoscopes to computers to pathology 
tests to pharmaceuticals). The groups and affor-
dances cohere in a system of relationships which 
produce roles and behaviours that emerge from 
those interactions, and which in turn produce out-
comes: care, treatment, errors, referrals, dis-
charges and deaths, for example. In essence, 
CASs are rich in collective behaviour: in health-
care, this means assemblies of loosely or tightly 
networked doctors, nurses, allied health staff, and 
scientists; managers of different hues; and poli-
cymakers of various kinds and at varying levels, 
as well as patients and patient groups. They all 
interact, inter-relating and mediating their behav-
iours via tools, rules, procedures and equipment, 
each exercising their skills for common purpose 
[2, 8]—to provide quality care to large numbers 
of patients.
The interconnections between the agents are 
dynamic, and the stakeholders interrelate in often 
surprising ways [16]. This provides challenges to 
understanding the way systems unfurl over time, 
to apprehending the system’s performance and 
what drives it, to designing interventions to alter 
that performance, to improving processes and 
workflows, and to measuring the outcomes of any 
interventions in the system [5, 17, 18]. CASs are 
inherently unpredictable, or it is probably more 
apt to say that behaviours within them and organ-
isational and clinical outcomes cannot be fore-
cast very far ahead.
27.2  Managing Complexity
These complexities of healthcare systems give 
rise to a range of challenges that clinicians, man-
agers, administrative and support staff, policy-
makers and researchers face as they carry out 
their various roles and responsibilities and seek 
over time to care for, and improve the care for, 
patients. Yet, the simplest way to manage health-
care is to ignore or deny its complexities. It is 
easier to imagine a 1:1 correspondence between 
the intentions for healthcare and the consequen-
tial result of those intentions, as seen in Fig. 27.1.
Many people do this: they imagine that the 
next policy or guideline or mandated change, or 
quality improvement programme, or procedure, 
or test result, or new IT system, will be taken up 
unproblematically on the front lines of care. 
Contrary to that kind of thinking, there are mul-
tiple layers to healthcare complexity [19]; in 
addition to the dynamics of the care setting (sys-
tems complexity), patients come with a range of 
complex conditions and needs, and diagnosis, 
treatment and follow-up are rarely unproblematic 
(medical complexity). As well, patients have 
intricate life histories, home lives, socio- 
economic circumstances, and families, partners, 
children and parents (situational complexity). All 
of these complexities co-evolve to evince intrac-
table problems (Fig.  27.2). Indeed, it is at the 
interstices of these three kinds of complexity 
depicted in Fig. 27.2 that much wickedness mani-











Fig. 27.1 Examples of linear thinking in healthcare. 
(Authors’ conceptualisation)
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that have considerable degrees of difficulty, are 
difficult even to define, making them often 
impossible in principle to solve. How, and the 
extent to which, any one individual or group 
(e.g., an executive member or group, or a clini-
cian or clinical team) can effectively manage 
complexity, or the wicked problems that ensue 
from that complexity, is not at all clear.
In a complex system, it is not just the different 
types of complexity that overlap to create chal-
lenges, but there are profound uncertainties gen-
erated by the inherent complexities [21]. These 
uncertainties interact (Fig.  27.3). For example, 
and depicted in Fig. 27.3, uncertainties about the 
processes of care may be compounded by an 
unclear diagnosis (labelled in the model scientific 
uncertainty) and further by a patient’s unstable 
mental state (characterised as personal uncer-
tainty). In many such situations the systems and 
structures are not understood (denoted as practi-
cal uncertainty).
Even more challenging, it is not always pos-
sible in healthcare environments for every piece 
of the jigsaw puzzle to be in place before acting. 
In fast-paced clinical practice, things happen rap-
idly, and a prompt response is required. While 
clinicians are always under pressure to be exhaus-
tive, they must also be pragmatic, and make room 
for the next patient. Hollnagel calls this the 









Fig. 27.2 Three kinds 
of complexities that 
co-evolve to wicked 
problems. (Reproduced 
from Kuipers, P., 
Kendall, E., Ehrlich, C., 
McIntyre, M., Barber, 
L., Amsters, D. & 
Brownie, S. (2011). 
Complexity and health 
care: Health practitioner 
workforce, services, 
roles, skills and training 
to respond to patients 
with complex needs. 


















Fig. 27.3 Example of uncertainties interacting in health-
care. (Reproduced from Pomare C, Churruca K, Ellis LA, 
Long JC & Braithwaite J. (2019). A revised model of 
uncertainty in complex healthcare settings: A scoping 
review. Journal of evaluation in clinical practice, 25(2), 
176–182)
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Hence, clinicians must be able to tolerate 
 uncertainty and act even where there is imperfect 
data and no clearly right path to take. Even when 
there is thought to be a right path (e.g., a present-
ing patient with clear symptoms, an apparently 
accurate diagnosis, and the availability of rele-
vant clinical guidelines stipulating the care to be 
delivered), the course of the disease can change 
or the treatment plan can alter, the clinicians may 
be following their own clinical path (mindlines) 
rather than the recommended care (guidelines) 
[23], or the culture within which the clinicians 
operate might not be conducive to teamwork. 
And a CAS itself is a dynamic, moving picture, 
so any treatment plan, or the delivery of care, or 
the post-treatment follow-up, needs to be updated 
in the light of the change or new circumstances or 
information. Even in a stable, well-run organisa-
tional ecosystem with a receptive, non-toxic, 
trustful culture, things can go wrong, variables 
can alter, the team’s composition can change, the 
carers can come under pressure, or the path to 
progress can be disrupted and therefore things 
will not run smoothly.
Another characteristic of complexity in 
healthcare is the sheer number and variety of 
stakeholders (e.g., professional groups, clinical 
specialities, managers, policymakers, regulators) 
involved in planning for and delivering care. 
Drawing upon different perspectives and forms 
of expertise, including the patient’s, can poten-
tially facilitate greater understanding of uncertain 
situations and improve the decision-making pro-
cess but can also add manifold layers of involve-
ment and interaction [24, 25]. Indeed, in complex 
systems it is often more appropriate to think 
about stakeholders and individuals as collective 
sense-makers [26] rather than rational decision- 
makers in the ‘if X, then Y’ mode. This notion 
focuses on the social aspects of meaning-making: 
people in CASs spend a considerable amount of 
energy figuring out what’s going on, and what to 
do next in the light of imperfect information. 
Indeed, individuals often, even typically, have 
conflicting understandings of uncertain situa-
tions. Sense-making theory says that we must 
recognise the relative value of the plausibility of 
a decision or explanation to people over its accu-
racy [12, 26]. For example, healthcare ‘huddles’, 
which have been shown to have positive effects 
on patient safety, leverage complexity principles 
such as fluidity, adaptiveness, sense-making, 
trade-offs and meaningful interaction [3, 27]. 
They provide feasible, credible decisions that the 
group can accommodate to, live with and action, 
rather than absolute answers. Clinicians and clin-
ical teams do not make decisions in textbook 
fashion, or via a structured decision tree, but 
make sense of the circumstances they find them-
selves in, and create meaning and take ensuing 
action emanating from the convergence of infor-
mation, guidelines, others’ perspectives, wishes 
of patients, and what is viable and possible.
27.3  Responding to Complexity
Responding to these inherent complexities of 
healthcare systems requires letting go of many 
simplistic explanations and ‘one-size-fits-all’, or 
cause-and-effect, solutions. Indeed, in CASs, 
changes in variables over time are normal, and 
often appear suddenly, even at times unfathom-
ably or chaotically. Surprise and unpredictability 
occur frequently: indeed, it has been said that 
things that have never happened, happen all the 
time.
Responses to induced or orchestrated or man-
dated changes can yield unexpected or counter- 
intuitive outcomes. Complex systems, because of 
their multi-layered nature, exhibit emergence: the 
properties of the system that arise from interac-
tions at one level down, for example, group 
behaviour emerges from the relationships and 
interdependencies of the individuals which make 
up the group. Healthcare CASs constantly create 
and re- create such emergent behaviours which by 
their very nature are unforecastable. This is why 
the work day people experience as it unfolds is 
never the same as the one they planned for at the 
start of the shift.
In addition, in homing in on any part of a 
CAS, we can discern elements of both self- 
similarity and local nuances. Self-similarity can 
manifest fractally, at different scales (e.g., fea-
tures of the culture of the organisation at the team 
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level approximate to that of the culture of the 
department, and then division, and then the whole 
organisation) or laterally (e.g., one department 
looks comparable structurally to another). It 
might seem paradoxical, but healthcare levels or 
departments, despite being self-similar in some 
respects, also each operate as unique entities. 
There are always localised contextual, cultural 
and structural distinctions. Such local nuances 
occur as the result of the particular configurations 
of agents (e.g., nurses, doctors, quality managers, 
patients) following their internalised rules and 
shared mental models (e.g., put the patients first, 
project a good reputation to the outside world, 
prioritise safety) in that unique setting.
Against such a backdrop, any efforts to intro-
duce a change or quality improvement initiative 
can be hampered if the complexities of the local 
context are not taken into account; things don’t 
always work the same in different places and 
indeed are never adopted as intended, but are 
always modified by local agents and cultures to 
suit circumstances [28]. Hence, for change pro-
ponents, engagement with agents on a local-level 
is required and while some aspects of an improve-
ment initiative may be standardised or readily 
imported from elsewhere, most things will need 
to be adapted to suit these variable contexts [7]. 
Even a rigid, highly structured, imposed IT sys-
tem intended for application universally across a 
health organisation will be used in vastly differ-
ent ways by local teams and individuals 
[29–32].
Responding to complexity also requires let-
ting go of traditional notions of organisational 
management. CASs manifest in such a way as to 
thwart attempts at tightly centralised control [33]. 
No one person can fully comprehend the entire 
system or claim consistent influence over all 
agents, for example, something that the issue of 
localised, nuanced context also underscores. In 
short, strictly hierarchical management, because 
it relies on the putative ability of a single person 
or executive grouping ‘at the top’ to be in charge, 
can in reality never cope with all the complexities 
present in a system such as a hospital or busy 
community setting, let alone an entire chain, 
health region or jurisdiction [34]. Alternative 
models of managing with complexity in mind 
focus instead on mechanisms or strategies such 
as distributed leadership, decentralised responsi-
bility, communities of practices, relationship- 
building, opinion leaders, shared mental models, 
and networked influence (Fig. 27.4). These hold 
greater promise in being better able to manage 
complex environments because information, 
power and control are spread throughout a CAS, 
and information that matters is often situated 
locally [35, 36]. Control is also distributed, and 
does not simply reside at the organisational apex. 
Top-level leaders and managers in complex 
organisations, then, essentially must focus on 
broad goals rather than prescriptive instruc-
tions—that is, negotiating with colleagues, 
employees or contractors over what needs to be 







Fig. 27.4 Three types of organisational structures. 
(Reproduced from Yaneer Bar-Yam (2002) Complexity 
rising: From human beings to human civilisation, a com-
plexity profile. Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems. 
Oxford, UK: UNESCO Publishers)
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stakeholders to figure out how they get there [37]. 
Rather than command and control, ongoing dia-
logue and feedback between the parties is needed. 
In CASs, people navigate, manoeuvre and nego-
tiate rather than carry out mandates, prescriptions 
and detailed requirements. Agency is every-
where; and blind adherence to instructions is in 
short supply. That is a very considerable dilemma 
and challenge for managers and leaders in 
healthcare.
27.4  Researching Quality 
and Safety Using Complexity 
Thinking
Despite the increasing prominence of complex-
ity, traditional methods for investigating safety, 
improving quality and implementing risk man-
agement in healthcare have typically been based 
more on linear than complex systems thinking. In 
linear thinking, unwanted system variability can 
be controlled and outcomes from an intervention 
can be generalised, scaled and spread. That logic 
suggests that the top-down mandates of the apex 
decision-makers directly, or through causal 
stages, lead to front-line change. Local problems 
can be addressed by executives independently of 
what might be going on in the larger system, and 
once a problem is solved it is permanently 
addressed and will no longer need to be 
 monitored. If the intervention is effective, we will 
see immediate, or almost immediate, results, or at 
least, responses causally related to or attributed 
to the top-down decisions, as a chain of events. In 
linear thinking, we can also apply multiple inter-
ventions simultaneously, while assessing them 
individually.
As we have seen, healthcare is not such a sys-
tem: it is dynamic, and causality is never fully 
knowable. Local problems will affect, and be 
affected by, the larger system. Validity of results 
will vary with context, and there is a time lag—
sometimes many years for things that change 
slowly, such as culture or a new clinical prac-
tice—between intervention and results. ‘Fix and 
forget’ does not work: we must consider variabil-
ity, unpredictability and work towards common 
goals. Planning broadly, but not in detail, for the 
longer term, and exercising influence, are key 
methods. Nudge-and-encourage, giving people 
room to manoeuvre, are more likely to be effec-
tive rather than instruction-and-adherence, ask-
ing people to comply with organisational 
requirements.
In such a world, making improvements to care 
systems, and implementing risk management in 
healthcare, is more effective when applying mul-
tiple methods and respecting the system charac-
teristics rather than searching for one optimal 
solution. Because systems interact at micro-, 
meso- and macro-levels, and are configured later-
ally, across heterarchical structures, we need to 
capture local and systems-wide information. We 
also need to understand the interactions between 
micro-, meso- and macroelements of the CAS, 
and laterally across the heterarchies. To answer 
the what?, when? and how much? questions, we 
can use multilevel statistical modelling. Even 
more pertinent, we can also model the systems 
and subsystems, using computational methods 
such as system dynamics modelling (for aggre-
gated, longitudinal data), social network analysis 
(for connections and influence), agent-based 
modelling (for individual or more granular data), 
and Functional Resonance Analysis Method 
(FRAM; to understand system variability). To 
answer the why? and how? questions, we will 
also need to use more qualitative methods, such 
as ethnographies, simulations and interviews or 
focus groups. Integrating multi-method data 
enables researchers to triangulate. This can help 
build a rich picture to represent the system we 
seek to influence, enabling identification of criti-
cal issues, key leverage points and potential solu-
tions to improving patient safety or care quality.
27.5  Real World Examples
We turn to an analysis of five studies, each of 
which exemplify our own research, evaluation 
and interventional efforts in attempting to create 
safer, better care, and to manage associated risks. 
Each is a study using complexity science and 
 systems thinking, but in various ways and with 
differing foci, aims and purposes. We present 
them at differing levels of granularity, from close 
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to the patient, to meso-level studies, to those 
attempting to influence macro, systems-wide 
change. The studies are of a group of carers 
alongside action researchers seeking to improve 
the way they deliver services to patients with a 
single clinical condition (our Lynch syndrome 
study) [38]; an investigation of a coal-face solu-
tion to deteriorating patients in acute settings 
(research on Medical Emergency Teams) [39–
41]; studies of departmental decision-making, 
communication and teamwork (social networks 
in a ward and an emergency department) [42, 
43]; an examination of social processes in aggre-
gate, with aligned clinicians, scientists and 
researchers creating a learning community 
(Australian Genomics) [44, 45]; and a systems-
level enquiry into patient safety (the Deepening 
our Understanding of Quality in Australia 
research programme) [46].
27.5.1  The Lynch Syndrome Study
The complexities of work or organisational pro-
cesses are not always evident at the start of a 
quality improvement project. An initial or super-
ficial view will end up missing the underlying 
interdependencies, social processes and emer-
gent behaviours which need to be explored and 
understood. One way of proceeding is to identify 
and visualise the focal process as they manifest 
(work-as-done), rather than as it is believed they 
manifest (work-as-imagined) [47]. Only then can 
we design useful interventions. By talking 
through the steps of how things usually go, and 
questioning why they are done that way, underly-
ing complexities can be revealed. One of our 
projects aimed to increase the referral rates of 
patients with cancer that receive a high-risk result 
from a screening test [38, 48, 49]. When we ini-
tially scoped the project and reviewed the guide-
lines, it was easy to imagine the system that the 
clinicians were working in as a relatively simple, 
linear process of:
 1. Screening tests carried out to assess the risk of 
the cancer being hereditary.
 2. Results reported as high or low risk.
 3. People with a high-risk result were referred to 
the genetic service (Fig. 27.5).
It took nine iterations across multiple consul-
tations between the stakeholders involved (sur-
geons, medical and radiation oncologists, 
pathologists and genetic specialists) and the 
research team to develop a process map that was 
agreed upon as depicting ‘referral as done’ [38] 
as seen in Fig. 27.6.
The number of factors influencing whether a 
high-risk result triggered a referral or not was 
surprising to all participants in the study. Factors 
included reluctance to initially overwhelm 
patients with a ‘new’ issue (‘The results arrive in 
the first days post-op when the patient is dealing 
with pain, incontinence and fear of the cancer 
returning’), failure to remember to refer later, 
practical issues (‘Referral forms are never avail-
able’, ‘There’s nowhere in the electronic medical 
record to record if a referral has been made’), 
lack of consensus on roles (‘It’s not my role to 
refer, just report’), and confusion (‘I’m not 
exactly sure what the report means. Do I refer or 
not?’). A suite of interventions was developed to 
effect changes in practices. By mapping the mul-
tiplicity of issues arising from the complexity of 
the context, and presenting them, we allowed 
Screen High risk Refer
Fig. 27.5 Linear conceptualisation of clinical work 
amongst Lynch Syndrome clinicians: referral as imag-
ined. (Authors’ simplification extracted from Taylor N, 
Long JC, Debono D, Williams R, Salisbury E, O’Neill S, 
Eykman E, Braithwaite J & Chin M. (2016) Achieving 
behaviour change for detection of Lynch syndrome using 
the Theoretical Domains Framework Implementation 
(TDFI) approach: a study protocol. BMC Health Services 
Research 16:89)
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individual clinicians and the team to see pro-
cesses undertaken in their own and other nearby 
departments and enabled them to appreciate how 
their actions could affect up- and down-stream 
processes. Bringing clinicians from different 
departments together with the patient as the 
focus, provided a deeper understanding of other’s 
roles and barriers, helped create a shared mental 
model, and fostered a whole-of-system approach 
to the care for patients with this condition.
NO REFERRAL
Referral to a private
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Fig. 27.6 Mapping the referral process for Lynch syn-
drome. (Authors conceptualisation based on Taylor N, 
Long JC, Debono D, Williams R, Salisbury E, O’Neill S, 
Eykman E, Braithwaite J & Chin M. (2016) Achieving 
behaviour change for detection of Lynch syndrome using 
the Theoretical Domains Framework Implementation 
(TDFI) approach: a study protocol. BMC Health Services 
Research 16:89)
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27.5.2  Research on Medical 
Emergency Teams
Other features of complexity that confound qual-
ity and safety or improvement endeavours are 
social and cultural influences. The introduction 
of Medical Emergency Teams in acute settings 
across the world illustrates this point. When a 
hospital patient’s condition deteriorates, urgent 
action is required to prevent irreversible harm 
(‘the slippery slope’ as seen in Fig.  27.7). 
Designed by colleagues originally in the USA 
and Australia, and then involving people interna-
tionally, Medical Emergency Teams were devel-
oped to provide a rapid response in this situation. 
If deterioration is detected the Medical 
Emergency Team can be called in from the inten-
sive care unit to directly manage the patient’s 
decline, the earlier the better.
Two sites where early trials of these teams 
were conducted had very different outcomes 
[28], illuminating the effect of social and cul-
tural norms [50]. The trial was not successful in 
a well-established hospital in London where the 
Medical Emergency Teams faced opposition 
from an entrenched cultural belief that patients 
were ‘owned’ by their admitting doctor. This 
belief clouded both whether the teams were 
authorised to treat the patient, and where 
accountability lay for the care of the patient. 
These issues often caused delays in response 
which rendered the team’s efforts ineffective. 
The other site was Liverpool Hospital in Sydney, 
Australia, a newer hospital with an openness to 
innovation and less opposition to shared account-
ability for patient outcomes. Here the trial, led 
by our colleague Ken Hillman, was a success. 
Today, Medical Emergency Teams are credited 
with reducing inpatient mortality and cardiac 
arrests in deteriorating patient cohorts by up to 

























Fig. 27.7 Deterioration as a slippery slope in the ‘Between the Flags’ intervention. (Reproduced from © Copyright 
Clinical Excellence Commission (CEC) 2010)
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27.5.3  Social Networks in a Ward 
and an Emergency 
Department
Communication and advice-seeking pathways 
are other key social processes that can affect 
patient safety and clinical risk but which are often 
not clearly understood before interventions are 
commenced [52]. Creswick and colleagues used 
social network analyses to map these pathways in 
an Australian Emergency Department, a respira-
tory and a renal ward [42, 43, 53], to test assump-
tions around the nature of communication in the 
units, who were the key knowledge brokers, and 
how united their teams were. In one study, the 
researchers asked staff (Emergency Department 
n = 109; respiratory ward n = 47): from whom 
had they sought advice for medication-related 
problems recently? They then constructed a 
sociogram from their replies as seen in Fig. 27.8. 
They noted that while Emergency Departments 
are often construed as a single interdisciplinary 
team, the results show clearly that communica-
tion is siloed, with nurses preferring to interact 
with nurses, doctors with doctors and allied 
health with allied health. Self-similarity was evi-
dent, with the same pattern seen on the ward.
The data facilitated an analysis of key knowl-
edge brokers in the system, including the phar-
macist on the ward, and highlighted the need for 
protecting the roles of those key sources of infor-
mation. It also revealed the complexities of the 
‘hidden work’ being done by those staff members 
who were sought out for advice.
Fig. 27.8 Medication advice-seeking network in an 
Emergency Department. (Reproduced from: Creswick N, 
Westbrook JI & Braithwaite, J. (2009). Understanding 
communication networks in the emergency department. 
BMC Health Services Research, 9(1), 247)
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27.5.4  Australian Genomics 
as a Learning Community
Much work has shown how social influences can 
be potent barriers to interventions and can drive 
undesirable behaviour [54–56]. They can also be 
drivers of positive change, of course [38]. But 
visualising and quantifying social processes is 
rarely done [44]. Social network analysis is a 
unique methodology that, as we have seen, maps 
the interactions between agents in a system and 
can identify the key players, areas of poor or high 
connection, and relationship strengths and risks. 
We used this methodology to examine social 
influences in the implementation of clinical 
genomics across Australia [57].
The Australian Genomics Health Alliance 
(hereafter, Australian Genomics) is a research- 
funded, nation-wide collaboration of genomic 
researchers, practitioners, consumers and opera-
tional staff tasked with leading the adoption of 
clinical genomics into routine healthcare in 
Australia [58]. Clinical genomics holds great 
promise for more accurate and rapid diagnosis of 
rare genetic diseases as well as guiding optimal 
treatment regimes for people with cancer, pro-
ducing high quality care. Successful use of clini-
cal genomics relies on interdisciplinary teams of 
clinical specialists, laboratory scientists, genetic 
specialists and counsellors to review and inter-
pret the gigabytes of data produced by each 
genome tested. Early implementation projects 
with members of Australian Genomics suggested 
that a potent driver of the successful use of clini-
cal genomics was social influence: learning from 
one another in the context of actually ‘doing 
genomics’. To map the extent and strength of this 
influence, we surveyed all members of Australian 
Genomics (n = 384). We asked them: ‘What are 
the strongest influences on the work you are 
doing towards adoption of clinical genomic prac-
tice’, and the socially based question: ‘Which 
other members are part of your genomic learning 
community?’
Results from the 222 respondents confirmed 
the influence of socially based activities with the 
most nominated factors being: ‘hands on learn-
ing’ and ‘shared decision-making’. ‘Formal 
courses’ in contrast did not rate strongly—they 
were only weakly influential. A sociogram was 
constructed from respondents’ nomination of 
people in their learning community across 
Australian Genomics settings (Fig. 27.9).
The largest nodes indicate the people with the 
most interaction in the network, i.e., the key play-
ers. It can be seen that the operational staff are 
particularly active and that the various groups, 
while tending towards being clustered, are not 
insular. Computations of the network show that 
there is a great deal of mixing across groups. We 
are using this information to foster more and bet-
ter learning across groups, to protect key linking 
and coordinating roles and ultimately to improve 
care quality.
27.5.5  The Deepening Our 
Understanding of Quality 
in Australia Studies
The ‘Deepening our Understanding of Quality in 
Australia’ (DUQuA) studies represent the culmi-
nation of a 5-year multilevel, cross-sectional 
research programme aiming to identify how 
quality management systems, clinician leader-
ship and safety culture in Australian hospitals are 
related to care delivery and patient outcomes 
[46]. Based on the ‘Deepening our Understanding 
of Quality in Europe’ (DUQuE) research in 188 
hospitals across seven European countries [59, 
60], DUQuA was also able to compare aspects of 
the Australian and European findings to better 
understand how quality management is enacted 
in acute settings. Evidence- or consensus-based 
measurement tools were designed or modified 
and then utilised to collect quantitative data on 
quality management systems at hospital and care 
pathway levels, department-level clinician safety 
culture and leadership, clinical treatment pro-
cesses, patient outcomes, and patient perceptions 
of safety (Fig. 27.10).
Collection methods included paper-based and 
electronic surveys, medical record reviews, exter-
nal audits, and accessing large national datasets. 
Linear and multilevel modelling were used to 
identify relationships between quality 
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 management, safety culture and leadership, care 
delivery and patient outcomes.
DUQuA participants included nearly half 
(n = 32) of the large, acute care public hospitals 
in Australia. Despite the apparent homogeneity 
of the group, the variability and complexity of the 
settings limited our ability to identify strong 
associations between quality management sys-
tems and processes, and patient outcomes. 
Variation, for example, was often greater within 
hospitals than between them. In some instances, 
such as implementation of evidence-based patient 
safety measures, Australia’s mandatory accredi-
tation programme involving assessment of per-
formance against ten National Standards [61], 
meant that there was little variability between 
comparative hospital safety performance at the 
organisation level. At the care pathway level, 
however, for the acute myocardial infarction, 
stroke and hip fracture conditions that were 
assessed, there was significant variation in lead-
ership and safety culture between conditions 
within the same hospital.
At individual hospitals, DUQuA has enabled 
us, through statistical modelling, to answer the 
what?, when? and how much? questions about 
Fig. 27.9 Genomic learning community of members of 
the Australian Genomics Health Alliance in 2018, where 
nodes are members and lines are ties. Size of node indi-
cates importance in the network. Colours represent the 
various working groups (n  = 22); red indicates national 
operational staff. (Created with Gephi 0.9)
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our acute care hospitals, and pointed to where we 
might best concentrate our efforts for future work. 
It has also enabled us to provide customised 
benchmarking data and links to evidence- based 
ideas for improvement for each hospital in the 
form of a report, alongside validated  measurement 
tools to aid hospital executives and clinical lead-
ers in implementing future quality improvement 
activities, and measuring their efficacy.




We have made the case that complexity science is 
a gateway to understanding healthcare organisa-
tions and the quality and safety of the care they 
provide. Complexity science aids understanding 
of the intricate, multi-agent, interactive system 
under consideration. As we have seen, thinking 
of healthcare settings as CASs rather than linear 
systems facilitates a deeper appreciation of care- 
as- delivered rather than as-imagined-to-be-deliv-
ered, and adds texture and richness to the 
understanding of what needs to be tackled in the 
pursuit of safer, higher quality, better care.
The alternative, a more linear depiction of the 
system within which care takes place, misses 
much and assumes or portrays that the task of 
improvement is more manageable than it is. 
Complexity thinking does not make the problems 
we are trying to solve in intervening to create 
safer and higher quality care any easier. To the 
contrary, it is in reality a frontal attack on sim-
plistic thinking, and those who assume the readi-
ness of systems to accommodate new ideas, 
techniques, programmes and technology and 
who believe that take-up, scale and spread inevi-
tably flow from decisions made at the top of the 
organisation chart or in response to research find-
ings. Traditional thinking also assumes there is 
sufficient absorptive capacity: the system can do 
what is being asked of it when safer or higher 
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Fig. 27.10 Levels and factors investigated in the 
Deepening our Understanding of Quality in Healthcare in 
Australia study. (Reproduced from Braithwaite J, Clay- 
Williams R, Taylor N, Ting HP, Winata T, Hogden E, Li Z, 
Selwood A, Warwick M, Hibbert P, Arnolda G. Deepening 
our Understanding of Quality in Australia (DUQuA): an 
overview of a nation-wide, multilevel analysis of relation-
ships between quality management systems and patient 
factors in 32 hospitals. International Journal for Quality in 
Health Care. 2020;32(S1):8–2.)
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representations the essential logic is chain rea-
soning, i.e., one thing leads to another in a cas-
cading sequence. That change model at its most 
basic is ‘do this’ in a prescribed way, and when 
things don’t work out ‘do more’ or ‘try harder’. 
In complexity representations, the essential logic 
is different. Complexity thinking is predicated on 
understanding multi-stakeholder, interacting 
relationships, giving consideration to the fact that 
the whole is greater than, or at the very least dif-
ferent from, the sum of the parts. That change 
model is based on non-linearity: the system is 
governed by feedback and is constantly adapting, 
with emergent behaviours and, due to the sheer 
amount of interactions and interdependencies, is 
inherently unpredictable. What seems on the sur-
face as a caused result (attributed to the actions of 
a decision-maker, or the executive team), can be 
coupled, and related to that decision and the 
accompanying actions, but can also be unlinked—
a mirage correlation, or an independent event, or 
an outcome of multiple interactions, or net-
worked influence [62]. What masquerades in a 
CAS as causality, in summary, is sometimes, 
even mostly, not.
As we have seen, complexity science led us to 
ask, of Lynch syndrome-type studies, how does 
clinical work actually unfold, in contradistinction 
to how people think it does? We considered, of 
Medical Emergency Team-type interventions: 
how long does spread take, even of a relatively 
easy-to-apprehend idea, but whose time has come, 
and what cultural factors enabled or impeded the 
emergence of Medical Emergency Teams, and 
their subsequent take-up? A complexity science 
lens was also mobilised to point to how networked 
behaviours were mapped to understand the con-
nections on the front line of care (in Emergency 
Departments and wards) and social processes in 
learning communities across a country (in 
Australian Genomics). And, in our final example, 
it helped us to home in on the care actually pro-
vided in multiple large hospitals, uncovering 
which variables are important (but not determinis-
tic) in quality improvement, systems- wide (the 
DUQuA research programme).
27.7  Where to From Here?
Encouraging people to adopt a complexity frame 
of reference, and doing research or designing 
interventions using such an approach, where 
strict generalisability, direct causation, and pre-
dictability are ruled out, can be daunting. It is 
easier to maintain a rationalisation that says, 
essentially: let’s design straight-line interven-
tions, implement such projects as intended, and 
prescribe the solution to the front lines in order 
for them to take up the evidence directly. This 
involves standardised procedures, mandated pro-
grammes, and pre-defined, structured tools or 
techniques. Once implemented, so this instru-
mental logic goes, we can observe the improve-
ment that will inevitably and unproblematically 
follow as a result of these initiatives.
But in complex systems, things are not readily 
decomposable into parts. CASs are organic, not 
mechanistic; frogs, not bicycles [63].
We believe linear models have limited appli-
cations in CASs generally, and healthcare specifi-
cally. The job of scholars, improvement agents, 
quality and safety specialists and policymakers is 
not to ice-skate elegantly over the top of prob-
lems or to construe them simply, but to grapple 
with them in all their gritty reality. In non-linear, 
complex systems, end-point changes can be dis-
proportional to the inputs. Newton’s clockwork 
universe of logical, machine-like health systems 
that change in direct response to the requirements 
placed on them can only take us—and indeed has 
only taken us—so far. Quantum mechanics, with 
its inherent complexity, unpredictability and 
uncertainty principle is a much more apt meta-
phor for change. As more people realise this, they 
will be more likely to appreciate the multidimen-
sional task of improving care quality and making 
things safer for patients. This way leads to tools 
such as FRAM [64], social network analyses [57] 
and system dynamics modelling. It paves the way 
to an understanding of the resilient properties of 
health systems [47]. It tells us to search for a 
deeper appreciation for the characteristics of the 
system, e.g., its absorptive capacity, contextual 
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richness and nuanced cultures. It invited us to 
consider the characteristics of the agents and 
stakeholder groups who manoeuvre, negotiate, 
trade-off and navigate their settings. These are 
the features of healthcare that anyone interested 
in researching, leading or delivering high quality 
care, or managing clinical risk, must factor into 
their thinking and practices.
27.8  Recommendations
 1. Sensitise those with responsibility for leading, 
managing, improving or researching care set-
tings to a systems view.
 2. Train sufficient staff in the tools of complex-
ity: FRAM, network analyses, system dynam-
ics modelling, process mapping, and the like.
 3. Approach quality and safety and risk manage-
ment activities with a knowledge of complex-
ity science, sense-making, and non-linearity 
rather than as a set of linear problems amena-
ble to simplistic causal change logic.
 4. Consider how our studies, borrowing from 
complexity theory, have resisted simplifying 
the challenges, but have nevertheless made 
progress in understanding care systems and 
their improvement.
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28.1  What Is Clinical Workflow?
Clinical workflow at its most simple is the 
sequence of steps associated with delivering 
healthcare—the ‘who, what, when, where, for 
how long, and in what order’ of each task. 
However, healthcare is complex and dynamic 
with many interdependencies. In such an envi-
ronment, tasks are rarely completed in a linear, 
step-wise fashion. Work tasks may be paused, 
interrupted, performed simultaneously, or be 
inter-dependent on other tasks or other clinicians. 
In many settings clinicians manage the care of 
multiple patients concurrently [1]. While infor-
mation technology may assist in streamlining 
some processes and providing guidance during 
task completion, it often changes workflows in 
both expected and unexpected ways [2].
Quantitatively measuring clinical work pat-
terns requires some form of classification for cat-
egorising elements of work. For example, clinical 
work can be conceptualised in terms of broad 
categories of: direct care with patients; commu-
nication with patients/families/colleagues; test 
ordering and reviewing results; documentation; 
managing medications; indirect care tasks associ-
ated with organising equipment, information, co- 
ordination of care tasks; teaching and mentoring; 
social interactions and breaks; and administra-
tion. The complexity of clinical work increases 
with each additional person, process or technol-
ogy added to the system.
Each step in a process is a point at which clini-
cal work (healthcare) can go right or wrong. 
Thus, each step in clinical workflows is a poten-
tial target for improving the safety and quality of 
care delivered. Many factors will impact the 
safety of clinical work, from an individual’s level 
of fatigue, to the organisational culture, e.g. 
whether staff feel able to seek advice. An under-
standing of clinical work, including the charac-
teristics of individuals and the environments in 
which work is performed, is essential for the tar-
geting of safety interventions. Safe clinical work 
is responsive to contextual factors, many of 
which may not be predictable. Thus, understand-
ing how clinicians use strategies to manage and 
adapt their work in response to contextual factors 
[3] is central to understanding how to support 
resilient and safe health systems.
Since the publication of the Institute of 
Medicine’s report To Err Is Human in 1999 [4], 
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there has been growing concern about the 
 potential for medical errors due to the disruptive 
nature of clinical work environments. Hospital 
environments have been characterised by dyna-
mism, complexity, interrelations, time and 
resource constraints, and have been identified to 
be at greater risk of errors than many other set-
tings [5–8]. Due to the interconnected nature of 
clinical work, the introduction of a new technol-
ogy or other system interventions may have 
unintended knock-on effects. A thorough under-
standing of clinical workflow contributes to the 
anticipation and containment of such unintended 
consequences.
28.2  Studying Clinical Workflow
28.2.1  Approaches for Studying 
Clinical Workflows
Some traditional methods used to study clinical 
work and its resultant outcomes (safety), include 
compiling and assessing medicolegal claims, 
medical record review, performance assessment, 
international quality and safety indicator bench-
marking, and initiatives such as the Italian 
National Outcome Plan (Italian PNE). Each of 
these approaches contributes data to provide 
information on particular safety issues on which 
there may be potential to intervene. Often evalu-
ations of safety rely upon such administrative 
data but many of these sources fail to reveal the 
context in which clinical care was performed: the 
social dynamics, the interactions with devices 
and tools, behaviours that adapt to circumstances, 
and the patient’s changing condition.
Direct observation of clinical work in situ pro-
vides an opportunity to gain new insights into the 
relationships between the way work is performed 
in everyday situations and the safety of care 
delivered. Data focusing on clinical workflow 
and clinical outcomes are essential for identify-
ing critical issues and organisational solutions to 
improve quality of care, ensuring reasonable 
workloads and the well-being and safety of both 
healthcare providers and patients.
Quantitative studies of clinical work can 
deliver data on the time spent managing different 
types of activities, their frequency and duration, 
along with the frequency, duration and sources of 
interruptions and disruptions to work. The extent 
to which clinicians work on multiple tasks (mul-
titasking) can also be assessed. These data can be 
compared with staff perceptions of their work 
patterns. For example, measuring observed 
sources of interruptions compared to reports of 
interruption sources by staff may identify types 
of interruptions which cause the most disruption/
annoyance to clinical staff [9]. Thus, sharing 
quantitative direct work observational data with 
staff provides a valuable source of evidence to 
raise awareness of actual work practices and can 
inform the design of interventions to support safe 
work.
Gathering comprehensive information about 
clinical workflows within a wider organisational 
context is not a simple matter; at best, data will 
represent a snapshot related to a specific time 
frame and be closely related to specific social and 
organisational dynamics. Further linking work 
patterns to specific outcomes can be methodolog-
ically challenging.
28.2.2  Time and Motion Studies
‘Time and motion’ research is an overarching 
term for a range of direct observation methods 
that aim to continuously observe and record an 
individual’s activities over a certain period of 
time. Early examples of time and motion studies 
in healthcare often focused on efficiency. Time 
and motion clinical workflow studies have more 
recently been moving towards linking workflows 
and clinical outcomes, but this is more 
challenging.
The development of technological tools for 
collecting time and motion observations has 
allowed the design of more comprehensive, mul-
tidimensional studies. A variety of computer- 
based tools are available for recording time and 
motion data to study clinical workflow [10]. Such 
tools free observers from recording, for example, 
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detailed time-task information, as electronic 
timestamps are automated. Such tools have 
moved beyond just collection of information 
about task frequency and time to consider dimen-
sions such as the location of work, people 
involved, and tools/equipment used. Given 
research evidence of the potential safety implica-
tions of excessive interruptions to clinical work 
[11], most tools will also seek to collect informa-
tion about interruptions/disruptions and multi-
tasking behaviours.
One such tool is the Work Observation Method 
By Activity Timing (WOMBAT) technique [12], 
originally developed in 2007, which provides a 
reliable method for investigating clinical work 
and communication patterns, and how these are 
impacted by the implementation of interventions 
such as health information technologies. 
WOMBAT advanced existing time and motion 
methods by enabling the collection of multiple 
dimensions of work (e.g. who, what, when, why 
and how) that are all accurately timestamped, 
thus better reflecting the complexity of clinical 
work. Rather than only being able to record one 
task at a time, WOMBAT can record multiple 
tasks occurring simultaneously (multitasking), 
capture all the characteristics of the tasks that are 
occurring, as well as automatically timestamping 
the duration of each task and the duration of over-
lapping (multitasking) time. WOMBAT can also 
be used to record tasks that have been interrupted 
by another task, capture the characteristics of the 
interrupting task, capture the duration that the 
task remains interrupted, as well as if, and when, 
the interrupted task is returned to. Comprehensive 
contextual information about the other people 
involved in tasks (e.g. patients, colleagues), time 
of day/week, location and any other characteris-
tics can be included in a WOMBAT data collec-
tion template to capture and build a picture of 
how clinical work is performed in the real world. 
These rich, multidimensional data assist in eluci-
dating the links between workflow and safety. 
The workflow time study approach combined 
with surveys or interviews increases the potential 
to capture work complexity, social dynamics and 
personal motivations. Obtaining baseline data 
about current patterns of work is also important 
for assessing the effects of interventions designed 
to improve care delivery models.
28.2.3  What Types of Questions Can 
Clinical Workflow Studies 
Answer?
Clinical workflow studies can be used to investi-
gate a range of questions related to the relation-
ship between work and safety. For example, to:
• Describe and compare the work patterns of 
different professional groups to consider 
implications for cognitive load and safety. 
Also, to allow comparisons between groups, 
settings, time and countries [13–15].
• Assess compliance with safety procedures. 
For example, Gon et al. investigated specific 
hand hygiene practices among birth attendants 
in Zanzibar [16].
• Identify workflow effects on cognitive load 
(e.g. interruptions, multitasking) and errors. 
For example, by examining the extent of inter-
ruptions to work, response to interruptions 
and also whether these interruptions were 
associated with task errors [1, 5, 11, 17, 18].
• Measure the impact of interventions or new 
practices on clinical workflows, and the poten-
tial impacts of any changes to safety [15, 19–
21]. For example, Westbrook et al. conducted 
a study of pharmacists’ work in the UK and 
Australia before and after the implementation 
of an electronic medication management sys-
tem to assess changes in their task-time distri-
bution and interruption rates [15] (Table 28.1).
28.2.4  Interruptions
One area of clinical workflow that has received 
more intensive study has been the association 
between errors and work interruptions [44]. 
Interruption science represents one of the models 
for how we can approach the broader study of 
socio-technical systems in patient safety [45]. 
The combination of multitasking (carrying out 
multiple tasks simultaneously) and interruptions 
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Table 28.1 Studies using the Work Observation Method By Activity Timing (WOMBAT) technique to measure clini-
cal workflow and relationships with patient safety
Clinical workflow studies measuring work patterns of different groups
Ampt et al. [22] 2007 Registered nurses Australia
Ampt and Westbrook [23] 2007 Nurses (geriatric, respiratory, renal/vascular) Australia
Ballerman et al. [24] 2011 ICU staff (physicians, nurses, respiratory therapists, unit clerks) Canada
Bellandi et al. [25] 2018 Doctors and nurses in surgical units Italy
Cavaye et al. [26] 2018 Community pharmacists Australia
Graham et al. [27] 2018 ED physicians Canada
Hand et al. [28] 2019 Renal dialysis dieticians USA
Holmqvist et al. [29] 2018 Nurses in home healthcare Sweden
Lehnbom et al. [30] 2016 Paediatric hospital pharmacists Australia
Shaw et al. [31] 2011 ICU nurses Canada
Westbrook et al. [32] 2011 Nurses Australia
Westbrook and Ampt [12] 2009 Nurses Australia
Westbrook et al. [33] 2008 Hospital doctors Australia
Sinsky et al. [34] 2016 Physicians (primary, cardiology, orthopaedics) USA
Clinical workflow studies examining contextual factors that impact workflow
Arabadzhiyska et al. [35] 2013 Junior doctors Australia
Hefter et al. [36] 2015 ICU physicians and physician assistants USA
Hefter et al. [37] 2015 ICU physicians USA
Hefter et al. [38] 2016 ICU physicians USA
Li et al. [39] 2016 ICU physicians Australia
Richardson et al. [13] 2016 Junior doctors Australia
Walter et al. [17] 2014 ED clinicians, ward doctors, ward nurses Australia
Walter et al. [3] 2017 ED physicians Australia
Walter et al. [1] 2019 ED physicians Australia
Clinical workflow studies examining cognitive load, interruptions, multitasking, errors
Ballerman et al. [40] 2010 ICU staff (physicians, nurses, respiratory therapists, unit clerks) Canada
Ballerman et al. [21] 2012 ICU staff (physicians, nurses, respiratory therapists, unit clerks) Canada
Ballerman et al. [41] 2010 ICU staff (physicians and nurses) Canada
Bellandi et al. [25] 2018 Doctors and nurses in surgical units Italy
Hefter et al. [37] 2015 ICU physicians USA
Hefter et al. [38] 2016 ICU physicians USA
Walter et al. [17] 2014 ED clinicians, ward doctors, ward nurses Australia
Walter et al. [3] 2017 ED physicians Australia
Walter et al. [1] 2019 ED physicians Australia
Westbrook et al. [11] 2018 ED physicians Australia
Westbrook et al. [33] 2008 Hospital doctors Australia
Clinical workflow studies examining effect of interventions or changes in practice
Ballerman et al. [42] 2011 ICU staff (physicians, nurses, respiratory therapists) Canada
Callen et al. [19] 2013 Nurses (Rheumatology dept) Australia
Georgiou et al. [20] 2017 ED physicians Australia
Westbrook et al. [2] 2013 Hospital physicians and nurses Australia
Westbrook et al. [9] 2017 Nurses Australia
Westbrook et al. [15] 2019 Hospital pharmacists UK and 
Australia
Westbrook et al. [14] 2016 Hospital pharmacists UK and 
Australia
Lo et al. [43] 2010 Hospital pharmacists Australia
Clinical workflow studies examining compliance with specific safety procedures
Gon et al. [16] 2018 Birth attendants in labour wards Zanzibar
Westbrook et al. [9] 2017 Nurses Australia
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is a potent latent source of clinical error [33, 46, 
47]. Direct observation in situ can assist in under-
standing the nature of interruptions and their 
impacts. For example, a study of emergency 
department physicians measured the relation-
ships between interruptions and prescribing 
errors and demonstrated that physicians were 
nearly three times as likely to make a clinical pre-
scribing error when interrupted [11].
The strategies that clinicians use to respond to 
interruptions can also be observed [3, 17]. Such 
data may provide insights into why many inter-
ruptions do not result in harm [44] and point to 
interventions which may effectively reduce 
unnecessary interruptions, as well as mitigate 
their negative effects. Considerable attention dur-
ing the study design phase must be placed on 
clearly defining what constitutes an interruption 
and the types of response behaviours which may 
be observed [46].
28.2.5  Multitasking
Multitasking is an important dimension of clinical 
work. Workflow measurements have often not 
accounted for multitasking in a sophisticated way, 
that is, they have often had observers identify the 
primary task and ignore the collection of data on 
secondary tasks. More recent studies have started 
to develop methods for capturing concurrent work 
tasks and investigating their effects on cognitive 
load. For example, Westbrook et al. showed that 
among emergency physicians, multitasking while 
prescribing medication was associated with mak-
ing more administrative/procedural errors (for 
example not using standard terminology), but not 
associated with an increase in clinical prescribing 
errors (e.g. wrong dose) [11].




Although tools such as WOMBAT provide a 
standardised methodology for conducting clini-
cal workflow research, there are many important 
local factors to be considered when conducting 
these types of studies.
Examples of practical issues that must be con-
sidered include:
• Study design. Consider if a validated study 
data collection template (e.g. modelled on a 
published workflow study) would be suitable 
or if customisation is required to suit the local 
context (e.g. physical locations, types of clini-
cal work tasks to be observed) or the particular 
research focus.
• Ethical considerations. Considerations around 
local ethics approval requirements, voluntary 
recruitment of study participants, obtaining 
consent from participants to be observed, pro-
cedures for study withdrawal, how to inform 
patients, and procedures for what observers 
should do if they observe a potential safety 
issue.
• Patient privacy. Clinicians may need to con-
duct procedures, physically assess the patient 
or discuss sensitive aspects of patient care, and 
thus observers need to always be cognisant of 
and respect patient privacy and dignity.
• Engagement. To facilitate buy-in from hospi-
tal management and staff, it is helpful to hold 
information sessions to discuss the research 
and introduce the observers, develop a posi-
tive rapport with staff, alleviate potential con-
cerns about scrutiny of individual work 
practices (i.e. data from multiple participants 
is aggregated), and arrange feedback sessions 
to report key research findings.
28.4  Data Quality, Analysis 
and Interpretation in Clinical 
Workflow Studies
There are several challenges in analysing and 
interpreting data collected in time and motion 
studies [48]. Some difficulties concern the data 
processing steps needed in order to perform fur-
ther statistical modelling, and stem from the data 
format and nature. Others are related to data 
quality and inter-observer variability, and further 
ones concern sampling units and the type of sta-
tistical tests that can be applied.
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28.4.1  Important Practical 
Considerations with Ensuring 
Data Quality in Workflow 
Studies
• Study data collection
Whenever practicable, it is preferable to use a 
validated data collection tool/technique. This 
ensures that the data variables to be collected 
have been previously tested and their defini-
tions/scope well developed. Use of validated 
data collection categories also allows for 
direct comparison across study findings.
• Sample selection
Consider the research questions and, thus, the 
type of staff that need to be included in the 
study sample (e.g. all staff or a specific profes-
sional group). Develop a sampling strategy to 
ensure that the collected data are representa-
tive across the sample of staff (i.e. proportion 
of time each participant or participant group is 
observed should be distributed appropriately, 
so that no one participant’s/group’s work prac-
tices are overrepresented proportionally to 
their contribution to the staff mix).
• Observational period
With the study research objectives in mind, 
consideration needs to be given to determin-
ing the observation period (e.g. day/evening/
night shifts, weekdays, weekends, public holi-
days). Observation periods should be equally 
distributed, and observation of participants 
should be randomised across the selected 
times/days/observers. The length of each 
observation session also needs to be consid-
ered. Depending on the work activities being 
captured, observer fatigue may set in after 2 h 
of intensive observation and impact data 
quality.
• Observers
Observers are integral to the success of any 
observational workflow study. Consideration 
needs to be given to observer selection (e.g. is 
it vital for the observer to be a clinician or 
have clinical knowledge/understanding?). For 
example, in a study about nursing activities, 
ward nurses have the advantage of being 
familiar with the organisational process but 
must acquire skills and experience in using 
and interacting with the observation tool. 
External observers, on the other hand, can be 
more facilitated in interacting with WOMBAT, 
but require more training and discussion with 
healthcare workers to correctly identify and 
record observed activities. Observer training 
is also critical to ensure they understand the 
methods of data collection and are intimately 
familiar with the definitions/scope of the work 
activity variables to be collected. Where more 
than one observer is collecting data, inter-rater 
reliability among the observers needs to be 
measured to ensure data consistency and 
integrity. For studies with a long period of 
data collection, random inter- observer reli-
ability measures should be undertaken 
throughout the data collection period to ensure 
the consistency of observers over time.
28.4.2  Analysis
A dataset from a time and motion study typically 
comprises data collected in different observation 
sessions, conducted at different times during the 
day/week, and possibly by different observers. In 
its minimal form, the dataset will have as many 
records as the number of “tasks” observed in the 
various sessions, one record (i.e. row) for each 
task. Observer, session and task-related informa-
tion will be stored in several columns, along with 
other timing information (e.g. start and end 
times). In the presence of multitasking, to be able 
to accurately compute task-specific statistics, 
such as interruption rates or proportions of task 
times, for each task categories one must first 
identify all the instances of multitasking involv-
ing tasks of the same category. In these cases, in 
fact, simply summing up the durations of all the 
observed tasks in a category to get the denomina-
tors for computing rates or proportions (but also 
for regression modelling) would lead to underes-
timation of these statistics, since all multitasking 
instances (i.e. time intervals) involving two or 
more tasks of the same category would be 
counted twice or more. Identifying these 
instances and correcting the computation of the 
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statistics from raw data is not a trivial task and 
algorithms can have issues of computational time 
complexity.
To estimate confidence intervals and test 
hypotheses about differences between groups, 
valid methods can be, respectively, bootstrap 
resampling and Monte Carlo permutation tests. 
For both goals, in fact, parametric methods have 
limitations when the test measure is the propor-
tion of a continuous variable (such as time on 
specific types of tasks), since the sample size is 
not clearly defined (there are conceptual ambi-
guities related to task definition), and the few 
proposed methods can have drawbacks such as 
allowing nonsensical intervals extremes (i.e. 
upper limit above 100%). Multilevel regression 
modelling is also an appropriate method for asso-
ciation studies, since it allows inclusion of covari-
ates to control for factors that can be hard to 
control for in observational studies in a real con-
text, and also to account for individual variability 
between participants, observers and setting/loca-
tion. This is particularly suitable for multicentric 
studies in which multiple observers are used, and 
random variability related to these factors could 
reduce statistical power and undermine the pos-
sibility to draw conclusions on the effectiveness 
of interventions and/or limit the generalisability 
of the results.
28.4.3  Inter-observer Reliability
Finally, inter-observer reliability assessment, 
required when several observers are involved and 
to verify learning progress during training of 
observers, also presents many challenges, due to 
the multivariate, timestamped and ordered nature 
of the data from observation studies, which limits 
the applicability of traditional inter-rater reliabil-
ity assessment methods [49]. First of all, mea-
sures such as Cohen’s kappa, are only applicable 
to one variable at the time, so that high k scores 
for one aspect can be achieved even if two observ-
ers disagree substantially on other variables 
object of their observation (e.g. the presence/
absence of multitasking, the category of the sec-
ond tasks). Secondly, computing these measures 
first requires matching pairs of tasks from differ-
ent observers’ data referring to the same task, a 
problem that cannot be done with perfect cer-
tainty. A way to overcome this issue could be that 
of either using non parametric tests to compare 
aggregate proportions between different observ-
ers, which avoids completely the need of pairing 
tasks, or to restructure the data in smaller time 
windows (e.g. 1 s) which can be perfectly aligned 
and matched, although restructuring can be tricky 
and sometimes computationally costly. Janson 
and Olsson, moreover, proposed a measure of 
agreement between two or more observers on 
multivariate categorical data which could be used 
on the time window data to overcome the limita-
tions concerning single measures [50, 51]. More 
generally speaking, it is necessary to be aware 
that a single method for assessing IOR will be 
always necessarily insufficient to address all the 
different aspects on which observers in time and 
motion studies can disagree, that there can be 
trade-offs between different possible alternatives 
that should be considered in the light of the spe-
cific study’s aims, and strive to adopt a composite 
method whenever possible to limit the impact of 
observers’ bias, and to be as transparent and 
detailed as possible in reporting the exact meth-
ods used.
28.4.4  Disseminating Findings 
to Influence Practice 
and Policy
An aspect that is often overlooked is the impor-
tance of disseminating the results of time and 
motion studies. It is clear that disseminating the 
outcome of a study in scientific peer-reviewed 
journals and at conferences is essential for 
increasing our understanding of workflow in 
healthcare contexts and of complex—and possi-
bly disruptive—phenomena such as interruptions 
and multitasking. As was previously highlighted, 
given the great variability in workflow studies 
and in the light of the unique challenges they 
posit, it is very important to be explicit in report-
ing the details of the methodology, including the 
definitions of task categories, interruptions and 
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multitasking, as well as the IOR assessment strat-
egy and methods used, beside the actual mea-
sures, to ease results interpretation and 
comparisons with different studies/contexts.
Less considered is the relevance of results dis-
semination within the organisational context in 
which a study was conducted. After a study was 
conducted workshops or dedicated ad hoc events 
should always be organised to present the results 
to the healthcare workers that were observed and 
the organisation’s management team. Besides 
increasing staff awareness of the relevance of 
these phenomena and of their possible conse-
quences in terms of errors, presenting and dis-
cussing results is a way to better understand and 
interpret the results. Involving all actors in the 
identification and refinement of possible organ-
isational solutions to reduce or minimise the neg-
ative impact of these phenomena and ultimately 
increase safety and quality of care is also likely to 
increase the uptake of future interventions.
28.5  Conclusion
There is much to be learnt from the specific anal-
ysis of clinical workflow and how it relates to 
patient safety [5]. Time and motion studies pro-
vide a robust method by which to measure clini-
cal workflows, particularly taking advantage of 
new electronic tools for data collection. Close 
collaborations between clinical staff and 
researchers conducting such studies is central for 
success, from the design stage to the final inter-
pretation of results. Most importantly is ensuring 
that new information is used to inform changes in 
practice and policy which support clinical staff in 
their work to deliver safe care to patients.
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29.1  Introduction to Shift Work
29.1.1  Definition and Main Features
The correct organization of health worker shift-
work is essential to ensure continuous 24-h 
patient care. Healthcare is the perfect example of 
the “24-h society,” whose milestones are the vari-
ous types of shift work (night work, split shifts, 
on-call work, part-time work, irregular and flexi-
ble working hours) and new technologies. In gen-
eral, “shiftwork” means any structure of work in 
which the operating time of a company is 
extended beyond the usual 8 or 9  h (typically 
between 7–8  a.m. and 5–6  p.m.), to cover the 
entire 24  h, through the alternation of different 
groups of workers [1, 2].
To ensure 24-h coverage, shift work must also 
include night work which, according to 
International Labour Organization Convention 
No. 171 [3], is defined as “all work which is per-
formed during a period of not less than seven 
consecutive hours, including the interval from 
midnight to 5 a.m. (night time).” The European 
Directive 2003/88/EC [4] defines a “night 
worker” as “(a) any worker who, during the night, 
works at least three hours of his daily working 
time as a normal course; (b) any worker who 
works a certain proportion of his annual working 
time, as defined at the choice of the Member 
State concerned.”
Shift scheduling may differ with respect to 
various parameters including:
• Duration of duty period: predominantly rang-
ing from 6 to 8 or 9 h, but it can last up to 12 h 
or more, or be reduced to 4 h (in the case of 
part-time work).
• Semicontinuous or continuous rota systems: 
depending on the inclusion of weekends or 
Sundays.
• Presence and frequency of work during the 
“nighttime.”
• Number and type of shifts: mainly two shifts 
(morning and afternoon) or three shifts 
(including the night) of 7–9 h, or four shifts of 
6 h (morning, afternoon, evening, night, in the 
so-called “6 × 6” shift system).
• Start and end times of each shift: for example, 
morning shift (starting after 03:00 and ending 
before 18:00), day shift (starting after 08:00 
and ending before 18:00), evening shift (start-
ing at any time between 18:00 and 23:00 and 
not categorized as a night shift), night (≥3 h 
between 23:00 and 06:00).
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• Direction of shift rotation: clockwise or phase- 
delayed (morning-afternoon-night), counter-
clockwise or phase-advanced 
(afternoon-morning-night).
• Speed of rotation among shifts: fast (every 
1–3  days), intermediate (every 4–6  days), 
slow (7 or more days), null (in the case of 
fixed shifts).
• Regularity/irregularity and length of the entire 
shift cycle (i.e., from 5 days up to 6 months or 
more).
Shift work can have adverse effects on the 
health and well-being of the worker who must be 
operative at all times and on days off. In particu-
lar, shift work causes significant interference in 
the different domains of human life (biological, 
behavioral, social) and alters the psychophysical 
balance of a person, in particular: (1) the pertur-
bation of circadian rhythms; (2) a reduction in 
vigilance and performance, leading to a conse-
quently greater risk of errors and accidents; (3) 
adverse health effects both in the short-term 
(sleep, digestive, mental and menstrual disor-
ders) and in the medium- to long-term (increased 
gastrointestinal, neuropsychic, metabolic, cardio-
vascular diseases); (4) difficulties in maintaining 
social roles, which have negative consequences 
on interpersonal relationships and family care. 
Several studies suggest that shiftwork also 
increases the risk of breast, prostate, and colorec-
tal cancers.
Shift workers must be adequately informed 
about this occupational risk factor and must be 
guaranteed adequate organization of working 
times based on proven ergonomic criteria as well 
as appropriate compensatory measures to miti-
gate adverse effects.
29.1.2  Chronobiological Aspects
“Circadian rhythm” describes the physiological 
oscillations occurring in biological functions over 
the course of 24 h. The word “circadian” comes 
from Latin, where “circa” means “around” and 
“diem” means “day.” In humans, the circadian 
master clock resides in the suprachiasmatic 
nucleus of the anterior hypothalamus and is syn-
chronized by environmental factors, in particular 
light/dark alternation. By way of the retino- 
hypothalamic tract, external light influences the 
expression of the CLOCK and BMAL1 genes, 
which are the main regulators of the periodic 
oscillations that occur during the light/dark cycle. 
The binding of CLOCK and BMAL1 activates 
other genes such as the Period genes that are also 
responsible for the physiological oscillation of the 
circadian rhythm by means of an inhibitory feed-
back loop. Period genes encode for the PER pro-
tein, whose level rises during the night and 
decreases during the day. Based on the light stim-
uli received and the genes activated as a result, the 
suprachiasmatic nucleus regulates the secretion of 
melatonin from the pineal gland: melatonin levels 
increase during the dark of night and decrease 
under the exposure to light during the day [5].
Shift work, in particular night work, modifies 
human exposure to the light/dark cycle and con-
sequently the normal circadian oscillation of bio-
logical functions. This alteration involves a 
flattening of the amplitude and a shift of the acro-
phase of circadian rhythms, the extent of which 
depends on the number of consecutive night 
shifts and the direction of rotation, clockwise or 
counterclockwise, of the on-duty periods. The 
type of shift work, whether rotating or fixed, can 
also affect the oscillation of circadian rhythms. 
Workers involved in continuously rotating shifts, 
the most widely used in the health sector, are 
forced to adapt as quickly as possible to changing 
work times, resulting in significant work-stress. 
Fixed-shift workers, on the other hand, are more 
likely to keep their sleep/wake cycle stable, pro-
vided they keep a consistent schedule even on 
days off.
29.2  Effects of Shift Work 
on Worker Health 
and Impact on Patient Safety
29.2.1  Sleep Deprivation 
and Vigilance
The disturbance of the psychobiological 
functions, linked to the modification of the 
sleep/wake cycle, plays an important role in 
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influencing work ability. Shift workers can suffer 
from a series of symptoms commonly known as 
“jet-lag syndrome,” characterized by fatigue, 
drowsiness, insomnia, digestive troubles, and the 
slowing down of mental functions and 
performance.
The timing of shifts (especially night and 
early-morning), the environmental conditions, 
and workers’ lifestyles can negatively affect both 
quantity and quality of sleep. After the night 
shift, a worker should be placed in favorable con-
ditions for psychophysical recovery. However, 
falling asleep and sleeping longer are very diffi-
cult due to environmental interference such as 
light and noise. Sleep is generally reduced by 
about 2–4 h: in particular, phase 2 of non-rapid 
eye movement sleep (NREM) and rapid eye 
movement sleep (REM) are disturbed. The REM 
phase is also particularly reduced by the early- 
morning shift (starting at 6  a.m. or earlier) 
because of a truncation of the last part of the 
sleep cycle; moreover, this advanced waking time 
usually causes excessive daytime sleepiness dur-
ing the waking period. The direction of rotation 
of shifts can also influence sleep patterns and cir-
cadian rhythms: clockwise-rotating shift sched-
ules are less disruptive than counterclockwise 
ones. In very quickly rotating shifts for example, 
the intervals between shifts rotating clockwise 
(1M-1A-1N) are longer (always 24 h) than those 
between shifts rotating according to a counter-
clockwise system (1A-1M-1N) which places the 
morning shift immediately after the afternoon 
shift and before the night shift of the very same 
day (“quick return”): in the latter case, rest inter-
vals between shifts are very short (only 8 h), thus 
implying the truncation of sleep preceding the 
morning shift and the possibility of only a very 
short sleep or nap before the night shift [6].
It is well known that sleepiness, sleep depriva-
tion, chronic fatigue, and fluctuations in vigilance 
are key factors in creating the conditions that lead 
to human errors and accidents through interac-
tions with other organizational factors, such as 
environmental conditions, workload, job content, 
and time pressure. Insomnia, one of the core 
symptoms of shift work disorder, has a preva-
lence of about 6% in the general population and 
between 29% and 38% in shift workers [7]. 
Symptoms include difficulties falling asleep, 
reduced sleep duration, frequent waking, and an 
intense preoccupation with the act of sleeping 
itself.
Fatigue, drowsiness, and insomnia resulting 
from a disturbed sleep-wake cycle can manifest 
themselves as the so-called “shift work sleep dis-
order,” which negatively affects physical and 
mental health, quality of life, performance, and 
productivity. A study by Drake et al. [8] investi-
gating 2570 US workers aged 18–65  years 
reported that 14% of night workers and 8% of 
rotating shift workers met the criteria for shift 
work sleep disorder. Such individuals had signifi-
cantly higher rates of ulcers (odds ratio of 4.18), 
sleepiness-related accidents, absenteeism, and 
depression, and missed family and social activi-
ties more frequently compared to shift workers 
who did not meet the criteria.
Concerning personal characteristics, 
Kalmbach et  al. [9] reported that in a group of 
normal sleeping, non-shift workers, the chances 
of developing shift work disorder after transition-
ing to rotating shifts were over five times greater 
for highly sleep-sensitive individuals. In a longi-
tudinal study including 1533 Norwegian nurses, 
Waage et al. [10] showed that the risk of develop-
ing a shift work disorder was significantly associ-
ated with the number of night shifts worked in the 
previous year, the Epworth sleepiness score, the 
use of melatonin, the use of bright light therapy, 
and symptoms of depression.
29.2.2  Interference in Performance 
Efficiency and Patient Safety
Shift and night work, as well as prolonged and/or 
irregular working hours, are also risk factors for 
patient safety, a fact well documented by many 
epidemiological studies. The working conditions 
of the night shift differ from those of the day 
shift. In particular, the night shift involves fewer 
employees who have to take care of many 
patients. The increased workload and the altera-
tion of the sleep-wake rhythm increases the risk 
of making clinical errors.
Studies in the industrial sector have shown 
that risk grows with the number of consecutive 
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night shifts (6% increase for the second night, 
17% for the third, and 36% for the fourth) and 
with the lengthening of work shifts, noting an 
exponential increase in the occurrence of acci-
dents after the eighth hour of work and estimat-
ing a doubling of the risk for 12-h shifts compared 
to 8-h shifts, for which there is no corresponding 
reduction in workload or introduction of ade-
quate breaks.
Similar results are also reported for the hospital 
workers, including a higher relative risk of acci-
dents in afternoon and night shifts, resulting in 
longer periods of absence, as well as reduced lev-
els of attention and vigilance and increased error 
associated with long shifts (24 h or more) [11–13]. 
On the other hand, it is also known that a signifi-
cant improvement of these outcomes can come 
from limiting the length of work shifts [14, 15].
According to a study of 2737 US medical resi-
dents [16], the incidence of at least one major 
mistake was 3.8%, 9.8%, and 16%, in the case of 
0 shifts, 1–4 shifts, and more than 4 shifts of pro-
longed duration (32 h on average), respectively, 
with a 300% increase in preventable adverse 
events due to fatigue and/or sleep deprivation 
resulting in the death of the patient. Other core 
symptoms of fatigue are exhaustion, tiredness, 
and lethargy, resulting in loss of efficiency, diffi-
culty in concentrating, as well as a decrease in 
productivity and safety at work.
In the case of nurses, too, an increase has been 
documented in the occurrence of errors, that 
jeopardize patient safety, dependent on the dura-
tion of a shift beyond 8  h, overtime, and night 
work shifts [17–19]. In addition, other studies 
have shown that, when coupled with high patient 
turnover, extended shifts or a reduced number of 
staff are associated with an increase in hospital 
mortality. In addition, other studies reveal signifi-
cant association between increased hospital mor-
tality rates and extended shifts or reduced staff 
along with high patient turnover (YES IT IS) [20, 
21].
A very recent national survey on work pat-
terns and fatigue-related outcomes carried out on 
3133 nurses of 6 practice hospital areas (child 
health including neonatology, cardiac care/inten-
sive care, emergency and trauma, inpatient men-
tal health, medical, and surgical nursing) in New 
Zealand showed that 30.8% of errors in the previ-
ous 6 months were fatigue-related while 64% of 
responders reported having felt sleepy at the 
wheel in the previous 12 months. Fatigue-related 
outcomes were associated with shift timing and 
sleep. Risk increased with more night shifts and 
decreased with more nights of sleep between 
11  p.m. and 7  a.m. during which nurses had 
enough sleep to feel fully rested. Risk also 
increased with roster changes and more shift 
extensions greater than 30  min, and decreased 
with more flexibility regarding shifts [22].
29.2.3  Health Disorders
The literature in recent years shows that shift 
work can cause serious medium- and long-term 
effects on the worker health due to the disruption 
of physiological circadian rhythms [1, 23]). 
Hence, the socioeconomic and health- related 
consequences of sleep and circadian rhythm dis-
orders in shift workers, such as absenteeism and 
mood disorders, should likewise not be underes-
timated [24].
Irritability, nervousness, and anxiety are fre-
quent complaints from shift workers, relating to 
more stressful working conditions. In association 
with persistent disruption of circadian rhythms 
and sleep deficit, they may lead to mood disor-
ders, chronic anxiety, and/or depression,  fostering 
absenteeism and often requiring the administra-
tion of sedatives and hypnotics [25].
After the aforementioned sleep troubles, gas-
trointestinal disorders are the most frequent mor-
bidities found among shift workers. In particular, 
the risk of gastroduodenitis, peptic ulcer, and irri-
table bowel syndrome is two to five times higher 
for shift and night workers [26]. The mismatch 
between circadian phases of the gastrointestinal 
tract (i.e., gastric, bile, and pancreatic secretions, 
intestinal mobility, hunger and satiety hormones) 
and meal times is one of the causes for this 
increased prevalence among shift workers, who 
are most frequently forced to consume “junk 
food,” which are pre-packaged and more caloric, 
and “pep” and soft drinks [27].
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Many epidemiological studies have demon-
strated a significant association between shift 
work and metabolic syndrome [28], insulin resis-
tance, and type 2 diabetes [29, 30].
Moreover, according to several authors, shift 
workers have a 40% higher risk than day workers 
of suffering from ischemic heart disease [31, 32], 
relating to circadian disruption along with dis-
turbed cardiac autonomic control and detrimental 
lifestyle changes, such as obesity and smoking 
[33]. A recent meta-analysis by Manohar et  al. 
[34] also reported a significant association 
between hypertension and rotating shift work.
Night shift work negatively affects female fer-
tility and reproductive health and is associated 
with an increased risk of adverse pregnancy out-
comes such as miscarriage and impaired fetal 
development, including pre-term birth and low 
birth weight [35]. In 2007, “shift work involving 
circadian disruption” was classified as “probably 
carcinogenic to humans” (Group 2A) by the 
International Agency for Research on Cancer 
(IARC) on the basis of sufficient evidence in ani-
mal models and limited evidence in humans, in 
particular for breast cancer. A positive associa-
tion between high-intensity, long-duration night 
shift work and breast cancer has also been 
reported in large populations of nurses [36]. 
Experimental animal and cellular studies found 
immunosuppression, chronic inflammation, and 
cell proliferation caused by the disruption of the 
light-dark cycle. According to recent epidemio-
logical studies, weaker evidence is also emerging 
for colorectal and prostate cancer: this has lead 
the IARC to confirm very recently its assessment 
of night shift work as a probable carcinogen [37].
29.3  Preventive Actions 
and Recommendations
29.3.1  Ergonomic Criteria 
for the Organization of Shift 
Schedules
Healthcare companies must also consider the 
well-being of their employees when organizing 
shift work. Shifts must be planned based on ergo-
nomic criteria that protect the psychophysical 
integrity and social well-being of workers. These 
criteria must take into account biological adapta-
tion, work performance, health status, and per-
sonal and social problems, and can be summarized 
as follows [38, 39]:
• The amount of night work and the number of 
consecutive night shifts should be reduced as 
much as possible (2–3 at most) to limit inter-
ference with circadian rhythms and sleep.
• Quickly rotating shift systems should be cho-
sen over slowly rotating ones, since they 
interfere less with circadian rhythms and 
minimize the extent of any cumulative sleep 
deficit.
• Clockwise rotation (morning-afternoon-night) 
should be preferred to counterclockwise rota-
tion (afternoon-morning-night) since it is bet-
ter adapted to endogenous circadian rhythms 
(which show a periodicity slightly longer than 
24  h in “free-running” experiments), avoids 
quick changeovers (e.g., having morning and 
night shifts within the same day), and allows 
for longer rest periods for immediate recovery 
from fatigue and sleep deficit.
• Setting the start of morning shifts too early 
should be avoided in order to reduce the trun-
cation of sleep (of the REM phase in particu-
lar) and the consequent sleepiness and risk of 
error.
• Prolonged work shifts (9–12 h) should only be 
considered when the workload is suitable, 
adequate pauses may be taken, and the shift 
system is designed to minimize the accumula-
tion of fatigue as well as the exposure to toxic 
substances.
• Shift cycles should be as regular as possible 
and should ensure as many weekends free as 
possible, in order to allow workers to better 
plan and enjoy their leisure and social time.
• Fixed night work should be implemented only 
for particular work situations, which require a 
complete adjustment to night work to ensure 
the highest levels of safety.
• Flexible working time arrangements should 




However, there doesn’t exist a “best” shift sys-
tem that can be recommended across the board. 
Each shift-based work schedule should be 
planned around and tailored to the different job 
activities and demands involved, as well as the 
specific traits, social habits, and personal back-
grounds of the workers involved. Workers must 
participate in the analysis, design, and implemen-
tation of the shift system chosen. This is impor-
tant for motivating workers and improving their 
psychophysical tolerance: indeed, shift schedules 
often fail because they do not reflect the condi-
tions and needs of workers. On the other hand, 
workers sometimes prefer less favorable shift 
patterns (i.e., 12-h shifts or counterclockwise 
rotation) in order to have longer rest periods 
between cycles. As previously mentioned, in sev-
eral cases the rapid transition from morning to 
night shift in the same day, in particular waking 
early in the morning, prefigures an extremely 
stressful and risky condition.
The duration of work shifts should be adjusted 
according to workload and the type of task, as 
well as the number of workers available. Jobs 
requiring high levels of vigilance and physical 
activity (i.e., emergency and intensive care units) 
should have shorter shifts while, on the other 
hand, shifts may be longer for jobs with a lighter 
workload (i.e., basic assistance or support activi-
ties) or jobs during which workers can take 
breaks.
29.3.2  Other Organizational Aspects
When introducing or modifying a shift scheme, 
an effective methodology should follow precise 
steps, including in particular:
 1. A preliminary, general plan taking into 
account the various conditions at play, such as 
legislative and contractual provisions, service 
and/or production requirements, working 
conditions.
 2. A careful analysis of the traits of the persons 
involved, with a focus on demographic aspects 
(e.g., age, gender), workloads in the different 
shifts, risk factors, personal conditions (e.g., 
family and social status, commuting).
 3. The structure of the shift schedule based on 
the previously mentioned ergonomic criteria.
 4. The shift system’s introduction and a verifica-
tion of the degree of acceptability by a sample 
group of workers for a given period, including 
the recording of appropriate indicators (e.g., 
subjective assessment, working behavior, 
absenteeism, errors).
 5. The final implementation of the new shift sys-
tem after adequate adjustments addressing 
any indications emerging from the previous 
phase.
The planning of shift work in hospitals is 
complex because it involves multiple organiza-
tional aspects based on the type of assistance pro-
vided (e.g., intensive care, medical, surgical, 
laboratory, and specialist services) and the opera-
tional standards in terms of the staff/patient ratio, 
the type of intervention, and the quantity and type 
of professionals available and/or necessary in 
each shift. Various interventions aimed at com-
pensating for the inconveniences caused by shift 
work have been proposed and adopted in recent 
years, often in very different and empirical ways 
depending on the different working conditions 
and specific, company-wide problems. According 
to Thierry [40], these interventions can be divided 
into two categories:
 (a) The “counterweights,” intended solely to 
compensate for inconveniences or 
 disturbances caused by the shift system. One 
that is usually (and often uniquely) adopted 
is the increase in remuneration for work per-
formed at night and during holidays. This 
constitutes a simple translation of the various 
aspects of the problem into monetary terms, 
which often has no direct connection to their 
specificity or seriousness, as the increase in 
remuneration may differ considerably as a 
function of contractual rules, trade union 
power, economic conditions, and company 
production needs. Other, more useful “coun-
terweights” represent actions aimed at 
improving working conditions such as envi-
ronmental hygiene, workload, and pace.
 (b) The “counter-values,” aiming at reducing or 
eliminating the causes of adverse conse-
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quences or inconveniences. Among these, the 
following must be reported at an organiza-
tional level: the reduction of night work by 
limiting the number of night shifts during the 
year and/or reducing the duration of the shift 
itself; the introduction of scheduled breaks 
providing an opportunity to enjoy hot meals 
and take short naps; a higher number of com-
pensatory rest days or holidays proportional 
to the number of night shifts worked; the pro-
vision of adequate social services (e.g., trans-
portation, nursery schools, kindergartens) 
through appropriate agreements with local 
authorities and commercial organizations; 
the possibility to switch to day work tempo-
rarily, at regular intervals, and/or perma-
nently after a certain number of years 
assigned to the night shift or at a certain age.
29.4  Some Considerations 
for Resident Doctors
The path to becoming a doctor is notoriously dif-
ficult. Medical residencies are institutional 
internships and are therefore structured to serve 
the dual, often competing, purposes of training 
new generations of professionals while respond-
ing to the working needs of a hospital. Despite 
improvements brought about by good-faith 
efforts, the physical and emotional demands on 
residents have few comparisons in modern soci-
ety. Some of these pressures are inherent to the 
nature of the profession. Most people cannot 
imagine a workday when a mental lapse or an 
error in judgment can deprive another person of 
their hearing, brain functioning, or even life. But 
those in the medical profession are expected to 
grin and bear it, and come back the next morning 
for their 6 a.m. shift.
Other demands are less easily explicable. 
Residents in the USA are expected to spend up to 
80  h a week in the hospital and endure single 
shifts that routinely last up to 28  h, with such 
workdays required on average about four times a 
month [41]. Overall, residents usually work more 
than twice as many hours annually as their peers 
in other white-collar professions, such as attor-
neys in corporate law firms, and face a grueling 
schedule that potentially puts both caregivers and 
patients at risk. In Europe, on the other hand, 
residents are subject to a maximum workweek of 
48 h, with no “apparent” harm to patient care or 
to the educational component of residencies. This 
workweek policy in Europe is just considered to 
be a legal formality, as the extension of work 
hours is common practice in any hospital and 
clinical ward. This disregard for the law, due to 
economical and organizational deficiencies, is 
not just an injustice to the worker, but also a seri-
ous clinical risk to patient safety. Residents are a 
cheap source of skilled labor that can fill gaps in 
staff coverage while being paid a fixed, modest 
salary. Hence the non-compliance with the 
European directive is something even more 
important in the context of residency. Residents 
are usually the last step in the health ladder and 
the more expendable.
This misconduct is so deeply rooted within the 
health system not only by systemic problems 
(such as a shortage of trained medical doctors, a 
lack of nurses, and difficulties in logistics) but 
also because of an overreliance on residents. In 
fact, usually owing to their willingness to learn 
more and learn faster, residents choose to work 
more than dictated by the law, without concern 
for their condition and, unfortunately, for patient 
safety. Surely there is a bigger problem among 
US residents in particular, seeing as, before 2011, 
it was routine for them to spend 100 or even 
120 h a week in the hospital, with single shifts 
extending up to 48  h and beyond. In 2011, the 
Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical 
Education established additional restrictions [42] 
among other things, by reducing the maximum 
shift duration to 16 h for first-year residents (also 
known as “interns”) and to 28 h for more experi-
enced residents [43]. But looking closely at the 
effects of the new rules, it is unclear how much 
residents’ working lives have actually changed. 
Averaging 80-h workweeks and regularly putting 
in 28-h shifts is still brutal by any measure. On 
the other hand, in 2017, the limit placed by the 
2011 law was reverted back to 24 h per shift for 
first-year surgery residents. This change was jus-
tified by the publication of the Bilimoria study 
[44], which claimed that longer shifts may be 
better for patients and for the training of young 
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doctors. The findings of this article have been 
confirmed by another article written about resi-
dents of internal medicine and published in 2019, 
in which it was shown that the exposure of inter-
nists to working time reforms during their resi-
dency was not associated with post-training 
differences in patient mortality, readmissions, or 
costs of care [45].
References
 1. Costa G. Shift work and health: current problems and 
preventive actions. Safety Health Work. 2010;1:112–
23. https://doi.org/10.5491/SHAW.2010.1.2.112.
 2. Costa G. Introduction to problems of shift work. 
In: Iskra-Golec I, Barnes-Farrell J, Bohle P, edi-
tors. Social and family issues in shift work and non 
standard working hours. Switzerland: Springer 
International Publishing; 2016;19–35.
 3. ILO International Labour Organization. C171-night 
work convention, 1990 (No. 171). 1990. https://
www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:
12100:0::NO::P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:312316. 
Accessed 30 Sept 2019.
 4. European Parliament and Council. Directive 
2003/88/EC of 4 November 2003 concerning cer-
tain aspects of the organisation of working time. 
2003. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
ALL/?uri=CELEX:32003L0088. Accessed 30 Sept 
2019.
 5. Seifalian A, Hart A. Circadian rhythms: will it revo-
lutionise the management of diseases? J Lifestyle 
Med. 2019;9(1):1–11. https://doi.org/10.15280/
jlm.2019.9.1.1.
 6. Costa G.  Sleep deprivation due to shift work. 
Handb Clin Neurol. 2015;131:437–46. https://doi.
org/10.1016/B978-0-444-62627-1.00023-8.
 7. Doi Y.  An epidemiologic review on occupational 
sleep research among Japanese workers. Ind Health. 
2005;43:3–10. https://doi.org/10.2486/indhealth.43.3.
 8. Drake CL, Roehrs T, Richardson G, Walsh JK, Roth 
T.  Shift work sleep disorder: prevalence and conse-
quences beyond that of symptomatic day workers. 
Sleep. 2004;27:1453–62.
 9. Kalmbach DA, Pillai V, Cheng P, Arnedt JT, Drake 
CL.  Shift work disorder, depression, and anxiety 
in the transition to rotating shifts: the role of sleep 
reactivity. Sleep Med. 2015;16:1532–8. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.sleep.2015.09.007.
 10. Waage S, Pallesen S, Moen BE, Mageroy N, Flo 
E, Di Milia L, et  al. Predictors of shift work dis-
order among nurses: a longitudinal study. Sleep 
Med. 2014;15:1449–55. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
sleep.2014.07.014.
 11. Gaba DM, Howard SK. Fatigue among clinicians and 
the safety of patients. N Engl J Med. 2002;347:1249–
55. https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMsa020846.
 12. Howard SK, Gaba DM, Smith BE, Weinger 
MB, Herndon C, Keshavacharya S, Rosekind 
MR. Simulation study of rested versus sleep-deprived 
anesthesiologists. Anesthesiology. 2003;98:1345–55. 
https://doi.org/10.1097/00000542-200306000-00008.
 13. Weinger MB, Ancoli-Israel S. Sleep deprivation and 
clinical performance. JAMA. 2002;287:955–7.
 14. Landrigan CP, Rothschild JM, Cronin JW, Kaushal R, 
Burdick E, Katz JT, et al. Effect of reducing interns’ 
work hours on serious medical errors in intensive-care 
units. N Engl J Med. 2004;351:1838–48. https://doi.
org/10.1056/NEJMoa041406.
 15. Lockley SW, Cronin JW, Evans EE, Cade BE, Lee CJ, 
Landrigan CP, et al. Effect of reducing interns’ weekly 
work hours on sleep and attentional failures. N Engl 
J Med. 2004;351:1829–37. https://doi.org/10.1056/
NEJMoa041404.
 16. Barger LK, Ayas NT, Cade BE, et  al. Impact 
of extended-duration shifts on medical errors, 
adverse events, and attentional failures. PLoS Med. 
2006;3(12):e487.
 17. Rogers AE, Hwang W-T, Scott LD, Aiken LH, Dinges 
DF.  The working hours of hospital staff nurses and 
patient safety. Health Aff (Millwood). 2004;23:202–
12. https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.23.4.202.
 18. Scott LD, Rogers AD, Hwang WT, Zhang Y. Effects 
of critical care nurses’ work hours on vigilance and 
patients’ safety. Am J Crit Care. 2006;15:30–7.
 19. Tanaka K, Takahashi M, Hiro H, Kakinuma M, Tanaka 
M, Miyaoka H.  Differences in medical error risk 
among nurses working two- and three-shift systems 
at teaching hospitals: a six-month prospective study. 
Ind Health. 2010;48:357–64. https://doi.org/10.2486/
indhealth.48.357.
 20. Needleman J, Buerhaus P, Pankratz VS, Leibson CL, 
Stevens SR, Harris M. Nurse staffing and impatient 
hospital mortality. N Engl J Med. 2011;364:1037–45. 
https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMsa1001025.
 21. Trinkoff AM, Johantgen M, Storr CL, Gurses AP, 
Liang Y, Han K.  Nurses’ work schedule char-
acteristics, nurse staffing, and patient mortality. 
Nurs Res. 2011;60:1–8. https://doi.org/10.1097/
NNR.0b013e3181fff15d.
 22. Gander P, O’Keeffe K, Santos-Fernandez E, 
Huntington A, Walker L, Willis J. Fatigue and nurses’ 
work patterns: an online questionnaire survey. Int J 
Nurs Stud. 2019;98:67–74. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
ijnurstu.2019.06.011.
 23. ANSES Rapport d’expertise Collective. Évaluation 
des risques sanitaires pour les professionnels expo-
sés à des horaires de travail atypiques, notamment de 
nuit. Paris: Agence Nationale de Sécurité Sanitaire, 
Alimentation, Environnement, Travail; 2016. 
p. 1–408.
 24. Rajaratnam SMW, Barger LK, Lockley SW, Shea SA, 
Wang W, Landrigan CP, et al. Sleep disorders, health, 
and safety in police officers. JAMA. 2011;306:2567–
78. https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2011.1851.
 25. Nakata A, Haratani T, Takahashi M, Kawakami N, 
Arito H, Kobayashi F, et al. Association of sickness 
absence with poor sleep and depressive symptoms 
G. Costa et al.
411
in shift workers. Chronobiol Int. 2004;21:899–912. 
https://doi.org/10.1081/cbi-200038104.
 26. Knutsson A, Boggild H.  Gastrointestinal disorders 
among shift workers. Scand J Work Environ Health. 
2010;36:85–95. https://doi.org/10.5271/sjweh.2897.
 27. Lennernas M, Hambraeus L, Åkerstedt T.  Nutrient 
intake in day and shift workers. Appetite. 1994;8:332–
42. https://doi.org/10.1006/appe.1995.0060.
 28. De Bacquer D, Van Risseghem M, Clays E, Kittel F, 
De Backer G, Braeckman L. Rotating shift work and 
the metabolic syndrome: a prospective study. Int J 
Epidemiol. 2009;38:848–54. https://doi.org/10.1093/
ije/dyn360.
 29. Strohmaier S, Devore EE, Zhang Y, Schernhammer 
ES. A review of data of findings on night shift work 
and the development of DM and CVD events: a syn-
thesis of the proposed molecular mechanisms. Curr 
Diab Rep. 2018;18(12):132. https://doi.org/10.1007/
s11892-018-1102-5.
 30. Suwazono Y, Dochi M, Oishi M, Tanaka K, 
Kobayashi E, Sakata K.  Shiftwork and impaired 
glucose metabolism: a 14-year cohort study on 7104 
male workers. Chronobiol Int. 2009;26:926–41. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/07420520903044422.
 31. Frost P, Kolstad HA, Bonde JP.  Shift work and the 
risk of ischemic heart disease – a systematic review 
of the epidemiologic evidence. Scand J Work Environ 
Health. 2009;35:163–79. https://doi.org/10.5271/
sjweh.1319.
 32. Puttonen S, Härmä M, Hublin C.  Shift work and 
cardiovascular disease  – pathways from circadian 
stress to morbidity. Scand J Work Environ Health. 
2010;36:96–108. https://doi.org/10.5271/sjweh.2894.
 33. van Amelsvoort LG, Jansen NW, Kant I.  Smoking 
among shift workers: more than a confounding fac-
tor. Chronobiol Int. 2006;23:1105–13. https://doi.
org/10.1080/07420520601089539.
 34. Manohar S, Thongprayoon C, Cheungpasitporn W, 
Mao MA, Herrmann SM. Associations of rotational 
shift work and night shift status with hypertension: 
a systematic review and meta-analysis. J Hypertens. 
2017;35(10):1929–37. https://doi.org/10.1097/
HJH.0000000000001442.
 35. Nurminen T.  Shift work and reproductive health. 
Scand J Work Environ Health. 1998;24(Suppl 
3):28–34.
 36. Wegrzyn LR, Tamimi RM, Rosner BA, Brown SB, 
Stevens RG, Eliassen AH, et al. Rotating night-shift 
work and the risk of breast cancer in the nurses’ 
health studies. Am J Epidemiol. 2017;186(5):532–40. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/aje/kwx140.
 37. IARC Monographs Vol 124 Group. Carcinogenicity 
of night shift work. Lancet Oncol. 2019;20(8):1058–
9. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1470-2045(19)30455-3.
 38. Knauth P.  Designing better shift systems. 
Appl Ergon. 1996;27(1):39–44. https://doi.
org/10.1016/0003-6870(95)00044-5.
 39. Knauth P. Innovative worktime arrangements. Scand J 
Work Environ Health. 1998;24(Suppl 3):13–7.
 40. Thierry H.  Compensation for shiftwork: a model 
and some results. In: Colquhoun WP, Rutenfranz J, 
editors. Experimental studies of shiftwork. London: 
Taylor & Francis; 1980. p. 449–62.
 41. Ladouceur R.  Twenty-four-hour shifts for residents. 
Can Fam Physician. 2013;59(2):123.
 42. ACGME Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical 
Education. Duty hour standard enhancing quality of 
care, supervision and resident professional develop-
ment. 2011. https://www.acgme.org/Portals/0/PDFs/
jgme-monograph[1].pdf. Accessed 30 Sept 2019.
 43. Park R. Why so many young doctors work such awful 
hours. The Altantic 21. 2017. https://www.theatlantic.
com/business/archive/2017/02/doctors-long-hours-
schedules/516639/. Accessed 30 Sept 2019.
 44. Bilimoria KY, Chung JW, Hedges LV, Dahlke AR, 
Love R, Cohen ME, Hoyt DB, Yang AD, Tarpley 
JL, Mellinger JD, Mahvi DM, Kelz RR, Ko CY, 
Odell DD, Stulberg JJ, Lewis FR.  National cluster- 
randomized trial of duty hour flexibility in surgical 
training. N Engl J Med. 2016;374:713–27. https://doi.
org/10.1056/NEJMoa1515724.
 45. Jena AB, Newhouse RL, Farid M, Blumenthal D, 
Bhattacharya J.  Association of residency work 
hour reform with long term quality and costs of 




Open Access  This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in 
any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to 
the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, 
unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons 
license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to 
obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.
G. Costa et al.
413© The Author(s) 2021 
L. Donaldson et al. (eds.), Textbook of Patient Safety and Clinical Risk Management, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59403-9_30
Non-technical Skills in Healthcare
Stavros Prineas, Kathleen Mosier, Claus Mirko, 
and Stefano Guicciardi
30.1  Introduction
Non-Technical Skills (NTS) can be defined as a 
constellation of cognitive and social skills, exhib-
ited by individuals and teams, needed to reduce 
error and improve human performance in com-
plex systems. NTS have been described as generic 
‘life-skills’ that can be applied across all techni-
cal domains [1]; they are deemed to be ‘non- 
technical’, in that they have traditionally resided 
outside most formal technical education curri-
cula. While the importance of human factors in 
the performance of technical tasks has been 
appreciated for over 80  years [2, 3], NTS as a 
formal training system is derived from aviation 
Crew Resource Management (originally called 
Cockpit Resource Management). CRM was first 
adopted by United Airlines in 1981 [4] after a 
series of high-profile air crashes in the late 1970s, 
in which human elements such as poor communi-
cation, teamwork and situation awareness were 
identified as key contributing factors [5–7]. CRM 
is now fully integrated into all commercial pilot 
training worldwide; in a constant state of evolu-
tion, it is currently in its sixth generation [8].
In healthcare, it was not until the 1990s that 
the significance of human factors in patient safety 
became more widely publicised [9], coinciding 
with the rise in medical simulation [10]. In 1999, 
an emergency medicine team training project, 
MedTeams, was launched [11]. The following 
year two landmark reports were published within 
weeks of each other: To Err is Human in the USA 
[12] and An Organisation with a Memory in the 
UK [13]. These inspired a burgeoning of research 
into applied human factors in healthcare. Flin 
pioneered a behavioural marker system known as 
Anaesthetists’ Non-Technical Skills (ANTS: 
[14]), followed by Non-Technical Skills for 
Surgeons (NOTTS: [15]). The disciplines of 
anaesthesia, critical care and surgery remain at 
the forefront of NTS training in medicine. Several 
other multidisciplinary clinical NTS frameworks, 
including the Oxford NOTECHs system [16] and 
TeamSTEPPS™ [17], have also been imple-
mented and studied in real and simulated clinical 
environments.
As NTS evaluation and/or training systems 
become increasingly incorporated within under-
graduate and postgraduate technical curricula, 
and specific techniques are developed (especially 
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in communication skills) supported by a growing 
body of research, a paradox arises: many non- 
technical skills no longer qualify as being ‘non- 
technical’. Moreover the term ‘non-technical’ 
appears to subordinate these skills to their techni-
cal counterparts, when in reality the two skill sets 
are both essential and inseparable, especially dur-
ing the management of medical crises. In time 
new terms may be required (e.g. ‘paratechnical’ 
skills, Clinical Resource Management) to define 
and describe this group of skills, and to consoli-
date their true place in the clinician’s 
armamentarium.
30.1.1  Practical Overview of NTS 
Training Topics in Healthcare
The standard NTS training topics are summarised 
in Table 30.1 and detailed in the rest of this chap-
ter. It is important to recognise that these skills 
are intertwined not only with the more traditional 
skills they support, but also with each other. 
Proficiency in one non-technical skill is, to no 
small extent, dependent on proficiency in the oth-
ers. Newer generations of aviation CRM have 
introduced new topics, e.g. the acquisition of 
expertise and managing automation. It is foresee-
able therefore that these topics will be incorpo-
rated into future clinical NTS training 
programmes.
30.2  Performance Shaping 
Factors
Most work environments operate on the assump-
tion that adequate training, experience and moti-
vation are enough to ensure successful 
performance. These prerequisites are necessary 
but not sufficient, especially in a complex adap-
tive system such as healthcare. There are many 
factors that can influence human performance—
over long periods of time, from day to day, or in 
a given moment. Performance Shaping Factors 
(PSFs) can be classified according to a clinical 
adaptation of Reason’s ‘Three Buckets’ model 
[18] where the traditional categories of ‘task’ 
(factors inherent to the nature of the task), ‘self’ 
(internal and personal factors) and ‘context’ 
(environmental factors) are each sub-divided into 
‘task/patient’, ‘individual/team’ and ‘workplace/
organisation’ factors, respectively (Fig. 30.1).
The ability to identify and evaluate PSFs in 
everyday practice may be a useful skill for front-
line clinicians. The Three Buckets model can be 
applied both prospectively and retrospectively. In 
2008, the UK National Patient Safety Agency 
launched a Foresight Training Resource Pack 
[19], based on a simplified version of the Three 
Buckets model, to help nurses and midwives bet-
ter foresee clinical risks. This package is cur-
rently used in a number of NHS Trusts. As a 
retrospective incident analysis tool, Contributory 
Factors Analysis, also known as the ‘London 
Protocol’ [20], is based on a similar principle, as 
is the HEAPS incident analysis tool used in 
Queensland Health [21] and other health net-
works in Australia. A quick Three-Bucket sum-
mary can be used to highlight PSFs relevant to 
cases presented at, e.g. Grand Rounds or M&M 
meetings.
30.3  Planning and Preparation 
Skills
Popular culture is full of references stressing the 
importance of planning and preparation before 
performing complex tasks: ‘Be Prepared’, ‘Plan 
the Dive and Dive the Plan’, ‘Luck favours the 
prepared’, ‘P to the seventh power’ (‘Prior 
Preparation and Planning Prevents P—Poor 
Performance’), etc. In teaching hospital set-
tings, medical and nursing trainees are often 
asked to perform tasks for which they are ill-
prepared. In these efforts they are not only ham-
pered by the opportunistic nature of teaching in 
Table 30.1 Typical NTS training topics
• Performance shaping factors
• Planning, preparation and prioritisation
• Situation awareness and perception of risk
• Decision-making
• Communication
• Teamwork and leadership
S. Prineas et al.
415
clinical  settings, but also by the culture of ‘see 
one, do one, teach one’, a tradition that is coun-
ter-intuitive to human-factors thinking and 
seemingly peculiar (among high-risk endeav-
ours) to medical and nursing education. 
‘SODOTO’ training has both critics [22] and 
defenders [23]. Simulation Based Education 
(SBE) can be used to demonstrate the conse-
quences of poor preparation and planning in a 
safe setting [24].
While there are a number of system tools that 
can help and guide staff (orientation days, check-
lists, pre-prepared procedural kits, etc.), the ques-
tion arises as to whether there is a set of definable 
human competencies/aptitudes that optimise 
planning and preparing for tasks, and whether 
this can be taught. The answer to the first part of 
this question appears to be ‘yes’, in that evalua-
tion of planning, preparation and prioritisation 
skills are key elements of the ANTS behavioural 
marker system. These help researchers identify 
‘good’ and ‘poor’ task management behaviours 
in simulated settings, with the highest inter-rater 
reliability of the four main ANTS categories [25]. 
However, the ANTS system is not designed to 
address how to train practitioners to plan and pre-
pare better.
30.4  Situation Awareness 
and Perception of Risk
Situation awareness (SA) is defined as ‘the per-
ception of elements in the environment, the com-
prehension of their meaning in terms of task 
goals, and the projection of their status in the near 
future’ [26]. Perception is essentially being aware 
of and/or gathering available information rele-
vant to a situation. In a clinical context this cor-
relates with taking a clinical history, examining a 
patient, reviewing the results of investigations 
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Fig. 30.1 Performance Shaping Factors. A clinical expansion of Reason’s Three Buckets model
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briefing, etc. Comprehension is the ability to 
form a mental model that makes sense of the 
available information. In clinical practice, this 
would be similar to forming a diagnosis, or a dif-
ferential of diagnoses. Projection is the ability to 
use an operating mental model of a situation to 
foresee potential future states, or as clinicians 
would say, to make a prognosis. A simple exam-
ple is given in Fig. 30.2.
In traditional medical training, these levels of 
awareness are built upon each other. For exam-
ple, trainees are (rightly) encouraged to take a 
history and examine a patient (Level I SA) before 
venturing a diagnosis (Level II SA). The SBAR/
ISBAR communication tool (see below) is a way 
of serially organising information to facilitate 
situation awareness between individuals. In real 
life however, perception, comprehension and 
projection may not occur in that order. In many 
emergency situations it is possible, indeed poten-
tially crucial, to prognose the need to resuscitate 
(Level III) before one has made a complete 
examination (Level I) or a definitive diagnosis 
(Level II). This concept of parallel rather than 
serial cognitive processing of SA is the hallmark 
of Naturalistic or Recognition-Primed Decision- 
Making, and a feature of expert cognition [27], 
described figuratively as ‘seeing the past, present 
and future at the same time’ [28].
In anaesthetic practice, [29] described a 
model of ‘distributed situation awareness’, 
emphasising that during an operation the 
patient’s condition is constantly being modified 
by the interventions of the anaesthetist and the 
surgeon in real time. Thus, in this model, ideal 
SA is the result of a dynamic and iterative pro-
cess of regularly scanning the environment, 
matching one’s mental model with incoming 
information, modifying the anaesthetist’s plan 
and actions accordingly, and cycling through this 
process repeatedly until the patient is safely in 
the recovery unit.
30.4.1  ‘Perception of Risk’
When thinking about potential adverse future 
states, a number of terms—hazard, threat and 
risk—are often used interchangeably, when they 
would perhaps be better used to connote overlap-
ping but distinct concepts. A hazard is anything 
that could potentially go wrong or cause harm, 
without any qualification of its likelihood or 
severity. For example, when asked to list the pos-
sible complications of central venous catheter 
insertion, a medical student will often recite a list 
of early and late complications, subcategorised 
according to anatomical location, structure type, 
etc. The student has no direct experience of cen-
tral line insertion and therefore limited ability to 
rank this list of hazards according to their likeli-
hood of occurring in routine practice, or what the 
real impact of each complication would be.
A threat is the subjective perception of a haz-
ard. It is important to recognise, independently of 
whatever data exists for a given situation, that a 
Fig. 30.2 Situation 
Awareness (SA) in a 
clinical context. 
(Courtesy of ErroMed, 
reproduced with 
permission)
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number of factors influence the perception of 
danger, including gender [30], healthcare role 
and length of experience [31], primacy (the dis-
proportionately ‘formative’ impact of early expe-
riences or first impressions: [32]), recency (the 
disproportionate impact of most recent experi-
ences: [33]), whether a person has volunteered to 
accept the hazard or had the hazard imposed 
upon them [34], whether the hazard is familiar or 
hitherto unknown [35], whether the effects are 
immediate or delayed [36], etc. If, for example, 
the medical student above, now a resident, were 
unlucky enough to cause a chylothorax with an 
early central line insertion, the complication 
would tend to figure prominently in that resi-
dent’s future assessments for a considerable time 
afterwards, even though in objective terms such a 
complication is very rare.
Subjective factors influence threat assess-
ments, which in turn can influence clinical 
decision- making. For example, a Canadian 
study of the prescribing practices of family phy-
sicians treating patients with atrial fibrillation 
showed that a substantial proportion stopped 
prescribing warfarin altogether after one of their 
patients suffered a haemorrhagic stroke, whereas 
physicians who did not routinely prescribe anti-
coagulants tended not to change their practice 
even when one or more of their patients suffered 
an thromboembolic stroke [37]. In this case, the 
negative consequences of electing to intervene 
(i.e. prescribing) had a greater impact on per-
ception of risk than the negative consequences 
of electing not to intervene (i.e. not 
prescribing).
A risk is a calculated evaluation of the likeli-
hood and impact of a hazard, based on objective 
assessments and measurements rather than sub-
jective interpretation. For example, the same 
medical student, now a consultant intensivist, 
might be able to cite a personal log of their last 
1000 central line insertions, quote literature 
reviews on the topic, and assert that the top three 
risks in their practice are, e.g. infection, pneumo-
thorax and accidental arterial cannulation. This is 
what Klein [28] would call seeing the ‘choke 
points’—another feature of expertise—the ability 
to identify quickly where the material dangers 
are in a situation, what actions are more likely to 
lead to failure, and what actions better ensure 
success (‘leverage points’).
In light of this, the term ‘perception of risk’ 
should be approached with a little caution. In the 
absence of hard data, most of what clinicians call 
‘risk assessments’ in day-to-day practice would 
in large part actually be ‘threat assessments’. 
Despite the subjective and potentially distorting 
nature of threat assessments, this is not necessar-
ily a bad thing. Reliable data for a given risk situ-
ation often may not exist, let alone be to hand. 
Moreover, expert clinicians are often called upon 
to make decisions in urgent and complex situa-
tions, and their ‘threat assessments’ are usually 
better than a novice’s ‘risk assessments’. To 
understand why and when this might be true (and 
when it might not be) requires a deeper analysis.
30.5  Expert Decision-Making
Efficient and accurate decision-making is critical 
to patient safety—and it is important that the 
people responsible for making decisions that 
impact patient safety are as experienced and as 
expert as possible. Research on expert decision- 
making in complex, dynamic domains, often 
referred to as Naturalistic Decision Making 
(NDM: [27, 38]), has demonstrated that the most 
important step in making a decision in these 
domains is to accurately assess the situation—
identify the problem, formulate a diagnosis, eval-
uate the risks. Mosier and Fischer [39] refer to 
this as the front end of the decision-making pro-
cess. Once the situation is known, the retrieval of 
a workable course of action, the back end of the 
process, is facilitated.
Expertise impacts the decision process in sev-
eral specific ways. First, expert decision makers 
exhibit high levels of competence and knowledge 
within the domain, and have experienced a wide 
variety of situations, instances, and cases they can 
draw upon (e.g. [40]). This means that a current 
case will often have features that match an event 
from the expert’s repertoire, facilitating quick and 
accurate situation assessment. Second, experts 
see and process information differently than nov-
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ices do. They can quickly identify critical cues—
that is, the subset of information most critical to 
accurate situation assessment—and attend to or 
categorise them. This impacts their ability to 
develop situation awareness and to create an accu-
rate mental model of the situation [41]. Experts 
are sensitive to changing values of information 
and can adapt their mental models to accommo-
date them [42]. They may use an iterative process, 
using feedback from the environment to adjust 
their actions and incorporate changes resulting 
from incremental decisions. In healthcare, for 
example, physicians often monitor results of a 
treatment to refine their diagnoses [43]. They also 
employ strategies to cope with dynamic situa-
tions—anticipating developments, prioritising 
tasks, and making contingency plans—and 
employ knowledge- based control to address con-
flicts or contradictions [39, 44]. The NDM frame-
work relies heavily on expertise and on intuitive 
rather than analytical processing, and capitalises 
on decision makers’ abilities to pattern match, to 
mentally simulate a course of action, and to use 
sense- making strategies to improve their under-
standing of a given situation.
30.5.1  Metacognition
Experts not only monitor the situation but also 
how they are thinking and whether it is appropri-
ate for the situation at hand. They critique and 
correct their diagnosis until they arrive at a satis-
factory mental model of the situation, or further 
processing is too costly [45, 46]. They are able to 
shift strategies when faced with high uncertainty 
or unmet expectancies, taking an incremental 
approach or engaging in more analytical pro-
cesses [47, 48]. For example, expert surgeons 
perform many routine tasks automatically, but 
‘slow down’ and engage in effortful processing in 
preparation for nonroutine events or in response 
to unexpected events [49].
30.5.2  Affect
Expertise also attunes the decision maker to 
affect that is in response to critical elements of 
the task context and that may have significance 
for their decisions. The affective reaction to a 
situation—particularly comfort or discomfort—
may represent a knowledge-based informational 
cue for decision-making. For example, when a 
situation is not recognised as familiar, affective 
responses such as unease or discomfort (‘some-
thing’s not right’) can motivate the expert to 
engage in more information gathering, or more 
substantive sense-making processes. Dominguez 
[50], for instance, reported that physicians fre-
quently refer to their comfort level while decid-
ing on whether or not to continue with 
laparoscopic surgery. This function of affect is 
similar to the role of ‘hunches’ in split-second 
decision-making.
30.5.3  Communication 
and Decision-Making
All individuals involved in ensuring a patient’s 
safety must function collaboratively as a team. 
Because healthcare is a dynamic task environ-
ment, team members need to respond adaptively 
to changing conditions. Communication plays a 
pivotal role in this process [51], especially in 
healthcare as team members often perform 
sequentially and rely on information from the pre-
vious shift to guide their decisions and actions. 
Team members let others in on their reasoning 
and inform them about their intentions and expec-
tations [52]. Critically, expert teams ensure com-
mon ground and shared mental models by 
providing feedback [53], and work to mitigate 
decision-making and other errors through team-
centred communication [54, 55].
30.5.4  Stress and Decision-Making
Stress related to the working conditions is defined 
by the World Health Organization as the response 
people may have when presented with work 
demands and pressures that are not matched to 
their knowledge and abilities, and which chal-
lenge their ability to cope. It occurs in a wide 
range of circumstances and may have a profound 
impact on decision-making which, in the medical 
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context, could negatively affect clinical out-
comes. Stress-related reductions in cognitive per-
formance (e.g. accuracy, reaction time, attention, 
memory) resulted in poorer patient safety out-
comes such as hospital acquired infections or 
medication errors [56].
It is therefore essential to address the causes 
of stress, which can be found both at the individ-
ual and at the organisational level. In the first 
case, it must be highlighted that medical practice 
has a solid rational basis made explicit through 
the clinical reasoning but, given the relationships 
doctors necessarily build with patients and other 
professionals, it also entails a strong emotional 
dimension that must be acknowledged [57]. 
Healthcare professionals experience emotions 
differently, quantitatively and qualitatively, and 
should be aware of their ‘emotional intelligence’ 
and trained on their ability to cope and react in 
case of stressful situations without stigmatisa-
tions [58, 59].
In the second case, from a system perspective, 
stressful conditions in the work environment 
must be identified and possibly mitigated—if not 
removed—in terms of both contents (working 
hours, monotony, participation and control) and 
contexts (job insecurity, teamwork, organisa-
tional culture, work-life balance). Doctors are 
requested to take charge of greater responsibili-
ties and demands, but resources are often limited 
resulting in risks of overload and burnout. 
Adequate staffing levels, human-capital invest-
ments, respect of working times and cultural 
changes in the medical organisations with a radi-
cal shift from competitiveness to collaboration 
and teamwork are therefore needed to reduce 
stress and its consequences [60].
30.6  Communication
‘Effective communication’ is recognised as a 
core non-technical skill [17], a means to provide 
knowledge, institute relationships, establish pre-
dictable behaviour patterns, and as a vital compo-
nent for leadership and team coordination [61, 
62]. It is crucial for delivering high-quality 
healthcare and has been acknowledged together 
with effective teamwork as an essential compo-
nent for patient safety [61, 63]. ‘Communication 
failures’ have long been recognised as a leading 
cause of unintentional patient harm [64]. More 
recently a report of 2587 sentinel medical adverse 
events, reviewed by the US Joint Commission 
over a 3-year period, cited ‘communication’ as a 
contributing factor in over 68% of cases [65].
However, ‘communication’ is a very broad 
term; pinning down a practical definition is diffi-
cult. In the wider academic literature, communi-
cation has been classified according to at least 
seven distinct philosophical approaches [66], of 
which at least two are relevant to non-technical 
skills training in healthcare: the information 
engineering (‘cybernetic’) approach and the 
social construction (‘sociocultural’) approach 
[67, 68]. The first defines communication as the 
linear transmission of ‘signal packages’ from a 
‘transmitter’ to a ‘receiver’ through a medium. 
The latter emphasises how team communication 
can create the dynamic context in which people 
work, implying that communication, rather than 
a neutral mean, is the primary social process 
through which a meaningful shared world is built 
[67]. There is also the field of ‘semiotics’—the 
study of signals and the nature of ‘meaning’ itself 
across different populations, demographics and 
cultures. These varied perspectives underscore 
the sociotechnical nature of all healthcare 
communication.
For the purposes of developing workable 
patient safety tools (and mindful of this very nar-
row context), communication can be defined as 
the transfer of meaning from one person to 
another [69]. In teams comprising health profes-
sionals with different backgrounds, roles, train-
ing and perspectives on care, the main purpose of 
communication is to facilitate among team 
 members a shared mental model of a situation: 
the context, the goals, the tasks, the methods to 
be used, who will do what, etc. (i.e. ‘team situa-
tion awareness’). Thus, it is important to recog-
nise that ‘meaning’ is different to ‘information’ 
or ‘knowledge’, and effective communication 
therefore depends to some extent on the existing 
level of situation awareness of individual team 
members. For example, stating clearly that ‘the 
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patient’s blood pressure is 80/50’ is not per se 
effective communication of its meaning if the 
person hearing it does not know that this finding 
usually represents critical hypotension in an 
adult.
While effective teamwork requires much more 
than communication (see below), specific fail-
ures in communication can hinder the process of 
building a shared understanding of the situation 
between team members, leading to poor perfor-
mance and errors [70]. It follows that effective 
communication in healthcare teams can only be 
the result of dynamic iterative ‘two-way’ pro-
cesses that lead to an ‘equilibrium of understand-
ing’ among team members [69], and which can 
and must change with the input of new people 
and new information. Refining these processes 





For ensuring effective team communication two 
aspects have been highlighted as fundamental 
[71]: the sharing of unique information held by 
team members in face-to-face environments and 
openness of information in virtual environments 
[72, 73]. To this one can add the implementation 
of closed-loop communication procedures that 
acknowledge the receipt of information and clar-
ify any inconsistencies in information interpreta-
tion [74].
The concept of ‘specific/directed/acknowl-
edged’ communication comes from simulation 
training [10]. ‘Specific’ refers to speaking clearly 
and the use of salient unambiguous descriptions, 
ideally using a ‘controlled vocabulary’ of terms 
with unique meanings as agreed by a discrete 
population of practitioners. An obvious example 
is the ‘military speak’ used in formal mission 
communications between soldiers, both in 
Hollywood movies and real life; however it 
should also be apparent that much of the diagnos-
tic and therapeutic jargon used by clinicians, 
based mostly on Latin and Greek terminology, is 
already a form of controlled vocabulary. 
Specificity is also reflected in a number of other 
practical ways [69]:
• Using the word ‘right’ only to mean chirality 
(as in ‘left’ or ‘right’) and avoiding its use to 
mean ‘Ok’ or ‘correct’ (as in ‘the left leg is the 
right leg for this operation, right?’)
• Using numbers rather than vague terms where 
applicable (‘the systolic is 200’ rather than 
‘the blood pressure’s high’, ‘I should be there 
in 10–20 min’ versus ‘I’ll be down soon’).
• Using the ‘five rights’ convention for prescrib-
ing and administering medications: checking 
the correct drug in the correct dose via the 
correct route at the correct time for the correct 
patient [75]; a convention routinely taught to 
nurses but not so consistently to doctors.
• Recognising and avoiding non-standard and 
ambiguous clinical abbreviations and acro-
nyms [76].
‘Directed’ means that information or instruc-
tions are explicitly directed to a nominated per-
son. For example, ‘Fran, please pass me the 
Yankauer sucker’ instead of ‘Somebody give me 
something for the bleeding’. Of course, the abil-
ity to direct information requires team members 
to know others’ names in the first place. One of 
the consistent elements of the WHO Surgical 
Safety Checklist is that team members introduce 
themselves by name and role [77]. A survey of 
OR teams showed that participants believed that 
knowing team member’s name and rank was 
important not only to team bonding but also to 
patient safety [78]. While intuitively attractive, 
more studies are required to determine whether 
directed vs. undirected communication has a 
reproducible impact on clinical safety.
‘Acknowledged’ communication seeks to con-
firm that what was said was not only heard, but 
also that what was heard matches what was said. 
In closed-loop communication, also known as 
‘read-back’ [79], the sender initiates communica-
tion, the receiver confirms that the communica-
tion has been heard and repeats the content, 
finally the sender verifies the accuracy of that 
content including an explicit accuracy check with 
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the recipient [62]. Closed communication loops 
improve the reliability of communication by hav-
ing the receiver of communication restate what 
was said by the sender to confirm understanding. 
[67]. Organisations requiring this type of closed- 
loop communication can help smooth the com-
munication process and ensure critical 
information is correctly conveyed and under-
stood. This seems to be most useful, e.g. during 
surgery to confirm sponge count, during high- 
risk patient handovers to ensure comprehensive 
information exchange and during medication 
ordering [67].
30.6.2  Briefings and Handovers
Briefings are discrete meetings to provide mem-
bers of a team with specific information and/or 
instructions. Handovers (also called handoffs in 
the USA) are briefings that occur at a changeover 
between personnel who share similar roles. 
Briefings set the scene for team interaction, 
ensuring that care providers have a shared mental 
model of what is going to happen during a pro-
cess, and raising team situation awareness to 
identify any risk points and plan for contingen-
cies. When done effectively, briefings can estab-
lish predictability, reduce interruptions prevent 
delays and build social relationships and capital 
for future interactions [80]. Briefings are designed 
to prepare teams to counter threats and minimise 
error potential. Formal and informal protocols, 
checklists, scenario planning, and open team dis-
cussion are commonly used [81].
Handover problems have been implicated in a 
number of adverse event studies [82, 83]. 
Perioperative briefings have been proven effec-
tive in improving surgical teams climate and their 
efficiency of their work [84]. Interprofessional 
checklist briefings have been shown to reduce the 
number of communication failures and to pro-
mote proactive and collaborative team communi-
cation [85]. Nevertheless, there remain 
definitional and methodological problems with 
using the existing literature to support any con-
clusions of what best practice should be [86]. 
This appears to be reflected in a recent retrospec-
tive study of over 300,000 adult patients under-
going major surgery, where the risk of 
complications, hospital readmissions and/or 
death was 44% in cases where there was a com-
plete handover of anaesthetic care from one prac-
titioner to another during the case, compared 
with 29% when no handover occurred [87]. There 
is clearly still a lot to learn about how to preserve 
continuity of care safely from one caregiver to 
another; meanwhile, specific techniques have 
earned substantial worldwide popularity.
30.6.3  SBAR
A structured communication technique called 
Situation, Background, Assessment, and 
Recommendation (SBAR) has been developed 
by the U.S. Navy nuclear submarine industry for 
high-risk situations and for its versatility has 
been adapted in healthcare setting [88]. The com-
munication process involving SBAR is as fol-
lows: the Situation is conveyed by the initiating 
individual and establishes the topic of discussion; 
the Background involves any information needed 
to make an informed decision for the patient such 
as the list of current medication, or recent vital 
signs; in Assessment, the individual initiating the 
SBAR report the patient’s situation and status; 
finally, the Recommendation is what the individ-
ual initiating the SBAR offers in terms of what 
they think should take place or be done [67].
A lower number of incident reports related to 
communication errors has been linked to SBAR 
tool in specific context such as effective in 
improving perception of communication between 
professionals and of the safety climate [89]. A 
recent review found moderate evidence for 
improved patient safety through SBAR 
 implementation, especially when used to struc-
ture communication over the phone.
One study reported problems with the tradi-
tional SBAR tool during its implementation at a 
number of West Australian hospitals [90], most 
notably that (a) it was not intuitively obvious that 
personnel introduce themselves as part of the 
Situation phase, (b) sometimes certain members 
disputed the recommendations, and (c) some-
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times not all parties clearly understood the rec-
ommendations. The researchers proposed 
‘iSoBAR’ (where ‘I’ stands for Introductions, 
‘O’ stands for Observations and replaces ‘A’ for 
Assessment, which in turn becomes Agreed Plan, 
and ‘R’ becomes Readback to confirm the agreed 
plan of action). At the time of publication, this 
variant was still in use in West Australia [91]. A 
simpler variant, ISBAR (where ‘I’ stands for 
‘Identify’) has been adopted by healthcare 
authorities in other Australian States [92]; indeed 
in Australia implementation of some version of 
SBAR has been adopted as part of a national 
standard of clinical handover [93]. However, 
high-quality research on this widely used com-
munication tool, in whichever variant, is still 
wanting [94].
30.6.4  Escalation of Concern: Graded 
Assertiveness
In most clinical situations, where there is a clear 
and agreed pathway for action and appropriate 
leadership, safety is best maintained by cooper-
ating with the plan and deferring to one’s superi-
ors. However plans do not always proceed as 
expected; if errors or mishaps occur, or an immi-
nent threat to safety arises, it is sometimes nec-
essary for healthcare providers to assert 
themselves in a clear and timely fashion to sup-
port patient safety [67]. As there are many hier-
archical structures in healthcare with many 
authority gradients between individuals, speak-
ing up to senior colleagues does not come natu-
rally to many people, especially junior personnel, 
even in the face of an overt safety issue. 
Organisations that employ clinicians with a duty 
of care to patients must therefore seek to 
empower staff by providing them with training 
in assertion techniques.
An example of assertive language is the two- 
challenge rule, where a concern is stated at least 
two times to better ensure it has been heard. The 
CUS tool (Concerned, Uncomfortable, Safety 
issue) also part of the TeamSTEPPS framework 
escalates communication from an expression of 
concern through a command to stop. The escala-
tion of concern consists of, ‘I’m concerned’, ‘I’m 
uncomfortable’, ‘this is unsafe’, meaning ‘This is 
a potential serious problem. Stop and listen to 
me’. [148]. Frankel and Leonard [95] suggest 
that the true ‘test’ of teams and leaders occurs 
when the ‘line is stopped’ after someone raises a 
concern, which then turns out to have been a false 
alarm.
Another tool, derived from the aviation-based 
PACE algorithm [96], is Graded Assertiveness. 
The tool comprises four levels of assertion—
Observation, Suggestion, Challenge and 
Emergency—and has been adapted for use in 
clinical environments [69]. An example of the 
tool is given in Fig. 30.3.
30.7  Teamwork and Leadership 
Skills
A team can be defined as ‘a distinguishable set of 
two or more individuals who interact dynami-
cally, adaptively, and interdependently; who 
share common goals or purposes; and who have 
specific roles or functions to perform’ [97]. 
Successful teams are the product of time, effort 
and trust. As teams are also defined as social enti-
ties [98] that at times perform highly technical 
functions, there may be value in regarding health-
care teams as microcosms of a wider sociotechni-
cal system, particularly in regard to improving 
patient safety [99].
Be it in a community health service or a large 
hospital, teams come in many forms: teams 
overlapping with other teams, teams nested 
within teams, teams dispersed in time and geo-
graphical space. It is therefore not surprising 
that there is a large variation among doctors in 
their  conceptualisations of what and where 
teams are [100]. It may not be obvious to an 
individual practitioner where the team is, or 
even if one exists, for the task they are trying to 
perform. Moreover, there is a growing (albeit 
belated) recognition that patients and their fami-
lies should be considered as part of the health-
care team [101].
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30.7.1  The ‘Anatomy’ of Teams
While apparently ‘leaderless’ teams do exist, 
especially in nature, in the human world most 
successful teams have leaders and followers. The 
concept of leadership is complex, and is explored 
later in this chapter. In broad terms a leader is 
someone chosen (by the team itself or by others) 
to exercise authority and influence over the team. 
While good ‘followership’ requires a cooperative 
attitude, it too is not as straightforward a concept 
as it may seem. For example, followers need to 
know when and how to be assertive, even to their 
leader, when there is an overt threat to patient 
safety ([69]; see Sect. 30.6.4 above). Leaders and 
followers exhibit different characteristics in dif-
ferent types of teams.
30.7.2  Unidisciplinary Teams
A unidisciplinary team is one where most of the 
members, if not all, essentially share the same 
skill set—an army of soldiers, for example. 
Unidisciplinary teams tend to be hierarchical, 
with ranks according to seniority or experience, 
and leaders of unidisciplinary teams have usually 
risen through these ranks, and thus share a com-
mon training background with their team mem-
bers. Ranks may be explicit (‘sergeant’, 
‘lieutenant’, ‘general’) or implicit (the ‘grand 
dame’ of a department, the ‘elder statesmen’ of a 
college or the ‘green’ registrar).
Unidisciplinary teams are very common in 
healthcare, e.g. clinical departments within a hos-
pital (‘Neurology’, ‘Physiotherapy’, ‘Anaesthesia’, 
etc.). Unidisciplinary team structures are task/ser-
vice focused and therefore are great for training 
and producing results (e.g. provision of a service) 
of a reproducible standard. It is also more likely 
that one member of the team can be substituted for 
another. When members of a unidisciplinary team 
communicate, there is usually a pre-existing level 
of shared understanding; as a result, a lot of mean-
ing in conversations, briefings and handovers can 
be conveyed implicitly (through assumptions, 
‘shorthand’ jargon/acronyms and non-verbal com-
munication) rather than explicitly.
Unfortunately, unidisciplinary teams tend to 
form ‘silos’—isolated hierarchies of expertise 
that communicate poorly with each other—a 
problem well known to healthcare [102].
Situation
A trainee anaesthetist is working with a consultant, who has been up all night on call.
The consultant has just intubated a patient. The trainee suspects an oesophageal intubation.
Level 4 : Emergency
Give order using standardised language and formal title, with consequence of failure to comply
"Dr Smith, *you must listen*. The patient is hypoxic.
Check the tube now or I will take over/call for help/hit the emergency button"
Level 1: Observation
Make a neutral factual observation about the situation
"The patient's chest doesn't appear to be moving."
Level 2 : Suggestion
Offer a face-saving alternative
"Perhaps I could ventilate manually while you listen to the chest."
Level 3 : Challenge
Question the plan and/or the assumptions
"Excuse me Sir, I don't see any sign of gas exchange, the O2 sats are starting to fall.
Are you sure the endotracheal tube is in the right place?"
Fig. 30.3 Graded Assertiveness. (Courtesy of ErroMed Pty. Ltd. (Reproduced with permission))
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30.7.3  Multidisciplinary Teams
In multidisciplinary teams people with diverse 
backgrounds and skills are brought together for a 
particular purpose. Leaders of such teams will 
usually not share the same background or experi-
ence with many of their team members. Members 
tend to have discrete technical roles rather than 
hold rank.
An operating theatre team is an example of a 
multidisciplinary team (containing unidisci-
plinary sub-teams—anaesthesia, surgery, nurs-
ing, wardsmen, etc.—as well as the patient). In 
healthcare the output of these teams is tailored 
to individual patients, and heavily influenced by 
the input of all individuals in the team who each 
play a discrete role. Frequently it is difficult (if 
not impossible) to substitute one team member 
for another, or to do without a member who has 
a specific technical role. Unless such teams have 
worked closely together for a while, there is 
often little shared understanding between team 
members; consequently, implicit communica-
tion is unreliable, especially early in the life of 
the team.
Multidisciplinary teams counteract the nega-
tive effects of silos and have been shown to 
improve patient outcomes in a range of in- 
hospital settings [103]. However, cohesive multi-
disciplinary teams are much harder to establish 
and maintain [104]. Successful multidisciplinary 
team leaders tend to employ situational leader-
ship and transferable command and control (see 
below).
30.7.4  Committees
A committee is a group of interested but diverse 
individuals (‘stakeholders’) assembled in a struc-
tured forum governed by agreed rules and 
motions through which collective decisions can 
be made. The group is presided over by a chair-
person with limited nominal authority. A com-
mittee has the anatomical appearance of a team 
but its individual members are under no obliga-
tion per se to function like one, unless the com-
mittee has been convened to perform a specific 
function (e.g. a ‘steering committee’ or a ‘task 
force’), and even that is no guarantee that it will 
function well. There is surprisingly little research 
on how healthcare committees function. ‘The 
psychology of committees is a special case of the 
psychology of mobs’ [105].
30.7.5  Improving Team Performance
Developing a behavioural marker system for 
team performance in high-risk clinical environ-
ments such as the operating theatre has been an 
ongoing global endeavour for at least three 
decades ([10, 14, 106, 107], [108]). The follow-
ing is a summary of the more commonly used 
markers.
30.7.6  Calling for Help Early: Team 
Assembly
Declaring the need to form a team is a fundamen-
tal team competency. Calling for help early is the 
first step in the ‘chain of survival’ for improving 
outcomes from cardiac arrest ([109, 110]). Other 
examples of team assembly include a trainee 
knowing when to call their on-call superior, or a 
practitioner calling a colleague for advice, or to 
assist them if they are feeling unwell or 
overwhelmed.
30.7.7  Team Structure: Clear Leader, 
Roles and Goals
In traditional command-and-control systems, a 
clear team structure and process is important. 
Trauma and resuscitation teams are more effec-
tive where there is a clearly defined team leader 
(see below) with other team members assum-
ing functional roles [111, 112]. Neonatal car-
diothoracic teams that rehearsed a ‘pit-crew’ 
style handover process with designated roles 
resulted in a faster handover with fewer techni-
cal errors [113].
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30.7.8  Team-Oriented 
Communication
Effective teams employ a number of team- 
oriented communication techniques such as 
briefings and handovers, specific/directed/
acknowledged communication, tools for enquiry/
advocacy/escalation of concern, etc. (see Sect. 
30.6 above). It is important for the leader to cre-
ate an atmosphere that fosters open exchange 
between team members [10] and encourages 
cooperative and assertive communication styles 
that are focused on the task at hand and ‘what is 
right’, rather than submissive and aggressive 
styles that are focused on power and ‘who is 
right’ [10, 69].
30.7.9  Decision-Making
Decisions in teams are usually made by the 
leader, either autocratically or in consultation 
with other team members, depending on the 
urgency and clarity of the situation, and skills and 
experience of the team involved (see Sect. 30.7.15 
below).
The emergence of shared decision-making 
between clinicians and patients in a range of 
healthcare domains [114–116] is further valida-
tion of incorporating patients and their families 
as part of the wider clinical team. This is a vari-
ant of consultative leadership where the physi-
cian informs and guides the patient along a 
process of making decisions about their own 
care, which are then executed by the rest of the 
team.
30.7.10  Managing Workload 
and Time
A team approach allows distribution of physical 
and cognitive workload across the human 
resources at hand [10]. For example, trauma 
teams work faster when members perform pre- 
allocated roles [117], and the time to complete 
the primary survey has a direct bearing on patient 
outcomes [118, 119].
30.7.11  Team Situation Awareness
Getting all members of a team to share a mental 
model of what needs to be done by whom and 
how is fundamental to effective team function. In 
using the term ‘shared mental model’ one can 
reinterpret Endsley’s SA model of shared percep-
tions, shared comprehension and shared projec-
tion to infer the need for a ‘team situation 
awareness’ that evolves with time and new infor-
mation just as individual SA does [120]. Creating 
a shared mental model has been shown to improve 
overall team performance in simulated settings, 
both in aviation [121] and in medical trauma 
[122]. Establishing and maintaining a dynamic 
and appropriate team SA may be considered an 
important communication role of the team leader 
(see below).
30.7.12  Team Familiarity, Group 
Climate and Interpersonal 
Conflict
People who work together regularly perform bet-
ter together. Teams where members are already 
familiar with each other tend to use their (shared) 
cognitive resources more effectively, which in 
turn improves their performance [123]. 
Cumulative team experience and team familiarity 
significantly reduce surgical operative time [124]. 
Moreover, teams that are made up of friends usu-
ally perform better than teams of ad hoc acquain-
tances, especially in larger groups and with 
high-output/high-turnover tasks [125].
In a complex dynamic workplace, differences 
of opinion and indeed conflict are inevitable. With 
appropriate resolution practices in place, conflict 
can be marshalled as a positive way to sharpen 
clinical decision-making [126]. More usually 
however, conflict that involves intimidation, bul-
lying or verbal abuse over time has been cited as a 
cause of occupational stress, which in turn 
increases absenteeism and staff turnover [127, 
131]. This effect appears to be more likely among 
female workers who have children [127], a domi-
nant demographic of healthcare workers, espe-
cially in nursing and allied health. It seems 
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intuitive that interpersonal conflict within health-
care teams would be a threat to patient safety; 
indeed surveys and structured interviews confirm 
that healthcare workers strongly hold this percep-
tion [128, 129]. Interpersonal conflict is a key fea-
ture of whistle- blower cases of serious and serial 
patient harm [130]; however the conspicuous con-
flict in these cases is mostly a consequence of 
poor individual or team performance (and conflict 
over reporting this) rather than a cause. While 
there are some relevant case reports [132], there is 
to date surprisingly little systematic research link-
ing team conflict to adverse patient outcomes; this 
would suggest an avenue for future study.
30.7.13  Debriefing
Debriefings are concise exchanges that occur after 
tasks or events, allowing team members to review 
what happened [67]. Debriefings may be psycho-
logical (especially after traumatic events), where 
team members are allowed a safe space to express 
their feelings about what occurred and to receive 
consolation and support; they may be technical 
(e.g. after a mission or procedure), where events 
and team/individual actions are systematically 
reviewed to improve future performance; or they 
may contain elements of both. Persons debriefing 
teams after a difficult clinical procedure, particu-
larly where there was a negative patient outcome, 
should be prepared to conduct both a psychologi-
cal and a technical debrief, or to defer one in 
favour of the other, as circumstances may demand. 
Debriefing may also be used to brainstorm new 
solutions to problems encountered during a pro-
cedure, or to consult experts from other clinical 
domains by the experts to enrich the collective 
wisdom of a care team. In this respect a well-run 
morbidity and mortality meeting can be viewed as 
a form of educational debriefing.
The benefit of providing single-session 
Critical Incident Stress Debriefing [133] or other 
variations of formalised psychological debrief-
ing, which is standard procedure in many health-
care institutions to personnel after traumatic 
adverse events, has been brought into question in 
a number of studies [134–136]. For a healthcare 
manager faced with personnel exposed to a trau-
matic event, the most practical advice can be 
summarised as follows [135]:
• The exposed person(s) should, in a timely and 
empathic manner, be offered information 
about the possible reactions they may experi-
ence, what they can do to help themselves if 
these occur, and where to get help if they want 
or need it.
• Early support should be made ready and avail-
able, but instigating interventions, if at all, 
should be based on an accurate assessment of 
need. Different people cope with stress in dif-
ferent ways.
• Interventions should be customised to the cul-
ture, personality and developmental level of 
the person.
• A rapid recovery, or even freedom from dis-
tress, may not be desired outcomes. This will 
depend on the goals and motivations of the 
individual person.
• Evaluate any interventions early and be pre-
pared to abandon something that isn’t helping, 
and design a new intervention as needed.
Thus, with certain staff, and in the hands of an 
experienced, vigilant and compassionate 
 facilitator, there may be greater therapeutic value 
in an informal but personalised debriefing pro-
cess over time.
In any case it has been argued that putting 
the information gained from debriefing into an 
improvement process is more important than 
the debriefing itself [95]. A timely debriefing at 
the end of a session facilitates appropriate feed-
back [137] Teams should document items that 
did not go well and make suggestions for 
improvement. By documenting problems, 
teams can move towards fixing them and pre-
vent issues later on [67].
30.7.14  Leadership, Command 
and Control
These are three distinct but overlapping 
concepts.
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• Leadership can be defined simply as the art of 
influencing others to achieve common objec-
tives in specific situations. Dixon [138] observed 
that people who are chosen to be leaders tend to 
be ‘task specialists’ or ‘social specialists’ or, 
rarely, both. These two leader types correlate 
with more modern descriptors of ‘transactional’ 
(task-oriented) vs. ‘transformational’ (team/
relationship-oriented) healthcare leaders [139]. 
Ideal leadership combines proficiency in techni-
cal command (see below) with at least two addi-
tional social roles—that of a ‘role model’ 
(someone who ‘shows the way’ by taking initia-
tive and inspiring junior members of the team to 
follow a shared vision) and that of a ‘shepherd’ 
(someone who cares for and protects the team, 
and encourages an environment in which the 
team can be most productive).
• It follows that just being a good technician/
tactician without social skills, or an affable 
‘people person’ without technical skills, does 
not per se make for a good clinical leader. 
[140] proposed a research-based framework 
for global evaluation of ED leadership behav-
iours that covers evaluation and planning 
behaviours (mission analysis, specifying 
goals, formulating strategy and reflection), 
action behaviours (patient and systems moni-
toring, providing guidance, error identifica-
tion and coordination) and interpersonal skills 
(conflict resolution, affect management, moti-
vation and communication).
• Command is the exercise of authority in the 
course of a task or a mission. Exercising author-
ity usually involves assessing a situation, mak-
ing decisions, giving orders and evaluating 
performance. Thus, command entails more 
than the mere wielding of resources (the defini-
tion of control—see below). For example, a 
consultant anaesthetist who is supervising a 
resident intubating a patient is in command, 
while the resident holding the laryngoscope is 
in control. A lone anaesthetist intubating a 
patient has both command and control.
• Command in complex emergencies can be 
divided into strategic (‘why are we doing 
this’), tactical (‘how are we doing this’) and 
operational (‘we’re doing this’). This com-
mand structure is known as ‘Gold-Silver- 
Bronze’ in the UK and its application has 
extended from police responses to civil unrest 
[141] to the NHS management of large-scale 
medical incidents [142]. These principles 
apply equally to smaller scale command chal-
lenges, such as the running of a clinical depart-
ment or a busy outpatients clinic.
• Control is the actual wielding of resources in 
the course of performing a task or series of 
tasks. For example, the person holding the 
laryngoscope has control of an intubation 
(whether or not they were directed by others to 
do it) but may command others to perform 
supporting manoeuvres (e.g. cricoid pres-
sure), to get equipment or administer drugs.
• Understanding how these concepts interact 
influences leadership practice. For example, it 
is often difficult to maintain strategic and tac-
tical oversight of a complex task if one is bur-
dened with being technically ‘hands-on’. 
Cardiac arrest teams whose leaders took an 
active part in resuscitating were often less well 
structured, less dynamic and performed resus-
citation less effectively, leading to the concept 
of team leaders standing back and guiding the 
team remotely, or ‘lighthouse leadership’ 
[143]; this is now a standard part of advanced 
resuscitation team training.
30.7.15  Leadership Styles 
and Situational Leadership
Leadership styles can also be classified by the 
steepness of the authority gradient between the 
team leader and team members. In an autocratic 
style, the authority gradient is steep, i.e. the 
leader expects orders to be followed without 
question, and team members have little or no 
opportunity to query, challenge, or offer input to 
the leader. In a consultative style, the authority 
gradient is more shallow: the leader more actively 
solicits views and input from the team, and it is 
easier for team members to question or advocate 
suggestions, although the leader makes the final 
decision (‘everyone gets their say but not every-
one gets their way’).
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Which style is better? In one theoretical model, 
the answer depends on the situation. For example, 
in a complex ill-defined scenario involving an 
experienced multidisciplinary team, a consultative 
approach would seem more constructive; on the 
other hand, in a well-defined time-critical emer-
gency with a novice team, invoking an autocratic 
drill would be more efficient. This is the concept 
of situational leadership—that good leaders adapt 
their style according to the available human 
resources and the needs of the situation [144].
Correlations have been found between Myers- 
Briggs personality types and leadership styles 
[145]. This suggests that clinicians in charge may 
gravitate naturally to one or other leadership 
style—autocratic or consultative, ‘task- specialist’ 
or ‘social-specialist’—according to their person-
ality. It is important therefore for clinicians to 
recognise their own natural tendencies, and (e.g. 
through simulation) to seek out training in being 
the opposite; naturally deferential types could 
practice being more assertive; naturally auto-
cratic types could practice active listening. In this 
way the leader is better prepared to apply what-
ever appropriate style a situation may demand.
30.7.16  Transferable Command 
and Control
In helicopter medical retrievals, the pilot is in 
overall tactical command and can modify or 
abort the mission at any time. However, as the 
rescue moves through different phases, different 
team members hold operational command, 
directing other team members (even the pilot) 
during the performance of key tasks. The pilot is 
in charge of getting the team to the site; the 
winchman oversees getting the medical crew to 
ground; the medical officer assesses the patient 
and is in charge of initial resuscitation; the para-
medic ensures the patient is safely secured on the 
stretcher; then it’s the winchman again, in charge 
of getting the patient and crew back into the heli-
copter; then back to the pilot, getting the chopper 
to the receiving hospital; and finally the medical 
officer is in charge of handing the patient over to 
the receiving emergency team. This concept of 
‘taking the con’ is a form of transferable leader-
ship [146] or transferable command and control, 
and can be applied to many multidisciplinary 
situations in healthcare, e.g. running an operating 
theatre, a busy diabetes outpatient clinic, or a 
community mental health service. It requires 
multidisciplinary team leaders to know and trust 
the different skill sets of their team members, and 
to balance autocratic and consultative leadership 
styles (see Sect. 30.7.15—see above).
30.8  Teaching Non-technical 
Skills
Training to ensure effective decision-making for 
patient safety should contain components of 
deliberate practice and feedback [147]. It is 
essential to expand the number and range of sce-
narios that decision makers have in their reper-
toires, and to develop the sense of what is 
important. High- and low-fidelity simulations are 
increasingly being used for research and training 
in dynamic domains such as healthcare (e.g. 
operating rooms; [148]). Low- fidelity approaches 
such as the ShadowBox™ method are effective 
ways to expose decision makers to a range of 
possible decision scenarios with coaching from 
experts on cues to monitor, issues to worry about, 
and interpretations of ambiguous situations [149, 
150]. Higher-fidelity training may include con-
textual features, such as the hospital or operating 
environment, and incorporate communication 
and teamwork in realistic simulations.
Over the last decade there has been increasing 
interest in the interprofessional team training—
doctors, nurses and allied staff training together 
as opposed to training within their craft groups—
to overcome the challenges of cultivating effec-
tive multidisciplinary teams and patient-centred 
care, particularly in crisis management scenarios 
[151, 152].
30.9  Summary
Supported by a large base of theoretical literature 
on human factors in both medical and non- 
medical domains, non-technical skills are fast 
becoming an established and indispensable build-
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ing block of patient safety, and increasingly 
incorporated into many undergraduate and post-
graduate healthcare curricula. A growing body of 
research suggests that good NTS training 
improves healthcare processes and outcomes, 
mostly in simulated environments, but also in 
real-world environments, especially in critical 
care fields such as anaesthesia, surgery and emer-
gency medicine. While there remain substantial 
challenges in developing methodologies to better 
define and refine the role of NTS in improving 
healthcare outcomes, this domain is a rich seam 
for future study.
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Medication Safety
Hooi Cheng Soon, Pierangelo Geppetti, Chiara Lupi, 
and Boon Phiaw Kho
31.1  Introduction
Ensuring patient safety during health services 
delivery is fundamental for an efficient health-
care system [1]. A strong organisational culture 
of patient safety and quality enables service pro-
viders to be better prepared for health emergen-
cies, promote healthier populations and 
contribute to the achievement of universal health 
coverage [2].
Pharmacotherapy is the most common thera-
peutic intervention in healthcare to improve 
health outcomes of patients. Despite the intent to 
benefit patients, there are many instances where 
effectiveness of medications is undermined by 
poor medication use process and practices that 
could promote avoidable medication errors, thus 
putting patients’ health in jeopardy [2]. Safe care 
requires that all individuals, patients and care 
providers are protected from medication-related 
harm when using the essential health services 
they need. A medication error is defined by the 
United States National Coordinating Council for 
Medication Error Reporting and Prevention as 
“Any preventable event that may cause or lead to 
inappropriate medication use or patient harm 
while the medication is in the control of the health 
care professional, patient, or consumer. Such 
events may be related to professional practice, 
health care products, procedures, and systems, 
including prescribing, order communication, 
product labelling, packaging, and nomenclature, 
compounding, dispensing, distribution, adminis-
tration, education, monitoring and use” [3].
Unsafe medication practices leading to medi-
cation errors are among the leading causes of 
morbidity and mortality in health services deliv-
ery. A medication safety fact file released by the 
World Health Organization (WHO) in 2019 
shows that medication errors harm millions of 
patients yearly [4]. The resultant financial burden 
of harm was estimated at USD42 billion each 
year, representing approximately 1% of global 
expenditure on health [5]. More importantly, 
these errors are preventable. Identifying the 
causes of errors and building safeguards in the 
healthcare system are key steps towards provid-
ing safe, quality, people-centred, timely, equita-
ble, efficient and integrated health services.
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31.1.1  A Focus on Transitions of Care, 
Polypharmacy and High-Risk 
Situations
Medication errors often occur as a result of gap in 
medication use process and practice, from pre-
scribing and ordering to transcribing and/or doc-
umenting, and from preparing and dispensing to 
administering and monitoring. Transition points 
of care, such as admissions to hospital from a 
community or primary care setting, transfer from 
one area within the hospital to another or dis-
charge from hospital to another care setting, are 
particularly vulnerable to medication errors [2]. 
Moreover, medications prescribed can be contra-
indicated for a particular patient, or in combina-
tion with his or her concomitant medications. 
The risk of harm is further heightened in high- 
risk situations associated with the use of high- 
risk medications.
The available evidence indicates that a sub-
stantial amount of medication-related harm is 
focused on transitions of care, polypharmacy and 
high-risk situations. In March 2017, the WHO 
launched the third Global Patient Safety 
Challenge: Medication Without Harm with the 
goal of reducing the risk of severe avoidable 
medication- related harm by 50%, over 5  years, 
globally [2]. It was envisioned that when these 
areas are appropriately managed, the risk of 
avoidable harm to many patients could be 
reduced, leading to improved patients’ trust 
towards the healthcare system, as well as health-
care workers’ job satisfaction, ultimately achiev-
ing safer hospital and primary care.
31.1.2  Learning Objectives
This chapter aims to highlight inherent risks and 
weaknesses in the medication use process in 
healthcare facilities, focusing on the three main 
areas identified as having the greatest burden of 
harm, as well as on the strategies that can be applied 
to mitigate them. After completing this chapter, 
readers will be able to appreciate the prevalence 
and incidence of common medication safety issues, 
as well as approaches that can be employed to 
reduce avoidable medication-related harm associ-
ated with transitions of care, polypharmacy and 
high-risk situations. As health service delivery 
requires inter-disciplinary involvement, this chap-
ter also aims to engage and empower young or 
experienced students or residents from different 
specialties to work together in ensuring medication 
safety while delivering health services.
31.1.3  Learning Outcomes: 
Knowledge and Performance
31.1.3.1  Knowledge Requirements
At the end of this chapter, a health professional 
should know:
• The relationship between medication errors 
and adverse drug events (ADEs).
• The scale of medication errors at three priority 
areas of medication safety.
• Common points in the medication use process 
where errors can take place.
• Ways to ensure medication safety at three pri-
ority medication safety areas.
• The benefits of inter-professional approach.
31.1.3.2  Performance Requirements
Healthcare professionals who understand that 
medication errors are preventable harm and 
appreciate risks of unnecessary harm associated 
with the three priority areas of medication safety 
will strive to:
• Improve quality and availability of informa-
tion during transitions of care.
• Engage with and educate patients, families 
and caregivers.
• Carry out medication reconciliations.
• Perform medication reviews.
• Practice deprescribing.
• Use generic names.
• Be extra vigilant during high-risk situations or 
treating high-risk patients with high-risk 
medications.
• Understand and practice drug calculations, 
e.g. adjustments of dosage based on clinical 
parameters.
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• Be familiar with the medications prescribed, 
prepared, dispensed, and/or administered.
• Develop double-check habits.
• Appreciate human limitations and human fac-
tors as contributing factor of errors.
• Communicate clearly and be an effective team 
player.
• Report and learn from errors.
31.2  Medication Safety 
in Transitions of Care
Transitions of care involve movement of 
patients between different levels of care within 
the same setting or across settings, and consul-
tations with different healthcare providers (see 
Fig. 31.1). Transitions of care may also involve 
other care providers, such as palliative care or 
social care. During transitions of care, changes 
to the current medication list of patients are 
very likely to occur. Therefore, ensuring medi-
cation safety involves implementation of safe 
medication practices to bridge critical commu-
nication gaps in medication use process. These 
could include appropriate prescription and risk 
assessment, medication review, patient engage-
ment and communication, as well as medica-
tion reconciliation [6]. Figure  31.1 shows the 
medication use process for a patient within the 
same setting or across different levels of care, 
specifically at the interface between hospital 
and primary care.
31.2.1  Prevalence of Medication 
Discrepancies
For patients who receive multiple medications 
from varied prescribers across different settings, 
obtaining a single medication list or a “gold 
 standard” on what they should be taking can pose 
a significant challenge [7]. This invariably pre-
disposes patients to a “mismatch” of the medica-
tions they take on a regular basis and what is 
prescribed to them at points of care, such as upon 
admission or at discharge. Technically, the use of 
the term “medication discrepancy” will be more 
appropriate than the term “error” when referring 
to the “mismatch”, in efforts to capture potential 
medication errors that occur during transitions of 
care [7]. Medication discrepancy is, therefore, 
defined as “Any difference between the medica-
tion use history and the medication orders. 
Discrepancies may be intentional, undocumented 
intentional or unintentional discrepancies” [6].
The prescribing process, from starting a new 
medication, adding, withholding or stopping a 
medication, to alteration of dosages by prescrib-
ers when patient receives outpatient care or inpa-
tient care, could lead to confusion among 
subsequent care providers (e.g. primary care 
counterparts and pharmacists). For instance, 
when reasons for changes in the preadmission 
medication list are not reported in the patient’s 
discharge medication list, the next care providers 
have to conjecture to determine the rationale of 
these alternations, and whether the change is 
temporary or permanent [8]. Medication dis-
crepancies owing to changes in medications dur-
ing hospital admission can be intentional, 
attributed to the condition which caused the 
admission or unrelated to the reason for hospi-
talisation, such as to improve the management of 
existing chronic illnesses. Importantly, any 
undocumented intentional or unintentional med-
ication discrepancy is a safety risk to patients. 
Studies indicate that more than half of patients 
experienced at least one unintended medication 
discrepancy during admission [9, 10]. One 
national multi-site audit found that nearly half of 
the patients with at least one new medication 
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Fig. 31.1 Medication use process and communication 
during transitions of care
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than half of the cases with medication discontin-
ued or withheld had undocumented reason. In 
addition, three out of ten patients had uninten-
tional omissions of preadmission medication 
[11].
31.2.2  Medication-Related Harm 
During Transitions of Care
Prevention of medication-related harm for 
patients who seek hospital or primary care, 
including during transitions of care, is a top 
patient safety priority. While not all medication 
discrepancies occurring at transitions of care 
cause immediate patient harm, unidentified and 
unresolved discrepancies can increase the risk of 
ADEs, emergency department visits and hospital 
readmissions in the longer time frame, such as at 
30-day time interval. A systematic review showed 
that 11–59% of medication discrepancies that 
occurred at transition points can lead to these out-
comes [10]. In fact, about 33.3% of ADEs that 
led to hospital admission were attributable to pre-
ventable medication errors [12, 13]. Omission 
errors at discharge can also prove to be detrimen-
tal. For instance, myocardial infarction can be 
attributed to the failure to continue aspirin for 
secondary prevention during care transition. 
Such risks are further heightened for patients 
with low health literacy, as well as for those pre-
scribed with high-risk medications or complex 
medications regimens. ADE is defined as:
Any injury resulting from medical interventions 
related to a drug. This includes both adverse drug 
reactions that are not preventable and complica-
tions resulting from medication errors, which are 
preventable [6, 14].
31.2.3  Making Medication Use Safer 
During Transitions of Care
Ensuring medication safety during transitions of 
care often require a multifaceted systematic 
approach involving inter-disciplinary care teams 
such as doctors, pharmacists and nurses. 
Interventions with the goal of reducing 
medication- related harm during transitions of 
care focus on three essential areas:
• Medication reconciliation
• Information clarity and availability at all tran-
sition of care points
• Patients and family engagement and 
education
31.2.3.1  Medication Reconciliation
Medication reconciliation is a risk mitigation 
strategy for preventing ADEs. It is defined as 
“The formal structured process in which health-
care professionals partner with patients to 
ensure accurate and complete medication infor-
mation transfer at interfaces of care” [6]. 
Medication reconciliation is an important com-
ponent in health services delivery especially for 
patients during hospitalisation. The best possi-
ble medication history (BPMH) is obtained 
when information about all medications taken 
by a patient is recorded accurately. This is often 
carried out via interview of patients, their fami-
lies or caregivers using a structured format. 
Obtaining BPMH followed by reconciliating the 
medication lists during transitions of care is 
essential to ensure medication safety and conti-
nuity of care, with the goal of communicating 
accurate and complete medication information 
to patients and subsequent care providers 
(Table 31.1).
Obtaining BPMH and carrying out medica-
tion reconciliation can take up to 30  min per 
patient [13]. Implementation of formal and 
structured medication reconciliation processes 
requires education and training of all healthcare 
professionals involved, including prescribers, 
nurses, pharmacists, and pharmacy technicians. 
Roles and responsibilities of each team member 
should be clearly elucidated and agreed upon. 
Targeting high-risk patients has the highest 
impact in contributing to the success of inter-
vention, whereas having technologies and 
appropriate tools that aid standardisation could 
force completion of these processes [15]. The 
High 5s Project is a WHO initiative to stan-
dardise medication reconciliation processes to 
improve patient safety. Apart from reducing 
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potential medication-related harm, one of the 
lessons shared in the High 5s Project on imple-
menting medication reconciliation is that dis-
crepancies that are resolved soon after 
admission will reduce delays in discharge and 
risk of human factor-related medication error 
[13].
31.2.3.2  Information Clarity 
and Availability at All 
Transition of Care Points
As mentioned earlier, BPMH is an important 
patient document for transitions of care. Hospitals 
and primary care teams should work together in a 
complementary manner to build the BPMH, and 
both patients and healthcare professionals should 
have access to an up-to-date medication list to 
ensure continuity of care [16]. Various facilitat-
ing tools and technologies described below are 
now available to ensure information availability 
and clarity during transitions of care.
Appropriate Tools and Technology
Having a checklist and form to standardise each 
stage of medication reconciliation processes can 
be helpful in improving medication safety, and an 
added benefit of this intervention is that it is fea-
sible also in low resource settings. The form 
(either in paper format or a simple electronic for-
mat) should be designed to enable listing of all 
current medications and have a space to commu-
nicate changes in therapy, whether addition or 
discontinuation, temporary or permanent, with 
rationale clearly stated [16, 17].
Electronic Health Records (EHRs)
EHRs are electronic versions of paper charts, 
which record patient information. A well- 
functioning EHR system improves the clarity and 
timeliness of medication information during tran-
sitions of care. While there has been steady growth 
in the adoption of EHRs globally, many are not 
integrated across or within settings, complicating 
the seamless transfer of information. Apart from 
sufficient funding, other major barriers include 
poorly developed infrastructures and communica-
tion technologies to support EHR systems, as well 
as the lack of human resources and capacity to 
develop and maintain such complex systems [18]. 
The discharge summary records should reflect the 
medication usage of the patient across transitions, 
as well as be accessible and editable by appropri-
ate healthcare personnel [6]. When EHR and well-
designed tools are available, up to a 45% reduction 
in unintentional discrepancies, improved patient-
provider communication, optimisation of medica-
tion regimen and better patient medication 
adherence to treatment are achievable [19, 20].
Information to Support Safe Use 
of Medications
Promoting the use of the generic name (interna-
tional non-proprietary name) of medicines in the 
prescribing and labelling process will help to 
improve clarity for both patients and healthcare 
professionals alike and minimise reconciliation 
errors. In addition, national pharmacovigilance 
centres, pharmacies or medication information 
services can improve understanding as well as 
Table 31.1 Steps in the medication reconciliation process to ensure medication safety during transitions of care [6, 13]
On admission On discharge/transfer
Verification Verifying the information obtained 
from patient/caregivers against at least 
one reliable source of information.
Retrieving the BPMH (or completing this if it was not 
completed upon admission) and verifying the final 
medication list at the time of discharge or transfer.
Clarification Returning to the patient and confirming 
the medication list with patient to build 
the BPMH.
Clarifying any inappropriate dosages or frequency and 
whether the change is temporary or permanent.
Reconciliation Reconciliating the BPMH with the 
medications prescribed on admission to 
identify and resolve any discrepancies.
Reconciliating and deciding which medication is 
required after discharge or transfer and prescribing or 
listing it.
Documentation Documenting reasons for intentional 
discrepancies and updating records.
Documenting reasons for changes or discontinuations 
to preadmission medication list and updating records, 
to indicate the discharge medication list and changes.
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support safe and effective use of medication by 
providing readily accessible information on med-
ications and potential ADE for both patients and 
healthcare professionals.
31.2.3.3  Patient Engagement 
and Education
Navigating the complicated processes in transi-
tions of care, especially across settings, requires 
high level of health literacy and active involve-
ment from patients and their families or caregiv-
ers [21–23]. This is essential as they are the only 
constant in their respective healthcare journeys, 
and those with low health literacy will face chal-
lenges to identify and voice discrepancies in their 
medication list during care transitions.
As being inadequately educated regarding 
their medications increases the risk of ADEs or 
suboptimal therapy, various actions can be taken 
by healthcare professionals to engage and edu-
cate patients. For starters, healthcare profession-
als should ensure that all patients as well as their 
immediate families or caregivers are made aware 
of changes in their medication, the monitoring 
needs and whom to contact should problems 
arise during transitions of care [13]. This can be 
done by properly engaging and counselling them, 
especially during discharge from hospitals, 
including asking whether they understand what is 
being communicated.
Other strategies include developing stan-
dardised discharge instructions for patients, cre-
ating or updating patient-held medication list 
with rationale for changes in therapy stated and 
follow-up needs specified. This comprehensive 
medication list can also increase their under-
standing about their medical conditions as well 
as the indication of each medications, how to take 
them, what side effects to expect and when they 
should seek help.
31.2.3.4  Monitoring 
and Measurement
Successful implementation of transitions of care 
interventions requires extensive coordination and 
communication between healthcare providers 
from different institutions. Various interventions 
can be put to trial to improve transitions of care, 
but they have to be adequately monitored and mea-
sured to determine their efficacy in reducing medi-
cation discrepancies and avoidable patient harm. 
Various standardised outcome measures are avail-
able, for instance process measures for the quality 
and effectiveness of medication reconciliation 
such as outstanding unintentional medication dis-
crepancies and percentage of patients receiving 
medication reconciliation [13]. In addition, vali-
dated survey instruments for patient-centred mea-
sures, such as patient experience and understanding 
of medications, are also recommended to achieve 
a well-rounded evaluation [16, 24, 25].
31.3  Medication Safety 
in Polypharmacy
In order to have a rough estimate of the prevalence 
of polypharmacy, it is necessary to understand the 
definition of polypharmacy first. In its most sim-
plistic definition, polypharmacy means “an indi-
vidual on multiple medications” [26, 27]. This 
usually afflicts those with numerous chronic health 
conditions, and is highly prevalent in the elderly as 
the number of co-morbidities increases in tandem 
with age [28, 29]. Individuals with polypharmacy 
often consult more than one medical specialist and 
have prescription medications filled at multiple 
pharmacies, making their medication regimen 
complex. This is further complicated by usage of 
non-prescription as well as traditional and/or com-
plementary medications [28].
There is however no exact definition for poly-
pharmacy. It is often defined as taking five or 
more medications, but other numbers were also 
used as the cut-off point [30]. This numerical 
definition is criticised as being arbitrary, as the 
number of medications taken lacks correlation 
with patients’ clinical outcome. In fact, the use of 
multiple medications is warranted and rational in 
some health conditions, for example, heart or 
renal failure. This rational polypharmacy is con-
trary to the negative connotation associated with 
the term, where it is used to describe duplication 
of therapy, presence of drug interaction, non- 
indicated or excessive use of medicines [31, 32]. 
Hence, proponents now advocate for a distinction 
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to be made between appropriate and inappropri-
ate polypharmacy [31, 32].
For polypharmacy to be appropriate, the com-
bination of medicines prescribed has to be opti-
mised based on available best evidence and 
incorporates the patient’s wishes to achieve the 
intended clinical outcomes [26, 33]. Failure to do 
so will result in inappropriate or problematic 
polypharmacy, where the risk of therapy out-
weigh the intended benefit, resulting in subopti-
mal treatment or patient harm. This includes 
potential prescribing omissions, where polyphar-
macy paradoxically results in under-prescribing 
of indicated medications due to an aversion 
towards potential ADR and non-adherence [33].
31.3.1  Prevalence of Polypharmacy
Most prevalence studies focused on the number of 
medicines, as well as frequency of potentially inap-
propriate medications (PIM) [34, 35]. 
Polypharmacy is usually defined as ≥5 medica-
tions, while the term excessive polypharmacy is 
used for ≥10 medications. Most of the research on 
polypharmacy focuses on the elderly (aged 
≥65 years old), those living in managed care facili-
ties and cancer patients, as these populations are 
more prone and vulnerable to the consequences of 
inappropriate polypharmacy. In the elderly popula-
tion, a systematic review noted that those in pri-
mary care recorded a lower prevalence of patients 
having ≥5 medications at 27–59% compared to 
those who are hospitalised at 46–84% [35]. A study 
conducted across Europe established that one-third 
of community dwelling patients were on polyphar-
macy [36]. Rates of excessive polypharmacy were 
also reported, with around 10% of patients falling 
within this group [35, 37]. In long-term care facili-
ties, 38–91% were on ≥5 medications, whereas 
11–65% were on ≥10 medications [38].
31.3.2  Medication-Related Harm 
in Polypharmacy
The concern with polypharmacy that makes it a 
medication safety priority is that it increases the 
risk of adverse drug reactions (ADRs) due to 
drug-drug interactions and duplicity of therapy. 
These unwanted effects are a major source of iat-
rogenic medication-related harm for patients, and 
the elderly are more susceptible due to age- 
related physiologic decline [31, 39]. An adverse 
reaction can also result in a prescription cascade, 
where it is mistaken for an emerging medical 
condition and treated with new medicines [29]. 
These situations contribute to the incidence of 
intentional or non-intentional non-adherence 
among patients, as well as physical harm such as 
falls, fractures, cognitive impairments and 
dementia [29, 40]. In terms of economic implica-
tions, polypharmacy increases avoidable health-
care costs such as emergency department visits 
and hospitalisations [40, 41].
The main cause of polypharmacy is the emer-
gence of multiple morbidities in an ageing popula-
tion. The prevalence of having two or more chronic 
conditions increases with age, afflicting two-thirds 
of those aged more than 65 years old [42]. Multiple 
morbidity is a major confounder of the relation-
ship between number of medications and health 
outcomes [43]. Other patient factors affecting 
polypharmacy include gender, with females hav-
ing a greater preponderance to take more medica-
tions, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status, with 
those of poorer background and less education 
more prone to polypharmacy [34, 37, 44].
Health system changes causing an increase in 
polypharmacy include improved patient aware-
ness and availability of treatment, wider insur-
ance coverage, as well as pharmaceutical 
promotions [45, 46]. The rise of preventative 
medicine also contributes to polypharmacy, as 
patients are prescribed medicines to reduce their 
probability of being inflicted with stroke or 
acute myocardial infarctions [26]. Emphasis on 
evidence- based practice also results in the rou-
tine application of clinical guidelines in pre-
scriptions. Unfortunately, these guidelines are 
often single condition specific and do not cater 
to potential medication-related problems due to 
treatment of multiple morbidities, further 
increasing the number of medications and 
potentially inappropriate medications being pre-
scribed [26, 29, 40].
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The number of medicines itself, regardless of 
appropriateness, also constitutes a risk for ADR 
as it increases the odds of drug interaction and 
inappropriate prescription [37, 40]. For exam-
ple, the combined use of diuretics and blood 
pressure medications in a patient with heart fail-
ure can lead to postural hypotension and hypo-
natremia. Interactions can also occur with 
non-prescription medicines, complementary 
and alternative medicines as well as food [34]. 
In fact, the addition of a new medication in a 
patient with polypharmacy was found to elevate 
the risk of prescribing or monitoring error by 
16% [27]. Prevalence of potential inappropriate 
medications meanwhile was found to range 
from 27% to 56% among the elderly in clinical 
care [35].
31.3.3  Approaches for Addressing 
Polypharmacy
Ensuring medication safety in polypharmacy 
entails the optimisation of medicines use, in 
which medicines prescribed for a patient are indi-
cated and well considered in terms of their risk 
and benefit profiles, potential interactions and 
patient acceptability. Various interventions aimed 
at improving the appropriate use of polyphar-
macy had been carried out, but systematic reviews 
concluded that these interventions had yet to 
demonstrate significant clinical outcomes [33, 
47]. However, this is more likely caused by defi-
ciencies in the research designs rather than actual 
ineffectiveness of the interventions in the trials. 
Most of the studies also follow-up their subjects 
for less than 1 year, which may not be enough to 
detect significant changes in clinical outcomes.
Interventions were led by doctors, pharma-
cists or multidisciplinary endeavours, and 
involved structured pharmaceutical care pro-
gramme, educational intervention and training, 
medication review, medication screening, pre-
scription review, electronic medical record-based 
intervention, comprehensive geriatric assessment 
and multidisciplinary case conference [33, 47]. 
Some of the more established strategies are fur-
ther discussed below.
For patients living in nursing homes or aged 
care facilities, similar multifaceted interventions 
were employed to optimise medications use. 
Medication review was the main recurring com-
ponent along with multidisciplinary case discus-
sion, education for staff, and utilisation of clinical 
decision support system [48]. Other interventions 
suggested include (1) implementing a medication 
reconciliation service by pharmacists, (2) con-
ducting audits on high-risk medication use, (3) 
developing deprescribing scripts, (4) developing 
prescribing guidelines for geriatric patients with 
multiple co-morbidities, (5) making electronic 
medication charts and records accessible to all 
healthcare professionals, and (6) empowering 
facility level Medication Advisory Committee to 
determine medication appropriateness [49].
31.3.3.1  Measuring Appropriateness 
of Medications
In order to ensure medication safety in polyphar-
macy, medications taken by a patient, especially 
those with multiple morbidities, should always 
be assessed by physicians before the start of a 
new medication, or routinely by pharmacists dur-
ing medication review and reconciliation [50]. 
The aim of this assessment is to increase medica-
tion appropriateness and decrease inappropri-
ately prescribed medication and prescribing 
omissions.
Among the elderly, the Beers criteria is often 
used to determine appropriateness of medicines 
use [51]. Medicines that should generally be 
avoided in this population or in certain specific 
medical conditions are considered. A total of 48 
medicines are deemed inappropriate to be used 
among the elderly, including benzodiazepines, 
anticholinergics and antihistamines, long-term 
non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs and stimu-
lation laxatives. Other validated screening tools 
include Medication Appropriateness Index (MSI) 
and Screening Tool of Older Persons’ 
Prescriptions and Screening Tool to Alert Doctors 
to Right Treatment (STOPP/START) [26]. Burt 
et al. developed a 12-item measure of polyphar-
macy appropriateness based on a systematic 
review and expert panel consensus, adding in 
measures on determinants of patient adherence, 
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medication regimen complexity and non- 
pharmacological treatments [52].
31.3.3.2  Medication Reviews
Medication review is the foremost strategy to 
reduce polypharmacy. In medication reviews, 
patients’ medications are evaluated by a trained 
healthcare professional and discussed together to 
identify drug-related problems. Interventional 
recommendations are then made to optimise 
treatment [41, 53, 54]. In 2018, the Scottish 
National Health Services published a compre-
hensive seven-step review process to serve as 
guidance in managing polypharmacy in a patient- 
centred manner. It involves (1) establishing treat-
ment objectives with the patient, before working 
through the whole list of medications to deter-
mine drug therapies that are (2) essential as well 
as (3) potentially unnecessary. The current treat-
ment is then assessed to determine its (4) effec-
tiveness, (5) safety, (6) cost-effectiveness and (7) 
patient acceptance [50].
Medication reviews are often led by pharma-
cists, where other issues such as medication 
adherence, device use technique and monitoring 
of treatment are also considered [53, 54]. This 
service is available in most Western countries, 
including the United States, United Kingdom, 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand, and is often 
conducted in community pharmacies and reim-
bursable by the respective governments [54]. 
Outcome wise, medication reviews that are more 
comprehensive and conducted in the context of 
patients’ clinical condition were found to signifi-
cantly reduce hospitalisation [53]. Medication 
reviews with follow-up were also found to 
improve patients’ quality of life, reduce 
medication- related hospitalisations and to be 
cost-effective [55, 56]. In the United States, med-
ication reviews known as Medication Therapy 
Management (MTM) were found to improve 
medication appropriateness, adherence and hos-
pitalisation for diseases such as heart failure and 
diabetes [57].
For a patient with polypharmacy, there is an 
increased risk of discrepancies during transition 
of care between different institutions. Hence con-
ducting medication reviews and reconciliations 
during hospital admission and upon discharge are 
likely to have a high impact on medication safety. 
A mechanism has to be in place to ensure changes 
in medication are properly documented and con-
veyed to the receiving care team, as this vital 
information is often inaccurate or lacking [26, 
27].
31.3.3.3  Rational Prescribing
Several guidelines on prescribing for the elderly 
exist, especially for conditions often affecting 
them such as management of constipation, 
chronic pain and rational usage of benzodiaze-
pines, anticholinergics and anti-psychotics [50]. 
Guidelines for the management of patients with 
multiple chronic conditions are also being devel-
oped and this is the way forward for the manage-
ment of polypharmacy [27]. Such guidelines are 
currently lacking, with only eight being identi-
fied by a systematic review [58]. Tools to assist in 
decision-making on polypharmacy are also avail-
able, for example, the Medicines Effectiveness 
Summary, where the annualised numbers needed 
to treat (NNT) to achieve a beneficial outcome 
for high-risk medications were calculated based 
on available trial evidence [50].
Computerised decision support systems are 
also increasingly being adopted to tackle poly-
pharmacy. This includes assisted detection of 
inappropriate medicines and doses, which are 
then conveyed to prescribers via an alert system. 
This intervention has been found to modestly 
reduce ADEs [37]. PRIMA-eDS, a recently 
developed European-based electronic decision 
support system, is able to recommend medication 
discontinuation or modification based on 
patients’ data and latest guidelines [59].
31.3.3.4  Deprescribing
Deprescribing entails going through a patient’s 
medication list systematically to identify items 
that can be safely discontinued. It includes iden-
tifying the rationale of each previously prescribed 
medication, weighing the benefit of the regimen 
against risk of ADEs, assessing their potential to 
be discontinued, prioritising the discontinuation 
sequence, as well as monitoring the effect on 
patient care [60]. Due diligence is important in 
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deprescribing, as inappropriately stopping a 
medication can lead to adverse drug withdrawal 
events. For these medications, a gradual tapering 
of doses is recommended [44]. Research findings 
suggested that deprescribing saves cost, reduces 
waste of medications and does not result in 
patient harm; however definitive impact on clini-
cal outcomes as well as patients’ medication 
adherence cannot be determined due to paucity 
of high quality, long-term trials [61, 62].
31.3.3.5  Health System Changes
In order to develop polypharmacy management 
programmes that are sustainable, change man-
agement principles such as Kotter’s Eight step 
process for leading change, as well as implemen-
tation strategies that are grounded in established 
theories are recommended [41]. Multidisciplinary 
and multinational projects, engaging varied 
stakeholders including politicians, healthcare 
commissioners, educators, regulators, providers, 
and patients, such as the European Union’s 
SIMPATHY consortium are also essential to spur 
innovation and drive change management [63].
31.3.3.6  Practical Tips
In addition to institutional changes, healthcare 
professionals can also address polypharmacy 
according to their individual capacities. The 
King’s Fund (2013) suggested practical tips on 
polypharmacy management that can be carried 
out by all healthcare providers [26]. Tips include 
ensuring that medication regimens are as simple 
as possible for patients in terms of frequency and 
pill burden, for example, substituting rather than 
adding medications to the regimen. Making 
things easier is also recommended, such as pro-
viding clear and specific written instructions, 
dosing schedules, compliance aids as well as 
assessing their level of understanding.
31.3.3.7  Practicing Patient-Centred 
Care
The involvement of patients and their family 
members in shared decision-making on their 
treatment regimen is important to ensure medi-
cation safety in polypharmacy. Prescribers 
should always communicate with patients to 
ensure that their needs are met and concerns 
addressed. Involvement of patients is essential to 
ensure that they understand the medication regi-
men and will adhere to the medicines prescribed 
[26, 50, 52]. Tools to facilitate patient involve-
ment can be used, including patient-held medi-
cation records, explanation materials for illnesses 
and medications as well as empowerment sup-
port materials such as WHO’s 5 Moments for 
Medication Safety [41].
31.4  High-Risk Situations 
in Medication Safety
Regarding medication safety, high-risk situations 
are circumstances which are associated with sig-
nificant harm due to unsafe medication practices 
or medication errors [64]. The inherent risk of 
use of certain drugs, defined as high-risk or high-
alert medications, as well as certain work envi-
ronments (e.g. hospital healthcare) and clinical 
scenarios (e.g. emergency and anaesthesia set-
tings), which involve particular difficulties for 
healthcare professionals in complying with safe 
medication practices, represent some examples 
of high-risk situations. Similarly, there are also 
some conditions inherent to the individual, such 
as childhood and old age, and medical condi-
tions, such as hepatic or renal impairment and 
cardiac failure, which predispose patients to an 
increased risk of medication errors and ADRs 
[64]. Pregnant women can even be included 
among high-risk patients due to the limited infor-
mation about the safety of most medications in 
this population, because of a lack of randomised 
clinical trials [65]. High-risk situations, as a 
whole, require mechanisms to prevent medica-
tion errors and, in case they occur, should cover 
means of identification before they result in harm 
to the patient. In a recent consensus prioritisation 
exercise, a group of leading researchers in patient 
and medication safety, including experts from the 
WHO Global Patient Safety Network, identified 
development of guidelines and standard operat-
ing procedures for high-risk medications, patients 
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and contexts, as well as the production of score- 
based approaches to predict high-risk situations 
as top priority research areas [66].
31.4.1  Medication Errors and Related 
Harm in High-Risk Situations
31.4.1.1  High-Risk Medications
High-risk medications are drugs that are more 
likely to cause harm to a patient when they are 
used in error or taken inappropriately. Although 
mistakes may or may not be more common with 
these drugs, the consequences of an error at any 
level of their management (i.e. prescription, stor-
age, dispensing, preparation, administration and 
monitoring) are more devastating to patients 
compared to non-high-risk medications [67]. 
These medicines require particular attention in 
the medication use process, mainly because of 
their potential toxicity, low therapeutic index or 
high possibility of pharmacological interactions.
A recent systematic review, which focused on 
the epidemiology of prescribing errors with high- 
risk medications in the inpatient setting, high-
lighted that the prevalence of these errors was 
highly variable, ranging from 0.24 to 89.6 errors 
per 100 orders. This wide range reflected the lack 
of uniqueness on definitions of both prescribing 
errors and high-risk medications. Dosage errors, 
incorrect date of prescription, and omissions of 
required medications were the most common 
prescribing errors. Opioids and sedatives were 
the most frequent pharmacological categories 
associated with these errors [68]. In another sys-
tematic literature review aimed at defining high- 
risk drug classes, methotrexate and warfarin were 
the top two drugs resulting in fatal medication 
errors [69].
While the drugs identified as high-risk may 
vary between countries and healthcare settings in 
light of the types of molecules used and patients 
treated, analysis of incident data and review of 
the literature identified a group of medicines that 
should universally be considered as high-risk. In 
2015, the New South Wales Clinical Excellence 
Commission summarised these drugs by the 
mnemonic acronym “A PINCH” (anti-infective 
agents, potassium and other electrolytes, insulin, 
narcotics and other sedatives, chemotherapeutic 
and immunosuppressive agents, and heparin and 
anticoagulants) [70]. The most frequent medica-
tion errors and ADRs associated with the use of 
the high-risk medication categories considered in 
“A PINCH” are reported in Table 31.2 [64, 70].
This list is not intended to be exhaustive, and 
tables should be developed locally in order to 
reflect the specificities of drugs used in different 
work environments. A wider list has been drawn 
up and is periodically updated by the Institute for 
Safe Medication Practices (ISMP), based on 
error reports submitted to the ISMP National 
Medication Errors Reporting Program, evidences 
from the literature and inputs from practitioners 
and safety experts. High-risk medications have 
been classified according to their different use in 
acute care, ambulatory healthcare and long-term 
care settings [71].
31.4.1.2  High-Risk Patients
Data from observational studies indicate that 
5–27% of all paediatric medication orders 
resulted in error [72]. Children, especially 
 neonates and infants, are particularly vulnerable 
to patient safety concerns, including the use of 
weight-based dosing, the need for stock medicine 
dilution to administer small amounts of medica-
tion, immature hepatic and renal systems and the 
inability to self-administer medications or com-
municate side effects [73].
In the elderly, as discussed in the previous 
section, long-term polypharmacy due to the 
emergence of multiple chronic morbidities and 
high probability of drug-drug interactions are the 
most critical factors in the medication safety 
field. It is also noteworthy that the elderly are 
generally poorly compliant to therapy and less 
likely to tolerate drugs. Indeed, age-related 
physiological changes, including the reduction 
of glomerular filtration rate, the decreasing liver 
volume and blood flow, as well as an increase of 
gastric acidity, affect pharmacokinetic processes, 
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thus exposing older people to an increased risk 
of ADRs [74].
Recent studies have reported that medication 
use is common among pregnant women. In a 
multinational web-based European study con-
ducted in pregnant women and new mothers with 
a child less than 1-year-old, 28% of the women 
used medications classified as risky to the foetus 
or child. Having a chronic disorder was the factor 
with the strongest association with the use of 
risky medications during pregnancy [75]. Even 
fragile patient groups, such as those with chronic 
pain conditions, diabetes, cancer or major psy-
chiatric disorders, need to be included among 
patients at increased risk of ADRs.
31.4.1.3  High-Risk Contexts
Two systematic reviews reported that prescribing 
errors are common in general practice and hospi-
tal inpatients [76, 77]. The hospital environment 
is particularly prone to error-provoking condi-
tions. Hospital wards may be busy or under-
staffed, and clinicians may inadequately 
supervise the medication use process or fail to 
check important information. Tiredness and the 
need to multitask often interrupt critical pro-
cesses, such as administration of medicines, 
cause adverse ramifications for patient safety 
[78]. For example, a study conducted in a Spanish 
tertiary-care hospital emergency department 
noted that medication errors occurred most fre-
Table 31.2 High-risk medication list [64, 70]
High-risk medication groups Examples of medications
Examples of medication errors and adverse 
drug reactions
A: Anti-infective Amphotericin Dosage and administration errors (e.g. 
substitution of the lipid-base form with a 
high dose of the cardiotoxic conventional 
form)
Aminoglycosides Dosage and monitoring errors (e.g. 
dose-related damage to hearing and 
kidneys)
P: Potassium and other 
electrolytes
Injection of potassium, magnesium, 
calcium, hypertonic sodium chloride
Preparation and administration errors (e.g. 
intravenous infusions incorrectly prepared, 
concentrated solutions administered in place 
of diluted solutions)
I: Insulin All insulins Dosage and administration errors (e.g. 
incorrect use of non-insulin syringes, 
misunderstanding of doses expressed in U 
or UI for units)
N: Narcotics and other 
sedatives
Opioids (e.g. hydromorphone, 
oxycodone, morphine, fentanyl), 
benzodiazepines (e.g. diazepam, 
midazolam), short-term anaesthetics 
(e.g. thiopentone, propofol)
Prescribing, dosage and administration 
errors (e.g. cardiorespiratory toxicity due to 
overdosing, incorrect management of 
molecules with different durations of action, 
incorrect use of opioid analgesic patches)
C: Chemotherapeutic 
agents
Oral and parenteral chemotherapeutics Dosage and monitoring errors (e.g. toxicity 
due to overdosing)
Methotrexate Administration errors (e.g. overdosing 
induced by daily administration instead of 
weekly administration)
H: Heparin and 
anticoagulants
Low molecular weight heparins (e.g. 
enoxaparin), orally active vitamin K 
antagonists (e.g. warfarin), newer oral 
anticoagulants (e.g. rivaroxaban)
Dosage and monitoring errors (e.g. risk of 
inefficacy due to underdosing, risk of 
bleeding due to overdosing)
Other high-risk 
medications identified at 
Local Health District/
Facility/Unit Level
Paracetamol Dosage errors (dose-related liver failure 
mainly in children)
Non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs Prescribing errors (long-term 
gastrointestinal, renal and cardiovascular 
toxicity mainly in high-risk populations)
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quently when medication were administered, 
especially during the afternoon or evening shift 
when staff were more tired [79].
Certain hospital specialties are associated 
with increased risk of medication administra-
tion error. In a prospective incident monitoring 
study conducted at a large Chinese tertiary hos-
pital, the frequency of administration error dur-
ing anaesthesia was 1.1%. The largest categories 
of errors were omissions, incorrect doses and 
substitutions. Even then, substantially more 
respondents who claimed that they were not 
fully rested reported inattention as a contribut-
ing factor to errors compared to those who were 
fully rested [80].
31.4.2  Some Ways to Ensure 
Medication Safety in High- 
Risk Situations
31.4.2.1  High-Risk Medications
Both at local and global level, the purpose of 
identifying a list of high-alert medications is to 
determine which drugs require special safeguards 
to reduce the risk of errors and minimise harm 
that can occur in the different phases of the medi-
cation use process [71]. Simplifying and stan-
dardising the ordering, storage, preparation, and 
dispensing of high-risk medications is the main 
strategy to reduce the risk of errors from high- 
risk medicines. In the fifth edition of the 
Accreditation Standards for Hospitals, the Joint 
Commission International identified improving 
the safety of high-risk medications in hospitals as 
a key objective, paying particular attention on the 
development and implementation of processes to 
manage the safe use of concentrated electrolytes 
[81]. Concentrated electrolyte solutions should 
always be stored in a controlled environment to 
prevent selection error and inadvertent adminis-
tration of undiluted solutions, which have con-
tributed to fatal outcomes.
Healthcare professionals are also involved in 
ensuring safe prescription, administration and 
monitoring of high-risk medications. In this 
regard, drugs with a narrow therapeutic index, 
such as chemotherapeutics and orally active 
vitamin K antagonists, should be carefully dosed 
and monitored by clinicians, in order to perform 
dose adjustments when necessary. Indeed, even 
small increases in the concentration of these 
medications at their site of action, for example, 
due to pharmacological interaction or concomi-
tant disease, may cause a significant increase in 
their effect, resulting in patient harm [64]. 
Therapeutic guidelines should be followed for 
drugs where dosing is complex and duration of 
therapy substantially increases the risk of toxic-
ity, for example, aminoglycosides and opioids 
[70]. “Navigating opioids for chronic pain” is a 
tool that provides guidance on different opioids 
based on morphine equivalence to compare the 
relative potency of the different molecules [82]. 
The use of shelf reminders, auxiliary labels, 
checklists and automated alerts, better if built 
into information technology systems, is intended 
to improve information and stimulate the atten-
tion of the clinicians regarding high-risk medi-
cines. A regular review of local and broader 
system incidents and near-misses and the use of 
prospective analysis and re-design of systems is 
fundamental to prevent reoccurrence of the same 
errors with these drugs [70].
31.4.2.2  High-Risk Patients
All patients should be supported by a prescribing 
team working in close partnership with other 
healthcare providers, to ensure that they are 
aware of the therapeutic objectives of the medica-
tions taken, their likely benefits and potential side 
effects [83]. Self-empowerment among patients 
is essential to promote medication safety, as they 
serve as the final barrier in preventing medication 
errors. For this purpose, the use of aide-memoire 
tools, such as WHO 5 Moments for Medication 
Safety, should be promoted especially among 
high-risk patients, their families and caregivers, 
at all levels of care and across all settings [84].
Among the paediatric population, improving 
medication safety across the spectrum of their 
medication use process remains an area of criti-
cal focus. In a prospective cohort study on priori-
tising strategies for preventing medication errors 
and ADEs in paediatric inpatients, computerised 
physician order entry with clinical decision sup-
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port systems, ward-based clinical pharmacists 
and improved communication among physicians, 
nurses, and pharmacists were identified as having 
the greatest potential to reduce medication errors 
[85]. While some advanced technologies, such as 
computerised physician order entry with clinical 
decision support systems, are increasingly 
adopted worldwide, others, including barcode 
administration systems and “SMART pumps” 
(i.e. infusion delivery systems that provide deci-
sion support for users), are only mainstream in 
the United States [86]. Technologies to improve 
medication safety that are still in the pipeline 
include mobile apps to assist each step of the 
medication management process from ordering 
to delivery in real time and workflow manage-
ment systems.
In outpatient paediatrics, focus of interven-
tions should be on the administration stage con-
sidering that parents, rather than patients or 
trained nurses, administer most medications. 
This process is error-prone, including parental 
confusion regarding the correct use of teaspoons, 
tablespoons, and dose cups. Supplementing the 
often-rushed information from physicians and 
pharmacists regarding drug administration with 
accurate Internet-based information on drugs or a 
personal consultation with an office-based phar-
macist could be helpful [73].
In the elderly population, rational prescrib-
ing is a crucial step to avoid ADRs resulting 
from unnecessary drug use, incorrect drug 
choices, inappropriate dosing regimens and 
therapeutic duplications [74]. Lists have been 
derived from consensus opinion to guide clini-
cians, and primarily general practitioners, about 
appropriate prescriptions for older people, 
including the Beers Criteria and STOPP/START 
tool [87, 88]. While the use of such criteria 
would reduce the risk of wrong prescription in 
older people, it is most effective if supplemented 
with periodic medication reviews, as reduction 
in the absolute number of prescribed medica-
tions, particularly non-indicated items, can min-
imise the risk of ADRs [74]. Multidisciplinary 
cooperation between nurses, physicists and 
pharmacists is essential in this aspect. By mak-
ing medical care plans together, errors associ-
ated with incorrect doses and noncompliance 
with regulations and laws can be prevented 
more effectively [89].
There is a paucity of information on medica-
tion safety during pregnancy. This underscores 
the important role healthcare providers play as 
trusted sources of information for women during 
this vital stage of their life. Interactions between 
women of childbearing age and their physicians 
and pharmacists will influence the decisions they 
make about medication use. Strategic messaging 
and improved informational resources could 
help maximise the effectiveness of these interac-
tions by ensuring that women receive the clear, 
credible, and comprehensive information about 
medication risks during pregnancy at the right 
time [90].
31.4.2.3  High-Risk Contexts
The working environment in healthcare facili-
ties, primarily hospital settings, are often subop-
timal with fluctuations in workload, staffing 
absences, missing medical records, distractions, 
and time pressures. Thus, prescribers should be 
equipped with the knowledge, skills and resil-
ience to cope with these eventualities [91]. 
Various strategies can be taken to mitigate 
inherent risks in high- risk situations. As an 
example, in the hospital setting, preparing and 
administering intravenous medications is par-
ticularly complex, error prone and dangerous. 
Mitigation of this risk entails conduct of error 
checking at each stage of the preparation. The 
use of pre-prepared injections may also help by 
eliminating errors in the reconstitution of drug 
and diluent [92]. Another risk reduction strategy 
is the implementation of electronic prescription. 
A recent systematic review and meta-analysis of 
38 prospective interventional studies found that 
hospital-based electronic prescription strategies 
reduced medication errors, dosing errors and 
ADEs. Although the available evidence was het-
erogeneous and mainly represented by non-ran-
domised studies, it provides early data to justify 
implementation and further evaluation of com-
puterised strategies [93].
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31.5  Final Recommendations 
and Conclusions
The complexity and vastness of the healthcare 
system as well as the rapid advancement in 
pharmacotherapy render medication safety chal-
lenging to achieve. A patient can now be seen by 
multiple prescribers in multiple facilities and 
started on multiple medications, some of which 
are high-risk. Healthcare workers are also work-
ing in an increasingly siloed environment, 
focusing on the specialisation of their unit, 
resulting in fragmented information exchange 
and lack of inter-departmental cooperation. All 
these factors increase the probability and pro-
pensity for unintentional medication errors to 
occur. Therefore, it is now vital for the next gen-
eration of healthcare professionals to appreciate 
the magnitude of the challenges faced in ensur-
ing medication safety, using the current strate-
gies as a reference to devise their own innovative 
solutions.
As a recap of the chapter, transitions of care is 
a major contributor to medication discrepancies. 
A lack of information sharing among healthcare 
professionals detailing medication changes when 
patients transfer from one hospital to another or 
between different setting of care, and inadequate 
patient health literacy are the main causes for this 
lapse in medication safety. Focusing on medica-
tion reconciliation, information clarity during 
care transition, as well as patient engagement and 
empowerment are keys to alleviate this issue.
The use of multiple medications or polyphar-
macy is a rising trend. This will inevitably 
increase medication-related adverse events lead-
ing to patient harm. Various measures have been 
taken to promote rationale prescribing, especially 
among elderly patients as well as to reduce inap-
propriate polypharmacy. Conducting robust 
research in this area is a priority, as there is insuf-
ficient evidences that current polypharmacy- 
related interventions significantly improve 
patients’ clinical outcomes. Multifaceted inter-
ventions involving multiple stakeholders and 
health system changes should be the focus of 
future research to ensure medication safety in 
this aspect of care.
Some situations, including patients, specific 
medications and contexts of care, are associated 
with higher inherent safety risks. High-risk medi-
cations are often those with narrow therapeutic 
index and high potency, whereas some patient 
segments, especially children, geriatrics and 
pregnant women, are physiologically more vul-
nerable to errors. Chaotic and understaffed insti-
tutions, including poorly trained staff, also 
increase medication error risk. Use of alert sys-
tems, checklists and computerised technologies 
are strategies that can reduce the risk level. Safer 
hospital and primary care will be achievable 
when safety strategies and risk management 
skills are built into healthcare systems and prac-
tices of medication, safety and risk management 
is built into healthcare systems and processes.
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Trying to identify what digital medical technolo-
gies are today is a practically unresolvable task. 
Over the last few years, we have seen a radical 
change in these technologies; they have become 
not only extremely sophisticated and complex 
but also capable of maintaining evolving rela-
tionships with their users.
It is obvious that the benefits of this evolution 
are absolutely valuable, but several issues are 
linked to the evolutionary lines of medical 
devices and are often related to usability. In fact, 
the usability of digital medical devices (i.e., the 
level of effectiveness and efficiency provided by 
the device in interactive environments) and the 
level of user satisfaction in certain contexts of use 
[1] are definitely not satisfactory at present. Users 
of medical technology are among the most 
diverse, including doctors, nurses, technicians, 
administrators, and patients themselves or their 
families. Each type of user has different and 
sometimes conflicting needs, skills, and traits. 
The tools themselves can be so different that 
combining them under a single label seems 
excessively summary as well as inappropriate. 
We could define the term “medical device” to 
refer once and for all, say, to devices without any 
relational quality beyond those impressed on 
them by their designers (e.g., a scalpel). But the 
notion of a medical device also encompasses 
e-health records, robots that assist or take the 
place of human operators, and applications that 
inform and help patients, thus creating a dialogue 
between patients and healthcare professionals; 
often these systems create ecosystems in which, 
in addition to one or more human counterparts, 
they interact with each other.
On closer inspection, the problem of usability 
of medical devices cannot be tackled in isolation 
and must concern managerial and administrative 
aspects of the entire healthcare system. However, 
within this complexity, the design of each medi-
cal device must be tailored to the specific activi-
ties, objectives, competencies, and skills of those 
they assist. Just as the considerations relating to 
their evaluation both in the development phase 
and during their actual use are indispensable. 
Given the complexity of the socio-technical sys-
tems that are responsible for providing health ser-
vices, the insufficient usability of medical devices 
is one of the major problems affecting the effi-
ciency of the entire system and, more impor-
tantly, the health of the patient [2, 3]. Many 
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studies in recent years have highlighted problems 
related to the usability of medical devices that 
have resulted in negative effects for the health of 
patients [4]. This paper will focus on a few stud-
ies in particular to shed some light on the nature 
of the problems and their consequences.
32.2  Some Studies on Medical 
Devices
Errors related to the use of medical devices can 
lead to serious damage to the patient and repre-
sent a frequent and sometimes silent cause of 
death. Numerous studies on errors in medicine 
clearly show a direct link between usability prob-
lems and errors, patient readmission, and injuries 
[5, 6]. As an example, it is worth noting that 
adverse events related to patient-controlled anal-
gesia were reported almost 2500 times between 
2003 and 2004. This figure seems even worse 
when we consider the fact that over 9000 adverse 
events occurred in the 5-year period from 2000 to 
2005 [7, 8]. These errors are often attributable to 
bad interface design: cognitive ergonomics 
guidelines are very often violated though they 
could be beneficially applied to the design of 
healthcare systems and medical devices in order 
to minimize the chance of adverse events.
Nowadays, electronic medical devices have 
spread to all hospital and extra-hospital environ-
ments, including operating rooms, emergency 
rooms, radiology departments, laboratories, 
emergency vehicles, intensive care units, and 
even homes. The development process and the 
performance of these devices are affected by an 
infinite number of variables that are not always 
considered and whose consequences are not 
always foreseen. Among these variables it seems 
obvious to consider that the pervasive use of 
these instruments is compromised by sound 
interference, low lighting, reflections, and electri-
cal interference. However, it is less commonly 
appreciated that operators, even experienced 
ones, are forced to continuously update their 
operational skills and develop new automatisms 
[9]. Performance can be further limited by stress, 
fatigue, and the application of incorrect proce-
dures. This is compounded by the wide range of 
devices that the operator uses over the course of a 
day. The physical, sensory, and mental capacities 
of health workers are variables that must be taken 
into account, especially since the use of equip-
ment increases considerably from year to year.
Devices can only be used safely and effec-
tively when the user, the activity, the context of 
use, the stress and fatigue levels, and the interac-
tions between all these factors have been ade-
quately evaluated during the design process. 
Keeping in mind the complexity of the factors 
involved, Schaeffer et  al. [10] have studied the 
consequences of using two different models of 
insulin infusion pumps for patients. In their study, 
they linked the design principles of human fac-
tors with those of user interface design. More 
specifically, the authors correlated the program-
ming errors of the instrument during data entry 
with different error categories, considering 
parameters such as blood glucose level or amount 
of carbohydrates. As a result of their evaluation, 
they were able to point out that, if certain devel-
opmental inefficiencies in the usability of the 
instrument had remained unresolved, adverse 
events could have occurred due to the release of 
inappropriate amounts of insulin, potentially 
having very serious consequences.
Other aspects relevant to the design of medical 
devices include population aging and consequent 
changes in users, such as reduced sensory capaci-
ties (e.g., decreased vision or hearing) and motor 
and cognitive abilities. Maša Isaković et al. [11] 
investigated elderly patients’ ease in using a glu-
cose self-monitoring application not specifically 
designed with them in mind. Their analysis 
showed that the most important points when 
designing an application for the elderly are the 
very basic aspects of the user interface: the size, 
visibility, and comprehensibility of buttons and 
symbols. For this purpose, the various distorting 
and illusory effects of perceptual processes 
should also be taken into account [12, 13]. 
Furthermore, the age-related deterioration of 
memory and a lack of familiarity with technology 
can cause user confusion and therefore lead to 
error. Although making applications suitable for 
all users would be a very difficult if not  impossible 
task, creating different profiles for different 
accessibility groups seems to be the best per-
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forming solution. In this case, the involvement of 
users from the earliest stages of design has been 
shown to be essential.
In development teams, collaboration between 
people with different skills is fundamental. The 
study conducted by Fairbanks et al. [14] on defi-
brillators highlighted the importance of collabo-
ration between clinicians and human factor 
experts. This study has pointed out that, although 
the collaborative design and the ergonomic eval-
uation of the user interface are well-established 
practices in the aeronautical and nuclear industry, 
most medical devices are not tested in all the con-
texts in which they will be used and with all 
future users. Defibrillators are perhaps the medi-
cal devices most exposed to critical situations. 
Problems such as the presence of too many but-
tons in a small area, the need for excessive scroll-
ing to get to the desired setting, and lack of 
feedback in an emergency can be lethal. Whereas 
the market today offers many choices, an ergo-
nomic approach should also guarantee the sim-
plification of the organization of the health 
system, increasing the quality, efficiency, and 
safety of care. Managers and experts should con-
sider medical devices that are truly functional for 
clinical-assistance activities and that aid workers 
in carrying out their daily tasks with greater satis-
faction and effectiveness, with the added benefit 
of consequent savings in terms of a reduced need 
for training.
One of the aspects of evaluation studies that 
can prove to be difficult is the recruitment of sub-
jects. Healthcare personnel, doctors, and nurses 
are often overworked professionals, which makes 
it difficult to involve them in evaluation circum-
stances beyond their working environments. To 
overcome this obstacle, Bond et al. [15] had eval-
uation sessions take place during a conference 
attended by end users, allowing direct interaction 
with the medical devices they wanted to evaluate. 
More specifically, their evaluations concerned 
one software application, a medical diagnostic 
tool (ECG viewer), and a medical research tool 
(electrode misplacement simulator). From their 
study, interesting possibilities emerge for con-
ducting evaluations in a way that does not involve 
taking the end users inside laboratories, but 
instead finding large gatherings of end users and 
taking the opportunity to have end users interact 
with the device at their convenience.
Another study is particularly interesting for at 
least two reasons: it is a longitudinal analysis that 
was carried out in two different phases over 
7 years, and concerns users who are sometimes 
neglected in usability studies, that is, radiology 
technicians. In this study [16], six radiology tech-
nicians were observed while performing radio-
logical examinations (i.e., Computed 
Tomography) as part of their usual activities in a 
hospital emergency department. The authors con-
sidered variables such as the occurrence of errors 
and the time needed to conduct various aspects of 
the examination. The same technicians were 
interviewed about their thoughts on the diagnos-
tic system they were using regarding aspects such 
as ease of use, cognitive effort required, and the 
possibility of it leading to errors. The results of 
this analysis highlighted several problems related 
to the usability of the system, both in itself and as 
part of a broader operational context. Most nota-
bly, it became apparent over the years that all 
noticeable improvements, such as a reduction in 
the time needed to carry out the examination, 
were in fact attributable to an increase in the skill 
of the operators. The system updates made 
between the first and second evaluations had not 
led to any improvement in usability.
32.3  Beneficiaries of Usable 
Medical Devices
Direct and indirect users of medical devices have 
different needs and characteristics. To varying 
degrees, any individual can take part in the improve-
ment of device usability and effectiveness for their 
particular context and needs. In any case, however 
different the needs may be, the following objec-
tives are universal when improving usability:
• To reduce the number of accidents and deaths 
due to incorrect, ineffective, or inappropriate 
use of medical devices.
• To improve the ease of use for users as well as 
users’ well-being.
• To comply with current regulations and cul-
tural needs of the various countries.
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Based on these considerations, Wiklund et al. 
[17] stated that ensuring adequate usability of 
medical instruments is as much a moral impera-
tive as a path to economic benefits (see Fig. 32.1).
Efforts to ensure adequate usability must 
involve all beneficiaries. Each user group is a 
vector of specific needs and requirements and is 
called to participate in the evolutionary develop-
ment of medical devices.
32.4  Usability Evaluation
Various government authorities (see, for exam-
ple, the FDA’s webpage1) have recommended 
that the activities and processes necessary to 
ensure the usability of medical devices should be 
divided into (a) processes relating to devices not 
yet on the market and (b) processes relating to 
products already in use.
For devices not yet on the market, the indica-
tions, essentially addressed to the manufacturing 
1  h t t p s : / / w w w . f d a . g o v / m e d i c a l - d e v i c e s /
human-factors-and-medical-devices
companies, guide the preparation of a final report 
that clearly expresses the results achieved regard-
ing the usability of the product.
Therefore, the report must contain clearly and 
in detail:
• Any conclusions reached during evaluation.
• A description of the device’s target users, 
applications, and contexts, and any training 
necessary for its operation.
• A description of the user interface.
• Any problems highlighted during evaluation.
• An analysis of the risks and dangers associ-
ated with the use of the device.
• A summary of preliminary results.
• A description and categorization of tasks 
along with their critical aspects.
• The details of the evaluation, based on the 
principles of human factors.
Following the release of the product on the 
market, issues may arise such as potentially or 
actually dangerous circumstances, errors during 
use, and improper use, even if the product was 











reduced user error rates
reduction of injuries
reduction of fatal events       
productivity increase
improved worker satisfaction
reduced training and support
reduction of caregiver workload
reduction of caregvers error rates
reduction of support requests
ease of learning
ease of use
reduction of operating time   
Fig. 32.1 The main beneficiaries of the increased levels of usability of medical instruments and their benefits
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lines.2 In this case, the priority becomes the clear 
communication of the event to the manufacturer 
of the device so that the device’s usability may be 
improved further. Here also, the FDA recom-
mends the preparation of a report describing with 
as much precision as possible the context in 
which the adverse event occurred. In particular, 
the following information is required:
• The device type, manufacturer, brand, and lot 
number if applicable.
• The exact location of the event.
• If a patient or device operator was harmed.
• If there was a problem with the device itself, 
such as a defect, malfunction, and break.
• Whether someone was directly operating the 
device at the time of the event, and if so, who.
• If there were other therapies being used on the 
patient at the time of the event that may have 
caused or contributed to the event.
Evidently, the FDA’s statements have as their 
conceptual basis user-centered design (UCD) 
[18] (see Fig. 32.2). UCD considers the user its 
focal point, rather than technology. In the realiza-
tion of a product, the specific needs, traits, and 
limitations of the end user are the most important 
2 (https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/human-factors-
a n d - m e d i c a l - d e v i c e s / p o s t m a r k e t - 
information-device-surveillance-and-reporting-pro-
cesses)
functional needs. To this end, development must 
be carried out at different levels by multidisci-
plinary teams of marketing representatives, 
developers, technicians, and usability experts. 
The goal of UCD is to understand what users 
really want and need in order to produce interac-
tive tools that foster a productive and satisfactory 
dialogue between user and device.
What this team is specifically called to do can 
vary depending on many factors, from the com-
pany’s positioning to how many products the 
company has already put on the market, from 
how innovative the product is to the type of target 
users and whether that type is more or less 
 precisely defined. In “The invisible computer” 
[19], Donald Norman states that it is extremely 
important to perform a preliminary assessment of 
user needs and then move on to a market analy-
sis. This sequence of analysis is already itself an 
iterative cycle, since the market analysis should 
serve to re-evaluate and reframe users’ needs in 
terms of their definitive requirements and charac-
teristics. Based on the results obtained, a series of 
iterative cycles is initiated, towards the specifica-
tion of the product (concept design), its realiza-
tion in the form of prototypes which gradually 
grow closer and closer to the final product (imple-
mentation), and experimentation on the usability 
of the product in the field before the product is 
definitively released (product launch).
Each of these cycles aims to make user-device 













Fig. 32.2 The process 
of user-centered design 
(UCD) in which, starting 
from user and market 
analysis, iterative 
evaluation cycles, with 
the user as the focal 
point, are carried out 
before the product 
launch
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Any difficulty encountered by the user poses a 
challenge to form new design hypotheses leading 
to alternative design solutions. Ultimately, UCD 
aims to maximize the usability of a product. ISO 
9241 [1] defines usability as the “the extent to 
which a product can be used by specified users to 
achieve specified goals with effectiveness, effi-
ciency and satisfaction in a specified context of 
use.” To achieve adequate usability, designers must 
be able to respond adequately to these questions:
• Effectiveness: does the product support the 
user in achieving their objective?
• Efficiency: does the product allow the user to 
achieve their goals without unnecessary effort, 
without wasting time, and without generating 
mistakes?
• Satisfaction: does the use of the product repre-
sent a positive experience for the user, meet-
ing not only instrumental requirements but 
also cognitive and emotional needs?
As defined, these questions must be answered 
in the affirmative, taking into account the speci-
fied users and the specified contexts of use.
32.4.1  Methods for Usability 
Assessment
The methods that have been developed over the 
years for the assessment of usability can be 
divided into two main categories: those carried 
out exclusively by experts and those involving a 
variable number of the end users. The methods 
carried out exclusively by experts are observa-
tional or inspectional in nature, while those 
involving end users, whether conducted in the 
laboratory or in the field, almost always consist of 
having the users perform tasks with the device in 
order to measure the distance between what the 
users perceive and how they interpret it, as well as 
between intention and action. The time and 
resources available are very often the main factors 
in the choice of methods used for the collection of 
end user requirements. For this reason, the most 
pragmatic and rapid methods are described below, 
since they allow the collection of large amounts of 
data in a reasonably short time while minimizing 
costs, possibly by leveraging several methodolo-
gies at once. The methods that involve expert 
analysis include cognitive task analysis, heuristic 
evaluation, cognitive walkthrough, and the Delphi 
Method. One method that involves both experts 
and end users is contextual inquiry. Users, on the 
other hand, are usually involved in usability tests 
and focus groups.
Cognitive task analysis
Cognitive Task Analysis is a technique—more 
accurately a set of techniques—which examines 
the cognitive nature of tasks by analyzing and 
breaking down the activities into specific actions, 
identifying their relative frequency and difficulty 
[20]. A fundamental part of the technique is the 
elicitation of the experts’ own knowledge, even 
tacit knowledge. This type of analysis allows the 
designers to create a practical hierarchy of inter-
ventions and therefore plan the redesign of the 
system around the most critical elements.
Heuristic evaluation
Heuristic evaluation is a low-cost technique that 
works well for medical devices and can  generally 
detect the main problems in a rather short time. It 
can also be very useful in cases where contextual 
observation cannot be applied or where confiden-
tiality may be restrictive.
The technique is usually based on guidelines 
or heuristics which are used by experts to inspect 
the technology under evaluation [21–23]. The 
guidelines have been refined over the years in the 
field of cognitive ergonomics. The application of 
this technique usually requires at least two 
experts to independently explore all components 
of the system and detect any violations of the 
appropriate guidelines, noting the severity of 
each violation. The detection of violations may 
also provide indications for the redesign of the 
system.
Cognitive walkthrough
Like heuristic evaluation, cognitive walkthrough 
is entrusted to experienced staff and not to end 
users [24]. Often following task analysis, a heu-
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ristic evaluation requires an expert to complete a 
series of tasks to test the system’s comprehensi-
bility and learning curve for a novice user. 
Essentially, in situations where the availability of 
end users and financial resources proves restric-
tive, experts may leverage their theoretical and 
practical knowledge of usability issues to evalu-
ate a product. Another advantage of this method 
is that the evaluator’s sensitivity eliminates the 
bias often found in less experienced users who 
attribute shortcomings in performance to some 
weakness in the device rather than their lack of 
experience.
Delphi Method
After identifying all user-related requirements 
for a product, it may be difficult to set priori-
ties. The Delphi method is by definition an 
iterated sequence of steps with the aim of 
ensuring that opinions converge as iterations 
progress [25]. Starting with fairly generic 
questions, experts discuss relevant issues and 
exchange opinions which can then be cross- 
referenced to provide the basis for a second 
session of deeper elaborations. From time to 
time, a summary of the previous session’s dis-
cussion can be provided to the experts. In the 
third and usually last meeting, a series of 
questions are asked in order to arrive at a con-
clusive consensus on the importance of the 
different factors considered.
Contextual inquiry
Contextual inquiry is a particularly pragmatic 
technique suitable for the design of a new prod-
uct or the redesign of an existing one. The activ-
ity of the expert tends to focus on the user: the 
expert asks the users questions about their experi-
ence as they interact with the device, such as 
questions about what is happening and why, and 
any possible improvements to the system [26]. 
Designer and user collaborate in this way in an 
almost symbiotic relationship to uncover infor-
mation essential for product development. To 
implement this methodology in highly complex 
healthcare contexts it is often necessary to use 
simulations of real scenarios to avoid situations 
that could be dangerous for operators and 
patients.
Usability test
Usability tests conducted with users can iden-
tify and quantify different variables such as the 
frequency and type of errors made by users 
when interacting with a device, the time needed 
to complete different tasks, and the frequency 
and nature of requests for support [27, 28]. 
Whenever possible, these tests are conducted in 
the laboratory and involve a limited number of 
users that are representative of end users in gen-
eral. In preparation for the execution of the test, 
it is important to establish the preliminary activ-
ity of selecting the tasks the user must try to per-
form and the techniques for recording the user’s 
activity. In addition to highlighting critical 
issues of which the user is normally unaware, 
usability tests are also commonly chosen to col-
lect information on the user’s experience, satis-
faction, and opinions on variables such as the 
attractiveness and the perceived usefulness of 
the system.
Focus groups
Focus groups are widely used, not only in health-
care but in all contexts that adopt a user- centered 
approach. A focus group consists of one (or 
more) experimenter(s)/facilitator(s) and a group 
of participants representing the end users [29]. 
The fundamental component of its success is the 
ability of the facilitator to animate the discussion 
among the group of people in search of useful 
ideas for the evaluation and/or development of a 
device. For focus groups to work it is essential 
that the facilitator follows simple rules such as 
providing everyone with clear, basic information 
about the purpose of the meeting, using terminol-
ogy that is easily understandable by all, listening 
respectfully, and employing a strong dose of 
empathy.
Adequate tools (e.g., notes, audio recordings, 
video recordings) must be integrated into the 
realization of a focus group to keep track of all 
the information, whether implicit or explicit, pro-
vided by the participants.
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32.4.2  The Usability Assessments 
in Reality
To date, there are no clear indications on which 
methodologies to adopt in order to maximize the 
amount of information gained from the evalua-
tion of medical equipment. Very often the path 
followed by evaluators is the one that appears to 
be the most informative given the limitations of 
the context within which evaluations are to be 
carried out [30]. In order to identify the path usu-
ally taken by the various researchers involved in 
the evaluation of medical devices, Campoe [31] 
conducted a meta-analysis on relevant studies 
published between 1993 and 2012. Following 
preliminary research, she identified 886 papers 
that, after several rounds of refinement, were 
reduced to only 18. The analysis of these 18 
papers showed that half of the studies on the 
usability of medical devices adopted only one 
analytical method which was either based on 
heuristics or involved end users. The other half 
adopted an approach integrating two or more 
methods.
The results of this review are not always meth-
odologically sound. For example, the users had 
not been described in any detail: in most studies, 
only the demographics of the users were 
described, and in six of the studies not even those 
were considered. However, even when studies 
did report more information on user characteris-
tics such as their level of professional experience, 
they did not use these variables to account for the 
results [31].
The task descriptions did not fare much better. 
In fact, only six studies reported in some detail 
the tasks used during the evaluation, relating 
them to the complexity, duration, and frequency 
of the operational process. However, the major 
weakness found in these studies lies in their lack 
of explanation of the reference environments 
used to evaluate tools that are often used in direct 
conjunction with other devices or that may have 
varying uses as determined by the operational 
context. The analysis by Campoe [31] showed 
that 11 studies reported the kind of environment 
in which the evaluation test took place (i.e., the 
hospital, operating room, etc.), but only 2 
described the physical characteristics of the envi-
ronment in which the device would be actually 
used. Complete negligence was found regarding 
the treatment of technical, social, and cultural 
characteristics of the reference environments: 
none of the 18 studies treated these characteris-
tics as relevant factors for the usability of the 
device under evaluation.
32.5  Conclusion
The solution to this sort of methodological anar-
chy among usability studies cannot come from 
the enforcement of rules, codes, laws, or compli-
ance with standards. The medical device ecosys-
tem is in fact undergoing continuous and rapid 
evolution, which often produces solutions that 
exceed the development goals contemplated by 
rules and standards. In fact, regulatory systems 
can often steer the development of medical 
devices towards solutions that have little to do 
with everyday practice or even hamper day-to- 
day operations [32].
Therefore, many aspects of the processes that 
ensure the usability of medical devices need to be 
reformulated or reframed in an absolutely inno-
vative way. In this regard, Vincent and colleagues 
[32] have argued that, with respect to several 
innovations in the medical field, it is not useful to 
reference pre-existing norms, standards, or well- 
established evaluation procedures. For example, 
3D printers enable the rapid production of pre-
cisely shaped components. But there are obvious 
difficulties regarding the quality control of the 
components produced. If we then consider the 
usability of personal, mobile medical devices, it 
is clear that the standards developed so far do not 
effectively guide the realization of products to 
really meet the needs of each user. Finally, the 
issue of ensuring usability can be further exem-
plified by the fact that the increasingly ubiquitous 
smartphone applications, including various 
health-related applications that are now within 
each individual’s reach, can receive formal certi-
fications and approvals not on the basis of their 
real content, but mostly of how they are 
presented.
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Technological advancement, as far as medical 
instruments are concerned, opens up obvious and 
serious problems, difficulties that clearly pose a 
challenge that has yet to be solved. However, the 
most innovative medical devices are also those 
that promise hitherto unexpected possibilities 
and benefits for the health of patients and broaden 
the horizon for the development of novel meth-
ods that will ensure proper usability [32].
References
 1. International Organization of Standards. ISO 9241- 
11. Guidance on usability. Geneva, Switzerland: 
International Organization of Standards; 1998.
 2. Middleton B, Bloomrosen M, Dente MA, et  al. 
Enhancing patient safety and quality of care by 
improving the usability of electronic health record 
systems: recommendations from AMIA.  J Am 
Med Inform Assoc. 2013;20(e1):e2–8. https://doi.
org/10.1136/amiajnl-2012-001458.
 3. Gardner RL, Cooper E, Haskell J, Harris DA, Poplau 
S, Kroth PJ, Linzer M. Physician stress and burnout: 
the impact of health information technology. J Am 
Med Inform Assoc. 2019;26(2):106–14. https://doi.
org/10.1093/jamia/ocy145.
 4. U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Draft guidance 
for industry and food and drug administration staff – 
applying human factors and usability engineering 
to optimize medical device design. Rockville, MD: 
Center for Devices and Radiological Health - Office 
of Device Evaluation; 2011. http://www.fda.gov/
MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/
GuidanceDocuments/ucm259748.htm.
 5. Powell-Cope G, Nelson AL, Patterson ES. Patient care 
technology and safety. In: Hughs RG, editor. Patient 
safety and quality: an evidence-based handbook 
for nurses. Rockville, MD: Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality; 2008.
 6. Reed TL, Kaufman-Rivi D. Management & technol-
ogy. FDA adverse event problem codes: standardiz-
ing the classification of device and patient problems 
associated with medical device use. Biomed Instrum 
Technol. 2010;44(3):248–56.
 7. Meissner B, Nelson W, Hicks R, Sikirica V, Gagne J, 
Schein J. The rate and costs attributable to intravenous 
2013 International Symposium on Human Factors 
and Ergonomics in Health Care: advancing the 
cause 129 patient-controlled analgesia errors. Hosp 
Pharm. 2009;44(4):312–24. https://doi.org/10.1310/
hpj4404-312.
 8. Hicks RW, Sikirica V, Nelson W, Schein JR, Cousins 
DD.  Medication errors involving patient-controlled 
analgesia. Am J Health Syst Pharm. 2008;65(5):429–
40. https://doi.org/10.2146/ajhp070194.
 9. Cassano C, Colantuono A, De Simone G, Giani 
A, Liston PM, Marchigiani E, Talla G, Parlangeli 
O. Developments and problems in the man-machine 
relationship in computed tomography (CT). In: 
Bagnara S, Tartaglia R, Albolino S, Alexander T, 
Fujita Y, editors. Proceedings of the 20th Congress 
of the International Ergonomics Association (IEA 
2018), Advances in intelligent systems and com-
puting. Cham: Springer; 2019. p.  822. https://doi.
org/10.1007/978-3-319-96077-7_52.
 10. Schaeffer NE, Parks LJ, Verhoef ET, Bailey TS, 
Schorr AB, Davis T, Halford J, Sulik B.  Usability 
and training differences between two personal insu-
lin pumps. J Diabetes Sci Technol. 2015;9(2):221–30. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1932296814555158.
 11. Isaković M, Sedlar U, Bešter JJ.  Usability pit-
falls of diabetes mHealth apps for the elderly. J 
Diabetes Res. 2016;2016:1604609. https://doi.
org/10.1155/2016/1604609.
 12. Bridgeman B, Peery S, Anand S. Interaction of cogni-
tive and sensorimotor maps of visual space. Percept 
Psychophys. 1997;59:456–69.
 13. Guidi S, Parlangeli O, Bettella S, Roncato S. Features 
of the selectivity for contrast polarity in contour inte-
gration revealed by a novel tilt illusion. Perception. 
2011;40:1357–75.
 14. Fairbanks R, Shah M, Caplan S, Marks A, 
Bishop P.  Defibrillator usability study among 
paramedics. Proc Hum Factors Ergonom Soc 
Annu Meeting. 2004;48:1768. https://doi.
org/10.1177/154193120404801530.
 15. Bond RR, Finlay DD, Nugent CD, Moore G, 
Guldenring D.  A usability evaluation of medical 
software at an expert conference setting. Comput 
Methods Prog Biomed. 2014;113(1):383–95. https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.cmpb.2013.10.006.
 16. Parlangeli O, Liston PM, Marchigiani E, Bracci M, 
Giani A. Perceptions and use of computed tomogra-
phy in a hospital emergency department: technicians’ 
perspectives. Hum Factors. 2019;62:5. https://doi.
org/10.1177/0018720819841758.
 17. Wiklund M, Kendler J, Strochlic A.  Usability test-
ing of medical devices. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 
Taylor & Francis Group; 2016.
 18. Norman DA, Draper S. User centered system design: 
new perspectives on human-computer interaction. 
Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates; 1986.
 19. Norman DA.  The invisible computer. Cambridge, 
MA: The MIT Press; 1999.
 20. Luczak H.  Task analysis. In: Salvendy G, editor. 
The handbook of human factors and ergnomonics. 
New York, NY: Wiley; 1997. p. 340–416.
 21. Nielsen J, Molich R. Heuristic evaluation of user inter-
faces. In:  Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on 
Human Factors in Computing Systems: empowering 
people, Seattle, WA; 1990. p. 249–56.
 22. Cockton G, Lavery D, Woolrych A.  Inspection- 
based methods. In: Jacko JA, Sears A, editors. The 
human-computer interaction handbook. Mahwah, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates; 2003. p. 1118–38.
32 Digital Technology and Usability and Ergonomics of Medical Devices
464
 23. Parlangeli O, Mengoni G, Guidi S. The effect of sys-
tem usability and multitasking activities in distance 
learning. In:  Proceedings of the CHItaly conference, 
13–16 September. Alghero: ACM Library; 2011. 
p. 59–64.
 24. Wharton C, Rieman J, Lewis C, Polson P. The cogni-
tive walkthrough: a practitioner’s guide. In: Nielsen 
J, Mack L, editors. Usability inspections methods. 
New York: Wiley; 1994. p. 105–40.
 25. Goldman K, Gross P, Heeren C, Herman G, 
Kaczmarczyk L, Loui MC, Zilles C.  Identifying 
important and difficult concepts in introductory com-
puting courses using a Delphi process. ACM SIGCSE 
Bull. 2008;40(1):256–60.
 26. Holtzblatt K, Wendell JB, Wood S.  Rapid contex-
tual design: a how-to guide to key techniques for 
user- centered design. San Francisco, CA: Morgan 
Kaufmann; 2005.
 27. Dumas J, Redish J. A practical guide to usability test-
ing (Revised edition). Exeter, UK: Intellect; 1999.
 28. Rubin J, Chisnell D.  Handbook of usability testing 
(2nd Edition): how to plan, design, and conduct effec-
tive tests. New York: Wiley; 2008.
 29. Krueger RA, Casey MA.  Focus groups: a practical 
guide for applied research. 3rd ed. Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage Publications; 2000.
 30. Caratozzolo MC, Bagnara S, Parlangeli O. Use of ICT 
to supply health-care services to nomadic patients: 
an explorative survey. Behav Inform Technol. 
2008;27(4):354–0.
 31. Campoe KR.  Medical device usability analyses: 
an integrative review. Proc Int Symp Hum Factors 
Ergonom Health Care. 2013;2(1):123–30. https://doi.
org/10.1177/2327857913021024.
 32. Vincent CJ, Niezen G, O’Kane AA, Stawarz K. Can 
standards and regulations keep up with health tech-
nology? JMIR Mhealth Uhealth. 2015;3(2):e64. 
https://doi.org/10.2196/mhealth.3918.
Open Access  This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in 
any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to 
the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, 
unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons 
license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to 
obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.
F. Ranzani and O. Parlangeli
465© The Author(s) 2021 
L. Donaldson et al. (eds.), Textbook of Patient Safety and Clinical Risk Management, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59403-9_33
Lessons Learned from the Japan 
Obstetric Compensation System 






Cerebral palsy is a pathological condition whose 
prevention and treatment have been immensely 
studied by experts in perinatal medicine and 
pediatric neurology. Despite this, it is still one of 
the main concerns nowadays in many countries, 
not only for scientific reasons but for legal ones 
also. For instance, in Japan, an increase in law-
suits relating to cerebral palsy was observed 
more than a decade ago, after healthcare 
resources in perinatal medicine had increasingly 
shrunk and had become fragile under the grow-
ing burden for physicians and midwives to pro-
vide advanced treatment, emergent care, 
high-risk treatment, and so on. Young physicians 
did not specialize in obstetrics because of the 
increased burden, which gave rise to a vicious 
cycle of shrinking resources in perinatal medi-
cine. To address this issue, the Japan Obstetric 
Compensation System for Cerebral Palsy 
(JOCS-CP) was urgently introduced in 2009 to 
investigate, develop preventive measures, and 
award monetary compensation on a no-fault 
basis, with the Japan Council for Quality Health 
Care (JQ) as its operating organization 
(Fig. 33.1). It has so far produced annual reports 
on the prevention of cerebral palsy for nine con-
secutive years including numerical data and spe-
cific themes relating to the occurrence and 
prevention of cerebral palsy. The success of the 
system is a good reference for responding to 
adverse events which may happen in and have a 
vast impact on perinatal care. Therefore, this 
chapter focuses on cerebral palsy with primary 
reference to materials published by the JOCS-CP 
in the field of perinatal medicine. The aim of this 
chapter is to learn about the issues mentioned 
above and to discuss the significance and impact 
of introducing a nationwide system like the 
JOCS-CP.  It describes knowledge and idea to 
questions of “Why cerebral palsy is highlighted 
among adverse event in obstetrics?”, “How the 
no-fault compensation/investigation/prevention 
system could be introduced?”, “What has been 
achieved by the system?”, and “How cerebral 
palsy is prevented?”.
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33.1  Context for the Introduction 
of the JOCS-CP: Increasing 
Conflict Over Cerebral Palsy 
and Hopes for a No-Fault 
Compensation System
According to the numbers of lawsuits filed in 
2004 against each medical specialty, per regis-
tered physician, the obstetrics and gynecology 
rate was the highest (12.4%), a heavy burden for 
all obstetricians involved. One assumption made 
about the obstetrics lawsuits was that a signifi-
cant portion of them related to cerebral palsy. It 
should be noted that recent studies have specu-
lated that most cases of cerebral palsy were not 
related to procedures performed by obstetricians 
and midwives, although there actually are a small 
number of cases caused by violations of current 
quality-of-care guidelines and/or standards. In 
general, it is difficult to distinguish between neg-
ligence and other causes of cerebral palsy. For 
example, a child may develop profound cerebral 
palsy after a normal or seemingly normal preg-
nancy and delivery. The onset of cerebral palsy is 
likely to provoke turmoil leading to legal action 
taken by the family, which raises questions about 
the delivery procedure itself and the family’s 
worries and anxieties about the long-term care 
needed for rearing their disabled child. To address 
this issue, obstetricians and relevant experts in 
Japan have long studied and explored the possi-
bility of introducing a no-fault compensation sys-
tem for cerebral palsy at the national scale to 
reverse the persistent high frequency of conflict 
around cerebral palsy. Concurrently, the Japan 
Medical Association (JMA) has been considering 
no-fault compensation since the early 1970s. Its 
1972 report entitled “The Legal Proceedings for 
Medical Accidents and the Relevant Theory” 
touched upon the following three items regarding 
institutionalization of such a system:
 1. Prompt compensation should be provided in 
cases of medical accidents for which a physi-
cian is deemed responsible after a thorough 
review of the case.
 2. A unique national compensation scheme 
should be devised to cover cases of accidents 
No-fault compensation Investigation/Prevention

















Fig. 33.1 No-fault compensation/investigation/prevention system for cerebral palsy. (The Japan Obstetric 
Compensation System (2009))
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not attributed to a medical procedure con-
ducted by a physician, that is, cases that were 
inevitable during clinical care.
 3. A unique national system should be estab-
lished for settling disputes, functioning inde-
pendently of the judicial court system.
Regarding the first point, the JMA Physician’s 
Liability Compensation System was launched in 
1973  in line with the indemnity insurance sys-
tem. However, neither the second nor the third 
point were realized in the following decades. In 
the early 2000s, concerns about patient safety, the 
shortage of obstetricians and pediatricians, and 
low national birth rates rapidly emerged in Japan. 
This eventually prompted the JMA to publish a 
report entitled “Toward Compensation in Cases 
Related to Medical Management and Procedures” 
in January of 2006. It states that “although it is 
ideal to launch a compensation system to cover 
entire medical specialties, a compensation sys-
tem with a narrower scope for cases with neuro-
logical sequela, i.e., cerebral palsy, should be 
given the highest priority for institutionalization.” 
The JMA board member who supervised the 
compilation of the report was an obstetrician and 
vice president who, years later, became the presi-
dent of the Japan Association of Obstetricians 
and Gynaecologists (JAOG). In August of 2006, 
the JMA published another report compiled by a 
project committee on the progress of the imple-
mentation of a compensation system for disabili-
ties caused by cerebral palsy. It set forth concrete 
and detailed reasons to launch a no-fault compen-
sation system specific to cerebral palsy. The proj-
ect was further promoted by a report from the 
Policy Research Committee of the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) which was at the time 
and still is a member of a leading political alli-
ance. The report was titled “The Framework of 
No-fault Compensation System for Obstetric 
Care,” commonly referred to as the “LDP 
Framework.” The report described the perceived 
significance of launching no-fault compensation 
system for cerebral palsy by declaring, “It usu-
ally is difficult to identify malpractice regarding 
an adverse event during delivery, and those cases 
are apt to be contested in court. The frequency of 
disputes is one reason for the shortage of obstetri-
cians.” The LDP Framework proposes that, to 
secure safe and trustworthy perinatal care that 
benefits obstetricians, patients, and families, a 
new system should: (1) compensate patients who 
develop impairments possibly caused by adverse 
obstetric events, (2) swiftly resolve and settle all 
disputes, and (3) improve the quality of obstetri-
cal care by investigating cerebral palsy cases. 
Immediately upon the release of the LDP 
Framework, significant official and unofficial 
attention focused on JQ, proposing that it should 
be an operating organization for the novel sys-
tem. JQ was the natural choice because it had 
previously conducted projects on quality and 
safety improvement, such as hospital accredita-
tion and Adverse Event Reporting and Learning 
Systems. In response to high expectations, JQ 
established in 2007 the Division of Introductory 
Work on the Japan Obstetric Compensation 
System for Cerebral Palsy (JOCS-CP) as a tem-
porary agent to introduce the JOCS-CP in 
Japanese healthcare system. At this point, it 
should be noted that political decision added 
momentum to the growing demand by academic 
society to launch the JOCS-CP; JQ was consid-
ered to be the right choice to operate the JOCS-CP 
because it was a neutral body related to quality 
and safety improvement in healthcare. The secre-
tary installed in JQ for working on the JOCS-CP 
during preparatory period intensively studied 
potential obstacles for the launch of a system 
and, in January of 2008, finally issued a report 
which described the detailed design of the sys-
tem. After careful review of the report, the JQ 
board accepted the role of managing organization 
of the system in March of 2008. Subsequently, 
the JOCS-CP was launched on the 1st of January 
2009, and has been in operation since, undergo-
ing a revision in 2015 that saw the expansion of 
eligibility criteria with the full support of 
stakeholders.
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33.2  The Meaning of “No-Fault 
Compensation” 
in the JOCS-CP
The term “no-fault compensation” could be 
defined in multiple ways. Besides the JOCS-CP, 
another compensation system in Japan—a sys-
tem regarding medication side effects, managed 
by the governmental Pharmaceuticals and 
Medical Devices Agency (PMDA)—has been 
described as a no-fault compensation system 
because it compensates individuals who suffer 
medication side effects provided that the medica-
tion was prescribed and administered appropri-
ately and that the medication is the probable 
cause of the adverse side effects. The system is 
designed based on the idea that adverse side 
effects can occur even when appropriate medica-
tion is prescribed and administered. On the other 
hand, no-fault compensation might refer to a sys-
tem which provides compensation no matter the 
degree of any suspected negligence. This is an 
idea of the JOCS-CP which is different from the 
one adopted by the civil judicial system. 
Specifically, the LDP Framework states that the 
JOCS-CP will compensate patients with cerebral 
palsy that was possibly caused by delivery proce-
dures regardless of the extent of obstetrical negli-
gence. Therefore, cerebral palsy cases obviously 
caused by congenital defects, such as cerebral 
anomalies, and thus not related to the obstetrical 
procedures are not eligible for compensation 
under the system.
33.3  Compensation Driven by 
the Indemnity Insurance 
Mechanism
The two main pillars of the JOCS-CP are com-
pensation and investigation/prevention 
(Fig.  33.1). Compensation works through a 
mechanism of indemnity insurance services pro-
vided by the alliance of indemnity insurance 
companies under contract with JQ, as indicated 
in “The Framework of the No-fault Compensation 
System in Obstetric Care” (Fig.  33.2). As 
described within this framework, a childbirth 
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facility (1) registers with the JOCS-CP under a 
unified agreement, and (2) agrees to pay a com-
pensation premium to an indemnity insurance 
company through JQ when a baby is born and 
cooperate with JQ for investigation when a baby 
develops profound cerebral palsy. The facility 
must notify pregnant women of the compensa-
tion for a baby with profound cerebral palsy by 
submitting the “Registration Certificate for 
Pregnant Women” to them. Childbirth facilities 
pay insurance premiums as high as JPY 16,000 
(USD 140/EUR 120) which are paid to the 
indemnity insurance companies through JQ.  At 
the inception of the system, the premium was 
JPY 30,000 (USD 265/EUR 225) for every baby 
born between 2009 and 2014. The reason for the 
subsequent reduction of the premium will be 
described later. JQ mediates the transaction, col-
lecting payments from the registered childbirth 
facilities and regularly depositing lump sums 
with the indemnity insurance companies. 
Children who develop profound cerebral palsy 
are assessed by the Review Committee to see 
whether they meet the eligibility criteria for com-
pensation. When a case is approved, monetary 
compensation is awarded as required under the 
compensation agreement between the childbirth 
facility and the family. For practical reasons, the 
compensation is directly paid to the patient’s 
guardian by the indemnity insurance company. 
According to LDP Framework, the Ministry of 
Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW) increased 
the lump sum childbirth compensation by an 
amount equivalent to that of the insurance pre-
mium in response to the likely increase in child-
birth costs set by childbirth facilities. Between 
2009 and 2014, the amount was JPY 30,000 
(USD 265/EUR 225), and, since 2015, the 
amount has been JPY 16,000 (USD 140/EUR 
120). Thus, the lump sum payment of public 
health insurance for childbirth has served as a 
financial source of compensation in the 
JOCS-CP. This link between compensation and 
public health insurance appears to qualify the 
JOCS-CP as a quasi-public system. The amount 
of lump sum compensation was stable after the 
system launched, at JPY 420,000 (USD 3700/
EUR 3150) for babies born in registered  childbirth 
facilities; then, in 2015, the insurance premiums 
reduced to JPY 16,000 from JPY 30,000. The 
standard compensation agreement stipulates that 
lump sum payments should generally be paid 
within 60 days of a petitioner’s complete submis-
sion, while it has actually been paid as swift as 
25  days or less after the petition. Similarly, 
annual installment should be paid within 60 days 
of the day of the month in which the child was 
born or of the receipt of all required forms, 
whichever comes first.
33.4  Monetary Compensation
The total monetary compensation per patient 
amounts to JPY 30,000,000 (USD 266,000/EUR 
225,000) in two forms of payment: a lump sum of 
JPY 6,000,000 (USD 53,300/EUR 45,200) and 
annual installments of JPY 24,000,000 (USD 
212,700/EUR 179,800). Installments of JPY 
1,200,000 (USD 18,600/EUR 15,800) are paid 
once a year for 20 years starting in the birth year 
of the claimant and ending on their 19th birthday. 
For example, regarding the petition and review 
process of events that occurred in the first year of 
a baby’s life, the review of all cases for children 
born in 2009 must be completed by 2015 because 
a petition may be filed until the claimant’s fifth 
birthday (as stated in the standard compensation 
agreement). Petitions for patients born in 2010 
(open until 2016) or later are processed under the 
same guideline.
33.5  Epidemiology of Adverse 
Events
 1. Prevalence of cerebral palsy
The prevalence of cerebral palsy has been 
reported on by various research groups. In 
designing the JOCS-CP, JQ explored existing 
data on Japanese childbirth from Okinawa 
Prefecture, Himeji City, and a part of the 
Tokyo metropolitan area. Among these stud-
ies, data from Okinawa Prefecture was 
 statistically accurate enough to be used in the 
designing process of the JOCS-CP. It gave a 
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figure of 2.3 cases of cerebral palsy per 1000 
live births which is comparable to rates deter-
mined in other countries.
 2. Estimates of annual numbers of eligible 
individuals in the JOCS-CP
Eligibility criteria and estimates of the 
numbers of eligible individuals are crucial 
elements of the system for appreciating the 
financial scale. These items were carefully 
assessed based on cerebral palsy registration 
data from Okinawa Prefecture, the city of 
Himeji, and a part of the Tokyo metropolitan 
area. The approximate number of eligible 
individuals per year was estimated to be 
“500–800 persons annually at maximum,” 
which the system took into account to ensure 
its financial sustainability.
 3. Revision of the JOCS-CP including re- 
estimation of the number of eligible 
individuals
In 2014, it became urgent to improve 
JOCS-CP financing because the excessive 
collection of insurance premiums since the 
system began was raising serious questions in 
the Japanese parliament, among public pay-
ers, in the MHLW, and among relevant entities 
and clinicians. Although the enumeration of 
eligible babies born in the first year had not 
yet been completed, the estimation was made 
again in 2015 in a more accurate way than that 
adopted on small scale at the inception of the 
system. In particular, cerebral palsy registra-
tion research had been expanded in Okinawa 
Prefecture and other institutional data were 
obtained from consulting facilities for physi-
cally impaired persons and relevant medical 
institutions in Tochigi Prefecture and Mie 
Prefecture with the help of researchers in 
those regions. Ultimately, it turned out to be 
difficult to make use of data from Tochigi 
Prefecture and Mie Prefecture as they were 
not reliable enough for making accurate esti-
mations, and so only the data from Okinawa 
Prefecture was employed to compute a point 
estimate of 481 and an interval estimate of 
340–623, with a 95% confidence interval. 
Concurrently, the JOCS-CP’s eligibility crite-
ria were revised as “born at 32 or more weeks 
of gestational age and 1400-g or more birth 
weight” giving rise to new point and interval 
estimates of 571 and 423–719, respectively. 
The revised criteria were put into effect in 
January of 2015.
 4. Statistics of eligible individuals—
Epidemiology of profound cerebral palsy in 
the JOCS-CP
The review procedure is carried out along 
with the standard compensation agreement. 
Briefly, a childbirth facility insured by the 
JOCS-CP files a petition with JQ, which must 
be accompanied by certification verifying the 
diagnosis of profound cerebral palsy by a 
qualified physician. The certification form 
must provide relevant information, such as 
detailed diagnostic and clinical data on the 
patient. Since scientific knowledge and exper-
tise are necessary for diagnosis, the certifica-
tion must be issued by physicians certified by 
the Japanese Society of Child Neurology and/
or registered physicians as defined by Article 
15 of the Physically Disabled Persons Welfare 
Act. Qualified physicians that agree to par-
ticipate in the review process are voluntarily 
registered with the JOCS-CP, and their identi-
ties affiliations are disclosed on its website; as 
of June 2019, 511 qualified physicians were 
registered. The petition undergoes prelimi-
nary review and then enters a queue awaiting 
approval by the Review Committee based on 
the eligibility criteria. The review process is 
fundamentally based on documents that dem-
onstrate compatibility with general criteria 
and exclusion criteria. Upon approval, the JQ 
board must authorize the petition, which is 
the final step of the review process. The peti-
tioner (i.e., the childbirth facility) is notified 
of the approval, which is promptly followed 
by payment of monetary compensation in the 
form of a lump sum and annual installments. 
Petitioners whose cases do not satisfy the 
general criteria may still be approved in a 
case-by-case review under the relevant crite-
ria. About 75% (2755) of the petitions had 
been approved as of June 2019. Regarding the 
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petitions of babies born in the system’s first 
year (2009), the reviews were completed in 
early 2015, while petitions of patients born in 
2010 or later were processed within the 
appropriate 5-year windows as described pre-
viously. There were 419 eligible cases among 
those born in 2009, followed by 382 in 2010, 
355  in 2011, 361  in 2012, and 351  in 2013, 
which seems to demonstrate a downward 
trend (Table  33.1). As of June 2019, 868 
(24%) of the petitions had been deemed ineli-
gible. The reasons for rejection were studied 
in depth by the Steering Committee of the 
JOCS-CP.  The most common reasons were 
that the petition did not meet the case-by-case 
review criteria in that the pH of umbilical 
arterial blood exceeded 7.1 and/or the fetal 
heart rate pattern did not meet the criteria for 
hypoxia during labor and delivery as speci-
fied by the standard compensation agreement. 
The next most common reasons for rejection 
were that the cerebral palsy was clearly con-
genital (i.e., caused by major brain anoma-
lies, chromosomal abnormalities, genetic 
abnormalities, etc.) and/or caused by condi-
tions that emerged during or after the neona-
tal period, such as meningitis. Petitions 
rejected by the Review Committee may peti-
tion the Appeal Review Committee by pro-
viding a rationale for the initial claim. Of the 
181 cases rejected by the Review Committee 
that appealed, only four petitions had been 
approved. Thus, the Appeal Review 
Committee has mostly supported the Review 
Committee’s decisions.
33.6  Investigation: Identifying 
Error During Delivery
Investigation is a primary pillar of the JOCS-CP 
process aimed not only at preventing cerebral 
palsy, but also at mitigating conflict and reaching 
speedy resolutions and settlements (Fig.  33.3). 
To achieve these goals, an Investigative Report is 
provided to the relevant childbirth facility and to 
the patients’ guardians/family. Investigative 
Reports result from intensive scientific investiga-
tions using sufficient data from childbirth facili-
ties and input from the patients’ guardians/
families. During the introductory and early years 
of the JOCS-CP, some obstetricians on the front-
line who were not engaged in the operation of the 
JOCS-CP rigorously opposed sharing 
Investigative Reports with childbirth facilities 
and families because they feared that the report 
could provoke conflict and potentially lawsuits, 
which had not been the case before the JOCS-CP 
was commenced. On the contrary, another group 
of obstetricians and patient representatives 
claimed that the Investigative Reports would 
meet the families’ expectations to learn the cause 
of cerebral palsy because scientific experts had 
generated them. Years later, the number of law-
suits did indeed decrease rapidly, as had pre-
dicted the latter group of obstetricians and patient 
representatives.
The JQ has equipped itself with seven sub- 
committees as working groups to produce the 
Investigative Reports. Each sub-committee com-
prises five obstetricians (the chair and four draft-
ing members), two neonatologists, one midwife, 
Table 33.1 Statistics of eligible case by birth year (as of June 30, 2019)
Birth year








2009 561 419 142 0 142 0 Expired
2010 523 382 141 0 141 0 Expired
2011 502 355 147 0 147 0 Expired
2012 516 361 155 0 155 0 Expired
2013 476 351 125 0 125 0 Expired
2014–2018 1098 887 158 44 202 9 Valid
Total 3676 2755 868 44 912 9












































Fig. 33.3 Production of standardized investigative report
and two lawyers (one representing the physician 
and the other representing the family). The law-
yers are appointed from a list of recommenda-
tions provided by the Japan Federation of Bar 
Associations in response to JQ’s request. The 
investigative procedure proceeds as follows. 
Petitions approved by the Review Committee are 
sent to the sub-committees, which then draft 
Investigative Reports. The Investigation 
Committee handles about 400 such reports per 
year. The five physicians and the midwife mostly 
provide medical perspective and the two lawyers 
draft standardized Investigative Reports that 
include clear points of contention which are easy 
for lay people to understand. The reports are 
structured with tables of contents and uniform 
language within and across reports to clearly con-
vey meaning. A manual was written to guide the 
standardization of the investigative work and 
reporting. The sub-committees produce drafts 
that are reviewed by the Investigative Committee 
to finalize them. Summaries of the final 
Investigative Reports with all personal identifiers 
deleted are posted on the JOCS-CP website for 
scientific use and to ensure transparency. As of 
June 2019, 2369 Investigative Reports had been 
published. The website includes a keyword 
search engine so that users can locate cases of 
interest. Copies of the originals are also available 
on request with personal identifiers deleted after 
confirmation by JQ’s ethics committee of the rea-
son for the request and so on. Because Japan’s 
Ethical Guidelines for Medical and Health 
Research Involving Human Subjects, revised on 
April 1, 2015, might influence the disclosure of 
Investigative Reports, JQ revised the disclosure 
process to conform to the revised ethical rules. 
Since November of 2015, JQ’s ethics committee 
has put into effect revised procedures for disclo-
sure. The concept and policy of producing 
Investigative Reports focuses on production of an 
Investigative Report that fully satisfies guardians/
families. Therefore, the goals, concepts, and poli-
cies are stated in the manual of investigative work 
as described below:
 1. The Investigative Report does not aim to 
accuse any party, but to elucidate the probable 
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causes of profound cerebral palsy and to spec-
ify ameliorative measures in order to prevent 
similar future events.
 2. The Investigative Report should be simple 
enough for guardians/families, Japanese citi-
zens, and lawyers to understand, and they 
should be trustworthy.
 3. The investigations should be conducted using 
data gathered during the course of delivery as 
well as data providing context, such as medi-
cal histories of diseases and terms of 
pregnancy.
 4. Delivery procedures, pregnancy management, 
and so on should be reviewed from a prospec-
tive viewpoint in terms of appropriate proce-
dures or management when the event in 
question, such as hypoxia, occurred.
 5. Ameliorative measures for the improvement 
of perinatal care should be explored from a 
retrospective viewpoint using all of the data 
collected from the childbirth facility.
 6. The Investigative Committee highly priori-
tizes its consensus that the prospective view-
point and the retrospective viewpoint should 
not be confused to avoid hindsight bias.
33.7  Controversy on Disclosing 
Preventability in Individual 
Cases
Since the inception of the system, there has been 
controversy regarding whether to include the 
“possibility of avoiding cerebral palsy” as deter-
mined by the Investigation Committee in an 
Investigative Report. Obstetricians have worried 
that stating that cerebral palsy might have been 
prevented could create conflict, potentially 
involving lawsuits. Obstetricians were afraid 
such statements might appear to be an accusation 
of negligence, despite the systems’ goals and its 
policy of not placing blame. The chair of the 
Investigative Committee stressed that these state-
ments should not be included in the Investigative 
Reports because the “possibility of avoidance” is 
often interpreted as the type of negligence feared 
by many physicians.
On the other hand, some of the Investigative 
Committee members, including patient represen-
tatives, argued that Investigative Reports should 
explore the possibilities for avoiding cerebral 
palsy to help in devising effective preventive mea-
sures. Ultimately, these members capitulated and 
agreed with the chair’s position because investiga-
tions cannot be carried out without the cooperation 
and commitment of the medical professionals. The 
Investigative Committee reached an agreement on 
December 15, 2009, in which the members in sup-
port of the doctors’ position presented ways to 
work on the “possibility of avoidance” issue in the 
Investigative Report. After controversial argu-
ments, the chair put forth a conciliatory document 
as a compromise on the issue. The text of that 
document, which might be a useful reference for 
investigative work in general, reads as follows.





• Preventive measures that might be helpful 
should be described under “The items to con-
sider for better obstetrical/perinatal care” in 
the Investigative Report after considering 
every possible preventive act through intense 
investigation of procedures and/or manage-
ment during pregnancy and delivery in com-
parison with methods of prevention that have 
been successful in similar cases.
• Items under “The items to consider for better 
obstetrical/perinatal care” in the Investigative 
Report should be described using the tone and 
phrasing exemplified by “It is desirable to be 
educated and trained in neonatal resuscita-
tion” and “It is strongly recommended that 
cesarean section or forceps delivery is imme-
diately performed when vacuum delivery is 
not effective.”
• If multiple preventive measures are proposed, 
they should be presented in order of 
importance.
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• When cerebral palsy is caused by low-quality or 
dangerous managerial or procedural practices, 
the childbirth facility should be urged to improve 
those practices as soon as possible. To this end, 
the Investigative Report should clearly state the 
causes and the relevant preventive measures.




• In the Investigative Report, the Investigative 
Committee should answer all questions from 
the guardian/family from a medical perspec-
tive to the greatest extent possible.
• When a guardian/family member asks, “How 
could the cerebral palsy in our case have been 
prevented?” the Investigative Committee should 
provide as complete an answer as possible.
• Answers to questions from the guardian/fam-
ily are written in a document entitled “Annex.”
• The “Annex” must be provided to the child-
birth facility and to the guardian/family.
• The contents of an “Annex” should not be dis-
closed by the JOCS-CP, and it is understood 
that disclosure by the guardian/family cannot 
be controlled.
33.8  Survey on the Investigative 
Report
The JOCS-CP initiated the investigative proce-
dures in line with the LDP Framework on the 
premise that the Investigative Reports would be 
accepted by the childbirth facilities and the guard-
ians/families and that they would be effective for 
improving perinatal quality of care and safety. In 
2015, a survey on the effectiveness of the 
Investigative Report was conducted to ascertain 
whether the Investigative Reports had been 
embraced by both childbirth facilities and guard-
ians/families. The results found that childbirth 
facilities and guardians/families mostly supported 
the Investigative Report’s policy, with about 73% 
of the facilities and 65% of the guardians/families 
responding “very good” or “mostly good.” The 
most frequently cited reason for approving of the 
Investigative Report was that “analysis was con-
ducted by a third party,” suggesting that they 
attached significant importance to the neutrality 
and fairness of a third party. Also of note is that, in 
response to the question about how well the report 
worked, about 14% of the guardians/families but 
just 3% of the childbirth facilities answered “not 
very good.” The difference in the figures is most 
likely closely related to the fact that 84% of guard-
ians/families who answered “not very good” 
marked “the cause of cerebral palsy was not even-
tually determined” as the reason, compared to 
58% of the childbirth facilities. Approximately 
36.3% of the Investigative Reports concluded that 
the cause of cerebral palsy was uncertain or 
unknown. It seems that the guardian/family 
respondents tended to expect that the Investigative 
Committee can always identify probable causes 
of cerebral palsy given that it is made up of medi-
cal experts specializing in perinatal care.
33.9  Most Frequent Errors
 1. Prevention—Identification of probable 
cause of cerebral palsy
All Investigative Reports are aggregated 
and put through systematic analysis by the 
Prevention Committee to create knowledge 
for the prevention of cerebral palsy through 
improvements to obstetrical and perinatal care 
(Fig. 33.4). The JOCS-CP publishes an annual 
Prevention Report, the latest including 2113 
Investigative Reports in its analysis. The 
JOCS-CP disseminates the preventive mea-
sures described in the Prevention Reports as 
effectively as possible by employing distribu-
tion methods which successfully worked in 
other JQ projects such as Adverse Event 
Reporting and Learning Systems. The annual 
Prevention Report specifically includes quan-
titative and epidemiological analyses of rele-
vant data—such as maternal data, clinical 
course of pregnancy, delivery and neonatal 
periods, institutional human resources, and 
the healthcare provision system—and the-
matic analysis using data on the causes of 
cerebral palsy described in the Investigative 
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Reports, fetal heart rate monitoring records, 
records on the administration of uterine- 
contracting agents and clinical procedures 
(such as forced delivery and neonatal resus-
citation), availability of medical devices, 
organizational structure, and other child-
birth-related resources and equipment. 
Aggregate analyses have been used to create 
tables of probable causes of cerebral palsy 
approved by the JOCS-CP. The JOCS-CP is 
the only institution in Japan that has data on 
probable causes of cerebral palsy on a large 
scale, although similar results on far smaller 
scales have been reported. Placental abrup-
tion and bleeding, and umbilical factors are 
the most common causes of cerebral palsy, 
 followed by intrauterine infections and uter-
ine ruptures. However, it should be noted that 
Investigative Reports failed to determine the 
causes of the cerebral palsy in 36.3% of the 
approved individual cases, suggesting that a 
significant proportion of cerebral palsy cases 
have unknown origins despite the current, 
advanced state of relevant research. The 
guardians/families and other non-experts 
generally do not know that knowledge of 
medical science is limited at this point which 
potentially increases the likelihood of con-
flicts between guardians/families and medical 
professionals. Therefore, it is important for 
the JOCS-CP to disseminate among our soci-
ety what is known and what is not known 
about the causes of cerebral palsy, including 
the fact that the causes of cerebral palsy have 
not yet been fully elucidated.
 2. Prevention—Frequent errors and thematic 
analysis
The thematic analyses included in the 
Prevention Report are conducted in accor-
dance with JQ’s other projects, such as the 
Nationwide Adverse Event Reporting and 
Learning Systems, and are recognized as 
effective tools for medical professionals to 
apply to in-depth data on adverse events, in 
this case cerebral palsy and preventive mea-
sures. Twenty themes have been addressed to 
date. The themes treat error- prone procedures 
and management which deserve improve-
ment. The themes are as follows:
(a) Vacuum delivery








A)  Delivered to Childbirth facility,
      Scientific societies, Government,
      etc.





A)  Report; Delivered both to family and
     childbirth facility
B)  Summarized report; Posted on the web
C)  Report with identifiers deleted;
      Available only for research use through







Fig. 33.4 Distributing “Prevention Report” to encourage quality improvement
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(c) Kristeller maneuver and Pressing maneu-
ver on uterine fundus
(d) Fetal heart rate monitoring during delivery










(m) Pregnancy induced hypertension
(n) Detonated all transfusion syndrome
(o) Neonatal care
(p) Neonatal resuscitation
(q) Case in which neonatal resuscitation is 
not needed within 5 min after birth
(r) Follow-up statistics of the past themes
(s) Medical chart recording
(t) Emergent transfer system of the pregnant 
woman and/or baby
Prevention reports are based on thorough 
study of aggregated Investigative Reports and 
include assessments of procedures implemented 
during maternal screening, labor and delivery, 
and recommended preventive measures. Those 
elements are presented according to the standard-
ized “Table of contents” in each Investigative 
Report. The standardization of individual reports 
enables quantitative and qualitative analysis and 
a better understanding of the prevention of pro-
found cerebral palsy. The structure of the the-
matic analyses in the Prevention Report is also 
carefully standardized.
33.10  Safety Practices 
and Implementation 
Strategy
The information gleaned from the Prevention 
Report strongly influences obstetricians and 
midwives because it is generated from data on 
cases of cerebral palsy which actually took place 
in Japanese childbirth facilities. The Prevention 
Reports published to date are available on the 
JOCS-CP website in PDF and CSV file formats. 
The thematic analysis is displayed in a particu-
larly user-friendly fashion through a list of indi-
vidual PDFs grouped by theme. In 2017, the 
Japan Society of Obstetricians and Gynecologists 
(JSOG) and JAOG revised the guidelines for 
obstetrical care, entitled “Guidelines for obstet-
rical practice in Japan.” The guidelines address 
five clinical questions using knowledge gained 
from thematic analyses of the Prevention Reports 
and the book on Cardiotocogram interpretation 
for profound cerebral palsy. Therefore, it is 
increasingly apparent that the JOCS-CP is a pro-
vider of up-to-date knowledge on perinatal care 
for the medical professionals of Japan’s scien-
tific community. The information generated by 
the Prevention Reports is shared with pregnant 
women as well as medical professionals for bet-
ter understanding their pregnancies. One of the 
leaflets for experts stresses the importance of 
consent in cases of induced labor using uterine- 
contracting agents. It recommends that the con-
sent document includes indications of the agents, 
drug-related side effects, possible treatments 
related to side effects, alternative drug options, 
and procedures to ensure patient safety during 
labor and delivery. Similarly, a leaflet for preg-
nant women depicts the standard practice of 
early skin-to-skin contact and highlights key 
items such as informed, written consent, the safe 
positioning of the baby, the baby’s expected 
body temperature, and so on. Patient representa-
tives of the Prevention Committee have made 
enormous contributions to the leaflets for preg-
nant women, mothers with neonates, and family 
members.
33.11  Two Clinical Cases
The Prevention Report includes not only quanti-
tative analysis but also qualitative and thematic 
analysis. The latter describes specific facts, pro-
cedures, management, and probable cause of 
cerebral palsy, along with recommendations. 
Here, we present two cases from the report which 
are closely related to patient safety.
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33.11.1  Case 1
33.11.1.1  Clinical Course
The patient presented with genital bleeding 
and abdominal stiffness with lower abdominal 
pain and was admitted to the clinic. She was 
diagnosed with imminent birth, and ritodrine 
hydrochloride was therefore administered 
intravenously. A labor-monitoring device was 
applied to the patient and dosage of ritodrine 
hydrochloride was increased in relation to the 
continuation of symptoms. The baseline fetal 
heart rate was 130 bpm with late deceleration. On 
observing the fetal heart rate pattern, the physi-
cian paused labor monitoring. However, the mon-
itoring resumed approximately 1  h and 30  min 
later and the device showed that the baseline vari-
ability of fetal heart rate (FHR) had decreased 
and mild variable deceleration manifested. 
Therefore, the patient was transferred to another 
hospital, where premature abruption of placenta 
was suspected. Cardiotocography (CTG) demon-
strated a highly decreased FHR and mild variable 
deceleration. Ultrasonography revealed further 
thickened placenta. The physician suspected that 
a cesarean section was emergently needed and 
therefore suggested and explained the procedure 
to obtain consent of the patient and a member of 
their family. Testing for the surgery was con-
ducted in a hurried manner. Subsequently, an 
emergent cesarean section was initiated approxi-
mately 1 h after consent was obtained. The baby 
was born 21 min after the cesarean section was 
initiated, with birth weight of 2540 g, umbilical 
cord arterial blood pH of 6.7, and BE of 
−27 mmol/L. Apgar score was determined to be 
1 after 1 min and 1 after 5 min. Neonatal resusci-
tation was conducted by Bag-Valve-Mask (BVM) 
ventilation, tracheal intubation, and chest com-
pression. The baby was diagnosed with prema-
ture birth and severe neonatal asphyxia. 
Pathological testing of the placenta displayed 
chorioamnionitis. Twelve days after the birth, 
MRI imaging revealed severe hypoxic encepha-
lopathy (HIE).
33.11.1.2  Probable Cause of Cerebral 
Palsy
 (a) Cerebral palsy was likely caused through 
hypoxia and academia of the fetus brought 
on by premature abruption of the placenta.
 (b) Intrauterine infection might have affected the 
placental abruption.
 (c) The abruption supposedly took place before 
admission although it is difficult to identify 
the time of occurrence precisely.
33.11.1.3  Evaluation of Procedures
 (a) Ritodrine hydrochloride was increased and 
the patient was kept under observation with 
the clinical findings that fetal heart monitor-
ing revealed decreased variability of the 
baseline and frequent mild and severe late 
deceleration. These findings are not com-
monly seen in clinical practice. The pattern 
should be interpreted as fetal insufficiency 
which requires subsequent decision-making 
by the physician, including cesarean section 
according to the clinical guidelines.
 (b) It is common practice that the clinic would 
transfer the patient to the hospital based on 
findings of decreased variability of the base-
line and mild variable deceleration.
 (c) It is common that, based on the ultrasonogra-
phy findings, the physician would conduct 
blood tests and recommend cesarean section, 
obtaining the written consent of the patient 
and the family member.
 (d) It is a common finding that the fetal heart rate 
pattern shows decreased variability of the 
baseline and fluctuates repeatedly by a 
decrease of 15  bpm for 1  min followed by 
recovery to normal.
 (e) However, it does not reflect common practice 
that the physician did not plan the cesarean 
section faster, making the decision to move 
the patient to the operating theater about 1 h 
after obtaining consent.
 (f) It is common practice that the physician 
would plan grade A cesarean section after 
having identified fetal bradycardia from 
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115 bpm to 80 bpm and complete delivery by 
cesarean section in 21 min.
33.11.1.4  Recommendations
For the clinic:
 (a) Participation in internal and/or external edu-
cation and training with cardiotocograms is 
encouraged for better interpretation. In addi-
tion, staff may participate in conferences 
organized by the hospital about the trans-
ferred case.
 (b) Staff are encouraged to study clinical guide-
lines on delivery to make correct differential 
diagnosis of placental abruption from immi-
nent birth.
For the hospital:
 (a) Participation in internal and/or external edu-
cation and training with cardiotocograms is 
encouraged for better interpretation.
 (b) Staff is encouraged to follow clinical guide-
lines when placental abruption is suspected 
in a patient.
33.11.2  Case 2
33.11.2.1  Clinical Course
The patient was in the clinical course of her first 
pregnancy and undergoing regular check-ups by 
the hospital. She was pregnant with dichorionic- 
diamniotic (DD) twins. The second twin eventu-
ally developed cerebral palsy. The patient was 
obese with a BMI of 33.9 before she became 
pregnant. She had been diagnosed with diabetes 
mellitus which was treated with insulin during 
the previous 5–6 years. She was diagnosed with 
imminent birth in the 33rd gestational week and 
treated with ritodrine hydrochloride. The intrave-
nous injections were administered until the 35th 
gestational week. In the 36th week, the patient 
manifested spontaneous membrane rupture and 
labor pain was noted. The labor was induced by 
oxytocin as it was too weak to keep in observa-
tion. The first twin was delivered after 10 h and 
53 min through a joint maneuver of uterus com-
pression and four-round vacuum delivery. Around 
the time of the first twin’s birth, the fetal heart 
rate pattern of the second twin exhibited 
decreased variability of the baseline. The find-
ings further deteriorated after the birth of the first 
twin, showing repetition of late deceleration and 
bradycardia. The second twin was eventually 
delivered through four rounds of uterus compres-
sions and six rounds of vacuum delivery. The sec-
ond twin was born in the 36th gestational week 
with birth weight of 2610 g. Analysis of umbili-
cal arterial blood sample exhibited a pH of 6.6 
and BE −34  mmol/L.  The baby’s Apgar score 
was determined to be 0 after 1 min and 0 after 
5 min. The baby went into cardiac arrest at birth, 
and therefore cardiac resuscitation was immedi-
ately attempted through manual ventilation, chest 
compression, tracheal intubation, and injection of 
adrenaline. Spontaneous heartbeats were 
observed 14 min after the initiation of the resus-
citation. The baby was subsequently moved to a 
NICU where mechanical ventilation was applied. 
Hypothermia was initiated for the baby 4 h after 
birth; however, it was terminated on Day 1 after 
birth when ultrasonography of the brain revealed 
extensive bleeding in the bilateral hypothalamus. 
As hemoglobin levels dropped to 7.4 g/dL, blood 
transfusion was conducted. Brain CT imaging 
reported (1) high density of the right ventricular 
wall suggesting subependymal hemorrhage, (2) 
enlarged ventricules and subaponeurotic hemor-
rhage, and (3) low density of cerebral white mat-
ter bilaterally suggesting previous hypoxia and 
immaturity of the brain structure.
33.11.2.2  Probable Cause of Cerebral 
Palsy
 (a) The baby developed cerebral palsy probably 
due to hypoxic conditions and associated 
fetal circulatory failure which took place 
during the delivery of the first twin and con-
tinued for approximately 40 min eventually 
causing severe hypoxia in the second baby.
 (b) Fetal hypoxia was supposedly caused by 
rapid uterine contraction after the birth of the 
first twin followed by increased intrauterine 
pressure and umbilical factors such as umbil-
ical cord compression.
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 (c) Vacuum delivery of the first twin jointly per-
formed with uterine compression maneuver 
may have caused hypoxia in the second twin.
 (d) Furthermore, it cannot be denied that the 
application of the uterine compression 
maneuver in the delivery of the second twin 
contributed as a deteriorating factor.
 (e) In addition, it is probable that the loss of cir-
culatory volume due to subaponeurotic hem-
orrhage and to the cardiac arrest at birth that 
lasted for 14 min gave rise to cerebral palsy.
33.11.2.3  Evaluation of Procedures
 (a) Management of imminent birth, procedural 
selection of delivery, description of risk in 
consent procedure of second baby during 
delivery of twins, the procedures that were 
applied when the patient underwent sponta-
neous rupture of the membrane in the 36th 
gestational week are all common practice.
 (b) In contrast, it does not reflect common prac-
tice that the medical staff did not ensure 
intravenous line until full dilation in the 
patient with gestational diabetes mellitus 
who suffered hypoglycemia.
 (c) Dosage of oxytocin to begin injection and 
dosage acceleration strayed from the 
guidelines.
 (d) In terms of judgment and procedure, it is 
standard that the physician diagnosed the 
patient with prolonged active phase of deliv-
ery and decided to implement vacuum deliv-
ery; however, it is not standard that delivery 
ultimately ended with a contraction period of 
43  min and that the uterine compression 
maneuver was applied to the delivery of the 
first twin.
 (e) It does not reflect common practice that the 
physician increased the dosage of oxytocin 
and did not provide the patient with oxygen 
amid suspicion of fetal insufficiency.
 (f) It is acceptable to select vacuum delivery as 
the method of emergent delivery for the sec-
ond twin.
 (g) It is controversial from a medical point of 
view to apply the uterine compression 
maneuver for the second twin because while 
some claim that it effectively helps vacuum 
delivery, others claim that it may prompt 
uterine rupture or failure of placental 
circulation.
 (h) It is common for the delivery to be conducted 
in the presence of a pediatrician upon request.
 (i) The procedure of neonatal resuscitation was 
in compliance with standards.
33.11.2.4  Recommendations
For the hospital:
 (a) Management of delivery of twins
• It is known that the proceedings of the 
clinical course of delivery vary even when 
carefully planned. Therefore, it is desir-
able that the decision of whether to con-
tinue to attempt vaginal delivery or to 
resort to emergent cesarean section should 
be made deliberately and swiftly.
• In addition, when attempting vaginal 
delivery of the second twin, cesarean sec-
tion should always be a ready option for 
securing the well-being of the second 
twin.
• Uterine compression maneuver should be 
carefully applied during the birth of the 
first twin, taking into consideration that it 
may affect placental circulation for the 
second twin.
 (b) Administration of uterine contracting agent
• Prescription and administration of uterine 
contracting agents should firmly abide by 
the latest clinical guidelines generated by 
academic and professional societies.
 (c) Pathological testing of placenta
• It is recommended that pathological test-
ing of placenta should be performed as it 
is vital to explore the cause of neurologi-
cal symptoms of a baby that may be 
observed at and after birth.
 (d) Management and monitoring system for vag-
inal delivery of twins
• The physician explained to the patient 
soon after birth that they had tried vacuum 
delivery as it would have taken 30 min to 
conduct a cesarean section no matter how 
fast they worked on delivery during the 
procedure.
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• It is desirable that systems for an emer-
gent cesarean section are always ready as 
a cesarean section for the second twin is 
seen with some frequency.
• A notice from the Ministry of Health, 
Labour and Welfare regarding the 
improvement of regional capabilities to 
provide perinatal care states that it is 
desirable for a regional center for perina-
tal care to be staffed with obstetricians, 
anesthesiologists, and other relevant staff 
to be able to conduct emergent cesarean 
section within 30 min.
• If this is not possible within the context of 
the hospital, the hospital should consider 
whether to conduct delivery in an operat-
ing room or conduct the cesarean section 
in the delivery ward.
For academic and professional society:
 (a) It is desirable to produce in-depth guidance 
for the vaginal delivery of twins.
33.12  Recommendations
JOCS-CP has conducted preventive activities, 
particularly thematic analysis, which produce 
recommendations related to the aforementioned 
themes. It is vital for medical professionals to 
take into account the recommendations for pro-
viding high standards of healthcare in the perina-
tal system. Excerpts from the recommendations 
are listed below.
33.12.1  Vacuum Delivery
For obstetricians:
 (a) Vacuum delivery should be done in a timely 
manner with the appropriate procedures.
• It should be conducted by a trained physi-
cian or a physician under guidance of 
trained physician.
• The physician to conduct vacuum deliv-
ery should consider the clinical course, 
including the mother’s well-being, the 
baby’s station, and fetal head rotation, and 
strictly follow the rules of indication and 
relevant conditions for implementation.
 (b) Procedures of delivery should be reviewed 
where necessary during delivery.
• Clinical guideline on delivery states that 
alternative measure such as cesarean sec-
tion for delivery should be explored in 
expedited manner when delivery do not 
proceed with baby’s head at zero station. 
If that is the case, it should be noted that 
trained staffs are ready for neonatal 
resuscitation.
 (c) It should be recognized that delivery with 
uterine compression maneuver could bring 
harm to the well-being of the fetus.
• Uterine compression maneuver should be 
applied only a couple of times when 
needed to complete delivery.
 (d) A baby delivered through vacuum delivery 
should be carefully observed for a certain 
period after birth.
For academic and professional societies:
 (a) Education on vacuum delivery should be 
provided at the institutional level.
 (b) Clinical guidelines developed by academic 
and professional societies should be shared 
among member physicians.
 (c) The guideline should include with more 
detailed description items to be carefully 
noted about vacuum delivery and the obser-
vation of a baby delivered through vacuum 
delivery.
33.12.2  Administration of Uterine 
Contracting Agents
For obstetricians:
 (a) Indications, condition, and contraindications 
should be carefully considered. Patient con-
sent should be documented. In case of emer-
gent administration after verbal consent, it 
should be recorded in writing.
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• Fetal well-being should be reviewed 
before administration.
• The fetus should be carefully monitored 
with a fetal heart-monitoring device after 
the administration of uterine contracting 
agents because they may cause hypercon-
traction of the uterus. The administration 
should be reviewed upon observing bra-
dycardia of the fetus.
• Uterine contracting agents should be pre-
scribed and administered in accordance 
with the dosage and administration guide-
lines specified in the package insert.
 (b) Concomitant administration of multiple uter-
ine contracting agents.
• PGF2α and oxytocin should not be con-
comitantly administered with PGE2. A 
1-h interval should be kept between their 
administrations.
 (c) Labor induction procedure amid administra-
tion of uterine contracting agents.
• Cervical dilation should precede the 
administration of uterine contracting 
agents. Cervical dilating agents and uter-
ine contracting agents should not be con-
comitantly given to patient.
• A balloon dilator may be applied preced-
ing uterine contracting agents with a 1-h 
interval.
For academic and professional societies:
 (a) Clinical guidelines should detail the dosages 
of uterine contracting agents and uterine 
dilating agents and the appropriate intervals 
of administration.
 (b) If possible, a standard should be created for 
the monitoring of labor with administration 
of uterine contracting agents.
33.12.3  Fetal Heart Rate Monitoring
For medical facilities:
 (a) Fetal heart rate should be carefully moni-
tored, paying attention to the following items:
• During the latent phase of labor, no abnor-
mal pattern should be initially observed 
by continuous monitoring with monitor-
ing device for 20 min. The next period of 
continuous monitoring should be done 
within 6  h, with intermittent monitoring 
every 15–90 min during the same phase.
• In case of lack of monitoring devices in 
the facility (e.g., a midwife facility), the 
fetal heart rate should be monitored every 
15 min during the latent phase of delivery 
and every 5 min during the active phase. 
Monitoring should be done for at least 
60 s after uterine contraction to interpret 
any change in heart rate due to the 
contraction.
• Physicians and midwives may conduct 
continuous monitoring throughout the 
latent period.
 (b) The clinical guidelines should include the 
requirement for 20  min of continuous 
monitoring.
 (c) The clinical guidelines should include any 
other requirements for continuous monitor-
ing of fetal heart rate.
 (d) The transducers of the monitoring device 
should be correctly applied to the patient. 
The site of application and the belt to fix the 
transducers may be changed and fastened or 
loosened as needed for proper functioning.
 (e) Recording of fetal heart rate should be done 
with attention to the following items:
• The time of the recording should be 
standardized.
• The fetal heart rate should be recorded on 
paper at a speed of 3 cm/min for accurate 
visualization of the heart rate pattern.
• The fetal heart recording should be stored 
with the medical chart which must be 
stored for 5 years by regulation.
• Clinical findings related to the monitoring 
(e.g., fetal heart rate and status of labor) 
should be appropriately described on the 
medical chart.
For academic and professional societies:
 (a) The clinical guidelines should be revised to 
improve understanding of the general proce-
dures of monitoring in delivery and the spe-
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cific monitoring procedures (1) after 
appreciation of labor, (2) with administration 
of uterine contracting agents, (3) during 
TOLAC, (4) after full rupture of membrane, 
and (5) in high-risk pregnancy such as a pro-
longed active phase of delivery potentially 
causing fetal insufficiency. In addition, the 
revised guidelines should be distributed 
among medical professionals in perinatal 
care.
 (b) Midwives should have access to facility 
guidelines on procedures of intermittent fetal 
heart rate monitoring and should understand 
the necessity of the periodic application of a 
monitoring device as well as continuous 
monitoring.
 (c) That the fetal heart rate should be recorded 
on paper at a rate of 3  cm/min should be 
made widely known in academic and profes-
sional societies.
33.12.4  Care for Placental Abruption
For pregnant mothers:
 (a) Patients should consult childbirth facilities as 
soon as possible if they perceive symptoms 
relating to placental abruption, rather than 
endure them. These symptoms include vagi-
nal bleeding, abdominal pain, stiffness of the 
abdomen, and decrease or lack of fetal 
movement.
 (b) Pregnant women must pay special attention 
to relevant symptoms if they may carry risk 
factors related to placental abruption, includ-
ing pregnancy-induced hypertension syn-
drome, past history of placental abruption 
and trauma caused by traffic accident, and 
age of 35 years or older.
For obstetricians:
 (a) Management of pregnancy
• All patients should be informed of early 
onset symptoms of placental abruption 
(i.e., vaginal bleeding, abdominal pain, 
stiffness of the abdomen, decrease of fetal 
movement) by the time they reach the 
30th gestational week.
• Health education and attentive health 
check-ups should be provided to patients 
who bear risk factors (e.g., pregnancy- 
induced hypertension) with a physician’s 
full awareness of those factors.
 (b) Diagnosis of placental abruption
• Fetal heart rate monitoring device should 
be applied to the patient for a certain dura-
tion (20 min or longer) to check the well- 
being of the fetus on admission of all 
patients and during any consultation in 
which the patient manifests abnormal 
signs.
• The possibility of placental abruption 
should be considered when symptoms 
suggestive of imminent birth and any 
abnormality in the fetal heart rate pattern 
are observed. Subsequently, differential 
diagnosis should follow in accordance 
with the clinical guidelines using ultraso-
nography, blood tests (i.e., CBC), serum 
chemistry, blood coagulation, and fetal 
heart rate monitoring.
• Placental abruption should be clinically 
examined, noting not only typical mani-
festations (i.e., abdominal pain, stiffness 
of the abdomen, vaginal bleeding, 
decrease or lack of fetal movement) but 
also atypical ones such as lumber pain. 
Furthermore, symptoms suggestive of ini-
tiation of delivery, such as labor onset and 
the sensation of water breaking, could be 
observed.
• All medical professionals relevant to 
childbirth should receive education and 
training on CTG interpretation, whether 
in-house or externally.
 (c) Care to provide after the diagnosis with pla-
cental abruption is made
• The fetus should be delivered as soon as 
possible, both under careful maternal 
management of DIC and fetal manage-
ment of premature birth. When planning 
the delivery, the type of forced delivery, 
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presence of pediatrician, and necessary 
transfer of mother and/or baby should be 
taken into consideration among other 
factors.
• Neonatal resuscitation should be in line 
with the latest clinical guidelines. In addi-
tion, indication of hypothermia should be 
deliberated when baby is resuscitated.
• The medical chart may be produced after 
care and must record details such as com-
plaints of the pregnant mother, internal 
examination, ultrasonography, fetal heart 
rate monitoring, transfer of the mother, 
and the performance of a cesarean 
section.
 (d) System to provide emergent care
• Standardized emergency communication 
flow should be implemented for prompt 
treatment of the patient, covering the 
receipt of a call from a patient who com-
plains of symptoms suggestive of placen-
tal abruption (i.e., vaginal bleeding, 
abdominal pain stiffness of the abdomen, 
decrease of fetal movement) and its 
prompt correspondence to medical 
professionals.
• Institutional standards should be created 
for the prompt treatment of placental 
abruption as to prompt forced delivery 
without transfer, request of maternal and/
or neonatal transfer and presence of pedi-
atrician in reference to context of the 
institution such as staffing for emergent 
surgery, care to provide the patient includ-
ing blood transfusion, neonatal resuscita-
tion, other neonatal care including 
hypothermia, etc.
• Procedures should be established for 
emergent calls for medical staff and effec-
tive communication of the level of emer-
gency. In addition, emergency systems 
should be routinely improved through 
simulation training to provide emergent 
care.
• Childbirth facilities should be ready in 
advance to provide care for a patient who 
has been transferred with placental abrup-
tion or probable placental abruption. It is 
desirable for care plans to be deliberated 
upon the arrival of the patient, evaluating 
the well-being of the fetus and placental 
abruption.
For academic and professional societies:
 (a) Research on the cause and early diagnosis of 
placental abruption is encouraged to aggre-
gate individual cases.
 (b) Public outreach is encouraged to let it be 
widely known that
• Placental abruption is an emergent state of 
disease which threatens the life of the 
fetus.
• Placental abruption may have profound 
consequences for the mother.
• Patients should consult a childbirth facil-
ity as soon as possible when they suspect 
they may suffer the disease.
 (c) The development of guidelines for the educa-
tion of pregnant mothers should be encour-
aged. The guidelines should outline 
symptoms which suggest placental abruption 
and actions they must take.
For central and local governments:
 (a) Maternal/fetal transfer systems should be 
reinforced on a regional scale when they are 
at risk, as should regional centers for perina-
tal care. In particular, it is recommended to 
establish transfer systems beyond prefectural 
jurisdiction.
 (b) Projects should be financed to research 
causes and early diagnosis of placental 
abruption.
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34.1  Introduction
The novel coronavirus disease, COVID-19, was 
identified in China in December 2019. The 
responsible agent, SARS-COV2, was first iso-
lated in China on January 9, 2020.
Since then, thanks to a globalized world, the 
absolute susceptibility of the world population to 
a new virus and an unprecedented situation, the 
infection has spread worldwide, infecting until 
now (May 16th 2020) 462,660,327 people in 188 
countries and killing 311,363 individuals [1].
Skill sets such as patient safety management 
and quality of care are indispensable to battling 
the critical issues posed by the pandemic, as they 
proactively and retroactively reveal weaknesses in 
the healthcare system. Unfortunately, in many 
regions where these valuable skills are present, 
they have not been directly applied in task forces 
for the management of the outbreak. Harm caused 
by a lack of knowledge of a new pathogen is 
unpredictable and in no way preventable. 
However, harm caused by foreseeable and pre-
ventable errors can be mitigated or avoided thanks 
to a systemic approach to risk management.
In this chapter, a clinical risk management 
perspective will be used to analyze how the world 
has coped with the crisis so far, highlighting mea-
sures that could have or should have been taken. 
The WHO pandemic plan will form the frame-
work for the analysis. Since the pandemic is still 
ongoing, it should be noted that the analysis can-
not be exhaustive and the solutions presented are 
preliminary.
34.2  COVID-19 Summary
 1. What is COVID-19?
COVID-19 stands for COronaVIrus 
Disease 2019 and is a disease caused by a new 
betacoronavirus, the severe acute respiratory 
syndrome- associated coronavirus 2 
(SARS-CoV-2).
 2. What are the symptoms of COVID-19?
Fever, coughing, and shortness of breath 
are typical symptoms in patients with COVID-
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19. In the most severe cases, the infection may 
cause pneumonia and acute respiratory failure, 
the latter being potentially life- threatening. 
The symptoms are similar to those of the com-
mon flu or cold and for this reason a diagnostic 
evaluation is needed to rule out COVID-19 in 
patients with flu-like symptoms.
 3. How does COVID-19 spread out?
The SARS-CoV-2 is typically transmitted 
via liquid droplets exhaled during speech or 
aerosol particles produced with coughing, 
breathing, and sneezing. Also, transmission 
may occur through direct contact with contam-
inated surfaces, mainly of hands which then 
make contact with the face, in particular the 
eyes, nose, and mouth. SARS-CoV-2 can sur-
vive on various surfaces (i.e. plastic, stainless 
steel, copper, and cardboard) for 4–72  h. 
However, common multi-surface cleaners 
are able to remove the virus.
 4. Who is at higher risk of COVID-19?
As the virus is new, limited knowledge is 
available. However, initial data from cohorts 
of patients in China showed that elderly people 
with multiple comorbidities, such as hyperten-
sion, diabetes, and malignancies, are likely to 
be at higher risk for severe and potentially life-
threatening disease. Current data have shown 
that children are not infected very often, and, 
in the case of infection, the symptoms are mild 
and the outcome is overall good.
 5. How do we treat COVID-19?
To date, no approved treatments for 
COVID- 19 are available and the management 
is supportive. Prompt medical assistance is 
essential for early treatment of the disease. A 
mismatch between symptoms (e.g., shortness 
of breath) and clinical findings (severe 
hypoxia) has been commonly observed and 
leads patients to seek medical advice only 
when the disease is in an advanced stage.
34.3  Magnitude of COVID-19
The pandemic has affected 188 countries and the 
number of deaths and affected patients world-
wide is very significant. The situation still varies 
greatly from country to country as across the 
regions of Italy, probably due to the differing pre-
vention strategies implemented.
34.4  Fundamental Aspects 
of the WHO Pandemic Plan
In 2005, following the outbreaks of avian influ-
enza caused by the A/H5N1 virus, which was 
endemic in animals of the Far East and led to 
serious infections in humans, the WHO published 
the “WHO global influenza preparedness plan” 
[2] consisting of six phases, each of them includ-
ing targets and specific actions that may be per-
formed on a national or international level. The 
actions are divided in five different categories.
A global objective is identified for each phase. 
Governments are asked to adjust the plan to 
account for their own particular contexts and the 
state of the pandemic within their nation, and to 




 1. New influenza virus subtypes are detected 
only in animals and pose a low risk for 
humans.
 2. New influenza virus subtypes pose a sub-
stantial risk for human disease localized to 
specific geographical regions.
Pandemic alert period
 3. Human infection occurs with a new sub-
type, but human-to-human transmission is 
rare.
 4. Small, highly localized clusters of infec-
tion form with limited human-to-human 
transmission. The virus is not well adapted 
to humans.
 5. Large clusters of infection form with local-
ized human-to-human transmission. The 
virus is adapted to humans and there is a 
real pandemic risk.
Pandemic period
 6. Virus transmission in general population.
Postpandemic period
Return to Interpandemic period.
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34.4.2  Framework
 1. Planning and coordination.
 2. Situation monitoring and assessment.
 3. Prevention and containment (i.e. non- 
pharmaceutical public health interventions, 
vaccines, and antivirals).
 4. Health system response.
 5. Communication.
34.4.3  Overarching Goals
• Interpandemic period, Phase 1
 – Strengthen influenza pandemic prepared-
ness at the global, regional, national, and 
sub- national levels.
• Interpandemic period, Phase 2
 – Minimize the risk of transmission to 
humans. Detect and report such transmis-
sion promptly if it occurs.
• Pandemic alert period, Phase 3
 – Ensure rapid characterization of the new 
virus subtype and early detection, notifica-
tion, and response for additional cases.
• Pandemic alert period, Phase 4
 – Contain the new virus within limited foci 
or delay spread to gain time to implement 
preparedness measures, including vaccine 
development.
• Pandemic alert period, Phase 5
 – Maximize efforts to contain or delay spread 
to possibly avert a pandemic and to gain 
time to implement pandemic response 
measures.
• Pandemic period, Phase 6
 – Minimize the impact of the pandemic.
34.4.4  Key Actions
SURVEY Improve virological and 
epidemiological surveillance
PREVENT Implement infection prevention 
and control measures:
• Public health interventions
• Prophylaxis with antivirals
• Vaccines
CURE Coordinate patient care and 
assistance
KEEP Develop plans to maintain health 
and essential services
TRAIN Establish training programs
COMMUNICATE Prepare communication 
strategies
CHECK Continue monitoring
• Planned actions by risk phase
• Available resources
• Additional resources needed
• Effectiveness of interventions 
performed
Key actions require the implementation of spe-
cific intervention, for which actors and responsi-
bilities must be identified.





34.5.1  Planning and Coordination
In order to adequately deal with a devastating 
emergency, such as the Covid-19 pandemic, it is 
fundamental to plan for the occurrence of similar 
situations even in unsuspected times.
Indeed, the pandemic plan requires WHO to 
coordinate member countries by taking on the 
role of a superior reference body [2]. A suspected 
underestimation of the current crisis, also by such 
superior reference body, had an impact mainly on 
the western world, which naively believed that it 
would be spared from what turned out to be a 
worldwide danger.
In particular, the most affected countries did 
not procure the necessary resources in the years 
between health crises. While countries had to 
develop effective mechanisms to stock up on “a 
global stockpile (e.g., antivirals, personal protec-
tive equipment, vaccines, laboratory diagnos-
tics)” [2], in some countries, in particular Italy 
and Spain, the lack of personal protective equip-
ment (PPE) among healthcare personnel has led 
to the spread of the infection in hospitals and care 
institutions.
During both Phase 1 and Phase 2, when the 
danger became more evident, effective strategies 
to protect health workers were not planned. In 
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Phases 3 and 4, strong emphasis should have 
been placed on ensuring proper coordination 
between the various actors involved in order to 
effectively engage the pandemic threat. The 
waves of the contagion could have been kept at 
bay by efficient identification and check of out-
breaks, and the sharing of appropriate instruc-
tions, additional resources, and simple and 
immediate guidelines. Instead, the exchange of 
information between neighboring countries and 
the international coordination of emergency 
responses have happened too late. During Phase 
5, which rapidly precipitated into Phase 6, 
attempts were made to remedy the mistakes 
made, learning from the most affected countries. 
It is precisely the lessons learnt which will allow 
us to prevent such a worldwide tragedy from hap-
pening again in the future.
34.5.2  Situation Monitoring 
and Assessment
Monitoring must be continuous and adopt a 
transversal approach, integrating and analyzing 
information systems data, in order to make an 
effective assessment.
The lack of information on the epidemiologi-
cal and virological monitoring from China in 
the early stages of the disease and the subse-
quent delay in taking appropriate actions to 
assess the risk of a pandemic will certainly be 
analyzed worldwide at the end of the emer-
gency. The various levels of responsibility, with 
subsequently difficult international solutions, 
will be also identified. The Western countries 
did not prepare themselves adequately because 
they did not have on hand, especially in the 
early stages, reliable and accurate information 
on the new viral strain and on the epidemiologi-
cal trend of the disease. Yet the national and 
international objectives and actions of the afore-
mentioned framework stated precisely what to 
do and how to do it. Unfortunately, the wasted 
time has resulted in tens of thousands of deaths. 
Thankfully, after a period of recovery, scientific 
communities across the globe have been quick 
to share data on new viral strains, develop a 
diagnosis, experiment with new therapeutic pro-
tocols, and work towards the production of a 
vaccine.
34.5.3  Prevention and Containment
Prevention and containment measures include 
actions aimed to avoid or slow down the spread-
ing of infection, such as non-pharmaceutical 
Public Health Measures (PHM), vaccines, and 
antivirals [2].
PHMs include individual protective measures 





• Surface and object disinfection.
• Travel restrictions such as border closure, 
tourism restrictions, entry and exit screening 
at airports and ports.
• Social distancing to reduce crowding and 
potential restrictions on nonessential activi-
ties; for example, in many workplaces and 
schools, “key-workers” may continue to work 
with extra precautions, while other employees 
should work from home wherever possible.
• Contact tracing, self-isolation of exposed indi-
viduals, and quarantine of those infected. The 
length of time suggested for quarantine and 
self-isolation will depend on the estimated 
period of infectivity of the pathogen.
These measures aim to delay and reduce the 
size of the “peak” of an infection trend and to 
slow transmission, so that the impact of the pan-
demic is mitigated and hospitals are not 
 overwhelmed. Cultural, socioeconomic, regula-
tory, and political factors can affect or limit the 
application of PHMs with serious, preventable 
consequences for the entire population.
First of all, updated national guidance on 
PHMs should be available in the interpandemic 
period (Phases 1 and 2). Included interventions 
must be planned and shared with decision- makers 
from sectors other than healthcare (e.g., transpor-
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tation) to avoid subsequent conflict that can delay 
implementation. Necessary resources and legal 
authority should be addressed in advance. 
Proposed interventions should be tested in simu-
lations and improved. During the pandemic period 
(Phases 3–6), contingency measures should be 
assessed and improved in affected countries and 
prepared in those not yet affected [2].
During the Covid-19 pandemic, given the lack 
of effective vaccines or treatments [4] the only 
tool currently available to reduce SARS-CoV-2 
transmission has been to identify and isolate con-
tagious individuals.
Each country has implemented different strate-
gies of prevention and control with varying 
results. For example, poorer nations have tended 
to introduce stricter measures than richer coun-
tries, relative to the severity of their outbreaks; 
their abundance of caution maybe be due to the 
fact that their healthcare systems are generally 
less developed. Europe, Sweden, the United 
Kingdom, and the Netherlands were relatively 
slow to take action. In the early stages of their epi-
demics, all three implemented “herd immunity” 
strategies, which involved few measures or relied 
on voluntary compliance. Later, however, the 
United Kingdom and the Netherlands switched to 
more aggressive responses, including country-
wide lockdown. Meanwhile, Germany and Austria 
adopted aggressive control strategies early on, as 
compared to Italy, France, and Spain, which 
implemented similar measures, including lock-
down, but later in their epidemics. So far, Germany 
and Austria have seen fewer deaths per capita 
attributed to COVID-19 than the other countries 
mentioned. A transmission model built on contact 
survey data for Wuhan and Shangai before and 
during the outbreak and on contact tracing infor-
mation from Hunan Province has allowed the 
impact of social distancing and school closure on 
transmission to be studied and has shown that 
social distancing alone, as implemented in China, 
is sufficient to control COVID- 19. Meanwhile, 
proactive school closures can reduce peak inci-
dence by 40–60% and delay the epidemic.
It is also becoming increasingly clear that test-
ing is a relevant contributing factor in controlling 
the epidemic. At present, countries such as South 
Korea and Singapore, and Italian regions like 
Veneto that have implemented aggressive contact 
tracing, broader case definitions, and/or intensive 
testing (i.e., case findings), in conjunction with iso-
lation, have achieved better results [5]. Emerging 
evidence shows an inverse correlation between the 
number of tests per million inhabitants and rates of 
active infections, new cases, and deaths [6].
34.5.4  Healthcare System Response
This category includes interventions aimed to 
plan (interpandemic phase 1 and 2) and to deliver 
(pandemic phases 3–5) a timely, appropriate, 
safe, and coordinated response of healthcare 
facilities to pandemic. So, in the interpandemic 
phases 1 and 2, any healthcare organization 
should
• Provide itself with contingency plans with 
clear indications of authorities, responsibili-
ties, and pathways.
• Set priorities and produce guidance about tri-
age systems, surge capacity, specimen han-
dling, diagnostic test deployment, human and 
material resource management.
• Share protocols or algorithm for case-finding, 
treatment and management, infection control 
guidelines.
• Increase awareness and skills of healthcare 
workers on pandemics.
• Assess pharmaceuticals and PPE inventory to 
secure supply [2].
Phases 3 and 4 include:
• The activation of emergency coordinating 
committees (at national, regional, and local 
levels).
• The start of a pre-established coordination 
between the healthcare sector and its partners 
for avoiding nosocomial transmission and 
laboratory infections, and ensuring biosafety.
• The review of contingency plans (especially 
surge capacity).
• The test of decision-making process and com-
mand chain [2].
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Phases 5 and 6 focus is on the full implementa-
tion of contingency plans. The objective is to 
ensure that healthcare systems are able to scale up 
their response and implement changes in triage or 
treatment priorities for the efficient use of health-
care facilities. At the end of the pandemic or 
between waves, it must be ensured that healthcare 
staff have due rest, inventory is taken of supplies, 
plans are revised in anticipation of subsequent 
waves, and essential services are reinforced [2].
Apart from the inevitable issues arising from 
facing an unknown pathogen and the continuous 
acquisitions of knowledge determining continu-
ous adjustments of strategies and protocols, the 
most common dysfunctions observed in terms of 
healthcare system responses during Covid-19 are 
listed below:
 1. Poorly coordinated application of the 
national pandemic plan and frequent 
derailing of systemic measures taken within 
a hierarchical decision-making process. 
During the initial phase, patients tended to be 
treated in hospitals, disregarding primary care 
services. Later, in Italy, the best performing 
regions in mitigating the propagation of the 
pandemic were those with an early involve-
ment and more robust organization of primary 
care services, such as Toscana and Veneto.
 2. Conflicting indications about essential 
issues. The WHO’s recommendation to “wear 
a mask if you are coughing or sneezing” [7] 
did not consider asymptomatic patients. 
Furthermore, if masks protect people besides 
the wearer, the prescription of wearing a mask 
should have been extended to everyone to 
ensure a more healthy environment. National 
authorities have followed the international 
policies to alleviate their responsibility and/or 
liability, but forgetting that global measures 
usually express minimum standards.
 3. Global shortage of Personal Protective 
Equipment (PPE). If not adequately pro-
tected, healthcare workers representing the 
first line of defense against the virus can 
infect colleagues and patients and be quaran-
tined, leading to the depletion of the health-
care workforce. The WHO has estimated that 
nearly 89 million masks per month are 
required to face the Covid-19 pandemic, 
along with 76 million examination gloves and 
1.6 million medical goggles. The supply of 
PPE, antivirals, and vaccines is an essential 
component of the healthcare system response 
to the pandemic. The determinants of the 
shortage seen include the off-shoring of PPE 
production to low-cost manufacturers, the 
abrupt disruption of production in the 
People’s Republic of China, the first country 
hit by Covid-19, trade restrictions, and export 
bans [8].
 4. Global shortage of diagnostic test reagents. 
This shortage is caused by the same reasons 
as the PPE shortage and it represents a serious 
problem in infection controls, considering the 
increasing value of intensive testing strate-
gies. In any case, reagent production is not the 
only bottleneck: the lack of qualified techni-
cians and labs running the tests has caused a 
cascade of dysfunctions, including laboratory 
congestion and staff overload, elevated need 
for specimen transportation, and manual order 
entry and reporting for outsourced tests lead-
ing to losses of information, identification 
errors, and delays in analyzing and communi-
cating results. In addition, the diagnostic per-
formance has been hampered by 
over-restrictive testing criteria and lack of 
swab technique standardization (increased 
number of false negative).
 5. Failure to learn from previous and current 
experiences. There are several causes for this 
failure:
 (a) Confirmation bias, the tendency to focus 
on information that confirms our pre-
ferred position or initial hypothesis. 
Threats such as pandemics that evolve in 
a nonlinear fashion (i.e., via exponential 
growth) are especially tricky to confront 
because of the challenge to rapidly inter-
pret events occurring in real time. It is 
most effective to take strong action 
extremely early, when the threat appears 
to be small or potentially even before 
there are any confirmed cases. However, 
if the intervention actually works, those 
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same actions will likely be considered an 
overreaction in retrospect.
 (b) Over-reliance on “gut feeling” or the 
opinions of one’s inner circle. In a time of 
uncertainty, it is essential to resist this 
temptation and instead take the time to 
collect partial knowledge dispersed across 
different fields of expertise.
 (c) Dependence on incomplete solutions 
instead of a systematic approach. An 
effective response to the virus needs to be 
orchestrated as a coherent system of 
actions taken simultaneously. The results 
of the approaches taken in China and 
South Korea underscore this point.
 (d) Individualization and politicization of 
emergency management.
 (e) Inadequate collection and dissemination 
of data.
 (f) Sunk cost bias and premature closure, two 
cognitive biases that obstruct the revision 
of previously made decisions.
 6. Structural limitations of emergency 
departments and/or wards have negatively 
affected safety, hindering the isolation of sus-
pect cases.
 7. Reduced staffing of public health units, 
which have been responsible for the adminis-
tration of vaccines for decades, has prevented 
aggressive contact tracing.
 8. The lack of primary care resources has ini-
tially compromised the home management of 
patients, before the forced reorganization.
 9. Delayed or insufficient treatment of non- 
Covid- 19 patients. For example, during the 
week of the 12th of March when the maxi-
mum daily infection rate was reached in Italy, 
the number of admissions to hospitals for 
heart attacks was half that of the same week in 
2019, while the mortality more than tripled. 
The two figures are not contradictory, but sug-
gest that many people suffering from a heart 
attack did not go to the hospital and those who 
did arrived late in more critical condition. The 
time between the onset of symptoms and the 
angioplasty increased by over 39.2%, so that, 
in absolute terms, the number of deaths from 
heart failure almost doubled in hospitals 
within the period considered, despite the fact 
that far fewer patients were treated [9].
34.5.5  Communication
Clear, consistent, and timely communication is 
crucial for managing disaster and emergency 
response efforts. Without proper communica-
tion, misinformation and misinterpretation can 
flourish and result in injury or fatalities. A com-
munications manager should be identified and 
involved in the task force to support communica-
tions strategies at all levels, international, 
national, regional, and local. Proper communica-
tion management during a health pandemic must 
also include both operational messages addressed 
to health workers and public safety announce-
ments. In any case, there are general criteria for 
effective communication regardless of the target 
audience.
34.5.5.1  Make the Message Clear
Information must be presented with simplicity 
and clarity so that everyone understands the con-
text and the instructions to follow. The aim is to 
outline the situation, highlighting the necessary 
background information, as well as the actions 
that need to be taken or will be taken soon.
34.5.5.2  Keep the Message 
Consistent
As important as clarity, the consistency of a mes-
sage helps ensure that everyone is on the same 
page. There may be more than one authority shar-
ing information so all messages must be in agree-
ment. When information is presented, it needs to 
be with one voice; this is particularly important for 
avoiding misinformation and miscommunication.
It can also help to repeat the same message so 
there is less room for confusion. People become 
disoriented during emergencies and may need to 
hear the same message multiple times before it 
sinks in.
34.5.5.3  Timeliness
Being open and sharing information as soon as 
possible are important communication techniques 
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during a pandemic to promote trust and reliability. 
The risk of miscommunication and incorrect 
assumptions increases when time goes by without 
any novel information or updates. Even when 
there is nothing new to report, reassure others 
with a repeating message as well as a rough time-
line for when new information will be available.
Messages should be timely, consistent, and 
clear across all communication platforms. While 
these platforms often include TV and radio, there 
is another resource that is being used more and 
more for immediate information: social media.
34.5.5.4  Monitor Social Media
Social media has become a major information 
source for many people. According to the Global 
Digital Report released in 2019, the number of social 
media users worldwide had risen to nearly 3.5 bil-
lion in early 2019, with 288 million new users in the 
previous 12 months, bringing global usage to 45%.
Due to its widespread use and ability to update 
instantaneously, social media platforms need to 
be utilized and monitored. In an effort to keep the 
messages clear and consistent, communication 
managers must address any misinformation and 
provide the correct information before it gets out 
of control.
34.5.5.5  Select the Most Appropriate 
Method of Communication
The right methods of communication can reach 
all people affected by a crisis, and can be reliable 
even with limited accessibility. Integrated strate-
gies with municipalities and voluntary associa-
tions must also be development so that messages 
are distributed as widely as possible.
Furthermore, it is necessary to clarify the roles 
and responsibilities of relevant parties when shar-
ing purely operational messages related to diag-
nosis, treatment, etc. Situation awareness—that 
is, taking the right steps at the right times—
should be integral to collaborative efforts.
During the current pandemic, on the other hand, 
we have witnessed a phenomenon of “overcommu-
nication” in which the following critical issues 
were encountered: ambiguous messages, such as 
incomplete or distorted information regarding the 
use of PPE for both healthcare professionals and 
citizens; inconsistent messages, as a result of too 
many experts expressing their own point of view; 
and unclear messages, such as recommendations 
that are called into question, retracted, and possibly 
reaffirmed in quick succession.
34.6  Improvement Actions Based 
on Lessons Learned
In the context of clinical risk management (CRM), 
the analysis of an incident report ends with recom-
mendations in order to share the lessons learned 
with others and thereby avoid re- occurrence of the 
incident. Here, we present a series of suggestions 
that have been developed with reference to docu-
ments and papers published by Italian national 
institutions (such as Istituto Superiore di Sanità, 
I.S.S.) and international scientific societies and 
journals, based on reports and questions forwarded 
to the clinical risk managers of the Italian Network 
for Health Safety (INSH) from physicians work-
ing on the front line during the Covid-19 epidemic 
outbreak [10]. Recommendations are available in 
5 languages at: https://isqua.org/blog/covid-19/
covid19-resources/patient-safety-recommenda-
tions-for-covid19-epidemic-outbreak.html.
To ensure effective collaboration and commu-
nication, it is essential to promptly activate an 
emergency task force with a clear chain of com-
mand, roles, and responsibilities, equipped with 
reliable information-sharing tools. The task force 
should adopt a proactive approach, providing the 
front line with clear and continuously updated 
information, maintaining a streamlined reporting 
and learning system, and collecting and dissemi-
nating good practices. CRM units can play a 
 relevant role in this setting. In addition, key human 
factors messages to help under pressure [11] 
should be implemented: (1) short but inclusive 
briefing and de-briefing, (2) open and inclusive 
leadership, (3) clarity of roles, (4) clear language 
protocols, (5) to ask questions—open questions—
before acting, (6) to focus on what not on who, (7) 
to help staff unfamiliar with the work, (8) to use 
checklists, (9) to encourage staff to speak up and 
collect staff concern, (10) to take a pause before 
thinking what to do, (11) to recognize performance 
limiting factors each other, as anyone is not good 
at recognizing them him/herself.
M. Tanzini et al.
493
Healthcare organizations should provide early 
and appropriate instructions for environment disin-
fection (e.g. regarding detergents, duration, and 
frequency) to prevent in-hospital infection spread, 
arrange germicide galenic preparations to avoid 
insufficient supply, and designate a hospital or 
building for infected patients rather than separate 
clean/dirty pathways in the same block. Hospital 
contamination can be further reduced by screening 
patients admitted for any reason (e.g. surgery, coro-
nary angioplasty, labor and delivery), by restricting 
access and establishing mandatory precautionary 
measures for visitors (i.e. surgical masks and 1 m 
of separation between waiting room seats), and by 
limiting or suspending nonurgent hospital admis-
sions, routine outpatient appointments, and post-
ponable surgical procedures.
Early educational training and refresher 
courses are useful to enhance staff awareness and 
skills regarding infection transmission and man-
agement, medical and protective devices, and 
pandemic-related patient safety practices such as 
hand hygiene, the SEPSIS bundle, and the bundle 
for the prevention of ventilator-associated pneu-
monia or central venous catheter infections. A 
preliminary evaluation of surge capacity is highly 
recommended to aid in the creation of a 
competence- based strategy for staff re-allocation 
during the emergency. Expert doctors and nurses 
should be supported early-on by young colleagues 
or colleagues from other specialties, who should 
receive proper training in preparation of the event 
that they may be called upon to take over.
Shortages of PPE must be prevented by taking 
continual stock of supplies and establishing poli-
cies for limited reuse or extended use, for secure, 
centralized storage and distribution, and for dis-
tribution priorities. Every effort should be made 
to ensure that medical devices (i.e., haemogas-
analyzers, pulsi-oximeter, mechanical ventila-
tors, suction pumps, and oxygen therapy) are 
available in care areas and are well-functioning.
34.6.1  General Guidelines
The development of reliable clinical pathways to 
reduce preventable harm requires the identifica-
tion of high-risk steps in the diagnosis and treat-
ment of infection, in care transitions (i.e., hospital 
discharge), and in special settings or categories of 
patients (e.g., surgery, obstetrics, pediatric care, 
oncologic or immunosuppressed patients). The 
following points should be addressed for safe 
diagnosis and treatment:
• With regard to diagnostic tests
 – Availability of diagnostic tests.
 – Reliability and timeliness of the diagnostic 
process.
 – Clear and updated criteria.
 – Standardization and quality validation.
 – Knowledge of uncommon presentations.
• With regard to treatment
 – Possible complications and prognostic 
factors.
 – Criteria for severity stratification for safe 
discharge or in-hospital allocation.
 – Parameters to monitor and to be alarmed 
for.
 – Criteria for setting upgrade.
 – Recall on drug-drug or drug-disease 
interactions.
 – Eventual not recommended drugs or other 
treatment precautions (i.e. in COVID-19 
patients nebulizers are not recommended 
for the potential spread of virus; non- 
invasive ventilation is suggested only in 
selected patients for no more than 1–2 h in 
case of unresponsiveness).
During discharge, information transferred 
must be clear and structured: it is important to 
address follow-ups and social or work-related 
restrictions, such as whether the patient is cured 
or only clinically cured, whether the patient 
needs home isolation, and any precautions to be 
observed in case of home isolation.
34.6.2  Guidelines for Obstetrics 
and Pediatrics
In obstetrics, pandemic-related risk management 
is focused on the prevention of maternal and 
newborn contagion. To minimize the exposure of 
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the mother, prenatal care may be limited, cases 
screened, and quarantine protocols implemented. 
To protect the newborn, water birth may be 
avoided, extra precautions may be taken during 
breastfeeding (e.g. use of a breast pump), and the 
mother and newborn may be separated. It should 
be noted that Covid-19 is not a criterion for pre-
term delivery or cesarean section.
To prevent unnecessary risks for children, 
changes in clinical presentation, laboratorial or 
instrumental examinations, and management 
must be highlighted for parents.
34.6.3  Guidelines for Caring 
for Immunocompromised 
Patients
For oncologic and other immunocompromised 
patients, good practices ensure the safety of 
required procedures and adequate infection pre-
vention. To this end, the postponement of anti- 
neoplastic treatment should be evaluated on a 
case-by-case basis; in any case, immunosuppres-
sant drugs must not be suspended, but dose 
increases should be postponed and a route of 
administration suitable for home treatment should 
be considered. Steroids can be continued with 
cautions. To minimize the risk of infection, indi-
vidual protective measures must be thoroughly 
applied, and limitations should be put in place for 
visitation in therapy rooms or hospital wards.
34.6.4  Guidelines for Special 
Contexts
In special contexts such as surgery or autopsy, 
particular attention must be payed to the environ-
ment and operator safety to avoid infection 
spreading. Preventive measures may include the 
use of negative pressure environments, appropri-
ate PPE, mindfulness of aerosol-generating pro-
cedures, granting access to the operating theater 
only to essential staff, and reliably reporting 
cases of infection.
34.6.5  Guidelines for General 
Practitioners
It is helpful to create special continuity units that 
visit people at home to prevent infection spread-
ing and patient harm. In addition, general practi-
tioners are strongly recommended to
• Educate patients about infection transmission 
and prevention.
• Inform patients about designated pathways for 
suspected/affected subjects.
• Reduce office contamination by avoiding 
overcrowding, preventing suspected patients 
access, appropriate cleaning, and utilizing 
PPE.
• Use tools for the early identification of cases 
and for the classification of the severity.
• Use checklists to avoid missing information 
and to ensure regulatory compliance.
• Strictly follow-up on home-managed cases.
34.6.6  Guidelines for Long-Term Care 
Facilities
In long-term care facilities and nursing homes, as 
well as in residential psychiatric facilities, risks 
can be reduced by
• Appropriate cleaning.
• The limitation of external visits and contact 
with the hospital.
• Restrictions on physical contact and careful, 
clinical monitoring of residents.
• Daily screening and measurement of body 
temperature for healthcare workers.
• Prompt isolation of suspected cases among 
residents or healthcare workers.
• Possible accommodation within the facility 
for healthcare workers.
• Provision of appropriate PPE.
• The creation of a filter area for new or return-
ing residents.
• The creation of an isolation area for affected 
not requiring hospitalization.
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34.6.7  Guidelines for Hemodialysis 
Patients
Recommended interventions include:
• Separate paths for affected/suspected cases.
• Screening and measurement of body tempera-
ture upon any access for patients and health-
care workers.
• Prompt referral to assessment and eventual 
isolation of suspected cases among patients 
and healthcare workers.
• Preference for home dialysis if feasible.
• Wide staggering of appointments and prohibi-
tion of carer access to waiting room.
• Use of private means of transportation or 
organization of individual medical 
transportation.
• Periodic screening with serologic tests or 
swabs of patients and healthcare workers 
according to local epidemiological trends.
Last, but not least, every effort must be made 
to ensure safe and appropriate care for nonin-
fected patients. The rapid conversion of many 
hospitals to Covid-19 treatment centers should 
not hamper emergency care. Explicit priority cri-
teria and dedicated, clean paths should be identi-
fied, taking into account pandemic status, hospital 
resources, and the need to avoid harmful delays 
in patient treatment, especially for oncologic 
patients.
34.7  Conclusions
Pandemic is a complex problem and the range of 
action must take into account the geographical 
area involved, international and national regula-
tions, production autonomies and commercial 
exchanges, lifestyle, culture and ethical values of 
the affected population, available technology, 
characteristics of care facilities, organization of 
the doctor-patient unit, and safety of staff, 
patients, and uninfected citizens.
Only a careful “a posteriori” analysis will 
allow to understand if the suspected delayed 
alarm by China and lack of awareness of the 
epidemic spread in other countries was due to 
lightness, incompetence, negligence, or guilti-
ness. The global involvement and the self-
defense carried on by the countries involved 
will not help to fully clarify the responsibilities. 
However, we must learn from this tragedy that 
no event, albeit improbable, should be consid-
ered impossible.
China may have thought it have done every-
thing possible to contain the contagion in a 
defined area, but forgot that probably the virus 
had already arrived in the rest of the world. The 
difference for other countries was the ability of 
national organizations to react in terms of resil-
ience (Box 34.1) [12].
Box 34.1 The Four Essential Abilities of 
Resilience
• The ability to respond. Knowing what 
to do, or being able to respond to regular 
and irregular changes, disturbances, and 
opportunities by activating prepared 
actions or by adjusting current mode of 
functioning.
• The ability to monitor. Knowing what 
to look for, or being able to monitor that 
which is or could seriously affect the 
system’s performance in the near term—
positively or negatively. The monitoring 
must cover the system’s own perfor-
mance as well as what happens in the 
environment.
• The ability to learn. Knowing what has 
happened, or being able to learn from 
experience, in particular to learn the 
right lessons from the right experience.
• The ability to anticipate. Knowing 
what to expect, or being able to antici-
pate developments further into the 
future, such as potential disruptions, 
novel demands or constraints, new 
opportunities, or changing operating 
conditions.
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All four abilities are necessary.
To respond to a critical event effectively, the 
organization learn what and how to do it, identi-
fying who does it and with what resources.
Monitoring requires learning from experi-
ences; thus, it will allow you to effectively antici-
pate dangerous situations [13].
Asia, Europe, Africa, the USA, Canada, South 
America, Australia, the entire planet has suffered 
an epochal arrest, paying a very high price in 
terms of life, economic recession, and political 
credibility. Yet everything was predictable, it was 
enough to think that it could happen.
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